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This dissertation evaluates the earliest phase of American engagement in the 
Pacific Ocean through a close examination of the fur-trading ship Columbia during the 
years 1787-93. I argue that Columbia established the dominant pattern of American 
commerce in the Pacific and, in doing so, played a significant role in the integration of 
disparate shores into a single Pacific World. This study also reconstructs her pioneering, 
yet understudied voyages in order to challenge a historiographical neglect of the 
eighteenth-century foundations of American empire in the Pacific. My research unfolds 
on three scales. First, Columbia reveals a series of interconnected local histories that 
hinge upon individuals in Boston, on the Northwest Coast of America, and in Canton. 
Second, her expeditions show how American merchants and sea captains leveraged 
transnational variations in trade to reorient the United States toward the commerce of the 
Pacific Ocean. Third, Columbia demonstrates how entrepreneurs of the Early Republic 
established a global trade circuit integrating the markets of the United States, the Pacific 
World, and China. This study also stresses the experimental nature of the Columbia 
expeditions. By reconstructing the financial outcomes of her voyages, I emphasize 
improvisation and adaptation as vital strategies in the development of a successful 
enterprise in the ocean hemisphere. Columbia’s success inspired a new generation of 
investors, imitators, and innovators to pursue similar profits in the Pacific World. 
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CHAPTER I  
 
THE COLUMBIA VOYAGES 
 
 
In September of 1787, Joseph Barrell, a Bostonian merchant who rose to 
prominence during the American Revolution, penned a short but radical series of 
instructions to Captain John Kendrick. “Sir,” wrote Barrell, “the ship Columbia and the 
sloop Washington being completely equipped for a voyage to the Pacific ocean and 
China, we place such confidence in you as to give you the entire command of this 
enterprise.”1 Barrell’s expression of “confidence” represented more than a pleasant turn 
of phrase. The Pacific was unimaginably far from Boston, and nothing like the Columbia 
voyage had ever been attempted from the thirteen colonies, now the United States. He 
needed experienced sailors to ensure the success of an expedition that would carry 
American commerce to the farthest quarters of the earth. 
Barrell’s instructions outlined the challenges ahead for Kendrick and his 
subordinate captain, Robert Gray, both veterans of the Revolutionary War. The Columbia 
expedition aimed to trade for otter pelts on the Northwest Coast of America, traverse the 
                                                          
1 Joseph Barrell, “Orders Given Captain John Kendrick of the Ship Columbia for a Voyage to the 
Pacific Ocean, 1787,” in Voyages of the Columbia to the Northwest Coast, 1787-1790 & 1790-
1793, ed. Frederic W. Howay, (Portland: Oregon Historical Society Press in cooperation with the 
Massachusetts Historical Society, 1990), 112. 
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Pacific, and exchange the luxurious furs for Chinese goods at the port of Canton 
(Guangzhou). In completing this task, Columbia and Washington would become the first 
United States vessels in the Pacific Ocean. Upon returning to Boston, they would 
complete the first American circumnavigation of the globe. If successful, Columbia 
would demonstrate the feasibility of United States commerce in the Pacific. The plan was 
ambitious, audacious, and hazardous. Barrell recognized that much could go wrong. The 
voyage would require two years, three years, or longer, and would operate in the most 
remote quarters of an unfamiliar ocean. Barrell warned Kendrick to expect the 
unexpected, stressing that “you will be on the spot, and as circumstances turn up you 
must improve them.”2 Improvisation was crucial. There would be little communication 
with faraway Boston, and no assistance if tragedy were to strike. In terms of logistics, 
expertise, and risk, the Columbia expedition was the eighteenth-century equivalent of 
placing human beings on the moon, and then bringing them home again, safely. 
  Columbia accomplished impressive navigational and commercial feats during her 
two voyages to the Pacific. During her first expedition, from 1787-90, Columbia proved 
that American entrepreneurs possessed the resources and experience to launch successful 
missions into the Pacific. In 1788, Captain Kendrick and his crew became, in Joseph 
Barrell’s words, the first “Free and Independent Americans” to explore the Pacific.3 
Thereafter, the adventurers also established the first American presence on the Northwest 
                                                          
2 Joseph Barrell, “Orders Given Captain John Kendrick,” 112. 
3 Ibid. 
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Coast. In 1789, following a year of fur trading among the indigenous peoples of the coast, 
the expedition weighed anchor for a transit of the Pacific. The Columbians, as I deem the 
adventurers, became the first Americans to call in the Sandwich Islands, now Hawaii, 
before approaching China. Columbia’s first transaction at Canton, in 1790, was a 
financial failure. Nonetheless, the Columbians gained the commercial experience 
necessary to ensure that future fur-trading voyages would be profitable. Thereafter, 
Columbia achieved the first American circumnavigation of the globe during her return to 
the United States. National leaders, newspapers, and potential imitators followed the 
progress of her voyage and celebrated her safe return.  
Meanwhile, Barrell planned a “saving voyage” to recover his investments and, in 
the process, prove the economic potential of the maritime fur trade.4 From 1790-93, 
Columbia’s second expedition, now under the command of Robert Gray, turned a 
significant profit and made territorial claims for the United States. In 1792, during a 
lucrative season of fur trading, the Columbians discovered, charted, and did business 
along the legendary “Great River of the West.” Captain Gray named this waterway in 
honor of his ship, and in reference to his country—the Columbia River. The expedition, 
therefore, provided the United States with its first territorial claim upon the Pacific coast 
of North America. Later, at Canton, the Columbians acquired a valuable cargo of teas, 
sugar, porcelain, and nankeens worth $90,000. In 1793, Columbia completed a second 
                                                          
4 “Joseph Barrell to John Webb, Feby 3d 1794” Joseph Barrell Letterbook, Massachusetts 
Historical Society. 
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circumnavigation and returned to Boston, where her cargo auctioned for an estimated 
$243,500. Overall, the expeditions lasted almost six years and logged more than 100,000 
miles at sea—roughly half the distance to the moon.5 In short, Columbia represented a 
project of great significance to the new republic. 
In this dissertation, I argue that Columbia established the dominant pattern of 
American commerce in the Pacific and, in doing so, played a significant role in the 
integration of disparate shores into a single Pacific World. My argument unfolds on three 
scales—the interconnected theaters of local, transnational, and global action. In one 
sense, her voyages reveal a series of local histories—an examination of specific 
conditions and decisions on the part of investors, captains, and intermediaries in disparate 
ports. Individuals enabled the expedition to “plug in” to existing trade relationships, and 
achieve commercial success, in each location. Local experience shaped the enterprise 
from the beginning. During the American Revolution, Bostonian merchants and sea 
workers mastered the financial, logistical, and practical skills needed to wage a war for 
independence at sea. In peacetime, Barrell and the Columbians applied that expertise to 
the logistical challenges of an expedition to the Pacific. Meanwhile, Columbia and her 
                                                          
5 The Columbians kept a log of anchorages and distances during the first expedition, but not the 
second. In contrast, John Boit recorded navigational positions on a regular basis during the 
second Columbia voyage. The sources demonstrate that, aside from greater mileage on the 
Northwest Coast in 1791-92, each of the expeditions traversed a similar distance. For this reason, 
I estimate the overall distance by doubling the numbers that appeared in the Columbian Centinel 
in 1790. “Boston, Wednesday, Aug. 11, The Columbia.” Columbian Centinel (Boston, 
Massachusetts), 11 August 1790. 
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cargo also exemplified the material particulars of Boston. She was constructed at 
Scituate, near Plymouth, and embarked with iron, copper, and woolen goods—all 
commodities purchased at minimal cost in Massachusetts. Local considerations also 
shaped her activities on the Northwest Coast. The Columbians forged relationships with 
indigenous rulers, who learned to thrive as middlemen between Indian trappers and 
American traders. Indeed, Wickaninnish, leader of the Clayoquot People, established 
hegemony over his neighbors through an exchange of otter skins for metals, 
manufactured goods, and firearms. Trade brought wealth, and wealth sustained his 
power. The Columbians also adapted to local trends, such as a growing demand for 
copper, or competition between trappers. Finally, local conditions shaped Columbia’s 
activities in China. The expedition negotiated with American, British, Cantonese, and 
Manchu persons in the cosmopolitan port of Canton. Through the assistance of Thomas 
Randall, for example, the adventurers learned to navigate the rigid commercial world of 
the Canton System. Tradition also permitted merchants and mandarins to contend for 
access to prestigious items, such as sea otter skins. Columbia’s exchange of furs for teas 
brought American commerce to bear upon an old market, but she accomplished this in 
new ways. 
Columbia’s expeditions also reveal transnational variations in trade, and the 
challenges of overcoming those variations, during the late eighteenth century. She sailed 
during a fraught period of transition from a colonial to a national economy. Prior to the 
Revolutionary War, shipbuilders, sawyers, farmers, ironmongers, distillers, and 
merchants throughout the thirteen colonies profited as suppliers to island plantations in 
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the British Caribbean. Following the revolution, however, Americans faced new 
restrictions on trade with European colonies. Joseph Barrell’s interest in the development 
of the China Trade—a promising though experimental avenue of commerce—represented 
part of a national “reorientation” toward markets unregulated by Europeans.6 Like other 
merchants, he hoped to restore national access to goods such as teas, porcelain, and silks, 
as well as to establish future markets for American products. Meanwhile, Columbia faced 
a different paradigm on the Northwest Coast. In economic terms, the region represented a 
free-market paradise. No central authority as powerful as a European king, nor even the 
weak Confederation Congress, existed on the Northwest Coast. As a result, indigenous 
groups traded with outsiders on individualized terms, specific to time and place. Indians 
engaged in free exchange of furs for metals, textiles, or manufactured goods, according to 
their immediate needs. Prices rose and fell, chiefs and commoners alternated in trade, and 
resources circulated—all as the unpredictable outcome of changing preferences on the 
coast. In contrast, Columbia encountered a strictly regulated system of commerce in 
China. Qing imperial officials supervised all economic activities involving foreigners, 
particularly those concerning the “sea barbarians” (hailiao, 海撩) or Westerners, trading at 
                                                          
6 James R Fichter, So Great a Proffit: How the East Indies Transformed Anglo-American 
Capitalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 31-55.; I borrow this language from 
Andre Gunder Frank, who deliberately uses the double-entendre in his discussion of the silver 
trade between Spanish America and China. Frank argues that the silver trade, conducted on a 
staggering scale for three centuries, demonstrates the central economic role of China in the early-
modern world. Americans of the period recognized this fact, as indicated by their efforts to 
establish direct trade not only with China, but also Mauritius, India, and the East Indies. See 
Andre Gunder Frank, ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998), 3-4. 
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Canton. Beijing appointed superintendents of trade to collect a complex set of tariffs, 
commissions, and presents from all incoming vessels, while vesting responsibility for 
trade in a guild of merchants known as the Cohong. Regulations also designated certain 
goods, such as sea otter furs, as prestigious commodities of interest to the imperial 
regime. 
Finally, Columbia accomplished the integration of subsistence, developing, and 
complex economies within the framework of global trade. Boston occupied the position 
of a developing economy during the late eighteenth century. An important market and 
port, the town was neither the site of agrarian nor industrial production. Nonetheless, 
Boston commanded the agricultural and manufactured goods of New England and 
shipped both throughout the Atlantic World in its capacity as the region’s principal port.7 
In this sense, Columbia represented a manifestation of the town’s main advantages—the 
                                                          
7 Historian William Cronon elaborates on the relationship between hinterlands and central places 
in Nature’s Metropolis. Here, he emphasizes the symbiotic relationship between natural resources 
and industrialization in the American West.  The book proceeds from an assertion that “one can 
understand neither Chicago nor the Great West if one neglects to tell their stories together.” 
Cronon evaluates the complex commodity markets and credit patterns surrounding Chicago in the 
Nineteenth Century and produces “a series of stories, each tracing the path between an urban 
market and the natural systems that supply it.” Here, he expands upon Johann Heinrich von 
Thünen’s “Central Place Theory,” effectively arguing that a balance of profit and shipping costs 
determines production demographics outside market towns and cities.  His method of describing 
Chicago’s hinterland shows that the “frontier, far from being an isolated rural society, was in fact 
the expanding edge of the [Chicago] boosters’ urban empire.” In many ways, the central-place 
concept also describes Boston during the late eighteenth century—a port that intermediated 
between the local economies of New England, the Atlantic World, and, beginning with Columbia, 
the Pacific World. Boston shipped New England grain and rum, iron, and timber, as well as 
providing merchantmen and sea workers to the carrying trade. Northwestern furs represented 
another natural resource to support the economic growth of the port, albeit originating at a 
significant distance from the town itself. See William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and 
the Great West (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991). xvii, 51, 369. 
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capacity to concentrate and move commodities to profitable foreign markets. Moreover, 
her expeditions extended those advantages into the Pacific World. In contrast, the  
Northwest Coast constituted a subsistence economy oriented toward the extraction of 
basic resources, including furs, fish, and timber. Individuals possessed roughly the same 
set of skills, be it hunting, gathering, or woodworking, and specialization of labor 
occurred only in the context of ceremonial activities, such as whaling. As such, 
communities of the coast sat on the threshold of globalization. Columbia introduced a 
growing supply of manufactured goods to the coast and, in doing so, prompted 
indigenous peoples to specialize in the trapping of marketable furs. Meanwhile, the 
Columbians amassed animal pelts for shipment to another market, China, whose 
economy was perhaps the most complex of the eighteenth century. China possessed 
ample natural resources, a large population, and a wide range of specialized industries. 
For more than four centuries, her maritime commerce had encompassed the South China 
Sea, East Indies, and Indian Ocean. Foreign trade featured the export of luxury and 
manufactured goods, including teas, sugar, silks, and porcelain. In exchange, China 
imported basic commodities such as rice, lead, silver, and furs. Columbia integrated the 
reciprocal economies of the Northwest Coast and China. Furthermore, she served as the 
vehicle by which the United States could intermediate in, and profit through, a global 
trade in metals, furs, and tea. 
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Table 1. Local, Transnational, and Global Dimensions of the Columbia Expeditions. 
 BOSTON NORTHWEST COAST CHINA 
LOCAL 
Expertise of 
investors, captains, 
and crew; merchants 
provide metals, 
woolens 
Basic producers of 
fur; rulers seek 
hegemony over 
neighbors 
Middlemen broker 
teas, sugar; 
merchants and 
officials compete for 
prestigious items 
TRANSNATIONAL 
Reorientation of 
national economy; 
search for new 
markets to acquire 
teas, sugar 
No central authority; 
free exchange and 
competition for 
foreign metals, 
woolens 
Centralized 
authority; regulated 
trade system 
governs demand for 
and acquisition of 
furs 
GLOBAL 
Developing 
economy; 
concentration and 
movement of goods; 
regional center of 
trade 
Subsistence 
economy; extraction 
of basic goods; 
emerging center of 
trade 
Complex economy; 
production of luxury 
goods; major center 
of trade 
 
 
The Columbia expeditions also introduce several historical problems significant 
to our understanding of the Early American Republic. First, historians often cite 
Commodore Matthew C. Perry’s mission to Japan, in 1852-54, as the beginning of United 
States engagement in the Pacific. Columbia, however, demonstrates that Americans were 
active in the ocean hemisphere decades prior—even before the ratification of the 
Constitution. This dissertation seeks, therefore, to demonstrate that the traditional 
narrative has neglected a crucial factor upon the development of the nation. Second, 
when Columbia first sailed into the Pacific, she entered an ocean hemisphere region in 
the midst of great change. The expeditions throw light upon a “sea of islands” during the 
formation of a single “Pacific World,” a process that Columbia in no small degree 
10 
 
accelerated. Finally, Columbia extends our understanding of globalization in Boston, on 
the Northwest Coast, and at Canton during the late eighteenth century. Her voyages 
demonstrate the interaction of the local and global on a microhistorical scale. Before 
heading full-sail into an analysis of the voyages, then, we must situate their broad 
historical significance. 
 
Columbia: Sources and Scholarship 
 
 
The Columbia expeditions constitute a significant episode in the history of the 
United States and the Pacific World. Nonetheless, the historiography of her pioneering 
voyages remains thin, narrative in tone, and focused upon the Northwest Coast. The first 
significant assessment of the Columbia expeditions originated with the report of Senator 
Alpheus Felch, Chairman of the Committee on Public Lands, in 1852. The report, which 
summarized Columbia’s contributions to American territorial claims, also represented a 
“state of the field” concerning the voyages for the nineteenth century. Although the report 
still represents a valuable compilation of sources, it offers no conclusions about the 
broader significance of the expeditions.8 William Sturgis and William Dane Phelps, 
                                                          
8 Felch prepared the report to accompany a memorial requesting federal compensation for the 
heirs of Joseph Barrell, John Kendrick, and Robert Gray, in recognition for their role in 
establishing a national claim to the Columbia River and Oregon Country. Felch synthesized log 
books, correspondence, contracts, foreign sources, and maps to conclude that “the government 
owes it to the merits of these men and their services… to make them some compensation in land, 
in the region where their services were performed.” Nonetheless, because the report served to 
“prove” the nation’s territorial claims, it presented few analytical conclusions and overlooked 
aspects unrelated to the Northwest Coast. See U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee of Public Lands. 
Report No. 335 (Felch Report). 32nd Congress, 1st Session, Reports of the Committees of the 
Senate of the United States, vol. 2. (Washington: A. Boyd Hamilton Printer, 1852), 1-32. 
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retired fur traders, also referenced Columbia in their accounts of the Northwest Coast. In 
general, however, early commentators used the expeditions to contextualize personal 
narratives, illustrate continuity in the fur trade, or support American aspirations in the 
Pacific World.9 
 The early twentieth century witnessed a wave of new research concerning 
Columbia, mostly originating with Frederic W. Howay, a Canadian barrister and 
historian. During a long career, Howay published on unexplored aspects of the maritime 
fur trade, Columbia’s voyages, and the Pacific World. For example, his articles examined 
Spanish settlements at Nootka Sound, scientific navigation, lost vessels, and British ships 
on the Northwest Coast.10 Similarly, his list of early of fur-trading vessels remains among 
the most comprehensive works available for students of the maritime fur trade.11 Most of 
his publications, however, pertain to the Columbia expeditions. Howay performed 
detailed research concerning John Kendrick, Robert Gray, and Robert Haswell, as well as 
                                                          
9 William Dane Phelps, “Solid Men of Boston in the Northwest,” in Fur Traders from New 
England: The Boston Men in the North Pacific, 1787-1800, eds. Briton C. Busch and Barry 
Gough (Spokane: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1997), 32-36; William Sturgis, “The Northwest 
Fur Trade,” in Ibid., 90, 93. 
10 Frederic W. Howay, “The Spanish Settlements at Nootka,” The Washington Historical 
Quarterly 8, no. 3 (1917): 163-171.; Idem., “Early Navigation of the Straits of Fuca,” The 
Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society 12, no. 1 (1911): 1-32.; Idem., “The Loss of the 
‘Tonquin’,” The Washington Historical Quarterly 13, no. 2 (1922): 83-92.; Idem., “An Early 
Account of the Loss of the Boston in 1803,” The Washington Historical Quarterly 17, no. 4 
(1926): 280-88.; Idem., “Letters Concerning Voyages of British Vessels to the Northwest Coast 
of America, 1787-1809,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 39, no. 3 (1938): 307-13. 
11 Idem., A List of Trading Vessels in the Maritime Fur Trade, 1785-1825, ed. Richard A. Pierce 
(Kingston, ON: The Limestone Press, 1973). 
12 
 
transcriptions of unpublished logs and correspondence.12 Later, he made his most 
important contributions as editor of Voyages of the Columbia to the Northwest Coast, 
1787-1790 & 1790-1793, a compilation of letters, orders, voyage narratives, account 
books, and illustrations originating during the expeditions.13 Despite his standing as the 
dean of Columbia studies, however, his work contributes little interpretation of the 
expeditions or their significance to Early America. 
Columbia briefly became a subject of historical interest again in 1992, the 
bicentennial of Robert Gray’s discovery of the Columbia River.14 Oregon Historical 
Society reprinted Voyages of the Columbia to coincide with the bicentennial. 
Furthermore, the organization published John Scofield’s narrative history of the 
expeditions and its captains, Hail Columbia!: Robert Gray, John Kendrick, and the 
Pacific Fur Trade. Meanwhile, Washington State Historical Society published J. Richard 
Nokes’ biography of Captain Gray, Columbia’s River: The Voyages of Robert Gray, 
1787-1793.15 Interest in the expeditions faded following the bicentennial, and historians 
                                                          
12 Idem., “John Kendrick and His Sons” The Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society 23, no. 4 
(1922): 277-302.; Idem., “A Short Account of Robert Haswell,’ The Washington Historical 
Quarterly 24, no. 2 (1933): 83-90.; Frederic W. Howay and Albert Matthews, “Some Notes upon 
Captain Robert Gray,” The Washington Historical Quarterly 21, no. 1 (1930): 8-12. 
13 Howay, Voyages of the Columbia to the Northwest Coast. 
14 Note that 1992 was also the quincentennial of Christopher Columbus’s arrival in the New 
World, an event that sparked intense professional and public interest in maritime voyages of 
discovery. 
15 John Scofield, Hail Columbia!: Robert Gray, John Kendrick, and the Pacific Fur Trade 
(Portland: Oregon Historical Society, 1992).; J. Richard Nokes, Columbia’s River: The Voyages 
of Robert Gray, 1787-1793 (Tacoma: Washington State Historical Society, 1991). 
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did not reexamine the topic for almost two decades. Most recently, Scott Ridley 
published the biography Morning of Fire: John Kendrick’s Daring American Odyssey in 
the Pacific. Both biographies treat their subjects, Captains Gray and Kendrick, with 
reverence and, once again, neither provides an interpretive treatment of the expeditions.16 
In the multimedia realm, WGBH, Boston public television, broadcast a series of short 
internet documentaries concerning Columbia. Developed for public consumption, the 
short films reproduce the traditional narrative for the screen.17  
To date, historians have still not produced an interpretive work concerning the 
Columbia expeditions, although documents from the voyages appear as evidence in the 
service of related topics. For example, Warren Cook predicates his interpretation of the 
decline of Spain in the Pacific Northwest, Flood Tide of Empire, to a significant degree 
upon documents originating among the Columbians.18 David Igler introduces his history 
                                                          
16 Ridley comes close to sanctifying his subject, John Kendrick. Moreover, he attempts to 
compensate for a terse body of evidence by phrasing speculation as fact. In general, Ridley’s 
sweeping conclusions about John Kendrick are not supported by the evidence. Scott Ridley, 
Morning of Fire: John Kendrick’s Daring American Odyssey in the Pacific (New York: Harper 
Collins, 2010). 
17 Directed by Andrew Buckley, an independent historian, “Hit and Run History” examined the 
investors and commanders behind the Columbia expeditions. Here, Buckley undertakes historical 
detective work, and examines a series of primary documents, probate records, and family 
archives. WGBH billed the shorts as the “centerpiece” of its history offerings on the internet, but 
the series encountered production delays after a single season. Andrew Buckley, dir., Hit and Run 
History: The Columbia Expedition (Boston: Hit and Run History, 2011). 
18 Cook focuses, in part, upon the chronicles and correspondence of the Columbians to assess 
Spanish and British claims concerning the events leading to the Nootka Crisis. Similarly, he 
shows the statements of Robert Gray and Joseph Ingraham to have influenced negotiations 
between George Vancouver and Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra. Finally, Cook exposes a 
map of Kendrick’s circumnavigation of Vancouver Island, produced by John Meares, as a 
fabrication intended to support British territorial claims on the island. See Warren L. Cook, Flood 
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of the Pacific World, The Great Ocean, by casting John Kendrick as an individual whose 
life reflected larger economic, social, and cultural concerns in the region.19 Similarly, in 
So Great a Profitt, James Fichter interprets Columbia as a manifestation of changes in the 
nature of Anglo-American capitalism, particularly with regard to the China Trade.20 
Finally, the Columbia documents also inform histories of the maritime fur trade. James 
Gibson’s account of the trade, Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods, incorporates 
evidence from multiple expeditions and stands as the most comprehensive account of the 
trade. Gibson presents the Columbians as examples of pioneering, albeit brutal, traders on 
the Northwest Coast. I dispute his interpretation as grossly misrepresentative of events.21 
                                                          
Tide of Empire: Spain and the Pacific Northwest, 1543-1819 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1973), 356-62, 219. 
19 Igler concludes that “John Kendrick’s venture in the Pacific could symbolize and presage the 
United States’ ultimate desire for oceanic power… [but] in all likelihood, curiosity and personal 
greed guided his actions more than any geopolitical ambition.” In this respect, he contradicts 
Ridley’s view of Kendrick as a forgotten hero. See David Igler, The Great Ocean: Pacific Worlds 
from Captain Cook to the Gold Rush (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013) 3-5, 11, 15. 
20 Fichter is correct in the board strokes of his argument, namely, in stating that Columbia served 
as a demonstration that Americans could do business in the Pacific World. He is incorrect, 
however, in his understanding of some details. For example, as this dissertation argues, Columbia 
was not a financial failure—rather, her first voyage was a failure, while her second expedition 
turned an exceptional profit. Additionally, he erroneously claims that “Barrell managed to wedge 
the frame of the Lady Washington into the Columbia’s hold, to be brought out and assembled on 
the [Northwest] coast.” In fact, Fichter has confused Lady Washington with Adventure. 
Furthermore, he incorrectly presents the sloop-construction as a feature of the first expedition. 
See Fichter, So Great a Proffit, 47-55. 
21 Gibson’s broad conclusions about the maritime fur trade are correct, but his characterization of 
the Columbians as brutal capitalists is wrongheaded. For example, he presents John Kendrick and 
Robert Gray as “two of the most egregious culprits” of violence on the Northwest Coast. 
Moreover, he singles out Gray as an “uninformed shipmaster” who extracted furs by force. In 
contrast, instances of violence between the Columbians and Indians occurred infrequently, and 
Gibson cites those occasions out of context. For example, Kendrick’s confrontation with Coya, a 
Haida chief, occurred when Indians attempted to board and capture Lady Washington. Gray 
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Barry Gough adopts a more neutral perspective toward the expeditions in Fortune’s a 
River. Instead, he argues that the Columbians intended to establish a permanent American 
presence on the Northwest Coast. Once again, I challenge this interpretation as 
overstating the significance of John Kendrick’s land contracts.22 
                                                          
undertook the destruction of Opitsat, a Clayoquot town, after receiving reports of a similar plot 
against Columbia. Gibson also errs in accepting Spanish accounts of Indian complaints—
hearsay—as evidence of Gray’s misdeeds. Indeed, John Boit witnessed the events at Esparanza 
Bay, and his account contradicts the version reported to the Spanish. In all cases, Gibson neglects 
the larger context in which violence occurred—cultural misunderstandings, accidental 
encroachment upon native concepts of sovereignty, and the language barrier. In reality, I argue 
that the Columbia expeditions are remarkable for how little violence occurred between Americans 
and peoples of the Northwest Coast. See James R. Gibson, Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China 
Goods: The Maritime Fur Trade of the Northwest Coast, 1785-1841 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1972), 30, 163-64.; Dionisio Alcalá-Galiano, Cayetano Valdés Flores Bazán y 
Peón, Josef Espinosa y Tello, and José Cardero, A Spanish Voyage to Vancouver and the North-
West Coast of America: Being the Narrative of the Voyage Made in the Year 1792 by the 
Schooners Sutil and Mexicana to explore the Strait of Fuca, ed. and trans. Lionel Cecil Jane 
(New York: AMS Press, 1971), 22.; John Boit, “Remarks on the Ship Columbia’s voyage from 
Boston, (on a voyage, round the Globe),” in Voyages of the Columbia, 400-402. 
22 My quarrel with Gough is based on two arguments. First, John Kendrick made his purchases 
after breaking with the Columbians, and written accounts of the expeditions contain nothing to 
suggest that Robert Gray pursued a similar agenda. In his instructions to Kendrick, in 1787, 
Joseph Barrell encouraged Kendrick to purchase lands “in the name of the owners.” Kendrick 
later notified Barrell that “in my last Voyage I purchased of the natives five tracts of land and 
copies of the deeds which was signed shall be sent you the first opportunity.” Gray and the 
Columbians made no such purchases, despite having sufficient material assets to do so, especially 
during the second expedition. Second, I am unconvinced that Kendrick intended to make 
“purchases” in the traditional sense of “real estate.” Curiously, the agreements granted access to 
“all the produce of both sea and land” as well as “free passage through all the rivers”—provisions 
that are redundant in a normal real estate transaction. Furthermore, the deeds affirmed that 
Maquinna could “live and fish on the said territory as usual,” a recognition that the Mowachaht 
People would continue to reside on the tract. The subtleties of language, when assessed against 
the practice of land tenure on the Northwest Coast, suggest that Kendrick’s “purchases” are better 
understood as private easements. The concept of private easement, based in the Anglo-Saxon 
legal tradition, holds that one individual is permitted use of real estate possessed by another 
person, group, corporation, or other entity. See Barry Gough, Fortune’s a River: The Collision of 
Empires in Northwest America (Madeira Park, BC: Harbor Publishing, 2007), 132-52.; Joseph 
Barrell, “Orders Given Captain John Kendrick,” 111.; “John Kendrick to Thomas Jefferson, 1 
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 Current scholarship concerning the Columbia expeditions suffers from significant 
gaps in research, all of which this dissertation seeks to correct. Narrative treatments 
approach Columbia without close examination of the investors, circumstances, and 
preparations that informed her voyages. Joseph Barrell, in particular, represents 
something of a historical question mark. His name appears, here and there, throughout 
scholarship that assesses business leaders of the Early Republic, yet no biographical work 
contends with his life and legacy. Similarly, historians have neglected to investigate the 
views of early-national leaders on the Pacific World, even when discussing their views on 
overland expansion of the United States toward the Pacific. Columbia’s significance to 
the Northwest Coast is well-attested, but the historiography of her voyages falls silent 
about her activities in Canton. This shortcoming is understandable considering the terse, 
opaque, and scant sources concerning her time in China. Likewise, historians have 
avoided an assessment of the outcomes of the Columbia voyages, either because of the 
mathematical challenges involved or because of the speculative nature of any 
conclusions. Finally, we face a bizarre contradiction in the historiography of the 
expeditions—historians recognize her significance to the maritime fur trade, but the 
discipline neglects her role in the creation of a Pacific World. Indeed, Columbia’s signal 
accomplishment was in bringing localities, individuals, and goods together under an 
innovative system of global trade. 
                                                          
March 1793,” The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 25, 1 January–10 May 1793, ed. John 
Catanzariti (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 307. 
17 
 
Columbia’s influence upon the integration of disparate shores into a single Pacific 
World is the subject of this dissertation. In Chapter 2, “Adventure to the Pacific,” I 
demonstrate that the experience of the American Revolutionary War shaped a national 
vision of new opportunities for the United States in the Pacific. Joseph Barrell, the 
Bostonian merchant most responsible for launching the Columbia expeditions, came of 
age during the Revolutionary Era. The war for independence—with its manifold 
challenges for entrepreneurs—taught him essential lessons in risk-taking, innovation, 
resilience, and vision. During the conflict, he invested in numerous privateering ventures 
and moonlighted as a supplier to the French Fleet at Boston, activities that shaped his 
enthusiasm for new commercial opportunities in the Pacific. The chapter also examines 
how Barrell’s perspective on the Pacific Ocean, a distant theater for American commerce, 
aligned with the views of three national leaders during the Early Republic. Thomas 
Jefferson, a skilled geographer, perceived the exploration of the Pacific as one element of 
a national impulse for westward expansion. Benjamin Franklin, thinking as a 
businessman, valued the region as a springboard into the profitable China Trade. John 
Adams, a strategist at heart, understood the Pacific Ocean as a theater whose vast 
resources offered new opportunities for the United States to compete with Europe. The 
Columbia expeditions, therefore, represented the first expression of a national fascination 
with the Pacific. Finally, the chapter assesses the human, financial, and material resources 
needed to launch Columbia. Joseph Barrell recruited partners, such as Samuel Brown and 
Crowell Hatch, whose navigational expertise and capital investments made possible an 
ambitious fur-trading voyage. In turn, the partners appointed captains—one a privateer 
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commander, the other a merchant mariner—whose experience complemented one 
another, and positioned the expedition to face commercial uncertainties in the Pacific. 
Moreover, the vessels Columbia Rediviva and Lady Washington represented another 
solution to the vagaries of trade, enabling simultaneous reconnaissance and exploitation 
of multiple fur ports. 
Chapter 3, “Iron Bound Coast,” argues that Columbia galvanized the maritime fur 
trade by integrating the indigenous markets of the Northwest Coast into a commercial 
network spanning the United States, the Pacific Ocean, and Asia. Following an 
improvisational approach to trade, the expedition adapted to commercial variation across 
the Indian communities of the coast, and, in several cases, cultivated ongoing 
relationships with local rulers. Columbia tapped into indigenous networks of exchange, 
such the trade in metals, that extended both along the Northwest Coast and into the 
continental interior of North America. In doing so, the expedition intensified local trade 
and concentrated stocks of “furry gold” in harbors such as Nootka Sound, Clayoquot 
Sound, and Masset River. Similarly, the Columbians adapted to market conditions such 
as the proliferation of iron goods and a commensurate growth in the demand for copper. 
The adventurers leveraged the indigenous desire for copper to maximize their own 
acquisition of furs. Indians regarded copper as a prestige metal, and clamored to 
exchange otter pelts for pieces of the auspicious material. As a supplier of metals, 
Columbia called new markets into existence and reoriented Indian communities toward 
the maritime fur trade. Moreover, the expedition transformed the production of furs on 
the Northwest Coast. Once regarded as otter “people” and hunted at subsistence levels, 
19 
 
like beavers before them, sea otters now assumed the mundane status of commodities to 
be harvested and sold. For indigenous rulers, Columbia represented an avenue to grow, 
bolster, or extend their authority. Chief Wickaninnish positioned himself as the principal 
middleman between suppliers of copper and fur. In doing so, he ascended to power on the 
waves of the maritime fur trade. The Columbians too, profited from his involvement as a 
reliable source of furs for a global market. 
In Chapter 4, “All Things in Abundance,” I reconstruct Columbia’s first season at 
the port of Canton (1789-90) and argue that, through the experience of commercial 
failure, the Columbians internalized the financial, cultural, and bureaucratic lessons 
central to foreign trade in China. Columbia faced a constellation of expenses that 
undermined her transaction at Canton. Costs arose from the retention of contractors such 
as river pilots, linguists, and compradors, in addition to exorbitant port fees. The 
Columbians also paid commissions to Thomas Randall, an American merchant residing 
in Canton, who possessed the expertise necessary to negotiate a transaction with the 
Cantonese. Moreover, Columbia traded without monetary resources, such as silver 
dollars, or even sheet lead, that could have enhanced her commercial prospects at Canton. 
Instead, the expedition was forced to accept disastrous prices for her furs. Columbia also 
arrived during a transitional period in the history of furs, as commercial goods, in China. 
Following the Manchu conquest of China, in 1644, sumptuous furs represented the elite 
station and ethnic background of the conquerors. In the eighteenth century, however, 
animal pelts entered the mass-market as symbols of prosperity among Han Chinese. 
Consequently, Manchus adopted otter skins—the most luxurious furs of all—as markers 
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of elite status in a country awash with lesser pelts. The Columbians learned, too, that 
while consumer demand sustained the maritime fur trade, it also created competition 
between Cantonese merchants and Manchu officials for access to otters. Furthermore, a 
complicated range of institutional roles, personal rivalries, and financial responsibilities 
shaped merchant behavior in Canton. For example, a row between the hong merchants 
Poankeequa (Pan Youdu, 潘有度) and Pinqua (Yang Bingguan, 楊丙官) hindered the sale of 
Columbia’s furs. In contrast to the Northwest Coast, where the Columbians negotiated 
simple trades on an individual basis, Canton presented an environment in which fees, 
regulations, and protocols governed a single, large transaction. Their failure to turn a 
profit is unsurprising, but also served as a critical learning experience. 
Chapter 5, “The Terraqueous Globe,” demonstrates that Columbia’s first 
expedition provided the popular support and practical experience necessary to a 
profitable second voyage, one crucial for the incubation of a global trade route. 
Columbia’s return to the United States, in 1790, received substantial newspaper coverage 
in the northeast. Bostonian newspapers declared the new nation indebted to the 
expedition for opening the Pacific, and editors throughout the northeast reprinted the 
story. National figures, including George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, followed 
her progress with an eye toward the territorial, commercial, and strategic potential of the 
ocean hemisphere. Additionally, through her circumnavigation of the globe, Columbia 
proved the logistical feasibility of an ambitious adventure to the Pacific. Meanwhile, the 
principals internalized the lessons of Canton in order launch a second expedition to the 
Pacific. Barrell hired a professional furrier, John Hoskins, and struck a profit-sharing 
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agreement with Columbia’s officers. The Columbians, too, prepared to maximize profits 
in the Pacific. The expedition carried the materials needed to construct another fur-
trading sloop, Adventure, at Clayoquot Sound. Upon arriving in China, they would 
present the ship’s permits in prepared form, enhance their transaction with lead, and 
retain a familiar middleman. Moreover, if necessary, Captain Gray could attempt to 
smuggle the expedition’s furs. The innovations paid dividends in 1792-93. Columbia’s 
second expedition avoided $3,000 in expenses, and her cargo sold for $90,000 at Canton. 
Furthermore, she probably realized $243,000 upon returning to Boston. Taken together, 
her two expeditions broke even—and more importantly, demonstrated the potential for 
profitable, routine, and lasting American involvement in the Pacific. Columbia also 
secured a reputation for her owners. In her wake, Joseph Barrell completed a new 
mansion at Pleasant Hill, became an amateur scientist, and promoted urban renewal in 
Boston. Similarly, Crowell Hatch launched a career in politics and Samuel Brown 
embarked upon philanthropic causes. Finally, Columbia inspired imitators throughout the 
United States. Joseph Ingraham and John Boit—former Columbians—both embarked 
upon expeditions of their own in subsequent years. Likewise, entrepreneurs such as 
Thomas Handasyd Perkins, Abraham Dorr and Sons, and the Winship Brothers 
dispatched vessels to the Northwest Coast and China. 
In Chapter 6, “Mar Columbiana,” I conclude that Columbia pioneered the trade 
routes, interpersonal networks, and local knowledge central to the development of an 
American commercial empire in the Pacific World. Columbia demonstrated the 
spectacular potential of the “golden round”—a business model of successive transactions, 
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executed on a global scale—and its multiplying effect on profits. The Columbians 
compounded their profits on the Northwest Coast, at Canton, and upon returning to 
Boston. Their accomplishment prompted others to replicate, improve, or innovate upon 
the Columbia model. From 1790-1820, the United States launched over 140 fur-trading 
expeditions to the Pacific—more than any other nation. British traders first demonstrated 
the viability of the maritime fur trade in 1785, and Russian voyages remained active in 
Alaskan waters, but American ships established a dominant position on the Northwest 
Coast after 1797. Furthermore, the maritime fur trade assumed national proportions in the 
United States, with vessels hailing from Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New 
York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. Columbia also inaugurated the exploitation 
of marine animals across the Pacific. In subsequent decades, Americans hunted sea otters, 
fur seals, and whales on an industrial scale, and, in the process, plunged those species 
into total population collapse. Meanwhile, the Columbians established an American 
presence in places such as the Oregon Country, the Hawaiian Islands, the Marquesas, and 
Japan. Similarly, Columbia intensified American business at Canton through her 
introduction of a maritime fur trade from the United States. During the nineteenth 
century, the United States established a formal presence—commercial, diplomatic, and 
military—in each location pioneered by the Columbians. Furthermore, American 
interests eclipsed, and then permanently displaced, Spanish involvement in the Pacific, 
transforming the ocean into an American Lake, or “Mar Columbiana.” Indeed, the 
interconnection of American activities in the ocean hemisphere accelerated its 
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metamorphosis from a collection of regions into a single Pacific World. Empire followed 
in Columbia’s wake. 
 
Boston, America’s Maritime Hub 
 
 
Columbia embarked upon her expeditions from Boston, Massachusetts, then the 
principal shipping hub of the United States. In historiographic terms, her expeditions 
reflected, extended, and transformed that heritage. First and foremost, Columbia 
represents a manifestation of Boston’s orientation toward the sea, a geographic feature 
that shaped the community since its founding in 1630—her expeditions extended the 
potential of infrastructure originally developed for shipping in the Atlantic World. 
Second, Columbia inaugurated a fourth historical period in the history of Boston. 
Following upon the commercial innovations of the founding, colonial, and revolutionary 
eras, her expeditions show that Bostonians could adapt to changing conditions of trade 
during the early national period. Third, Columbia represents a stunning demonstration of 
the maritime expertise of Bostonian entrepreneurs and sea workers. Investors, captains, 
and crew contributed a high level of professionalism to her expeditions, and, in the 
process, enabled Boston’s commercial projection into the Pacific World. In a larger 
sense, then, Columbia provides a unique window into the transformation of a regional 
shipping hub—in short, Boston’s reorientation toward global trade. 
Boston is best understood through its connection to the sea, maritime life, and the 
business of shipping. From its founding, in 1630, Boston depended upon and prospered 
through its relationship with the ocean. Originating in East Anglia, England, a region 
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defined by its economic relationship to rivers, seas, and fens, the Puritan separatists of 
Massachusetts Bay held a cultural disposition toward seafaring.23 Boston, situated on a 
peninsula, was surrounded by water and most accessible from the mainland by boat. In 
this respect, the town evolved as a location between land and sea, much like Nootka 
Sound or Canton.24 Boston’s emergence as a commercial center also depended upon the 
ocean. Foodstuffs, timber, and other staples traveled more easily by sea than over the 
unreliable roads of colonial America. Meanwhile, inland settlements depended on the 
port for news, print media, and manufactured goods throughout the colonial period. 
During the seventeenth century, the port developed a vibrant shipping industry that 
supplied beef, pork, wheat, wood, and rum throughout the Atlantic World. Furthermore, 
it emerged as the preeminent port in North America, with commercial connections to 
                                                          
23 For the Puritans, the Atlantic Ocean served as a gateway to religious refuge, a barrier to 
Anglican corruption, and a source of sustenance during their construction of a “citty upon a hill.” 
Unsurprisingly, John Winthrop delivered his famous sermon, A Model of Christian Charity—in 
which he exhorted the separatists to construct a model society in Massachusetts—aboard a ship. 
See David Hackett Fischer, Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), 31-36.; Benjamin W. Labaree, Colonial Massachusetts: A History 
(Milbrook, NY: KTO Press, 1979), 24-25, 27, 30-34, 40-41. 
24 Early maps demonstrate that the ocean also dominated patterns of settlement beyond Boston. 
William Wood’s rendering of the region, in 1634, marks the location of eighteen towns on the 
fringe of Boston Harbor and Massachusetts Bay, none more than a few miles inland. Wood 
characterized the region as providing “good Harboring for Ships of any burthen” and described 
Boston as “the chief place for shipping and merchandize.” See Walter Muir Whitehill, Boston: A 
Topographical History, 2nd Edition, Enlarged (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1968), 1-8.; William Wood, New-England’s Prospect. A True, Lively, and 
Experimental Description of that Part of America, Commonly Called New England (London: 
Thomas Cotes, 1634), front matter, 2, 42. 
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Great Britain, the Caribbean, Africa, the Azores, and Spain.25 Boston’s maritime 
industries came of age during the eighteenth century. In 1725, the town featured six 
ropewalks and a dozen shipyards, with dozens more located throughout New England. In 
total, the region constructed perhaps one-third of shipping in the British Empire, and 
Massachusetts alone could launch more than a hundred vessels per year.26 Labor statistics 
also reflect the town’s maritime orientation. During the 1760s, over 650 Bostonians 
depended directly upon the ocean for their livelihood. These individuals comprised one-
quarter of workers in the town. An even larger number—more than 1,500 Bostonians, or 
60 percent of workers—felt the influence of the ocean in terms of employment, retail 
goods, or information.27 
                                                          
25 Whitehill, Boston: A Topographical History, 16-17, 20.; Labaree, Colonial Massachusetts, 52, 
63, 95-97. 
26 Despite a debate on the precise scale of shipbuilding, scholars have reached a consensus that 
Boston, and secondary ports throughout New England, commanded a prodigious share of colonial 
shipbuilding.  Jacob Price concludes that, from 1769 to 1772, Massachusetts alone was 
responsible for construction of 113 topsails and 298 sloops and schooners, or 34 percent of all 
vessels launched in the American colonies.  Furthermore, of 7,043 merchant ships registered in 
the British Empire in 1775, 2,246 hailed from the colonies (31.9%), and 1,026 (14.5%) of the 
total originated in New England. Ralph Davis observes that, in terms of tonnage, Boston and New 
England contributed an even higher percentage, 30.4 percent, toward British shipping. Gary 
Walton argues that shipping productivity grew by sixty to seventy percent during the eighteenth 
century, with Boston among the most productive ports. See Jacob M. Price “A Note on the Value 
of Colonial Exports of Shipping” The Journal of Economic History 36, no. 3 (1976): 704-724.; 
Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries (London: Macmillian, 1962), 66-68.; Gary M. Walton, “A Measure of Productivity 
Change in American Colonial Shipping,” The Economic History Review, New Series 21, no. 2 
(1968): 268-82. 
27 Among the categories of employment in Boston, persons listed as blockmaker (16), caulker 
(14), duck cloth maker (16), fisherman (37), mate (20), merchant (206), ropemaker (37), 
sailmaker (30), sailor (58), sea captain (114), sea cooper (16), shipwright (65), and wharfinger 
(24) depended directly upon the sea for employment. See Alan Kulikoff, “The Progress of 
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Figure 1. Paul Revere, A View of Part of the Town of Boston in New England and British Ships of 
War Landing their Troops 1768, engraving, color on sheet, 23 x 39.5 cm., Chicago: Alfred L. Sewell, 
1868. 
 
 
Columbia represents a bold extension of the town’s preexisting capacity for 
shipping and trade. Boston’s maritime infrastructure, which evolved to support shipping 
in the Atlantic World, became a significant factor in launching America’s first expedition 
into the Pacific. One tradition holds that Columbia Rediviva (“Columbia Revived”) was 
constructed at Scituate in 1774, and refit in Boston in 1787, making the ship an 
embodiment of maritime continuity in Boston.28 The urban environment also reflected a 
dense concentration of consumer demand, shipping, and maritime investment. Boston’s 
principal thoroughfares, such as Union, Fish, and Ship Streets, ran parallel to the 
                                                          
Inequality in Revolutionary Boston,” William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series 28, iss. 3 (1971): 
377, 385-86. 
28 Howay, Voyages of the Columbia, vi. 
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merchant houses and industries on the Town Cove. Joseph Barrell established his 
business headquarters in this district, known as Merchant’s Row, at 80 Codman’s Wharf. 
From here, he managed the intricate business of equipping Columbia, a process that 
involved neighboring businessmen such as Hermann Brimmer, Joseph Coolidge, and 
James and Thomas Lamb. State Street, the town’s grandest avenue, followed a 
perpendicular route from the State House directly to the wharves.29 In a sense, the street 
continued into the harbor as Long Wharf, a quarter-mile structure that became the town’s 
“dramatic road to the sea.” Long Wharf permitted the largest ships to load or unload 
cargo without assistance of smaller boats, and, therefore, further improved upon an 
excellent harbor. Columbia moored here, giving her convenient access to the various 
artisans, smiths, sailmakers, and ropers who ran businesses on the wharf.30 
                                                          
29 Steady population growth, combined with the scarcity of land on peninsula, shaped the 
urbanization of Boston throughout the eighteenth century. See Whitehill, Boston: A 
Topographical History, 37, 41.;William Price, New plan of ye great town of Boston in New 
England in America with the many additional buildings & new streets, to the year, 1769 (1769) 
[Massachusetts Historical Society]; Samuel Chester Clough, Atlas of Boston Neighborhoods 
based on the Direct Tax Census of 1798: block 2200, block 3200, and block 3700 (1798), Samuel 
Chester Clough Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society. 
30 Long Wharf contributed to making Boston the most important port in British America. Neither 
of the other major colonial ports, Philadelphia or New York, could claim anything like it. Robert 
Albion has demonstrated that, prior to 1837, Boston and Philadelphia alternated as America’s 
“largest port,” with Boston predominating prior to 1800. In hydrographic terms, however, only 
New York Harbor could accommodate the same draught of ships as Boston, while vessels might 
run aground in the meandering channels leading to the ports of Baltimore, Charleston, and 
Philadelphia. Long Wharf extended the natural capacity of Boston, and also provided a measure 
of innovation that forestalled the town’s decline versus competing ports. See Whitehill, Boston: A 
Topographical History, 9-11, 20-21, 23, 25.; Robert Greenhalgh Albion, The Rise of New York 
Port, 1815-1860 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970), 1-37. 
28 
 
Scholars of Colonial Massachusetts have demonstrated that maritime conditions 
brought about three historical phases in the development of the province, and that 
Bostonians adapted to new commercial challenges during each phase. During the first 
phase, Bostonians established a vital attachment to sea resources, particularly the 
productive fisheries of the North Atlantic. Most maritime activities of this period, such as 
fishing, shipbuilding, and coastal shipping, represented either subsistence or supporting 
industries.31 The second phase, beginning around 1689-90, witnessed the emergence of a 
moneyed, powerful, and urbane merchant class in Massachusetts Bay. Following the 
“Glorious Revolution,” merchants harnessed the natural surplus of the province, 
including fish, meat, grain, and timber, as export commodities bound to distant points of 
the Atlantic World. Furthermore, merchants financed new maritime infrastructure, such 
as the Long Wharf and New Market, investments that enhanced their economic and 
political influence in Boston.32 The third phase, beginning around 1730, is best 
                                                          
31 Benjamin Labaree demonstrates that Massachusetts was “inexorably bound… to the territory” 
during its earliest decades, as two resources, timber and foodstuffs, assumed a central role in 
subsistence and colonial expansion. A third resource, furs, served as an export commodity. At 
midcentury, the colony became a surplus producer of timber and foodstuffs. Bernard Bailyn 
concludes that, beginning around 1660, the emerging merchant community made Boston the 
“exact pivot point of the primary orbit of Atlantic trade in New England.” Moreover, he contends 
that the commercial transition propelled New England merchants into a culture of profits, status, 
and external connections that distinguished them from farmers, laborers, and artisans. The 
construction of commercial improvements in Boston, such as the Massachusetts Province House 
and the Sea Wall, or “Barricado,” during the 1680s, is evidence of their growing influence in the 
town. See Labaree, Colonial Massachusetts, xv-xvi, 45, 88-95.; Bernard Bailyn, The New 
England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), 91-
98.; Whitehill, Boston: A Topographical History, 18, 20. 
32 G.B. Warden emphasizes that legal developments in Massachusetts both promoted and 
recognized the economic ascendance of the merchant class. For example, merchants became 
voters due to reduced property qualification in the 1690s. Some even achieved election to office. 
Furthermore, new market regulations held economic benefits for the merchant class. Boston 
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understood as a period of dire economic discontinuities between London and her North 
American colonies. New legislation such as the Molasses Act, combined with stringent 
enforcement of the Navigation Acts, protected Great Britain and the West Indies at the 
expense of New England—and especially Massachusetts. Protection of the sugar industry 
encouraged the rise of smugglers. Unable to profit through legitimate business, colonial 
merchants increasingly smuggled contraband French, Dutch, and Portuguese sugar to the 
distilleries of New England.33 Following the Seven Years’ War, as depression struck the 
                                                          
experienced “a significant realignment in town politics” in which merchants, the purveyors of 
basic goods, services, and credit, reached a strategic accommodation with the public. The 
relationship later “had a salutary effect” upon American resistance to British economic policies. 
Phyllis Hunter demonstrates that trade shaped the cultural preferences of the merchant class in 
Purchasing Identity in the Atlantic World. She argues that, during the late seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, capitalism transformed the Atlantic Ocean into a commercial highway, and 
that merchants involved in the business of directing overseas trade experienced a parallel 
transformation from “Puritan” to “Yankee.” Commercial interests and participation in a 
transatlantic system of exchange set Massachusetts merchants apart in terms of wealth, manners, 
and political outlook. In turn, their sensibilities shaped the emergence of polite society, as well as 
the growth of maritime industries, in Boston. See G.B. Warden, Boston, 1689-1776 (Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Co., 1970), 50-57.; Phyllis Whitman Hunter, Purchasing Identity in the 
Atlantic World: Massachusetts Merchants, 1670-1780 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 3, 
8-9, 52-54, 71-72, 77-84, 107-127. 
33 In his landmark work, Capitalism and Slavery, Eric Williams assesses the growth of 
discontinuities between the mercantilist economies of British empire at large and the “Thirteen 
Colonies” of revolutionary fame. He contends that the “West India Interest,” politicians who 
represented planters and metropolitan industrialists, manipulated Parliament in a manner that 
created a “crisis in relations between producers and processors” during the middle eighteenth 
century. Indeed, New England generated significant revenues through the processing of raw sugar 
and molasses, rather than purchasing refined sugar and rum from Caribbean producers. 
Meanwhile, limitations on American production of textiles and bar iron made the colonies 
dependent upon British manufactured goods. William Labaree elaborates on the specific conflicts 
arising from mercantilism. The Molasses Act (1733) placed a protective tariff upon molasses 
originating the British Caribbean, and, rather than purchasing the raw material at a higher price, 
New England traders substituted contraband supplies originating in the French, Dutch, and 
Portuguese empires. The Sugar Act (1764) hindered the ability of New England to refine its own 
sugar, once again prompting merchants to purchase goods outside the British Empire. British 
attempts to enforce the Navigation Act and suppress smuggling only served to reinforce the 
colonial sense of powerlessness in the imperial economic system. See Eric Williams, Capitalism 
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colonies, Parliament enacted the Stamp Act and Townshend Acts, revenue legislation that 
undermined the financial security of laborers, artisans, and merchants throughout the 
seaports of British America. When grassroots organizers in Boston attempted to flaunt 
the Tea Act, Parliament dissolved the elected government of Massachusetts and 
blockaded Boston Port, events that alienated Colonial America from Britain and 
contributed to the outbreak of revolution in 1775.34 
The Columbia expeditions inaugurated a fourth phase in the history of Boston and 
show that the town continued to adapt to macroeconomic change in the Atlantic World. 
Following independence, the United States faced a bewildering plague of economic 
maladies including debt, inflation, industrial and commercial ruin, and an ineffective 
Confederation government. British regulations upon trade with its erstwhile colonies, 
including new duties and restrictions, presented terrible challenges to seaports such as 
Boston. Meanwhile, France and Spain also enacted new mercantilist policies toward the 
                                                          
and Slavery (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 56-59, 60-64, 75, 77, 80-81, 
85-97, 105- 07.; Labaree, Colonial Massachusetts, 197-99, 219-20, 334-39, 262-67. 
34 The political ramifications of the Stamp Act (1765), Townshend Revenue Acts (1767), and 
Coercive Acts (1774) are a standard feature in any account of the Revolutionary Era, and require 
little elaboration here. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the acts generated an unprecedented 
amount of opposition because of their deleterious effects upon colonial livelihoods. In The Urban 
Crucible, Gary Nash demonstrates how the legislation magnified an economic hardship in the 
colonies following the Seven Years’ War. During a time of declining wages and rising 
unemployment, the Stamp Act and Townshend Revenue Acts imposed new administrative and 
material expenses upon Americans. Boston suffered more than other seaports. The Boston Port 
Act (1774), a component of the Coercive Acts, interrupted the town’s maritime economy and 
threatened to bankrupt merchants, artisans, and laborers alike. See Gary Nash, The Urban 
Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1986), 155-66, 184-99, 200-09. 
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independent United States. Collectively, the closure of traditional markets drove 
American merchants to seek new business opportunities in waters beyond the influence 
of Europe.35 Bostonian merchants, even more than others, recognized an urgent need to 
restore the commercial health of Massachusetts. In 1786-87, Daniel Shays, an 
uncompensated Revolutionary War veteran, mobilized an agrarian rebellion to resist debt 
litigation and high taxes in western Massachusetts.36 Understood in this context, 
                                                          
35 Robert Albion, et.al., discuss how the macroeconomic problems of the Confederation period 
forced Boston to adopt innovative new strategies in New England and the Sea. The Confederation 
period witnessed debilitating economic troubles, including a staggering amount of state debt, 
devaluation of war bonds, decimation of fishing fleets, and commercial ruptures triggered by the 
departure of Loyalists. Albion explains that “the worst blow,” came “when Great Britain 
announced its commercial policy toward the new nation.” New regulations limited United States 
commerce with British colonies, imposed heavy duties, and prohibited some imports outright. In 
Independence on Trial, Frederick Marks argues that “no problem concerned more people” than 
the British commercial policies. Protection of trade devastated business in American seaports, but 
also had repercussions on commercial arrangements in the countryside. The restrictions, he 
observes, prompted merchants to seek new business opportunities in waters outside Britain’s 
influence. Mary Gallagher observes that similar restrictions imposed by France and Spain also 
contributed to the exploration of new markets. In “Charting a New Course for the China Trade,” 
she argues that East Asia represented a promising market that attracted substantial American and 
European investment. See Robert G Albion, William A. Baker, and Benjamin W. Labaree, New 
England and the Sea, picture ed. Marion V. Brewington (Middletown, CT: Marine Historical 
Association, Mystic Seaport, 1972), 54-55.; Mary Gallagher, “Charting a New Course for the 
China Trade: The Late Eighteenth-Century American Model,” in The Early Republic and the Sea, 
eds. William S. Dudley and Michael J. Crawford (Washington: Brassey’s Inc., 2001), 55-80.; 
Frederick W. Marks, Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press), 52, 56-66. 
36 Joseph Ernst argues in “Shays’s Rebellion in the Long Perspective” that merchants contributed 
to agrarian revolt by insisting upon transactions in specie, a resource in short supply in during the 
Colonial and Confederation periods. During the Revolutionary War, Massachusetts merchants 
favored the control of inflationary trends through the elimination of paper money and a reversion 
to bonds, taxes, and hard currency. Meanwhile, the overall circulation of specie was insufficient 
to meet demand for taxes paid in coin, a problem that undermined the financial independence of 
agrarian households. In ‘The Public Creditor Interest in Massachusetts,” Richard Buel, Jr., 
explains that the Congressional requisition of 1785, triggered a sudden withdrawal of specie from 
circulation. In Massachusetts, the move further undermined the ability of rural debtors to meet 
their obligations. When creditors attempted to litigate for payment, Daniel Shays spearheaded a 
movement to close courthouses and arm against state intervention. In this context, merchants of 
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Columbia represents an innovative program to place Bostonian commerce upon firmer 
economic footing in the Pacific Ocean, a region unregulated by Europe.37 Nonetheless, 
her expeditions demonstrate strong continuity with previous historical phases in which 
Bostonian merchants accessed new natural resources, opened new markets, and adapted 
to changing commercial rules. Joseph Barrell carried forward the tradition of colonial 
entrepreneurs who transformed the business of overseas trade, such as Thomas Hancock 
or Nicholas Boylston.  
Columbia also represented an adaptation of existing, albeit much newer, practices 
in the American China Trade. In 1787, when she embarked for the Pacific Ocean, 
entrepreneurs had already launched successful expeditions from the United States to 
China. Indeed, investors such as Robert Morris and Elias Hasket Derby took bold risks in 
adapting existing patterns of the European China Trade to conditions in America. In 
1784, Robert Morris, the wealthiest man in America, dispatched the Empress of China on 
                                                          
the eastern seaports financed the recruitment of 3,000 militia, under Continental General 
Benjamin Lincoln, to restore order in western Massachusetts. See Joseph A. Ernst, “Shays’s 
Rebellion in the Long Perspective: The Merchants and the ‘Money Question’,” In In Debt to 
Shays: The Bicentennial of an Agrarian Rebellion, ed. Robert A. Gross (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1993), 57-60, 68-80.; Richard Buel, Jr., “The Public Creditor 
Interest in Massachusetts, 1780-86,” in Ibid., 51-56.; David P. Szatmary, Shays’s Rebellion: The 
Making of an Agrarian Insurrection (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1980), 1-18, 
84-89. 
37 Although the British South Sea Company maintained a claim to the Pacific, the corporation 
existed principally on paper. In 1719, the notorious “South Sea Bubble” undermined its reach, 
economic power, and prestige. Meanwhile, the Spanish Empire maintained a more robust claim to 
the Pacific, albeit with difficulty, as I discuss at length below. See William J. Barger, “New 
Players at the Table: How Americans Came to Dominate Early Tarde in the North Pacific,” 
Southern California Quarterly 90, no. 3 (2008), 247-52. 
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a voyage from New York to Canton. The venture depended upon the accuracy of a single 
trade directory and set of charts, as well as rumors that American ginseng would fetch a 
high exchange value at Canton.38  Similarly, Elias Hasket Derby launched Grand Turk 
from Salem, Massachusetts, to China in 1786. The voyage experimented with the practice 
of transshipping to multiple locations in the Spanish Atlantic, in order to augment 
ginseng with silver for exchange in China. Both voyages earned spectacular profits.39 
Columbia was, therefore, neither the first United States nor New England vessel to 
participate in the China Trade, and her expeditions rested upon the shoulders of prior 
success. Nonetheless, Columbia represented a clear innovation—in terms of itinerary, 
logistics, and goods—over previous American forays into the China Trade. Both 
precursors followed the traditional East India route around the Cape of Good Hope, 
across the Indian Ocean, and through the Sunda Strait. In contrast, Columbia became the 
                                                          
38 Philip Chadwick Foster Smith, The Empress of China (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Maritime 
Museum, 1984), 103-04. The Bostonian sloop Harriet nearly became the first American vessel to 
trade at Canton. In 1783, Harriet launched on a voyage to Canton, but, after purchasing a cargo 
of tea at Cape Town, returned without proceeding to China. James Fichter makes describes Cape 
Town as “the gateway to the Indies” and makes a reasonable claim that Harriet constituted the 
beginning of American commerce in the East Indies, if not China. Few materials survive to 
describe the expedition. According to Samuel Eliot Morison, Harriet carried a cargo of ginseng 
and returned with double that weight in Hyson tea. See Fichter, So Great a Proffit, 37-39, 304 
n.22.; Samuel Eliot Morison, Maritime History of Massachusetts, 1783-1860 (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1921), 44.  
39 Freeman Hunt, ed., Lives of American Merchants, Vol. II, (New York: Derby & Jackson, 1858), 
48-57.; Dane A. Morrison, True Yankees: The South Seas and the Discovery of American Identity 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 35-36.; Jonathan M. Chu, “The Origins of the 
China Trade and the Development of a National Investment Community,” Paper presented to the 
joint seminar of the Program in Early American Economy and Society at the Library Company of 
Philadelphia and the MacNeil Center for Early American Studies (November 2007), 27-38. 
 
34 
 
first American vessel to approach Canton via the Pacific—a route that opened new 
resources and opportunities to a struggling republic. Her expeditions sailed thousands of 
miles beyond established trade routes, ports, and assistance and remained there for years. 
Furthermore, she enhanced her profits through experimentation with sea otter furs, one of 
the untapped resources of the Pacific World. Columbia, then, constituted an innovative 
approach to the China Trade but also provided the United States with new alternatives to 
the restrictive system of European trade in the Atlantic. 
 
Navigating the Northwest Coast of America 
 
 
 Columbia’s expeditions depended upon the acquisition of otter furs from the 
indigenous communities of the Northwest Coast of America, and, when not sailing, the 
Columbians lingered in harbors such as Nootka Sound, Clayoquot Sound, Cumshewa’s 
Inlet, and Neah Bay. From a historiographic perspective, however, her voyages 
complicate several themes common to the interpretation of Native America. First, 
Columbia is not a traditional story of colonization, but rather, one of culture contact, 
mutual commercial advantage, and negotiation between trading partners. Some 
contemporaries attempted to establish imperial borders and outposts, but the Columbians 
operated as roving fur-traders and settled only for the winter. During the eighteenth 
century, geopolitical conditions remained too fluid for the territorial, economic, and 
institutional trappings of colonialism to take root on the Northwest Coast. Nonetheless, 
Columbia and similar enterprises brought about the conditions in which colonialism 
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could develop.40 Second, the expeditions reveal that neither Native American nor Pacific 
Islander historiographies quite suit the culture groups of the Northwest Coast. Their 
reliance upon complex hunter-gathering, combined with access to a continental resource 
base, demonstrates strong similarities to other First Nations of America. Meanwhile, 
coastal peoples held a disposition toward marine cosmology, transportation, and 
resources that closely resembles that of Pacific Islanders. Finally, encounters between the 
Columbians and Indians did not constitute a “middle ground.” Trade did not occur as a 
survival strategy, nor in a fracture zone, but rather as routine business on the part of 
stable communities. Columbia gained access to robust networks of indigenous trade, 
while indigenous communities secured new manufactured goods. Later expeditions to the 
coast accelerated an invasive, colonial, and disruptive trend in relations between 
Americans and Indians of the Northwest Coast. The Columbians, however, preferred a 
commercial strategy of mutual advantage and accommodation.  
The historiography of the Northwest Coast is, in fact, heavily indebted to the 
Columbia expeditions, as well as other contemporaneous voyages, which provided 
primary sources of great significance in reconstructing the history of the region’s 
indigenous peoples. Considered beside archaeology, linguistics, and ethnography, the 
documentary sources help to provide a nuanced view of Indian societies on the coast. 
                                                          
40 Paige Raibmon, “Unmaking Native Space: A Genealogy of Indian Policy, Settler Practice, and 
the Microtechniques of Dispossession,” in The Power of Promises: Rethinking Indian Treaties in 
the Pacific Northwest, ed. Alexandra Harmon (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008), 
67, 70-71. 
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Likewise, ethnohistorians have adopted an anthropological perspective on the historical, 
economic, and cosmological features common to the northwestern “culture group.” For 
example, coastal communities held similar notions of noble sovereignty and sovereign 
rights to natural resources. Indigenous rulers in multiple communities, therefore, regarded 
Columbia as an exclusive resource, and bristled at competition from their neighbors.41 
Practices of trade and communal exchange form a significant area of continuity within 
the culture group, and one with strong implications for scholarship regarding the 
maritime fur trade. Anthropologists have often concentrated upon the potlatch, a gift-
giving ritual that substantiates networks of lineage, patronage, and friendship in coastal 
communities. Chiefs controlled the local exchange of goods across the Northwest Coast, 
meaning that Columbians could exercise similar trade strategies throughout the region.42 
Recent scholarship characterizes the peoples of the coast as “complex hunter-gatherers” 
whose societies featured a differentiation of labor more often associated with agricultural 
                                                          
41 Alfred Kroeber performed some of the earliest work concerning the cosmology of California 
Indians, including inhabitants of the southern Northwest Coast. His linguistic work with Roland 
Dixon contributed to a recognition of similarities between Maidu, Klamath, and Columbia River 
languages. Furthermore, Kroeber’s photographs of indigenous communities (1901-1930) provide 
a visual record of continuity and change, a basis for comparison with other groups, and source 
material for ethnographic study. His research established the contemporary view of a single 
“culture group” including peoples from Cape Mendocino to Alaska. See Alfred L. Kroeber, “The 
Religion of the Indians of California,” University of California Publications in American 
Archaeology and Ethnology 4, no. 6 (1907): 319-56.; Roland B. Dixon and Alfred L. Kroeber, 
“The Native Languages of California,” American Anthropologist, New Series 5, no. 1 (1903): 1-
26.; Bancroft Library, “Ethnographic Photographs of California Indian and Sonora Indian 
Subjects by Alfred L. Kroeber, 1901-1930,” Accession 4690, (Berkeley: Bancroft Library, 
University of California, 1997), 2-44. 
42 Philip Drucker, “Rank, Wealth, and Kinship in Northwest Coast Society,” American 
Anthropologist, New Series 41, no. 1 (1939): 55-65. 
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societies. Put another way, peoples of the coast shared a damp, cool environment, and 
hunters provided animal furs for the community. The preexisting orientation toward sea 
otters, then, explains how local rulers managed to accelerate the production of furs as an 
export commodity.43 
 
 
 
Figure 2. John Meares, A Chart of the Interior Part of North America Demonstrating the Very Great 
Possibility of an Inland Navigation to the West Coast, 1790, engraving, 45.72 x 25.4 cm., London: 
Logographic Press, 1790. 
 
 
Contemporary scholars have reconsidered the relationship between European and 
American fur traders and the native peoples of the Northwest Coast, and most now 
emphasize indigenous agency, accommodation, and adaptation to foreign influences. For 
example, Charles Menzies incorporates oral histories, toponyms, and fishing practices to 
characterize Gitxaała adaptation to capitalism following contact with Europeans. Jeff 
                                                          
43 Kenneth Ames, “The Northwest Coast: Complex Hunter-Gatherers, Ecology, and Social 
Evolution,” Annual Review of Anthropology 23 (1994), 209-29. 
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Oliver uses documentary sources to evaluate ecological and cultural transformation 
among the Salish peoples of colonial British Columbia.44 Much scholarship focuses upon 
interactions between European and Nuu-chah-nulth (Nootka) peoples. Noel Elizabeth 
Currie assesses imperial rhetoric in the journals of Captain James Cook, the “discoverer” 
of Nootka Sound, with attention to the construction of a British territorial claim to 
indigenous spaces. Similarly, Warren Cook evaluates Spanish, British, and American 
voyages to the Northwest Coast, with significant attention to the role of native peoples in 
shaping foreign competition for possession of Vancouver Island. Daniel Clayton uses 
ethnological sources to reinterpret the “imperial refashioning” of Vancouver Island by 
explorers and fur traders.45 This historiography, which describes native political and 
social circumstances along the Northwest Coast, is crucial to understanding the context in 
which the Columbia did business. Moreover, it emphasizes European attempts to expand 
the boundaries of territorial empires at the expense of indigenous systems of land tenure, 
resource management, and sovereignty. Finally, it provides a baseline for measuring the 
scale, scope, and depth of cultural change that occurred following indigenous contact 
with outsiders.  
                                                          
44 Charles R. Menzies, People of the Saltwater: An Ethnography of Git lax m’oon (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2016), 69-84, 87-97.; Jeff Oliver, Landscapes and Social Change 
on the Northwest Coast: Colonial Encounters in the Fraser Valley (Tucson: University of 
Arizona, 2010), 32-37. 
45 Noel Elizabeth Currie, Constructing Colonial Discourse: Captain Cook at Nootka Sound 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 3-18.; Daniel Clayton, Islands of Truth: The 
Imperial Refashioning of Vancouver Island (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 
2000), xi-xxi, 3-5, 69-73, 165-167.; Cook, Flood Tide of Empire, 101, 136-43, 146, 149, 160, 
162, 284-86, 295, 312, 323-25, 335-40, 368-70, 375-79. 
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Columbia does not reflect the familiar history of European colonization of 
indigenous shores and peoples, but rather, speaks to an older commercial orientation 
toward shared spaces and negotiated outcomes. Indeed, the historiography of European 
settlement in the Pacific World is silent about Columbia’s significance to the Northwest 
Coast. Neither expedition embarked under orders to establish a permanent settlement, nor 
did the principals equip them to do so. Joseph Barrell, the merchant, preferred a 
commercial model in which fair dealing and valuable goods could unlock new markets. 
Barrell did instruct John Kendrick that “if you make any sort of improvement of land 
upon the coast, be sure you purchase the soil of the natives,” and noted that “it would not 
be amiss if you purchased some advantageous tract of land in the name of the owners.” 46 
Nonetheless, his emphasis lay upon improvement, not settlement, of land. Kendrick later 
purchased easements on Vancouver Island, an arrangement in accordance with 
indigenous notions of land use. In this regard, the Columbia expeditions more closely 
conform to the trading-post model of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as well as 
indigenous paradigms of exchange. Trading posts required neither a substantial purchase 
of land, nor a permanent population, nor a large administrative party. In some cases, the 
advantages of trade alone justified their presence. Columbia and Washington functioned 
as mobile trading posts, a further improvement upon the relatively unobtrusive trading-
                                                          
46 Joseph Barrell, “Orders Given Captain John Kendrick,” 111. 
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post model.47 In this regard, the Columbia expeditions demonstrate that an alternative to 
territorial empire was not only possible, but profitable. 
Furthermore, the Columbia expeditions point to historiographic problems in the 
analysis of indigenous cultures of the Northwest Coast, communities characterized by a 
liminal position between land and sea. In contrast to many other groups of American 
Indians, the northwestern culture group maintained an ocean orientation more common to 
Pacific Islanders. For example, ocean resources, transport, and cosmology defined Nuu-
chah-nulth communities in much the same manner as those in Polynesia. Political 
concerns revolved around control of islands, waterways, and rookeries to as great a 
degree as land territories. In this sense, Columbia and Washington represented strategic 
assets with the potential to dominate harbors, supply firearms, and establish regional 
hegemony.48 Coastal peoples, therefore, did not perceive Columbia from the perspective 
                                                          
47 In describing Jamestown, Virginia, Alison Games argues that, although the post “ultimately 
developed as a place of English settlement, in its first few years it adhered more closely to a trade 
model.”  Indeed, she contends that English merchants depended on “proper acquisition through 
purchase” to build trading posts, while trade “legitimated their access to foreign territory—theirs 
not through theft, but through exchange.” See Alison Games, The Web of Empire: English 
Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560-1660 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
128. 
48 Eugene Y. Arima, “Notes on Nootkan Sea Mammal Hunting,” Arctic Anthropology 25, no. 1 
(1988): 16-27.; Gary Coupland, “Maritime Adaptation and Evolution of the Developed Northwest 
Coast Pattern on the Central Northwest Coast,” Arctic Anthropology 35, no. 1, North Pacific and 
Bering Sea Maritime Societies: The Archaeology of Prehistoric and Early Historic Coastal 
Peoples (1998): 36-56.; Michael Harkin, “Whales, Chiefs, and Giants: An Exploration into Nuu-
Chah-Nulth Political Thought,” Ethnology 37, no. 4 (1998): 317-332.; Gregory G. Monks, Alan 
D. McMillan, and Denis E. St. Clair, “Nuu-Chah-Nulth Whaling: Archaeological Insights into 
Antiquity, Species Preference, and Cultural Importance,” Arctic Anthropology 38, no. 1 (2001): 
60-81. 
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of “Indians” resisting “White” encroachment upon native lands. Instead, they understood 
Americans as a commercial windfall borne upon the ocean, another perspective they 
shared with Pacific Islanders. Local rulers competed to monopolize prestigious trade 
goods such as textiles, iron, and copper, and to establish positions of influence with the 
Columbians.49 Certainly, the introduction of foreign goods, ideas, and biota threatened to 
undermine the cultural integrity of coastal communities, but, as in Polynesia, European 
colonialism developed later in the nineteenth century.50 In other ways, however, the 
indigenous communities of the Northwest Coast experienced the Columbia expeditions in 
a manner different from encounters in Polynesia. First, violence—or the threat of 
violence—represents a significant theme in the historiography of American territorial 
conquests across the Pacific World. In contrast, the Columbians attempted to avoid 
confrontations with their indigenous trading partners. Where violence did occasionally 
erupt, as at Tillamook Bay or Opitsat, it occurred because of cultural misunderstandings 
rather than as a manifestation of coercive force.51 
                                                          
49 Gibson, Otter Skins, Boston Ships, China Goods, 115-27. Nicholas Thomas emphasizes that 
Pacific Islanders “were not merely victims but actors who resisted colonizers’ impositions or 
creatively accommodated them.” The description also suits Indians of the Northwest Coast. See 
Nicholas Thomas, Islanders: The Pacific in the Age of Empire (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2012), 2-3. 
50 David Igler, “Diseased Goods: Global Exchanges in the Eastern Pacific Basin, 1770-1850,” 
The American Historical Review 109, no. 3 (2004): 693-719.; Oliver, Landscapes and Social 
Change on the Northwest Coast, 79-110. 
51 Jeffrey Geiger contends that the “the specter of violence, of violent penetration” constitutes a 
“central theme” in accounts of American territorial and sexual conquests in Polynesia. Again, I 
contest the claim that the Columbia expeditions leveraged violence as a conscious tool of 
economic exploitation. Geiger also argues that “scientific” constructions of difference helped 
substantiate the European views of “race as essential character” and “race as denigration.” 
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Finally, Columbia contributes to a more nuanced historiography of the Northwest 
Coast, particularly with respect to the way Indians negotiated a new “world of goods” 
that became available in the late eighteenth century. Richard White’s influential concept 
of the “middle ground,” which described mutual accommodation between Indians and 
Europeans in central North America, does not accurately depict the Northwest Coast of 
1787-93. Unlike the communities born during the chaotic Beaver Wars of the seventeenth 
century, the maritime fur trade assumed the form of intentional, temporary encounters 
between traders and indigenous communities. Furthermore, Americans and Pacific 
Indians inhabited stable communities, and although maritime commerce enriched their 
societies, neither required the fur trade to maintain cultural continuity.52 Nonetheless, 
trade required the participation of indigenous trappers, who hunted furbearing animals in 
exchange for exotic goods. Likewise, the introduction of metal, glass, textiles, and 
                                                          
Certainly, scientific navigation contributed to the European construction of racial categories. The 
Columbians, however, often perceived and articulated race in a more instrumental manner. In 
most cases, their observations on the question of race had little to do with “essentials,” as Geiger 
suggests, and rather advanced the commercial goals of the expeditions. For example, Robert 
Haswell assembled an elaborate “Vocabulary of Nootka Sound,” including numbers, verbs, and 
common nouns, as a tool for exchange. Similarly, John Hoskins approached the Clayoquot 
Indians as an amateur ethnographer, recording a wealth of information about local resources, 
subsistence, customs, ceremonies, and beliefs. Meanwhile, John Boit befriended a number of 
Indians, including influential nobles such as Wickaninnish and Tootiscosettle. Indeed, despite 
occasional conflict, the Columbians exhibited little “denigration” of the peoples of the Northwest 
Coast. See Jeffrey Geiger, Facing the Pacific: Polynesia and the U.S. Imperial Imagination 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2007), 20-28, 28-38.; Robert Haswell, “Vocabulary of 
Nootka Sound,” in Voyages of the Columbia, 102-07.; John Hoskins, “Narrative of the Second 
Voyage of the ‘Columbia’,” in Ibid., 258-65, 79-89. ; John Boit, “Remarks on the Ship 
Columbia’s voyage from Boston (on a Voyage, round the Globe),” in Ibid., 386-87. 
52 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes 
Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1991), x-xi. 
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firearms transformed Indian modes of subsistence and political economy. Indians 
incorporated their new trading partners into preexisting networks of trade, and leveraged 
personal connections with Westerners to enhance group prestige.53 Meanwhile, the 
Columbians depended upon the generosity of indigenous peoples—largely on indigenous 
terms—for their livelihood and survival, in much the same manner as in remote locations 
across the South Pacific. Columbia succeeded on the Northwest Coast in no small part 
because Indians supported their guests with food, timber, anchorages, and friendship. 
Meanwhile, Indians selected between foreign goods with an eye for rare, magical, or 
otherwise superior items, and especially those that could be modified to suit indigenous 
purposes.54 In the end, the Columbians favored a negotiated exchange that satisfied both 
parties, and that exchange made possible the development of a commercial circuit 
between Boston, the Northwest Coast, and China. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
53 William Cronon frames this in concise terms, stating that “the fur trade could not have existed 
without Indians.” William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of 
New England (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983), 91-94. 
54 Daniel Richter contends that goods “derived their significance from Native contexts, rather 
than from the European economic and social environment for which the goods had originally 
been designed,” so that a copper kettle might be disassembled into smaller copper ornaments. 
Daniel Richter, Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 42-46. 
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Canton, China’s Window on the World 
 
 
 Upon arriving at Canton, Columbia became merely the newest participant in a 
bustling commercial system.55 In this regard, her activities in China reflected those on the 
Northwest Coast of America. Unlike Nootka or Clayoquot Sounds, however, Canton 
constituted a window on the world whose international traffic made it a port of global 
significance.56 During the eighteenth century, merchant ships navigated between Canton 
and almost all the important ports of Europe and Asia: Nagasaki, Manila, Batavia, 
Malacca, Madras, Hormuz, Lisbon, L’Orient, London, Amsterdam, Stockholm, and 
Petersburg. Beginning in 1784, Americans established new trade connections between 
Canton and the ports of New York, Boston, and Salem. Columbia intensified that 
commercial orientation by establishing new trade routes to Vancouver Island and Boston. 
In assessing the Columbia, then, we must also consider the broad context of Chinese 
engagement with outsiders via Canton, as well as European and American commerce 
with China. 
In recent decades, scholars increasingly “reoriented” their view of China, once 
absent from the historiography of global commerce and capitalism, to recognize the 
                                                          
55 Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, “Born with a ‘Silver Spoon’: The Origin of World Trade 
in 1571,” Journal of World History 6, no. 2 (1995): 205. 
56 Paul A. Van Dyke, The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700-1845 
(Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), 5-18. 
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Middle Kingdom as a crucial agent in the development of a modern world system.57 
Recent scholarship emphasizes the enduring influence of China in global trade. For 
example, Janet Abu-Lughod stresses that, to understand the world economic system since 
1500, historians must look backward to a period before European hegemony. Beginning 
in the thirteenth century, she explains, Europe and China established contact through 
middlemen in the Indian Ocean. The principal Eurasian trade circuits became 
interconnected for the first time, permitting the movement of spices, silks, and porcelain 
along routes connecting Quinsay (Hangzhou) to the Champaign Fairs.58 Moreover, John 
Hobson emphasizes that, since the sixth century, a constellation of technological and 
commercial developments propelled East Asia—and particularly China—to a central 
                                                          
57 Historiographic interest in early-modern Chinese trade developed in parallel with three 
geopolitical trends. First, Deng Xiaoping’s program of “Reform and Opening Up” (Gaige 
Kaifang, 改革開放) encouraged historians to investigate the antecedents for commercial 
engagement between China and the West. Second, the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, in 1989-91, 
helped to depoliticize a historical study of China that had, for nearly 40 years, been understood 
through the ideological lens of the Western “Cold War Consensus.” Third, contemporary interest 
in globalization prompts scholars to seek the roots of modern commerce, culture, and 
cosmopolitanism in earlier eras. Today, as China asserts its influence in the Pacific, historians are 
breaking new interpretive ground in China’s early modern relationship with Europe and the 
United States. As previously mentioned, I borrow the language of “reorientation” from Andre 
Gunder Frank. See Huaiyin Li, “From Revolution to Modernization: the Paradigmatic Transition 
in Chinese Historiography in the Reform Era,” History and Theory 49, no. 3 (2010): 336-360.; 
Arif Dirlik, “Reversals, Ironies, Hegemonies: Notes on the Contemporary Historiography of 
Modern China,” Modern China 22, no. 3 (1996): 243-284.; Maxine Berg, “From Globalization to 
Global History,” History Workshop Journal, no. 64 (2007): 335-340.; Albert Feuerwerker, 
“Presidential Address: Questions About China’s Early Modern Economy History That I Wish I 
could Answer,” Journal of Asian Studies 51, no. 4 (1992): 757-769.; Frank, ReOrient, 3-4. 
58 Abu-Lughod characterizes the period as a “remarkable moment in world history… by which 
time China and Europe had established direct, if decidedly limited, contact with each other.” See 
Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System, A.D. 1250-1350 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 3-14, 18-24. 
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position in the world economic system. Following this trend, Hobson argues, many of the 
advancements of early modern Europe must be understood as responses to, or 
innovations upon, prior developments in the Far East.59 Similarly, Kenneth Pomeranz 
demonstrates that, prior to 1800, Chinese standards of living were equal to—and in many 
cases exceeded—those of their European counterparts. Pomeranz shows that 
consumption of consumables, durable goods, and “everyday luxuries,” remained higher 
in China than in Europe. Finally, he concludes that the “Rise of the West” is attributable 
to colonization in the Americas, a development that enabled Europe to artificially escape 
the resource, labor, and ecological constraints that affected China. Conversely, Peer Vries 
credits the development of Europe, and Great Britain in particular, to the scientific 
revolution and the role of state intervention in creating opportunities for economic 
growth. In this regard, the Columbia expeditions contribute to our understanding of the 
                                                          
59 Hobson explains that “the East actively pioneered its own substantial economic development 
after 500,” a position that works against the traditional story of triumphant European capitalism.  
He asserts that “by 1100 the leading edge of global intensive power had shifted across to China 
and remained there until the nineteenth century.” One implication is that agricultural, 
navigational, and monetary innovations that originated in East Asia came to shape the economic 
expansion of Europe during the Renaissance. Nonetheless, the historian must exercise some care 
concerning Hobson’s conclusions—his argument has been described as “provocative” and “a 
polemic… [that] sees almost everything in black and white and has no patience for shades of 
gray.” See John M. Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 1-6, 50, 294-322.; Kenneth Pomeranz, review of The Eastern Origins of 
Western Civilization, by John M. Hobson, The International History Review 28, no. 2 (June 
2006): 350-352.; J.R. McNeill, review of The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation, by John 
M. Hobson, The Journal of Modern History 78, no. 3 (September 2006), 695-697. 
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transitional period between 1780 and 1820, when European and American societies 
experienced a “Great Divergence” from older economic and technological paradigms.60 
Columbia is best understood as a continuation of, and innovation upon, 
preexisting patterns of Western commercial engagement with China. It becomes, 
therefore, necessary to situate her voyages within a broad framework of European trade at 
Canton. William Lytle Schurz, writing in the early twentieth century, emphasized the 
influence of the Manila Galleons in shaping a commercial connection between Colonial 
America and China. The galleons, each transporting millions of pesos in American silver, 
navigated in an annual circuit between New Spain and the Philippines, where bullion 
purchased goods from mainland China.61 Recent works emphasize the significance of the 
silver trade in prompting the modern phase of globalization and funding Europe’s “Great 
Divergence.” Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giráldez argue that silver, a durable commodity 
that traded throughout the Old World and New World, enabled disparate markets to 
participate in a single economic system.62 Spanish silver, mined in the Americas, 
                                                          
60 Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern 
World Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 114-165, 264-297.; Peer Vries, 
Via Peking back to Manchester: Britain, the Industrial Revolution, and China (Leiden: Leiden 
University, 2003), 7-9, 31-34, 39-42, 59-63. 
61 William Schurtz Lytle, “Acapulco and the Manila Galleon,” The Southwestern Historical 
Quarterly 22, no. 1 (1918), 18-37.; Ibid., “Mexico, Peru, and the Manila Galleon,” The American 
Historical Review 1, no. 4 (1918), 389-402. 
62 Specifically, Flynn and Giráldez contend that globalization required a reserve commodity, such 
as silver, in large enough quantities to trade in all markets. Spanish production of silver, 
originating in Mexico and Peru, met these requirements. They explain that “for our purposes, 
global trade emerged when all important populated continents began to exchange products 
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facilitated the imperial expansion of Europe. Andre Gunder Frank emphasizes, in contrast 
to conventional wisdom, that silver had its greatest impact in the context of the Pacific 
World. Frank argues that the transpacific galleon trade, linking Spanish America and 
China, enabled Europeans to purchase the exotic, rare, and luxurious goods of Asia. In 
short, he contends that the transfer of bullion financed Europe’s dramatic technological 
and economic growth after 1500.63 Silver sustained transpacific trade until the eighteenth 
century, when British and American vessels such as Columbia pioneered the maritime fur 
trade. Meanwhile, silver suffered from a “breakdown” in value during the 1780s. 
Alejandra Irigoin attributes the collapse to expanding production and declining minting 
standards in New Spain, as well as market saturation in China.64 Not coincidentally, then, 
European and American merchants began looking for other exchange commodities as 
silver fell from grace. Columbia shows that, just as Spain had financed a golden age by 
                                                          
continuously… [and] the singular product most responsible for the birth of world trade was 
silver.” See Flynn and Giráldez, “Born with a ‘Silver Spoon’,” 201-221. 
63 Andre Gunder Frank states that the earliest “globe encircling pattern of world trade” traveled 
upon “wheels oiled by the worldwide flow of silver… across the Pacific.” He contends that, 
during the early modern period, Western states were relative newcomers to the world economic 
system.  He emphasizes that Asian trade goods, originating predominantly in China, circulated 
outward to enter peripheral markets such as Europe and Africa. Frank argues that Europe was 
simply too resource-poor to produce goods of value to East Asian consumers, too impoverished 
to purchase Eastern manufactures, and too politically divided to compete effectively against large 
Chinese and Indian states. He argues that mineral exploitation of the Americas released Europe 
from its economic doldrums. The prodigious supply of silver permitted Europe, in his memorable 
language, to purchase “a seat, and then a whole railway car, on the Asian train.” See Frank, 
ReOrient, 53-56, 148, 275-76. 
64 Alejandra Irigoin, “The End of a Silver Era: The Consequences of the Breakdown of the 
Spanish Peso Standard in China and the United States, 1780s-1850s,” Journal of World History 
20, no. 2 (2009): 207-243. 
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shipping American Silver to China, merchants in the United States could help to restore 
the new nation’s fortunes by trading furs in Canton. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Johannes Vingboons, View of the City of Canton, with Mountains in the Background, 
watercolor on paper, 44 x 65.5 cm., 1665. Nationaal Archief, The Hague. 
 
 
Columbia became the first American ship to approach China from the Pacific, but 
it represented a second variation in the burgeoning trade between America and the Far 
East.65 American vessels first approached China from the Cape of Good Hope, Indian 
Ocean, and Sunda Strait. Katherine Griffin and Peter Drummey have demonstrated that 
                                                          
65 Caroline Frank argues that “even before the eighteenth century, colonial Americans has broad 
awareness of the lucrative East Indies trade, an interest in competing in that arena, and a local 
market for Chinese commodities.” Nonetheless, their experiment in this branch of commerce 
lasted a mere nine years, 1690-99, and the American China Trade did not resume until 1784. See 
Caroline Frank, Objectifying China, Imagining America: Chinese Commodities in Early America 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 23-57. 
50 
 
merchants from Salem frequented this route—in which they dominated the spice trade—
even after Bostonians pivoted to the Pacific.66 Phyllis Hunter observes that the financiers 
of the Empress of China, including Robert Morris and other established merchants, took 
great risks in mounting the first United States expedition to China. Nevertheless, they 
preferred the documented challenges of the Indian Ocean to the unpredictable hazards of 
the Pacific.67 According to Mary Gallagher, the owners of the Empress initially planned 
to dispatch a simultaneous fur-trading voyage into the Pacific but reverted to the East 
Indies route when financing for multiple ships fell through.68 Meanwhile, Joseph Barrell 
shipped a trial cargo aboard the Empress of China, but her success convinced him to 
experiment more deeply in the Pacific.69 
From the Chinese perspective, the European “Sea Barbarians” who traded at 
Canton were all of one kind, and newcomers from the “Flowery Flag Country” 
(huaqiguo, 花旗國), the United States, should hold identical rights, responsibilities, and 
                                                          
66 Katherine H. Griffin and Peter Drummey, “Manuscripts of the American China Trade at the 
Massachusetts Historical Society” Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Volume 
C, 1988 (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1989), 128-139.  
67 Phyllis Whitman Hunter, Sailing East: the Empress of China and the New Nation (New York: 
Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
68 Robert Morris and his partners purchased several other vessels, including a frigate also named 
Columbia. Originally intended for the Continental Navy, Columbia’s construction stalled for lack 
of funding and she remained unfinished upon the conclusion of the Revolutionary War. While it 
is tempting to wonder whether this vessel did, in fact, become Columbia Rediviva (her name 
suggests the possibility), there is no evidence to connect the frigate with Joseph Barrell. See 
Gallagher, “Charting a New Course for the China Trade,” 61-63. 
69 Smith, The Empress of China, 275-76, 288. 
51 
 
regulations in China.70 In this regard, too, Columbia merely instituted an innovative route 
to an established port, and should, likewise, be considered against the historiography of 
Western merchants in Canton. Writing in the 1950s, John King Fairbank emphasized the 
continuity between European and American commerce on the China Coast. Moreover, 
Fairbank sought to explain modern Sino-American relations in terms of Imperial China’s 
response to Western influences such as capitalism, nationalism, and Christianity.71 Later 
historians, such as William Skinner, preferred a “China-centered history” that interpreted 
the Middle Kingdom by the standard of own historical development, without comparison 
to Europe and the United States.72 Columbia fits these historiographies imperfectly. 
Although her expeditions innovated upon standing patterns of foreign trade at Canton, 
she occasioned no special consideration from local merchants, compradors, and 
                                                          
70 In 1848, Xu Jiyu, the governor of Fujian province, explained that the Cantonese deemed the 
United States “the Flowery Flag Country” (huaqiguo, 花旗國) because ships hailing from America 
“fly a flag with flowers [i.e., stars].” Chen Lanbin, the Chinese minister to Washington, D.C., 
used the same terminology as late as 1878. “Flowery Flag Country” differs from the modern 
name for the United States, Meiguo (“beautiful country,” 美國). See Xu Jiyu, “Yinghuan zhilüe 
(Short account of the oceans around us)” in Land Without Ghosts: Chinese Impressions of 
American from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present, eds. R. David Arkush and Leo O. Lee 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 19-23.; Chen Lanbin, “Travel in the Interior,” in 
Ibid., 51. 
71 Fairbank produced a wealth of foundational work concerning Sino-American relations. 
Although his interpretation of China’s “response to the West” is now considered dated, it served 
as an important point of departure for later scholars. See John King Fairbank, The United States 
and China, 4th Edition, Enlarged (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 143-163. 
72 G. William Skinner, “Presidential Address: The Structure of Chinese History,” The Journal of 
Asian Studies 44, no. 2 (1985): 287-290 
52 
 
mandarins. Nevertheless, the expedition did contribute to a massive expansion of the fur 
trade, a development that cannot be understood from a strictly Chinese perspective.  
Paul Van Dyke, a historian of maritime China, provides the most comprehensive 
framework for interpreting the Columbia expeditions in China. His dissertation, “Port 
Canton and the Pearl River Delta, 1690-1845,” assessed the characteristics of the 
commercial system, from its inception as an ad hoc accommodation, to the period of 
imperial regulation in the eighteenth century, and through its termination in 1842. Van 
Dyke concludes that Western merchants valued the consistency and predictability of the 
Canton System, despite its drawbacks as an inflexible regulatory regime.73 Furthermore, 
his monographs explore the system from both Western and Chinese perspectives. For 
example, he explains that foreign merchants needed to master a byzantine structure of 
port fees, relationships, and customs in order to turn a profit. Conversely, he 
demonstrates that foreigners misjudged the “monopolistic” structure of the Cohong 
(Gongxing, 公行), or merchant guild, when, in fact, the institution existed to preserve 
                                                          
73 Van Dyke argues that the Canton trade expanded because its structure met the distinctive needs 
of all parties. Crucially, it provided foreign merchants with a reliable and profitable trading 
environment, but still permitted Qing imperial officials to control the movement of foreigners in 
China. Moreover, the Canton System benefitted from its emphasis upon consistent application of 
regulations, extension of credit, and emphasis upon interpersonal relationships. Nonetheless, Van 
Dyke contends that “in the long-term, the strengths were overshadowed by the weaknesses.” In 
his estimation, the Canton System suffered from inflexible administration, local corruption, and 
unchecked smuggling. See Paul A. Van Dyke, “Port Canton and the Pearl River Delta, 1690-
1845, Volume 1” (PhD dissertation, University of Southern California, 2002), 1-4, 570-75. 
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competition between merchants.74 Indeed, his examination of customs procedures serves 
as a manual for estimating costs, reconstructing cargoes, and assessing the outcomes of 
Columbia’s transactions in China. Moreover, my findings affirm his conclusions. The 
Columbians collaborated with local middlemen, adapted to commercial changes, and 
learned to innovate within the structure of the Canton System. 
Meanwhile, the Columbia expeditions placed significant emphasis upon the 
cultivation of local business relationships in Canton. In this respect, the expeditions 
represent an alternative to the elaborate protocols of “guest ritual,” in which trade-as-
tribute served to legitimize diplomatic relations emanating from Beijing.75 In contrast, 
                                                          
74 Van Dyke, The Canton Trade, 19-34.; Paul A. Van Dyke, Merchants of Canton and Macao: 
Politics and Strategies in Eighteenth-Century Chinese Trade (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 2011), 1-4, 49-66. 
75 The Chinese tribute system combined aspects of diplomacy and trade in order to establish, 
affirm, and advance relationships between the middle kingdom and foreign nations. Scholars 
disagree over various aspects of the tribute system, as well as its overall purpose and meaning. 
John King Fairbank framed the system as the dominant institution in Imperial Chinese foreign 
relations, while downplaying the role of law, bureaucrats, and realism in shaping perceptions of 
the outside world. Fairbank argued that the ceremonial forms of the tribute system, especially the 
requirement that foreigners bow (koutou, 叩頭) to the emperor, served principally to legitimize the 
imperial worldview of China as the “central state” (zhongguo, 中國, the Chinese name for China) 
in the international system. Conversely, John Wills contends that the tribute system functioned 
best in the context of China’s immediate neighbors (Korea, Vietnam, Liuqiu), smaller states that 
shared the sinocentric view and benefitted from the patronage of China. By comparison, he 
emphasizes that the tribute system did accommodate the foreign-relations traditions of Europe. 
Furthermore, Wills stresses the differences between the Qing tribute system and its antecedents. 
Indeed, Qing foreign relations often incorporated the principles of political realism, a dimension 
that also undermines the perception of the tribute system as a monolithic institution. More 
recently, David Kang approached the tribute system from the perspective of international-
relations theory. Kang argues that China wielded the “key institutions” of investiture and 
embassies to orchestrate “external relations among political actors in early modern East Asia.” 
Investiture enabled China to legitimize its reginal hegemony, while embassies reinforced 
communication and diplomatic relations between states. Furthermore, he contends that the tribute 
system contributed to a regional order in which “China’s relations… with the Sinicized states 
were characterized by peace and stability.” Ji-Young Lee affirms that “the tribute system was 
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Columbia carried a commercial cargo and the Columbians held no diplomatic standing as 
representatives of the United States. As private traders, with no institutional backing from 
either a government or a chartered company, they established relationships among the 
merchants of Macao and Canton. Recent historiography reflects the negotiated character 
of commercial relations at Canton. William Rowe stresses that the Canton System 
represented, at its core, a pragmatic accommodation between Chinese and Western 
merchants.76 Meanwhile, Americans enjoyed commercial advantages over their European 
competitors in China. Americans traders were no longer subject to state monopolies such 
as the East India Company, offered a wider range of goods, and remained willing to trade 
with less reputable merchant houses.77 Paul Van Dyke emphasizes the local dimensions 
of exchange that enabled Americans to compete successfully at Canton. For example, 
                                                          
about the use of Chinese Confucian culture for strategic purposes.” Nonetheless, he contests 
Kang’s view that China behaved as a “benign hegemon” toward its neighbors. Instead, Lee 
observes that “imperial China did act more opportunistically and coercively, and exploited the 
less powerful in East Asia.” The tribute system, then, provided China with “symbolic 
domination” of a dual nature—it legitimized the regime on a domestic level, while underscoring 
the regional primacy of the state. See John King Fairbank, ed. The Chinese World Order: 
Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 1-19, 135.; 
John E. Wills, Jr., “State Ceremony in Late Imperial China: Notes for a Framework for 
Discussion,” Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Chinese Religions, 7 (1979): 46-57.; John E. 
Wills, Jr., “Tribute, Defensiveness, and Dependency: Uses and Limits of Some Basic Ideas about 
Mid-Ch’ing Foreign Relations,” Annals of the Southeast Conference of the Association for Asian 
Studies 8 (1986): 84-90.; David Kang, East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and 
Tribute (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 1-4, 10-11, 54-56 81.; Ji-Young Lee, 
China’s Hegemony: Four Hundred Years of East Asian Domination (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2016), 5-8, 11-15, 35. 
76 Rowe demonstrates that the Canton System maintained this character even after the imposition 
of Qing regulation in the middle eighteenth century. See William T. Rowe, China’s Last Empire: 
The Great Qing (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 127-148. 
77 Gibson, Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods, 84-109. 
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Americans had greater latitude in attracting a Cantonese merchant than their European 
competitors, whose companies tended do business with longstanding partners. American 
furs, which substituted for silver in a manner that European manufactured goods could 
not, also provided new options. Finally, where legitimate business failed, unregulated 
exchange with Cantonese smugglers helped to maximize profits.78 The historiography of 
local conditions, personal relationships, and commercial adaptation provides the 
framework for my assessment of the Columbia in China.  
 
Sailing on the Spanish Lake 
 
 
Columbia accomplished more than forging human and commercial connections 
between Boston, the Northwest Coast, and Canton—she established the patterns of trade 
that brought disparate shores together as a single Pacific World. In 1788, however, she 
intruded upon an ocean hemisphere best characterized as a “Spanish Lake.” For three 
centuries, Spanish officials visualized the Pacific as a mare clausum, or “closed sea,” 
under the sole jurisdiction of the imperial metropolis, or, in some cases, its colonial 
possessions in America.79 One aim of this dissertation is to demonstrate how Columbia 
                                                          
78 Financial incentives, such as commissions and “connivance fees” enabled Europeans to move 
trade goods of lesser value, either in collaboration with smugglers or the Portuguese authorities in 
Macao. Van Dyke concludes that “as long as the proper payments were put into the proper hands, 
there were ways of marketing almost anything in China.” See Van Dyke, The Canton Trade, 67, 
129. 
79 William Lytle Schurz popularized the terminology of the “Spanish Lake” in 1922. Considering 
the empire’s claim to a mare clausum, however, Schurz recognized that Spanish territorial 
aspirations in the Pacific fell short of its actual colonial presence. He demonstrates that while 
Spain could claim “the whole eastern shore of the Pacific from the region of Cape Mendocino to 
that of Cape Horn,” its possessions in the west consisted principally of the Philippines and 
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charted a course for the United States to assume a dominant role in the Pacific and 
transform the Spanish Lake into an American Sea, or “Mar Columbiana.” 
Columbia contributes to an expanded historiography of Early America by 
reorienting our focus from the Atlantic to the Pacific World—a division that began 
during the Spanish conquest of the Americas. Spain dominated the exploration and 
exploitation of the Pacific Ocean for more than two centuries. Its earliest engagement in 
the ocean hemisphere, however, resulted from the geographic misconceptions and 
geopolitical considerations of the fifteenth century. Spanish merchants, eager to 
circumvent Arab and Portuguese domination of the Indian Ocean, found great appeal in 
the possibility of a western passage to Asia. In October 1492, Columbus made his famous 
“discovery” of the Americas when those continents blocked his westward voyage to the 
Indies. From the perspective of the Pacific, his voyages are significant for two reasons. 
First, Columbus revealed a continental division of the Ocean Sea into two distinct bodies 
of water, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Second, his voyages set in motion the 
Castilian, and later Spanish, colonization of lands with beachfront on the Pacific.80 
                                                          
Caroline Islands. Furthermore, Schurz observes that Spain attempted to prohibit foreigners from 
intruding upon its notional “empire” in the Pacific. The demands of patrolling the ocean 
hemisphere (one-third of the earth’s surface!), however, remained beyond the capacity of Madrid 
or México. In contrast, Schurz explains that the most significant factors in Spain’s domination of 
the region were “the very remoteness of the sea” and “the hardships of an unbroken voyage into 
the Pacific.” See William Lytle Schurtz, “The Spanish Lake,” The Hispanic American Historical 
Review 5, no. 2 (1922): 181-194. 
80 Medieval geographers often represented the globe in theological terms. Isidore of Seville 
drafted O-T, or orbis terrae (“circle of lands”) maps, that arranged the known continents and seas 
around Jerusalem, the spiritual center of Christendom. Meanwhile, a vast and unbroken expanse 
of water, the mare oceanum (“Ocean Sea”), encompassed the known world. In contrast, 
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Spanish colonies in the Americas translated, gradually, into geographical 
knowledge about and territorial claims upon the Pacific Ocean. In 1493, seeking to 
prevent conflict between Spain and Portugal, Pope Alexander VI partitioned the world 
into two hemispheres, each under the exclusive control of one maritime power. The 
Spanish hemisphere included the majority of the Americas and extended westward into 
the Pacific, then unknown to Europeans.81 In 1513, Vasco Núñez de Balboa, a Spanish 
conquistador, began an expedition from Santa María, in modern Panamá, in order to 
investigate tales of a rich Indian kingdom. During his overland crossing of the isthmus, 
Balboa became the first European to behold the Pacific Ocean. Noting that it stretched 
away to the southward, he deemed it the “South Seas.”82 Nonetheless, the narrow isthmus 
presented a formidable barrier to navigation between Europe and the Indies. In 1520, 
Ferdinand Magellan traversed the straits that now bear his name, between mainland 
                                                          
Renaissance geographers began to visualize the earth as a sphere. In 1489, Henricus Martellus 
represented the mare oceanum as extending west from the Pillars of Hercules toward East Asia. 
The new geographic paradigm suggested a western trade route to Asia. The influence of this idea 
upon Columbus requires no elaboration here. See Wesley M. Stevens, “The Figure of the Earth in 
Isidore’s ‘De natura rerum’,” Isis 71, no. 2 (1980): 268-77.; David Woodward, “Reality, 
Symbolism, Time, and Space in Medieval World Maps,” Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 75, no. 4 (1985): 510-21.; Arthur Davies, “Behaim, Martellus, and Columbus,” The 
Geographical Journal 143, no. 3 (1977): 451-59. 
81 Spain and Portugal formalized the agreement through the instrument of the Treaty of 
Tordesillas, a document that specified a line of demarcation 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde 
islands. See O.H.K. Spate, The Spanish Lake (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1979), 27-29.; Edward Heawood, “The World Map before and after Magellan’s Voyage,” The 
Geographical Journal 57, no. 6 (1921), 432-33. 
82 The name “South Seas” remained in common use through the eighteenth century, and 
colloquially, to the present. See Spate, The Spanish Lake, 29-34. 
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South America and Tierra del Fuego, and sailed west into the peaceful ocean he named 
“Pacífico.” His accomplishment provided Spain with a maritime route to East Asia.83 
Taken together, Balboa and Magellan bolstered Spain’s geographical claim to the Pacific, 
including kingdoms in faraway places such as the Caroline Islands and the Philippines.84 
The Columbia expeditions demonstrated that the United States could challenge the 
territorial legacies of Columbus, Balboa, and Magellan. In 1788, she proved that 
Americans possessed the technical expertise needed to overcome geographic constraints 
and navigate in the remote, dangerous waters of the Pacific Ocean. Furthermore, she 
produced firsthand American knowledge about the Pacific, and therefore, helped to 
substantiate later claims by the United States to peripheral regions of the Spanish Empire, 
namely California and the Oregon Country. 
                                                          
83 In 1517, Ferdinand Magellan, a Portuguese navigator spurned by his own king, made an 
audacious pitch to King Carlos of Spain. Citing rumors of a southern passage through the 
Americas, Magellan proposed to sail westward to the “spice islands,” or Moluccas. Carlos 
authorized the navigator to command a squadron of five vessels on a search for the straits. 
Magellan proceeded southward along the coast of South America until, in late 1520, he located 
the fabled straits between the continent and Tierra del Fuego. In 1521, he completed the first 
reconnaissance and transit of the Pacific Ocean, although he died in combat on the island of 
Mactán, in the modern Philippines. The remnants of Magellan’s crew, under the command of 
Basque navigator Juan Sebastian Delcano, completed the first circumnavigation of the globe upon 
returning to Spain in 1522. Sea Heawood, “The World Map before and after Magellan’s 
Voyage,” 434-40.; Laurence Bergreen, Over the Edge of the World: Magellan’s Terrifying 
Circumnavigation of the Globe (New York: Harper Perennial, 2003), 29-39, 175-203. 
84 In subsequent decades, Spain conquered indigenous empires in Mexico and the Andes, 
established ports such as Acapulco and San Blas, and began charting the western coastline of 
America. Meanwhile, the transpacific expeditions of Alvaro de Saavedra and López de 
Villalobos, both launching from Acapulco, reinforced the empire’s claim to the Pacific Ocean. 
See Engel Sluiter, “The Fortification of Acapulco, 1615-1616,” The Hispanic American 
Historical Review 29, no. 1 (1949), 69-80.; Glyndwr Williams, The Great South Sea: English 
Voyages and encounters, 1570-1750 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 2-5. 
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The Columbians did not engage in colonization, however, but rather, introduced 
new economic forces that challenged Spanish domination of the Pacific Ocean. Indeed, 
the Spanish Empire depended upon the resources and trade potential of the Pacific. 
Silver, mined in the Americas, became the lifeblood of commerce between the Spanish 
Empire and the Far East. New Spain and Perú produced approximately 129,000 tons of 
silver from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Modern scholars estimate that 
79,000 tons, or fifty-seven percent, of Spanish silver eventually circulated in China.85 In 
1565, Miguel López de Legazpi inaugurated the transpacific silver trade between 
Acapulco and the Far East.86 The “Manila Gallons,” as the annual voyages were known 
after 1571, shipped silver specie to the Chinese merchants of Manila. In exchange, the 
merchants traded spices, porcelain, silk, and decorative arts imported from Canton in 
                                                          
85 The government of New Spain assumed control of its first silver mine, at Tamaçula, in 1525. 
Additional mines opened throughout the following decades, including the great mines of 
Zacatecas, which contributed a large percentage of imperial revenues over the next three 
centuries. Similarly, the discovery of silver at Potosí, in 1545, triggered a mining boom in the 
Spanish Andes. Potosí produced perhaps sixty percent of the world’s silver during the latter 
sixteenth century. See Henry R. Wagner, “Early Silver Mining in New Spain,” Revista de 
Historia de América 14 (1942): 49-71.; D.A. Brading and Harry E. Cross, “Colonial Silver 
Mining: Mexico and Peru,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 52, no. 4 (1972): 545-79.; 
Flynn and Giráldez, “Born with a ‘Silver Spoon’,” 209.; Frank, ReOrient, 148. 
86 In 1564, Legazpi established Spanish settlements in the Philippines and conquered the 
Kingdom of Maynila. The earliest galleon trade connected Acapulco and Cebu from 1565 until 
1571, when the commercial terminus relocated to the colonial capital at Manila. From 1565-1815, 
the Manila Galleon shipped 31,000 tons, or twenty-four percent of all silver originating in 
Spanish America, to East Asia. See Carmencita T. Aguilar, “The Muslims in Manila Prior to 
Colonial Control,” Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 2, no. 1 (1987): 150-58.; Nicholas 
P. Cushner, “Legazpi, 1564-1572,” Philippine Studies 13., no. 2 (1965): 163-206.; Junald Dawa 
Ango, “The Cebu-Acapulco Galleon Trade,” Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society 38, no. 
2 (2010), 149-56.; Schurz, “Acapulco and the Manila Galleon”: 18-37.; Frank, ReOrient, 148. 
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China.87 Furthermore, the influx of silver attracted ships hailing from Brunei, Japan, Java, 
Malacca, and Siam and established Manila as the foremost emporium of Southeast 
Asia.88 Following a season of trade in the Philippines, the Manila Galleon returned to 
Acapulco, where merchants of New Spain gathered to purchase Chinese manufactures for 
retail or reshipment to Europe.89 Columbia possessed none of the material advantages of 
the Manila Galleons, and she did not constitute a direct challenge to Spain’s economic 
juggernaut in the Pacific. Instead, she harvested the secondary resources of the Pacific—
sea otter furs—to compensate for her shortage of silver. In doing so, she constituted an 
alternative business model that appeared innocuous to Spanish officials, but one with 
potential to undermine Spanish domination of the Pacific. More importantly, Columbia 
charted the course for hundreds of American imitators to swarm the Spanish Lake. 
                                                          
87 As a consequence of the Treaty of Tordesillas, Portugal prohibited foreigners from intruding 
upon its half of the globe, including Africa, the Indian Ocean, and East Indies. Moreover, the 
Treaty of Zaragoza (1529) designated a maritime boundary between the Portuguese and Spanish 
zones in the Pacific. The treaty placed the boundary 297½ leagues east of the Moluccas, or along 
the modern 141° E meridian. Spain’s colonization of the Philippines (1565-71), which lay within 
the Portuguese zone, represents the most significant breach of the treaties. In general, however, 
both powers observed the agreements. As a courtesy, Portugal permitted Spanish vessels to enter 
her zone in service of the Philippines. Moreover, Spanish authorities gave up direct trade between 
New Spain and Canton, a port within the Portuguese zone. The Manila Galleons, therefore, 
terminated in the Philippines, and Chinese merchants maintained the carrying trade between 
Canton and Manila. See Peter Gerhard, Pirates of New Spain, 1575-1742 (Mineola, NY: Dover 
Publications, 2003), 23-54.; Marcos A. Almazán, “The Manila Galleon,” Artes de México, no. 
143, EL GALEON DE MANILA (1971): 24-28.; John E. Wills, Jr., “Maritime Europe and the 
Ming,” in China and Maritime Europe, 1500-1800: Trade, Settlement, Diplomacy, and Missions, 
ed. John E. Wills (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 51-61. 
88 M.N. Pearson, “Spain and the Spanish Trade in Southeast Asia,” Journal of Asian History 2, 
no. 2 (1968): 109-112. 
89 Almazán, “The Manila Galleon,” 24-28. 
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British pirates threatened the Spanish Pacific throughout the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, but Columbia represented a purely commercial pivot to the Pacific. 
The galleon trade held new social and strategic implications for the Spanish Lake. Silver 
promoted commerce between the colonies of New Spain, Panamá, and Perú, and 
merchants rose to prominence in ports such as Acapulco and Callao.90 In Manila, the 
growth of a Chinese merchant community paralleled the that of the galleon trade.91 The 
exchange of Spanish silver dollars throughout the Americas, Pacific, and Asia—a 
practice that continued until the nineteenth century—is another legacy of the silver 
trade.92 Beginning in the sixteenth century, however, commercial riches attracted pirates 
who crossed from the Caribbean or, increasingly, entered the Spanish Lake via Cape 
                                                          
90 Benito Legarda, Jr., “Two and a Half Centuries of the Galleon Trade,” Philippine Studies 3, no. 
4 (1955): 346-51.; L.A. Clayton, “Trade and Navigation in the Seventeenth-Century Viceroyalty 
of Peru,” Journal of Latin American Studies 7, no. 1 (1975): 5-13.; Schurz, “Mexico, Peru, and 
the Manila Galleon,” 389-402. 
91 Growth in the population of Chinese merchants is evidence of the commercial pull of Manila. 
Chinese inhabitants numbered 10,000 in 1586, 20,000 in the 1620s, and perhaps 45,000 in 1639. 
Spanish-Chinese mestizos also prospered as artisans, professionals, and government officials of 
Manila. Meanwhile, Chinese sojourners immigrated to the principal towns of New Spain, where 
they established businesses, neighborhoods, and families. In fact, chinos comprised perhaps two 
percent of the population of the colony by 1650. See Wang Gungwu, The Chinese Overseas: 
From Earthbound China to the Quest for Autonomy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2000), 53, 55-56.; Lucille Chia, “The Butcher, the Baker, and the Carpenter: Chinese Sojourners 
in the Spanish Philippines and Their Impact on Southern Fujian (Sixteenth-Eighteenth 
Centuries),” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 49, no. 4, Maritime 
Diasporas in the Indian Ocean and East and Southeast Asia (960-1775) (2006): 514-23.; Edward 
R. Slack, Jr. “The Chinos in New Spain: A Corrective Lens for a Distorted Image,” Journal of 
World History 20, no 1 (2009): 35-67. 
92 The Spanish Peso served as the principal currency of exchange at Canton. Western merchants 
trading in silver, however, preferred to describe the coins as “dollars,” and, therefore, I use this 
term throughout the dissertation. See Irigoin, “The End of a Silver Era”: 207-243. 
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Horn. Some buccaneers looted the settlements of Panamá, the richest commercial ports in 
America, while privateers seized the Manila Galleons. Between 1585 and 1700, English 
pirates took hundreds of thousands silver ingots and perhaps one million gold pesos. In 
addition, they murdered hundreds of inhabitants, burned scores of ships, torched several 
important towns, and wrought destruction valued at 4-5 million silver pesos.93 Columbia, 
in contrast, avoided contact with the inhabitants, settlements, and military forces of the 
Spanish Empire. Her commanders under orders “not to touch at any part of the Spanish 
dominions,” and, upon encountering Spanish officials at Nootka, the Columbians 
ingratiated themselves with the Iberians.94 Like Dutch merchants in the East Indies, their 
commercial invasion of the Spanish Lake constituted an exercise in soft power, rather 
than a show of force. 
                                                          
93 A short account of the most prominent pirates of the Pacific gives some indication of the 
rapacity of foreign attacks upon the Spanish Lake. From 1572-80, John Oxenham attacked the 
settlements of Spanish Panamá, ultimately capturing a king’s ransom of 60,000 gold pesos and 
100,000 silver ingots. Francis Drake, who completed the second circumnavigation of the globe, 
launched an even more devastating assault on Spanish America in 1578. His capture of the 
galleon Nuestra Señora de la Concepción, off Ecuador, yielded “a very large amount” of precious 
metals and gemstones. In 1587, Thomas Cavendish wreaked destruction upon the Pacific coast of 
New Spain, where he burned five prize ships and torched the ports of Guatulco, Navidad, and 
Acatlán, Moreover, Cavendish captured the Manila Galleon Santa Ana and her cargo of 122,000 
gold pesos. Henry Morgan, a seventeenth-century buccaneer, wrought similar destruction in the 
Spanish Lake. In 1671, Morgan sacked the richest commercial town in America, Panamá City. He 
escaped with six hundred prisoners and somewhere between 150,000 and 750,000 pesos. Later, in 
1680, pirates under the command of Richard Sawkins and Bartholomew Sharp destroyed 25 
ships, killed hundreds, and inflicted millions of pesos of damage upon the Pacific Coast of New 
Spain. Peter Gerhard, Pirates of New Spain, 1575-1742 (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 
2003), 57-60, 80-94, 109-21, 139-41. 
94 Joseph Barrell to John Kendrick, “Orders Given Captain John Kendrick of the Ship Columbia 
for a Voyage to the Pacific Ocean, 1787” in Frederic W. Howay, ed., Voyages of the Columbia to 
the Northwest Coast, 1787-1790 & 1790-1793 (Portland: Oregon Historical Society Press, 1990), 
111.;  
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Figure 4. Abraham Ortelius, “Maris Pacifici quod vulgo Mar del Zur,” copper engraving with color, 
34 x 49.5 cm., as reproduced in Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, Antwerp: Gilles Coppens de Diest, 1590. 
 
 
Most significant to this dissertation, the silver trade prompted Spain to undertake 
the exploration, colonization, and fortification of the galleon route along the Northwest 
Coast and California. Spanish exploration of the coast proceeded in two phases, each of 
which produced geographic knowledge of value to future navigators, including the 
Columbia expeditions.95 Spain began the opening phase in response to the presence of 
                                                          
95 Limited exploration occurred before this period. In 1542-43, Juan Rodríguez Cabrillo (João 
Rodrigues Cabrilho) and Bartolomé Ferrer (or Ferrelo) became the first Europeans to reconnoiter 
San Diego Bay, the Channel Islands, and Cape Mendocino. Neither navigator made adequate 
descriptions of their discoveries, and, as a consequence, future expeditions would rediscover, 
rename, and retake possession of the same locations. See Warren L. Cook, Flood Tide of Empire: 
Spain and the Pacific Northwest, 1543-1819 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 2-5.; Iris 
H.W. Engstrand, “Seekers of the ‘Northern Mystery’: European Exploration of California and the 
Pacific” in Ramón A. Gutiérrez and Richard J. Orsi, eds., Contested Eden: California before the 
Gold Rush (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 83-86. 
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privateers. In 1579, Francis Drake landed in “Nova Albion,” or California, and took 
possession of the region for England.96 Thereafter, reasoning that fortified settlements 
could secure the galleon route, Spanish officials dispatched expeditions to chart the coast 
of Alta California. In 1587, Pedro de Unamuno conducted a voyage from Manila to 
Acapulco, during which he reconnoitered Morro Bay and performed land exploration of 
the site of San Luis Obispo.97 In 1602, Sebastián Vizcaíno, a merchant of New Spain, 
commanded another expedition, in which he investigated the excellent anchorages of San 
Diego Bay, Mission Bay, and Monterey Bay. The cessation of hostilities with England 
and Netherlands, however, caused the government of Spain to abandon its planned 
occupation of California.98  
The intrusion of imperial rivals in the Pacific, during the middle eighteenth 
century, prompted the Spanish Empire to resume its exploration of the Northwest Coast. 
                                                          
96 Drake’s capture of Nuestra Señora de la Concepcíon did not directly impact the Northwest 
Coast or California, but his exploits did emphasize the vulnerability of Spanish shipping 
throughout the Pacific. See Cook, Flood Tide of Empire, 7-9. 
97 W. Michael Mathes, “Spanish Maritime Charting of the Gulf of Mexico and the California 
Coast,” in Mapping and Empire: Soldier-Engineers on the Southwestern Frontier, eds. Dennis 
Reinhartz and Gerald D. Saxon (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 24-26.; H.R. Wagner 
and Pedro de Unamuno, “The Voyage of Pedro de Unamuno to California in 1587,” California 
Historical Society Quarterly 2, no. 2 (1923): 142-43, 147-58. 
98 Vizcaíno probably felt a sense of urgency in the protection of the galleon routes. In 1587, he 
was a passenger aboard the galleon Santa Ana when the English buccaneer Thomas Cavendish 
attacked. In the aftermath, Vizcaíno forfeited a valuable cargo of pearls, perfumes, silks, and 
porcelain to Cavendish. See Cook, Flood Tide of Empire, 10-14, 17-20.; Iris H.W. Engstrand, 
“Seekers of the ‘Northern Mystery’: European Exploration of California and the Pacific,” in 
Contested Eden: California before the Gold Rush, eds. Ramón A. Gutiérrez and Richard J. Orsi 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 90-92. 
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In 1741, Russian explorers made claims to Alaska and portions of the Northwest Coast.99 
During wartime, British navigators once again invaded the Spanish Lake, seizing 
galleons in the Philippines and even occupying Manila.100 In peacetime, Captain James 
Cook, a scientific navigator, placed Madrid in the uncomfortable position of knowing less 
about the Spanish Lake than did London.101 Spain responded to the intruders with a 
second phase of exploration, colonization, and reinforcement of the Northwest Coast. In 
1765, authorities in New Spain embarked upon an aggressive defense agenda that 
                                                          
99 Vitus Bering investigated the coast of Alaska as far east as Icy Bay, within sight of Mount St. 
Elias. Meanwhile, his partner, Aleksei Chrikov, reached a southern position within sight of the 
Alexander Archipelago. Their discoveries formed the basis of Russian territorial claims to the 
Aleutian Islands and Alaska. See Ilya Vinkovetsky, Russian America: An Overseas Colony of a 
Continental Empire, 1804-1867 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 29-33. 
100 In 1743, during the War of Austrian Succession, George Anson intercepted and seized the 
galleon Nuestra Señora de Covadonga off the coast of Cape Espiritu Santo, in the Philippines. In 
doing so, he captured £400,000 in tea, porcelain, silks, and gold bullion. Great Britain struck an 
even heavier blow during the Seven Years’ War. The British occupation of Manila, from 1762-
64, demonstrated that rival powers now possessed the logistical wherewithal to challenge the 
territorial basis of Spain’s empire in the Pacific. See Williams, The Great South Sea, 241-47.; 
Nicolas Tracy, Manila Ransomed: The British Assault on Manila in the Seven Years’ War 
(Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1995), 57-108. 
101 James Cook brought new precision to the charting of lands such as New Zealand, Australia, 
the Hawaiian Islands, and the Northwest Coast. His first voyage, from 1768-71, succeeded in 
charting the coasts of New Zealand and Australia, thus setting the stage for later British 
colonization of these lands. Cook’s second expedition, from 1772-75, disproved the existence of 
Terra Australis Incognita, a massive continent rumored to exist in the South Pacific. Moreover, 
he showed the Union Jack in the independent islands of Fiji and Tonga. During his third 
expedition, from 1776-79, he investigated the legendary “Straits of Anian,” believed to be the 
entrance to a sea passage through the North American continent, from the Pacific to the Atlantic 
Ocean. Furthermore, Cook became the first European navigator to visit the Hawaiian Islands. In a 
tragic turn of events, he was killed in a skirmish with islanders at Kealakekua Bay, in February, 
1779. Despite this gruesome conclusion, Cook’s voyages laid the foundations of British territorial 
claims in the Pacific. See J.C. Beaglehole, The Life of Captain James Cook (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1974), 196-225, 226-56, 331-356, 357-79, 591-636, 637-72. 
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included the construction of shipyards, the colonization of Alta California, and overland 
exploration to San Francisco Bay.102 Later, Spanish navigators sailed northward under 
orders to take possession of the Northwest Coast.103 Three decades of exploration, 
colonization, and acts of possession helped to forestall British and Russian encroachment 
in the Pacific, but Madrid failed to anticipate purely commercial threats to its empire. 
In the years immediately prior to the Columbia expedition, three developments 
propelled Spain toward a vigorous defense of its northernmost claims. In 1778, James 
Cook conducted a systematic survey of the Northwest Coast, during which he made 
counterclaims to locations such as “King George’s Sound,” or Nootka, that Spain 
presumed to fall within its jurisdiction.104 Next, in 1784, Russian trappers established that 
empire’s first colonial settlement in America at Three Saints Bay on Kodiak Island. The 
                                                          
102 King Carlos III of Spain must be credited for inaugurating the Bourbon Reforms, a 
reconsideration of imperial policies that propelled Spain into a second golden age in the late 
eighteenth century. Carlos appointed José de Gálvez, an energetic reformer, to oversee the 
defensive renovation of New Spain. Gálvez established a naval shipyards at San Blas, an 
anchorage in possession of ample freshwater and timber, and convenient to exploration of the 
Northwest Coast. Moreover, he spearheaded the colonization of Alta California, and theorized 
that mission settlements could serve as a bulwark against Russian settlement in the region. In 
1769-70, Franciscans under the command of Fray Gaspar de Portolá explored San Francisco Bay 
and founded missions at San Diego and Monterey. See Cook, Flood Tide of Empire, 45-50, 51-
52.; Mathes, “Spanish Maritime Charting of the Gulf of Mexico and the California Coast,” 28-29. 
103 Multiple navigators attempted to take possession of the Northwest Coast, but most turned back 
in the face of storms, fog, or other unpredictable events. Juan Francisco de la Bodega established 
New Spain’s northernmost territorial claims when, in 1775, he took possession at Sitka and 
proceeded northward to the latitude of 58°30’, near Lituya Bay, Alaska. See Mathes, “Spanish 
Maritime Charting of the Gulf of Mexico and the California Coast,” 30-31. 
104 J.C. Beaglehole, The Life of Captain James Cook (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), 
591-636. 
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settlement, located at 57° north, also lay within the territorial limits of New Spain.105 
Finally, British fur traders such as James Hanna, Nathaniel Portlock, and John Meares 
began cruising the Northwest Coast in 1785-87. Spain viewed their exploitation of 
furbearing resources, and the practice of overwintering on the Northwest Coast, as a 
prelude to British colonization of locations such as Nootka Sound.106 In 1788, authorities 
in New Spain launched a fact-finding mission to determine the scale, disposition, and 
positions of foreign intruders on the Northwest Coast. Its commander, Esteban José 
Martínez, reported on British and Russian plots to colonize the furbearing districts of the 
coast, and recommended the immediate fortification of Nootka Sound. Consequently, in 
1789, military engineers prepared to construct the fort of San Lorenzo at Nootka.107 
Columbia arrived in the Pacific at a pivotal moment in the Spanish Lake. Some 
events, occurring in Europe, influenced the rapid decline of Spain’s empire in the Pacific. 
For example, the death of Carlos III, in 1788, brought his ambitious imperial reforms to a 
sudden end. In 1789, the French Revolution also cast Spain’s foreign relations into 
disarray, as constitutionalism called into question the “family compact” between the 
French and Spanish Bourbons. In New Spain, Viceroy Manuel Antonio Flores noted that 
                                                          
105 Gwenn A. Miller, Kodiak Kreol, Communities of Empire in Early Russian America (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2010), 28-48. 
106 Dick A. Wilson, “King George’s Men: British Ships and Sailors in the Pacific Northwest-
China Trade, 1785-1821” (PhD Dissertation, University of Idaho, 2004), 14-36, 59-80, 104-26.; 
Cook, Flood Tide of Empire, 85-145. 
107 Cook, Flood Tide of Empire, 122-45. 
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“we should not be surprised if the English colonies of America, republican and 
independent, put into practice the design of discovering a safe port on the south sea.”108 
Although Flores recognized that the United States posed a threat equal to the British or 
Russians, later developments show that his subordinates—those charged with policing 
the Northwest Coast—did not. Meanwhile, Spain most feared the expansion of Great 
Britain, a nation with proven capacity to upset her military, economic, and scientific 
hegemony across the globe. Britain was ascendant in Europe, India, and the Atlantic 
World—but she was merely one contestant in the Pacific. 
Some scholars have pointed to the emergence of an “English Lake” in the 
Pacific.109 This periodization, however, overstates the permanence of British activity in 
the eighteenth-century Pacific. Scientific navigation provided Great Britain with superior 
knowledge of the ocean hemisphere—but few colonies. Indeed, during the eighteenth 
century, New South Wales, a penal colony, represented London’s sole territorial 
experiment in the Pacific. Two other events, Britain’s triumph in the Nootka Crisis and 
the creation of a protectorate in the Sandwich Islands, had limited value prior to the 
nineteenth century. In another sense, the “English Lake” overlooks the contemporaneous 
rise of American activity in the Pacific. Cook’s third expedition sailed in 1776, the same 
year that American revolutionaries declared the United States independent of Britain. In 
                                                          
108 Manuel Antonio Flores quoted in Ibid., 130. 
109 Arif Dirlik, “The Asia-Pacific Idea: Reality and Representation in the Invention of a Regional 
Structure,” Journal of World History 3, no. 1 (1992): 55-79. 
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1788, the First Fleet disembarked convicts at Botany Bay, but free Americans entered the 
Pacific aboard Columbia. In 1789, when Spanish Governor Esteban Martínez arrested 
British fur traders on the Northwest Coast, he permitted Columbia to continue trading for 
sea otters. Later, when George Vancouver and Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra 
convened to resolve the Nootka Crisis, their conclusions depended in part upon 
Columbia’s discoveries on the Northwest Coast. By 1797, five short years after the 
Columbia expeditions, the number of American fur-trading ships on the Northwest Coast 
exceeded those originating in the British Empire. Did Britannia displace Spanish power 
in the Pacific? If so, her unintended, and perhaps more significant, act was to clear the 
ocean for the United States. 
 
Columbia and the Pacific World 
 
 
In 1788, when Columbia steered into the Pacific Ocean, she entered an ocean 
hemisphere that barely resembled the complex geography of trade routes, postcolonial 
island states, and multiethnic settlements familiar to modern eyes. Although the 
eighteenth century represented a time of great transformations in the region, the vastness 
of the ocean itself continued to dominate events in the Pacific World. For example, island 
civilizations of the South Pacific had occasional contact with Europeans but little or no 
interaction with Asians or American Indians. Northern Pacific cultures either experienced 
limited European colonization, as in Alaska and California, or inhabited the extreme 
fringe of world known to Westerners. Travelers crossed the ocean infrequently, and 
goods even less often. Scientific navigators made incremental study of the Pacific World 
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throughout the eighteenth century, but comprehensive exploration did not become a 
prestigious, geostrategic activity until the voyages of Captain James Cook. Columbia was 
the harbinger of dramatic changes in the Pacific. She represented a new commercial 
paradigm that would connect disparate communities, intensify the movement of trade 
goods, and open new commercial markets to the United States. For the Columbians, the 
Pacific Ocean was an indisputable reality, but what exactly was the “Pacific World”? 
Many historians view the Pacific World through the conventions of other ocean 
histories, and, in particular, the analytical frameworks of the Atlantic World. The two 
oceans share many historical similarities, especially when considering economic, 
linguistic, and cultural diversity across the region.110 In general, Atlantic historians assess 
relationships between individual places and peoples, rather than monolithic processes. 
They prefer to investigate global interactions rather than individual nations or states. 
Their central concerns are the conditions of migration, ethnicity, and colonialism that 
defined the New World against the Old, and positioned the ocean as a path between two 
                                                          
110 Matt Matsuda emphasizes the analytical similarities of ocean histories, noting that “the 
imaginative of a ‘Pacific’ rooted in the notion of a ‘distant’ ocean is logically Atlantic in 
inspiration.” Certainly, the oceans are similar enough that a number of concepts originating in 
Atlantic history are useful tools when assessing the Pacific. For example, Bernard Bailyn 
characterizes the Atlantic World as “multitudinous, embracing the people and circumstances of 
four continents, countless regional economies, languages, and social structures, beliefs as 
different as Dutch Calvinism and Inca sun worship, and ethnicities as different as those of 
Finland’s Saamis and Africa’s Igbos.” The Pacific is equally diverse. One might as easily 
describe a Pacific World that embraces the cultures of four continents (Asia, Australia, North 
America, and South America) as well as thousands of islands, hundreds of regional trade 
arrangements, languages, and social conventions, and beliefs as different as Chinese 
Confucianism and the veneration of the god Maui. See Matt K. Matsuda, “The Pacific,” The 
American Historical Review 111, no. 3 (2006): 762.; Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic History: Concept 
and Contours (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 61-62. 
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hemispheres. Consequently, no standardized form of commercial, cultural, or social 
encounter predominated in the Atlantic.111 Nevertheless, most historians find sufficient 
reason to speak of a single Atlantic World. Bernard Bailyn emphasizes that this world, 
forged through the sustained interaction of African, American, and European peoples, 
demonstrates “a common morphology, a general overall pattern, however fluid and 
irregular, of development and change.” The combination of generalities and particulars 
contribute to a scholarly understanding of a common “Atlantic” experience defined by 
the sustained social interaction, commercial exchange, and cultural hybridization of 
diverse peoples.112  
Just as the Columbia navigated from the Atlantic to the Pacific, it is appropriate 
that the Atlantic World framework also has explanatory power in the Pacific. For 
example, David Igler explains that “the Pacific World concept is also unstable and 
problematic… [but] offers similar analytical payoff to the term ‘Atlantic World.’”113 
Three similarities, relating to geographical space, demographics, and movement, suggest 
a common framework of analysis. The Pacific Ocean, like the Atlantic, is surrounded by 
                                                          
111 Alison Games concludes that “there was… no uniform style of cultural encounter or exchange 
around or within the ocean” to describe the grand diversity of human experience in the region. 
See Alison Games, “Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges and Opportunities,” American 
Historical Review 111, no. 3 (2006): 744, 752.; Bailyn, 30-38, 44-49. 
112 Bailyn, Atlantic History, 62. Responding to the lingering disconnect between the local 
experiences and global dynamics, Mapp deems Atlantic History “a fruitfully effective model and 
a frustratingly elusive notion.” See Paul W. Mapp, “Atlantic History from Imperial, Continental 
and Pacific Perspectives,” William and Mary Quarterly 63, no. 4 (2006), 713. 
113 Igler’s language carries a special concision that I cannot improve upon. Igler, The Great 
Ocean, 10. 
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four continents: Asia, Australia, North America, and South America. Moreover, Pacific 
archipelagos such as the Hawaiian, Society, Marquesas, and Samoan Islands are rough 
analogues for island chains in the Atlantic.114 Second, the region features a range of 
social, ethnic, and political identities as complex as the Atlantic World. Pacific religions 
range from Sunni Islam to Animism. Likewise, ethnic affiliations differ as much as Han 
Chinese, Maoris, and Spanish Mestizos.115 Third, the interconnectedness of disparate 
peoples, places, and ideas reflects an “ocean world” concept common to the Atlantic 
World.116 Both oceans experienced sustained periods of economic and cultural 
integration. Integration of the Pacific began during the middle eighteenth century, when 
scientific voyages and commercial enterprise intensified connections between Europeans 
and Islanders. Maritime trade shaped the interaction of communities thousands of miles 
apart, such as Boston, the Northwest Coast, and Canton.117 
Two remaining similarities between the Atlantic and Pacific Worlds relate to the 
choice of narrative. First, historians of European and American history find significant 
                                                          
114 Alison Games, “Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges and Opportunities,” 743. 
115 Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic History, 61-62. 
116 Igler, The Great Ocean, 10. 
117 Katrina Gulliver, “Finding the Pacific World,” Journal of World History 22, no. 1 (2011), 88-
93. Bernard Bailyn explains that “a long phase of development and integration” was the hallmark 
of the Atlantic World. The integrative phase began around 1500, when the transatlantic slave 
trade forged human and economic connections between Europe, Africa, and America. Igler 
observes a similar developmental pattern in the Pacific, where “commerce quickly multiplied the 
range of interactions between maritime traders and indigenous peoples.” See Bailyn, Atlantic 
History, 81.; Igler, 7-8. 
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material in both oceans. For centuries, the Atlantic and Pacific each facilitated the 
geopolitical and economic expansion of Europe, and scholars often describe each region 
with respect to the dominant state in one period or another. Immanuel Wallerstein 
comments upon the successive “hegemonic powers” of Spain, Netherlands, and England, 
whose economies dominated the Atlantic for more than four centuries.118 Similarly, 
scholars of the early modern period approach the Pacific Ocean as a Spanish or English 
“Lake,” while modernists often describe it as the “Mar Columbiana,” or American Sea. 
This dissertation seeks to address the moment of conceptual transition, when the United 
States supplanted Spain as the dominant maritime power in the Pacific.119 Second, where 
indigenous histories speak to the Pacific World, these, too, parallel ethnohistory in the 
context of the Atlantic World. In recent decades, scholars described the Americas as the 
“Indians’ Old World” and increasingly adopted a perspective that “faces east” toward the 
Atlantic.120 Similarly, historians of the Pacific are concerned with native peoples 
inhabiting a “sea of islands” or a vast “water continent,” and looking outward to 
                                                          
118 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of 
the European World Economy, 1600-1750, with a New Prologue (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2001), xxii-xxv. 
119 Arif Dirlik, “The Asia-Pacific Idea,” 55-79.; Arrell Gibson, Yankees in Paradise: The Pacific 
Basin Frontier (Santa Fe: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), 8. 
120 Neal Salisbury, “The Indians' Old World: Native Americans and the Coming of Europeans,” 
The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series 53, no. 3, Indians and Others in Early America 
(1996): 435-458.; Richter, Facing East from Indian Country, 7-8 
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neighbors beyond the horizon.121 This dissertation adopts a similar maritime view, to 
describe the interactions between American fur traders and three communities defined by 
a relationship to the sea. Once again, the interpretive similarities draw attention to the 
application of an Atlantic-World model to the Pacific. 
Nevertheless, both oceans maintain their individual properties as subjects of 
historical analysis, and the Columbia expeditions help to illuminate the differences 
between them. David Igler asserts that considerations of periodicity, scale, demographics, 
indigenous contact, and global commerce help to distinguish the Pacific.122 Despite the 
“integrative phase” common to both oceans, that phase began almost three centuries later 
in the Pacific. Moreover, integration of the ocean occurred in large part because of 
Columbia and other pioneering commercial vessels.123 The staggering scale of the 
Pacific, an “ocean hemisphere” covering one-third of the world’s surface, also 
contributes to its historical differences. By the middle seventeenth century, maritime 
activities had become routine in the Atlantic World. In contrast, the “tyranny of distance” 
continued to define the Pacific a century later. Expeditions to the ocean hemisphere, such 
as Columbia, faced the combined hazards of disease, typhoons, violence, lapses in 
                                                          
121 Epeli Hau’ofa, “Our Sea of Islands,” Contemporary Pacific 6 (1994): 153.; Matsuda, Pacific 
Worlds, 5.; Mansel G. Blackford, Pathways to the Present: U.S. Development and its 
Consequences in the Pacific (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006), 13. 
122 Igler, The Great Ocean, 10. 
123 William H. Goetzmann, New Lands, New Men: America and the Second Great Age of 
Discovery (New York: Viking Press, 1986), 232-33. 
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communications, and other undiscovered dangers—all impossibly far away from friendly 
shores.124 Large human migrations, comparable to the Atlantic Slave Trade or 
immigration to the Americas, did not occur in the Pacific. Prior to the voyage of the 
Columbia, the largest migration was the Pleistocene peopling of Melanesia, Micronesia, 
Polynesia, and Australasia, thousands of years in the past. Columbia sailed during a 
century when Pacific Islanders, traveling abroad as “cosmopolitans” for short periods, 
constituted the bulk of “migrants” in the Pacific.125 Even the First Fleet that transported 
convicts to New South Wales did not arrive in Australia until 1788, contemporaneous 
with Columbia’s appearance in the Pacific.126  
Meanwhile, distance buffered the indigenous peoples of the Pacific World from 
regular contact with Europeans until the final decades of the eighteenth century. When 
Columbia doubled Cape Horn, she exited the “red, white, and black” Atlantic and entered 
an ocean where regular interaction between Islanders and Europeans was less than a 
generation old.127 On the Northwest Coast, her first destination, contact had occurred 
                                                          
124 Barry M. Gough, Distant Dominion: Britain and the Northwest Coast of America, 1579-1809 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1980), 1-7. 
125  Thomas, Islanders, 13-23, 47-53.; James Belich, Making Peoples: A History of the New 
Zealanders from Polynesian Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth Century (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1996), 141-42. 
126 Robert Hughes, The Fatal Shore: The Epic of Australia’s Founding (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1986), 43-83. 
127 Gary Nash, Red, White and Black: The Peoples of Early North America  (New York: Prentice-
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only a few years before, during the age of Captain Cook, if at all. Globalization and the 
“integrative phase” also accelerated more quickly than in the Atlantic. In 1788, Columbia 
marked the first appearance of the “Boston Men,” and their particular brand of market 
capitalism, in the Pacific.128 Just two decades later, hundreds of American trading, 
whaling, and scavenger vessels would operate in the ocean hemisphere.129 
This work also contends, however, that the Columbia expeditions complicate and 
extend Igler’s interpretation of Pacific World. Igler devotes only passing attention to 
Columbia in his landmark work, The Great Ocean, and his incorporation of primary 
sources relating to the voyages is quite selective. For example, he concludes that the 
Columbians preferred a strategy of “confrontation” and that “violence often figured 
prominently” in their expeditions.130 I argue, on the contrary, that the expedition’s 
hallmark was its pragmatism in fostering conditions of mutual accommodation. Columbia 
is conspicuously absent in Igler’s treatment of the maritime fur trade, the Northwest 
Coast, and Canton, even though her expeditions reveal much about the character of Early 
American involvement in those locations. Moreover, his analysis barely touches upon 
voyages prior to 1800.131 Observations such as these, which challenge Igler, do not 
detract from the significance of his broad claims about the Pacific World. Here, 
                                                          
128 Phelps, “Solid Men of Boston in the Northwest,” 31-83. 
129 Gibson, Yankees in Paradise 109-30, 131-43, 155-60. 
130 Igler, The Great Ocean, 15, 77-82. 
131 Ibid., 17-20, 30, 33-36, 105-11. 
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Columbia contextualizes the beginnings of the “vital interplay between global, oceanic, 
and local scales of history,” and therefore, extends his argument backward into the 
eighteenth century.132 Occupying a moment between the “scientific” and “commercial” 
periods of European involvement in the Pacific, the Columbia deepens our understanding 
the connections between these eras. Moreover, her voyages  reveal environments in 
which American and European “hegemonic power” had not attained the prominence of 
later decades. Most importantly, the voyages underscore new conditions of “glocality” 
that connected the communities of Boston, the Northwest Coast, and Canton. Indeed, 
Columbia extends Igler’s claim that the eighteenth-century Pacific “was not a single 
ocean world,” and demonstrates how it became an integrated, discernable ocean 
region.133  
 
A Note on Names  
 
 
Jason sent his invitation to all the adventurous young men of Greece, and 
soon found himself as the head of a band of bold youths… They are called 
the Argonauts, from the name of their vessel. 
 
 
Throughout this work I refer to the captains and crew of both vessels, the 
Columbia and Washington, as the “Columbians.” The term connects them strongly to 
their flagship, in much the same manner as the Greek Argonauts are associated with a 
                                                          
132 Ibid., 11. 
133 Ibid., 4. 
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quest for the Golden Fleece aboard the ship Argo. The Columbians were American 
mariners, to be sure, but their significance as pioneers in the distant Pacific sets them 
apart from other Americans who followed them in later years. The Columbia expeditions 
took them far beyond the red line, so to speak, and frequently carried them into uncharted 
waters. Their choices, their attitudes, and the economic conditions they conjured into 
being, set the stage for American domination of the maritime fur trade, and the Pacific 
World, in later years. Thomas Bulfinch, the great American collector of mythologies, 
explained the Argo legend in terms that could easily describe the voyages of the 
Columbia: 
 
This is one of those mythological tales, says a modern writer, in which 
there is reason to believe that a substratum of truth exists, though overlaid 
by a mass of fiction. It probably was the first important maritime 
expedition, and like the first attempts of the kind of all nations, as we 
know from history, was probably of a half-piratical character. If rich spoils 
were the result, it was enough to give rise to the idea of the golden 
fleece.134 
 
 
It is possible that Bulfinch sensed this connection more strongly than we might 
expect. His father, the architect Charles Bulfinch, invested in the Columbia, which sailed 
in pursuit of its own golden fleece, the sea otter. Boston men set out to become the first 
“Free and Independent Americans” to enter the Pacific, touch upon the Northwest Coast, 
                                                          
134 Epigram and quotation from Thomas Bulfinch, Bulfinch’s Mythology: The Age of Fable, the 
Age of Chivalry, and Legends of Charlemagne (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1913), 131-32. 
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and return by an audacious circumnavigation of the globe.135 During their odyssey, the 
Columbians allied with Indian chiefs, negotiated with representatives of an emperor, and 
first sighted the “Great River of the West.” Family history, local history, and global 
history became intertwined. If anything has the makings of a national mythology for the 
United States, it is the epic of the Columbians. And yet, as Bulfinch observed, when one 
peels back the veneer of myth, the “substratum” of complicated, unusual, and surprising 
reality is often more instructive than the legend itself. 
                                                          
135 Joseph Barrell “Orders Given Captain John Kendrick,” 112. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
“ADVENTURE TO THE PACIFIC” 
 
 
In 1787, just after the departure of his ships Columbia Rediviva and Lady 
Washington from Boston, Joseph Barrell, esquire, penned a short note to accompany a 
package sent to the Congress of the Confederation, then meeting in New York: 
 
Mr. Barrell in behalf of the Owners of the Adventure to the Pacific Ocean 
presents his most respectfull Compliments, to His Excellency the President 
of Congress, and Requests the honor of his Acceptance of a Medal struck 
on the Occasion.1 
 
 
 There is no record of the President’s reaction to receiving the medal, but its 
significance would could not have been overlooked. The medal, which celebrated the first 
American voyage to the distant Pacific, was also the first private commemorative piece 
struck in the United States. According to scattered and often inconsistent sources, Barrell 
is believed to have ordered some 300 medals in pewter, copper, and silver. Of these, he 
“caused also about a dozen silver ones to be struck; one of which was sent to General 
                                                            
1 Joseph Barrell to President of Congress, n.d., probably 1787, enclosure with Columbia and 
Washington medal, ALS, Columbia Papers II, Massachusetts Historical Society. 
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Washington.”2 Additionally, Barrell presented medals to the Secretary of State, Thomas 
Jefferson, and their common friend, John Adams.3 The medal was striking in simplicity 
and beauty, befitting a new nation founded upon republican principles only eleven years 
earlier. The obverse face featured a relief of the ship Columbia and its consort, the sloop 
Lady Washington, sailing together on a placid, indeed pacific, ocean. The unassuming 
legend “Columbia and Washington commanded by J. Kendrick” was embossed upon its 
broad, upset rim. The reverse face provided a continuation to that legend, stating that 
ships had been “Fitted at Boston N. America for the Pacific Ocean.” The words were 
illuminated by a shimmering star, perhaps a reference to the “New Constellation” of 
thirteen stars, one per state, on the new nation’s flag.4 The legend concluded by 
                                                            
2 In addition to the four silver medals presented to the President of Congress, Washington, 
Jefferson, and Adams, three more are known to have been in the possession of Barrell, his 
brother-in-law Samuel Blatchley Webb, and Captain Robert Gray. Assuming that Hoskins is 
correct, and Barrell ordered a full dozen, the remaining medals were probably distributed to the 
other five investors in the voyage. See John Box Hoskins, “Narrative of the Second Voyage of the 
‘Columbia’” in Voyages of the Columbia to the Northwest Coast, 1787-90 & 1790-1793, ed., 
Frederic Howay, ed. (Portland: Oregon Historical Society in cooperation with the Massachusetts 
Historical Society, 1990), 162.; Anne E. Bentley, “The Columbia-Washington Medal” 
Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Third Series, 101 (1989), 120-27. 
3 “Joseph Barrell to Thomas Jefferson, 24 November 1787,” in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 
vol. 12, ed. Julian P. Boyd (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), 379.; Joseph Barrell, 
Boston, to John Adams, 24 November 1787, ALS, Adams Family Papers, Massachusetts 
Historical Society. 
4 Eran Shalev has demonstrated that astronomical knowledge affected the language and 
representation of politics during the eighteenth century. For example, “strong monarchs” such as 
Philip IV of Spain and James I of England presented themselves as the “embodiment of their 
respective states” and “as celestial bodies, particularly the sun.” Louis XIV of France, who may 
have uttered “I am the state” and cultivated a popular image as the “sun king,” is only the most 
obvious example. In this scheme, kings became the “monarchial pivot” around which “other 
planets,” symbolizing the subjects and territories of the nation, would “revolve.” By contrast, the 
United States adopted astronomical language and symbols to represent a nation constituted on 
republican principles. For example, in 1775, scientist John Rittenhouse delivered an oration that 
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attributing the expedition to Joseph Barrell and his partners—Samuel Brown, Charles 
Bulfinch, John Derby, Crowell Hatch, and John M. Pintard. The medal, long supposed to 
have been designed by Paul Revere, is now suspected to have been the handiwork of 
another Bostonian engraver, Joseph Callender, or perhaps even Barrell himself.5  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Joseph Barrell and Joseph Callender. The Columbia and Washington Medal, 1787, obverse 
and reverse in silver, ex Appleton, 42 mm., Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston. 
 
                                                            
likened the thirteen colonies to a “new American constellation” of thirteen stars. Ideology and 
iconography became even more closely connected during the American Revolutionary War. In 
1776, the Pennsylvania Ledger published an essay describing the thirteen stars as “united upon 
the principles of perfect equality… gravitating towards one another.” Congress adopted the same 
iconography on June 14, 1777, when it designated that “the Flag of the thirteen United States” 
should feature “Thirteen Stars, white in a Blue Field, representing a new Constellation.” See Eran 
Shalev, “‘A Republic Amidst the Stars’: Political Astronomy and the Intellectual Origins of the 
Stars and Stripes” Journal of the Early Republic 31, no. 1 (2011): 40-42, 49-53.; Journals of the 
Continental Congress, 1774-1789, vol. 8, 1777, May 22-October 2, ed. Worthington Chauncey 
Ford (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1907), 464. 
5 Joseph Barrell and Joseph Callender, Columbia and Washington medal, 1787, obverse and 
reverse in silver, ex Appleton, Massachusetts Historical Society; Bentley, “The Columbia-
Washington Medal”, 121-23. 
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What justified this extraordinary act—that of sending commemorative medals of a 
Bostonian maritime enterprise to the new nation’s political elites? How might 
Washington, Jefferson, and Adams have reacted to receiving such an artifact as a gift? 
What was the meaning of the Columbia? Most likely, the three luminaries would have 
been enormously proud of what the expedition’s two captains, John Kendrick and Robert 
Gray, set out to accomplish. Certainly, the projected voyage was ambitious in the 
extreme. If successful, the Columbia and Lady Washington would become the first 
United States vessels to enter the Pacific Ocean. There, Kendrick and Gray would 
pioneer upon an American fur trade between the Northwest Coast and China. Later, 
having realized a significant profit, the Columbia and Lady Washington would return to 
the United States with cargoes of valuable tea, porcelain, and silk. In doing so, the vessels 
would achieve another “first”—becoming the first ships to circumnavigate the globe 
under American colors. Washington, Jefferson, and Adams must have recognized the 
enormous material requirements, financial risks, and unavoidable danger involved in the 
enterprise. 
The Columbia expedition emerged from transformations in the political economy 
of the United States during and after the Revolutionary War. The experience of war 
taught American merchants crucial lessons about entrepreneurship, risk, innovation, 
resilience, and vision. In the aftermath, many merchants—and particularly Bostonians—
advanced a program of free trade on the global stage. The Columbia-Washington Medal 
provides a window into the planning of, and provides a mission statement for, two 
voyages of commercial expansion in the Pacific. Such an ambitious program could only 
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be accomplished through a combination of ingenuity, information, and imagination. This 
chapter addresses each point in turn. First, it examines Joseph Barrell, the American 
entrepreneur most responsible for launching Columbia. Second, the chapter assesses the 
perspectives of three national leaders—Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and John 
Adams—whose views shaped American engagement with the Pacific World. Finally, the 
chapter shows how Barrell advanced his commercial vision and assembled the financial, 
human, and physical resources necessary to mount the expedition. In short, the 
Revolutionary War prepared merchant-capitalists, national statesmen, and veteran 
mariners to overcome the challenges of sending an expedition, that of Columbia and 
Washington, into the distant Pacific. 
 
“Fitted at Boston N. America… by J. Barrell…” 
 
 
What follows is the first detailed account of the life of Joseph Barrell, the 
entrepreneur responsible for sending Americans to the Pacific in 1787.6 Barrell’s 
contemporaries regarded him as “well qualified by his experience and ability for taking 
the lead in such matters.”7 How did this businessman, barely remembered today, develop 
the “experience and ability” needed to plan such an ambitious venture?  
                                                            
6 The information gathered here is collected from a wealth of primary and secondary documents, 
including letters, probate records, memoires, periodicals, and government records. My account 
does not include the business records of N. Barrell and Company, housed within the Harvard 
Business Library, which lie outside the scope of this dissertation. 
7 Charles Bulfinch, The Life and Letters of Charles Bulfinch, Architect, with other Family Papers, 
ed. Ellen Susan Bulfinch, editor (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1896), 64. 
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Joseph, born in 1740, would not have been the natural bet to become the most 
famous Barrell in history—his ancestors had accomplished much since the family 
immigrated to America, and his older brothers preceded him in business. Barrell 
descended from a family of coopers known since the time of the Norman Conquest of 
England. His adventurous forebear, George Barrell, hailed from the village of St. 
Michaels, one of the twelve “saints” parishes in Suffolk. In 1637, during a period of 
increasing social and political discontent, George and his family immigrated to the new 
colony of Massachusetts Bay, becoming one of thousands who took passage to New 
England during the “Great Migration.”8 Settling in Boston, an aspiring village, he 
acquired a “great lot at the Mount” and resumed his family trade.9 George’s eldest son 
John also trained as a cooper. Like his father, John intended to improve his own 
condition, albeit through social climbing rather than immigration. In 1643, he assumed 
the family business and entered service as a sergeant in the town’s artillery company. The 
status of an independent proprietor and a militia leader burnished his reputation as a solid 
                                                            
8 Drawn from a sketch of the Barrell genealogy included in a biographical memoir of the 
geologist Joseph Barrell, grandson of the merchant Joseph Barrell, and presented to the National 
Academy of Sciences at its annual meeting. See Charles Schuchert, Biographical Memoir of 
Joseph Barrell, 1869-1919 (Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1925), 6. 
9 Annie Haven Thwing compiled thousands of probate, title deed, and inheritance records into a 
single index, now located at Massachusetts Historical Society. See Annie Haven Thwing, 
Inhabitants and estates of the town of Boston, 1630-1800: and the crooked and narrow streets of 
Boston 1630-1822 [CD-ROM] (Boston: New England Historic Genealogical Society and 
Massachusetts Historical Society, 2001), Reference Code 4591. 
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citizen.10 Moreover, he married Mary Colburn, the daughter of William Colburn, a 
founder of the colony and an influential figure in Boston.11 Their marriage placed the 
Barrell family in line for a share of the Colburn inheritance.12 
John Barrell, Jr. began the family transition from manual labor to commercial 
enterprise. In 1673, he worked as a “servant” to Samuel Ward, also a cooper, perhaps in 
the capacity of an apprentice.13 The arrangement must not have appealed to him—later 
generations remembered him alternatively as a “mariner,” “shopkeeper,” or even 
“Captain Barrell.”14 His marriage to Abiah Sanderson, the daughter of a merchant, 
provided some of the capital necessary to embark upon a new, more profitable line of 
business. She brought three houses, a tenement, land, and £20 sterling into the 
marriage.15 Following their wedding, John, Jr. established a small retail enterprise on 
Newbury Street. From 1706-1711, he constructed a stable on “his pasture” at South End, 
presumably to facilitate the movement of merchandise into, out of, and around Boston. 
Likewise, he made two additions to his “timber shop” on Newberry Street and 
                                                            
10 Thwing, Inhabitants and estates of the town of Boston, 1630-1800, Reference Code 4593. 
11 Schuchert, Biographical Memoir of Joseph Barrell, 6. 
12 Thwing, Inhabitants and estates of the town of Boston, 1630-1800, Reference Codes 4608, 
16160. 
13 Ibid., Reference Code 59967. 
14 Schuchert, Biographical Memoir of Joseph Barrell, 6. 
15 Thwing, Inhabitants and estates of the town of Boston, 1630-1800, Reference Codes 888, 889. 
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constructed a “new brick house” on the premises.16 John, Jr. never knew his grandfather, 
George, who brought the Barrell family to Massachusetts, nor would he survive to meet 
his grandson Joseph, whose ship Columbia would carry a new nation into the Pacific. To 
his son, John Barrell III, he left a burgeoning family fortune and a middle-class lifestyle 
unknown to his ancestors. 
Boston was a town in transition during the eighteenth century, and John Barrell III 
took advantage of its new commercial orientation. Considered “a well educated man and 
a successful shipping merchant,” he transformed the family business into a merchant 
house with connections throughout the Atlantic World.17 John III purchased ships, 
established an overseas network of agents, and developed a vigorous shipping business 
between Massachusetts, Virginia, Great Britain, and distant places such as the Canary 
Islands.18 Moreover, he amassed a fortune while supplying the British garrison in Nova 
                                                            
16 Ibid., Reference Code 4596. 
17 Schuchert, Biographical Memoir of Joseph Barrell, 6. 
18 Thomas Oxnard, “To All people to whom these presents shall come, Thomas Oxnard, Samuel 
Wenthworth, and Chales Apthorp of Boston, merchants, send greeting. Whereas Joseph Gerrish 
and John Barrell of Boston, merchants, of the one part, and Alexander French, late master of the 
ship Hallowell of Boston, of the other part, by their mutual bonds, of the twelfth of October 
instant, have submitted themselves to our final determination of all matters depending between 
them…” (Boston, 1739), Early American Imprints, Series I: Evans, 1679-1800, Charles Evans 
and Roger P. Bristol, contributors (microfiche), no. 49215.  
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Scotia during King George’s War.19 Meanwhile, he married Ruth Green, with whom he 
fathered eight sons from 1729-45—Joseph Barrell and his brothers.20 
According to tradition, Joseph’s eldest brothers could be expected to inherit and 
either share, divide, or liquidate the family business. Indeed, Nathaniel assumed control 
the commercial house, which received the new name “N. Barrell and Company.”21 
Colburn established a partnership with blacksmith Edward Foster, merchants Benjamin 
Davis and Edward King, and wharfinger Isaac Winslow, Jr.22 Similarly, Walter accepted 
a position as customs inspector in Nova Scotia.23 Upon coming of age, Joseph became a 
junior partner at N. Barrell and Company.24 Here, he learned the principles of accounting, 
investment, projected returns, and shipping—expertise that informed later ventures such 
                                                            
19 John Barrell III partnered with Joseph Gerrish, a veteran of the 3rd Massachusetts Regiment, to 
establish the provisions trade to Anapolis Royal, Nova Scotia. Later generations of the family 
would maintain these connections with the British government, prompting Colburn Barrell, a 
loyalist, to repatriate to London during the American Revolution. See Thwing, Inhabitants and 
estates of the town of Boston, 1630-1800, Reference Code 20936.; Stephen E. Patterson, 
“GERRISH, JOSEPH,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, Vol. 4, (University of 
Toronto/Université Laval, 2003– ), http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/gerrish_joseph_4E.html 
(Accessed on 23 May 2015). 
20 John Barrell III’s eight sons were named John Nathaniel (“Nathaniel”), Colburn, Walter, 
Joseph (of Columbia fame), Theodore, William, Jeremiah, and Edward. Thwing, Inhabitants and 
estates of the town of Boston, 1630-1800, Reference Code 4597. 
21 Ibid., Reference Code 4597. 
22 Ibid., Reference Code 4601. 
23 Ibid., Reference Code 4605. 
24 Julie Aronson and Marjorie E. Wieseman, Perfect Likeness: European and American Portrait 
Miniatures from the Cincinnati Art Museum (New Haven: Yale University Press for Cincinnati 
Art Museum, 2006), 150. 
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as the Columbia.25 For the moment, however, he continued training under his older 
brothers. In 1761, he began selling imported textiles, probably on consignment, out of R. 
Traill’s store near the Boston Work House.26 Soon enough, he planned to open his own 
business. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. John Singleton Copley, Portrait of Joseph Barrell, 
c.1767, pastel on cream laid paper, 59.4 x 47 cm., Worcester 
Art Museum, Worcester, MA. 
                                                            
25 Barrell kept detailed records in advance of the second Columbia expedition recorded 
expenditures, including categories for outfit, provisions, tools, and cargo. [Joseph Barrell], 
“Expenditures for the Columbia’s Outfit and Cargo” in Voyages of the Columbia, 448-64. 
26 “Just Imported, and to be Sold by Joseph Barrell” New Hampshire Gazette (Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire), 13 February 1761. 
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Like so many other Americans, Barrell found himself transformed by the 
American Revolution. The conflict informed his thinking about entrepreneurship, risk, 
and innovation, while instilling in him a sense of resilience. Most importantly, however, 
the revolutionary era forced him to embrace innovation and shaped his vision for the 
Columbia expedition.27 In short, the struggle for independence taught him the lessons 
necessary for launching a commercial expedition to the Far East.28 
Joseph Barrell faced significant risks from the moment he opened his “new 
STORE by the STATE-HOUSE,” in a high-rent commercial district of Boston, in 1762.29 
Many leading merchants considered the town to be saturated with retail shops.30 
                                                            
27 In modern terms, Joseph Barrell embodied several concepts central to the development of a 
successful business. Three of these, the identities of the entrepreneur, risk-taker, and innovator, 
can be measured in terms of discrete business outcomes. The remaining two characteristics, 
resilience and vision, are intangibles crucial to the survival and success of groundbreaking 
enterprises. Here, I evaluate his development of the first four characteristics, with special 
attention to wartime conditions and his home community of Boston. The fifth characteristic, 
vision, is addressed later in this chapter. 
28 In this respect, however, Barrell was not alone among American businessmen. Robert Morris 
and Elias Hasket Derby, shipping magnates of Philadelphia and Salem, respectively, also 
intended to revive national commerce through the China Trade. Both men launched profitable 
voyages to China via the Indian Ocean. In preparing to send his own expedition to the Far East, 
however, Barrell favored the Pacific. See Charles Rappleye, Robert Morris: Financier of the 
American Revolution (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 386-90; E.H. Derby, Jr., “Elias 
Hasket Derby” in Lives of American Merchants, ed. Freeman Hunt (New York: Derby & Jackson, 
1858), 2:52-54. 
29 “Imported and to be sold by Joseph Barrell” New Hampshire Gazette (Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire), 19 November 1761. 
30 John W. Tyler, “Persistence and Change in the Boston Business Community, 1775-1790,” in 
Entrepreneurs: The Boston Business Community, 1700-1850, eds. Conrad Edick Wright and 
Katheryn P Viens (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1997), 101. 
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Moreover, commercial risk abounded in the 1760s, a period of imperial crisis in which a 
political rift gradually opened between Great Britain and America.31 Barrell later 
remembered the period as one of “adversity” and “difficulties.”32 In accepting the 
substantial risk of opening a grocery under such conditions, he exemplified the spirit of 
an entrepreneur, and set himself apart from his oldest brothers, who merely inherited and 
managed a successful family business. 33 The Stamp Act Crisis erupted in 1765, while 
Barrell was still becoming established in his new business. Merchants faced difficult 
choices in navigating the controversy. For Barrell, just starting out and struggling to build 
a customer base, the options posed a quandry: support Parliament and face public 
alienation, or endorse the Sons of Liberty and risk official retribution. Later generations 
remembered that he “he early espoused, and during the whole course of his life firmly 
maintained, the cause of his country.”34 Like his Patriot brothers, Nathanial and Colburn, 
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he probably supported the Sons of Liberty in spirit if not in word.35 For a young 
entrepreneur, the economic conditions of Boston shaped a volatile business environment. 
Although Parliament repealed the Stamp Act in 1766, the Townshend Acts, introduced in 
1767, renewed the constitutional crisis and prompted another wave of boycotts. 
Bostonian merchants approved a comprehensive non-importation agreement that targeted 
all goods from England. Crucially, however, the agreement sought to “encourage the Use 
and Consumption of all Articles manufactured in any of the British American 
Colonies.”36  
The new constraints did not stop Barrell. By 1768, he expanded his business to a 
grocery in Boston’s South End. Here, he advertised tea, sugar, peppers, chocolate, spices, 
and spirits in the customer’s choice of “large or small Quantities, on the very lowest 
terms for Cash.” While he did continue to sell “a few English Goods,” these did not 
necessarily breech the terms of non-importation. Barrell could justify the questionable 
items as having been purchased through middlemen in other colonies.37 Few would have 
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quarreled with this explanation, as he was considered “fair and honorable” by his peers.38 
Moreover, he probably acquired tea through smugglers, perhaps those associated with the 
Dutch East India Company.39 The non-importation movement taught Barrell the value of 
adaptation in the face of institutional, social, or political obstacles. 
Barrell became a seasoned risk-taker prior to the Columbia expeditions. Although 
risk is never desirable, Barrell understood it as a necessary evil in building a business. 
Consequently, he was not afraid to bet on a promising enterprise.40 Even political 
economists of the eighteenth century recognized the centrality of risk. Richard Cantillon, 
a Franco-Irish economist, proposed the first theoretical treatment of the “entrepreneur” in 
his tract Essai Sur la Nature du Commerce en Général (1755). Here, Cantillon argued 
that entrepreneurs are best understood as those who “establish themselves with capital to 
run their enterprise” and “may be considered to be living with uncertainty.”41 The 
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uncertainty, he explained, resulted from an entrepreneur allocating known sums for 
goods, services, and equipment, without reliable foreknowledge of profits. 
Entrepreneurial success, therefore, depended upon the business person becoming expert 
in the estimation and mitigation of risk. Cantillon categorized a variety of business people 
as “entrepreneurs,” including “merchants in wholesale and retail” as well as “those who 
purchase commodities… and transport them.”42 During the turbulent 1770s, just as the 
term entrepreneur was becoming commonplace, Joseph Barrell expanded his business to 
include shipping—a trade fraught with risk on the high seas. By expanding into a second 
line of work, he exemplified the range of entrepreneurial activities available to a 
Bostonian. 
During the non-importation movement, Barrell weathered his first major 
challenge, but the eruption of hostilities between the “United Colonies” and Great Britain 
presented an entirely new set of conditions. During the Revolutionary War, British 
warships enforced a blockade against the Thirteen Colonies, thus limiting imports of 
consumer and strategic goods. Elsewhere, British merchantmen ferried military supplies 
across the Atlantic.43 For Americans, Privateer vessels represented a solution to both 
problems, and also an opportunity for a ship owner to reap astronomical profits. 
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York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1976), 87-91. 
95 
 
Privateers usually began as small merchant or fishing vessels.44 Fitted with light 
armament, manned by a skilled crew, and chartered with an official lettres de marque, 
such vessels became privateers authorized to take prizes at sea. In doing so, they deprived 
Britain of its shipping and simultaneously acquired goods needed in America.45 
Moreover, the cost to outfit a privateer was feasible even for middling businessmen. One 
could acquire guns, equipment, and supplies for around £1,000 sterling, a sum 
comparable to Barrell’s commercial losses during the early conflict.46 Privateers often 
took prizes valued at tens of thousands of pounds. Custom dictated that the crewmembers 
receive half the value of a prize, while the remaining fifty percent belonged to the 
owner.47 Barrell could theoretically recover his investment, and realize a profit, with a 
single cruise. 
Privateering, however, was not without its pitfalls. As one historian of the 
revolution at sea has observed, “If the profits were high, so too were the risks.” 48 
Schooners and sloops, though often able to escape from heavier vessels, could not stand 
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gun-to-gun against British warships. Under poor wind conditions, or an incompetent 
master, a privateer might be captured or sunk, causing a businessman to forfeit his 
investment. Facing potential losses, Joseph Barrell became an expert in the management 
of risk. In doing so, he benefitted from local knowledge. Colonial investors launched 
hundreds of privateers—and took thousands of prizes—during earlier wars between Great 
Britain and France. Such expertise, which enabled a novice investor to anticipate risks, 
still circulated in the living memory of New Englanders.49 Barrell could also consult his 
peers about risks unique to the revolutionary conflict. Massachusetts launched 958 
privateers, carrying more than 35,000 crewmembers, during the Revolutionary War. 
Boston alone contributed 349 vessels.50 There was no shortage of fresh information, or 
rumor, about wartime conditions at sea. 
Barrell managed his investments though the common practice of sharing risk with 
multiple investment partners. Prior to 1779, he purchased a share in the General Putnam, 
a privateer owned by his brother, William Barrell of Philadelphia. Likewise, he also 
invested in the Satisfaction and Vengeance, ships owned by merchants in Newbury and 
Boston.51 Beginning in 1779, he became the managing partner in collaboration with his 
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brother-in-law, Colonel Samuel Webb of Wethersfield, Connecticut. Together, they 
financed several successful privateers, such as Revenge, General Gates, Beaver, and 
Recovery.52 Barrell launched other vessels, including American Tarter, Friends 
Adventure, and General Lee, in partnership with fellow Bostonians.53 Meanwhile, he 
took advantage of an employer’s market in skilled seamen. Economic hardship in 
Massachusetts made the privateer an attractive option for sailors. The promise of regular 
wages, combined with the allure of prize money, drew many experienced sea workers 
from the waterfront to the deck.54 A few sailors, such as Thomas Allen, who served 
aboard Barrell’s vessel, General Putnam, returned with sufficient winnings to start new, 
profitable businesses of their own.55 Barrell also profited handsomely upon his 
investment in privateers. Vengeance and Revenge each captured “large and valuable prize 
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ship[s]” that “more than cleared the first cost” of his investments.56 Moreover, his 
customers maintained a steady appetite for captured cargoes, which included “Brown 
Sugar, Gin in Cases, French Brandy in Anchors” and “a few Cask of excellent Porter.”57 
Even where the prizes were insignificant, such as two oystermen, they were “palatable if 
not profitable.”58 In short, privateering made Barrell an expert in the management of 
commercial risk. 
Joseph Barrell also understood the value of innovation in business. Unlike the 
willingness to accept risks, the impulse toward innovation was not considered a defining 
characteristic of the entrepreneur during the eighteenth century. Like many businessmen 
of the revolutionary era, though, Barrell saw opportunities to deliver goods and services 
in new, creative ways.59 He launched an innovative new enterprise in September, 1778, 
when the French Admiral, Charles Hector, Comte d’Estaing, brought his fleet to anchor 
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in Boston Harbor. The fleet, sailing in support of the Franco-American alliance, included 
twelve ships of the line, four frigates, and more than 7,500 hungry crewmembers.60 Their 
presence placed a heavy demand upon local resources. In the countryside, towns 
complained that the quartering of French troops created a dearth of household goods, 
foodstuffs, and livestock. Meanwhile, bread shortages triggered riots against the French 
in Boston.61 Something had to be done. Charles Bulfinch recalled that “the unsettled state 
of the time prevented Mr. barrel from engaging in any active business” prior to the arrival 
of d’Estaing.62 Indeed, Barrell perceived a golden opportunity to serve his country’s 
cause, feed the French, and profit.  
He probably received an introduction to the admiral, as well as the French 
Consul-General, during a banquet hosted for the French by Nathaniel Tracy, another 
Bostonian merchant.63 Thereafter, he sprang into action. Barrell mobilized his 
longstanding knowledge of goods, prices, producers, and teamsters.64 He leveraged “local 
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networks of exchange” that supplied the town of Boston with “all sorts of goods and 
services.”65 Meat, bread, butter, cheese, and vegetables were all available in Boston, but 
usually through small neighborhood groceries. The existing network was adequate to feed 
families, but not thousands of sailors.66 Barrell’s principal innovation was to coordinate, 
regulate, and concentrate foodstuffs in quantities adequate to meet the daily subsistence 
needs of the fleet.67 In doing so, he intensified the consolidation of “local exchanges” into 
a sophisticated network that provided “a general run of products” into Boston.68 
Furthermore, he reinvested his privateer winnings—including luxury goods, sugar, and 
tea—toward meeting the fleet’s needs. Barrell, the neighborhood grocer and privateer 
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owner, combined his agricultural and maritime expertise to achieve commercial 
innovation.  
Charles Bulfinch described the result as “three months of hurried employment” 
along the waterfront.69 Certainly, it was among the most profitable periods in Barrell’s 
professional life. He realized a small commission upon all transactions occurring under 
his supervision, including the purchase, transport, and sale of produce to the French.70 
Assuming a commission of 3% on a daily fleet expenditure of more than $50,000, less 
Barrell’s operating expenses, his daily profit would have exceeded $1,400. Extended 
across a period of sixty days, this sum would exceed $80,000.71 The enterprise, combined 
with privateering, propelled him into the ranks of Boston’s post-revolutionary elites. In 
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1771, prior to the Revolutionary War, Barrell ranked among the eighth decile of 
taxpayers, a vulnerable, lower-middle-class position. In 1784, following the conflict, he 
appeared in the top, wealthiest decile of taxpayers. In fact, his postwar assets compared 
favorably with those of “old money” merchants such as John Hancock, William 
Greenleaf, and Jonathan Amory, Sr. Only one other Bostonian, Samuel Breck, a 
purchasing agent for Admiral d’Estaing, rose so far and so fast.72 
Life was full of ups and downs for Joseph Barrell. Throughout the period, though, 
he exhibited the intangible qualities of resilience and perseverance.73 Barrell’s eulogists 
stressed that “during the darkest period of his life cheerfulness never forsook him.” 
Success or failure notwithstanding, he remained the indomitable optimist, always 
maintaining a hopeful perspective on the future. His friends recalled that he pursued his 
goals with “uncommon zeal, firmness, and perseverance.”74 Their invocation of the word 
“perseverance” suggests that, throughout rough times, Barrell kept confidence in his own 
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abilities.75 Contemporaries affirmed that he was “bold and noble in his designs, and 
fearless of difficulties in accomplishing them.”76 Barrell understood defeat, and relied 
upon his own talents to stage a reversal of fortune. 
Two tragedies, both of which called for resilience and perseverance, struck during 
the 1770s. Either was sufficient to unravel a lesser individual. The first tragedy assumed 
an intensely personal character. In 1764, Barrell married Ann Pierce, whom he regarded 
as “the best of women.” Moreover, breaking with the conventions that often governed 
weddings in Boston, he married Pierce “from pure regard” rather than for economic 
advantage. Their love-match was a good one.77 Then, in June of 1771, Anne died, 
probably following a battle with smallpox.78 Barrell, wracked with despair, confided to 
his friend John Adams that “this World has lost all its Charms” and that he “would have 
been very glad to have gone with her.”79 Although the period of mourning probably 
lasted for several months, he soon reverted to a state of optimism that helped him 
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thrive.80 Thereafter, Barrell honored Anna’s dying wishes and remarried, wedding 
Hannah Fitch in December of 1771.81 The second significant tragedy was professional in 
nature. The British occupation of Boston—Parliament’s response to the famous 
“Destruction of the Tea” in 1773—severely limited imports and pushed many businesses 
toward bankruptcy.82 If this were not frustrating enough for merchants of the town, a 
preventable fire ravaged Boston’s South End in 1775. Thirty retail stores, including 
Barrell’s grocery, burned in a matter of hours. In the aftermath, he lamented that “I 
suffered loss 1000 £ sterling, a sum more than I can at this time loose without feeling 
it.”83 Thereafter, compelled to start over, he shifted his investments into privateers. These 
two episodes, the loss of a spouse and a business, demonstrate Barrell’s resilience in the 
face of catastrophic setbacks, both in the personal and professional spheres. His friends 
observed that “he passed through unusual vicissitudes of prosperity and adversity.” 
Moreover, they recalled that “disappointment, which he sometimes experienced, sat 
apparently easy on his mind. He considered it as the lot of the enterprising.”84 Barrell’s 
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resilience served him well in later years, particularly when launching Columbia on an 
uncertain expedition to the Pacific Ocean.  
Following his experiences during the American Revolutionary War, Barrell had 
acquired all the prerequisites to develop and communicate a strong vision for his next 
enterprise. What that enterprise might be, however, was not immediately obvious. 
Despite his entrepreneurial nature, Barrell was not the first to conceive of sending an 
American ship to China, nor was he the first to accomplish such a voyage. His visionary 
enterprise would represent an innovation upon the proven success of other groups, 
notably investors under the leadership of Robert Morris of Philadelphia.85 Morris, the 
wealthiest individual in the United States, had amassed a fortune through his shipping 
firm, Willing, Morris, & Co.86 One contemporary estimated his net worth at £350,000, 
although a recent biographer stresses that Morris was “rich in resources, but rarely in 
cash.”87 During the American Revolution, he served in a succession of posts including 
delegate to the Continental Congress, Agent of Marine, and Superintendent of Finance. 
Morris also courted controversy. His enemies, including Henry Laurens, and Thomas 
Paine, accused him of using information gained from the Secret Committee on Trade to 
                                                            
85 Mary A.Y. Gallagher, “Charting a New Course for the China Trade: The Late Eighteenth-
Century American Model” in The Early Republic and the Sea: Essays on the Naval and Maritime 
History of the Early United States, eds. William S. Dudley and Michael J. Crawford, 
(Washington: Brassey’s, Inc., 2001), 61-63. 
86 Rappleye, Robert Morris, 11-17, 24-26. 
87 Ibid., 202.  
106 
 
engage in war profiteering. On the other hand, he occasionally paid the Continental Army 
out of his own pocket and countersigned for loans to Congress.88 
In August 1783, while American ministers continued to hammer out a peace 
agreement with Great Britain, Morris announced to John Jay that “I am sending some 
Ships to China in order to encourage others in the adventurous pursuits of Commerce.”89 
Indeed, he was already planning the first commercial voyage from the United States to 
Canton, that of the Empress of China. In many ways, the expedition represented a 
transition from revolution to independence. Morris recruited experienced war veterans to 
supervise the peacetime venture.90 John Green, another Philadelphian, had captained the 
merchant schooner Queen of France for Willing and Morris since 1764.91 During the 
Revolution, he commanded the Continental ships Lion and Duc de Lauzan, ships which 
operated in the distant waters of the Caribbean and Europe.92 Green received an 
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appointment to captain the Empress. Similarly, Bostonians Samuel Shaw and Thomas 
Randall also participated in the conflict, serving together in a Connecticut artillery 
company under the command of Major General Henry Knox.93 Following the conflict, 
Shaw traveled with a personal letter of recommendation from General Washington, while 
Randall established a merchant house with Commodore Thomas Truxton in 
Philadelphia.94 Morris brought both men into the enterprise as supercargoes, or business 
managers, aboard the Empress.95 Even the ship represented a legacy of the Revolutionary 
War. Her designer was John Peck, considered the “most scientific naval architect” in the 
United States, whose frigates Belisarius, Rattlesnake, and Hazard had been among the 
fastest warships in the Continental Navy.96 Peck designed the Empress of China to the 
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same specifications as Belisarius, thus realizing the advantages of the blueprint for 
peacetime commerce.97 
Morris financed the Empress of China in collaboration with a number of other 
investors who perceived new opportunities in the Far East. His partners included Daniel 
Parker and William Duer, established military contractors to the American Congress, and 
later, their silent partner John Holker, Jr. 98 The original model required Morris and 
“Daniel Parker & Co.” to finance two-thirds of the expedition. Meanwhile, the “sundry 
merchants of Boston,” probably including Joseph Barrell, were expected to purchase the 
final third.99 According to one popular author, the “skittish Boston investors failed to buy 
in,” prompting the principals to revise their business model.100 This claim, however, 
overlooks cargo space purchased by several Bostonians. Barrell shipped twenty-three 
casks of ginseng aboard the Empress, a cargo that realized $4,053 in Canton. His 
involvement is best understood as experimental, or what modern businesspeople might 
call “test marketing.”101 While Bostonian merchants did not invest directly in the 
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Empress of China, their involvement did defray some expenses and, most importantly, 
helped Morris attract additional attention to the China Trade. 
On 22 February, 1784, the Empress of China weighed anchor and sailed out of 
New York Harbor. Morris instructed Captain Green to “run Southward” and then 
“proceed thence thro’ the Streights of Sunda to Macao,” the gateway to Canton.102 
Meanwhile, Morris briefly entertained the possibility of sending the Empress to the 
Pacific. The concept originated with John Ledyard, a Connecticut adventurer who had 
sailed with James Cook during the celebrated third voyage of 1776-80. Upon returning to 
the United States, which achieved its independence while he was at sea, Ledyard 
approached Morris with a scheme to realize an “astonishing profit” in the Pacific. In 
1778, while anchored at Nootka Sound, Cook’s men purchased otter skins with “no 
thoughts at that time of using them to any other advantage than converting them to the 
purposes of cloathing.” Later, when the expedition put into Canton for supplies, Ledyard 
noted that “skins which did not cost the purchaser six-pence sterling sold in China for 
100 dollars.”103 The sum equates to a profit margin of more than 83,000 percent per 
unit.104 In an astonishing decision, Morris and his partners passed up the opportunity—
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instead, they became convinced that the Pacific route was too unpredictable, dangerous, 
and worrisome.105 
The moment when Joseph Barrell became interested in the Pacific Ocean is 
impossible to pinpoint, although the “South Seas” probably captured his imagination in 
the 1780s. We cannot know how Barrell might have viewed the Pacific had he, in 1784, 
been the principal investor behind an ambitious venture like the Empress of China. 
Having purchased cargo space aboard the vessel, though, he undoubtedly followed news 
of the expedition with great interest and understood the lessons of her commercial 
success at Canton.106 Upon returning, in 1785, the Empress demonstrated that a trade 
from the United States to China could be profitable. She did nothing, however, to prove 
the feasibility of a commercial voyage in the Pacific. Barrell wrote that an American 
mission to the “Pacifick Ocean & China” was possible, and even desirable, as early as 
1785—but he expressed no interest in personally launching such a venture.107 Thomas 
Bulfinch later explained that Barrell became interested in financing an expedition to the 
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Pacific in 1787, after reading about the “discoveries of Capt. Cook, the account of which 
had lately been published.” Certainly, Barrell remarked that “there is a rich harvest to be 
reaped by those who shall go in first.”108 He must have wondered, through, whether 
national leaders would support a Pacific expedition in the same manner as the Empress. 
Richard Henry Lee celebrated the “short and successful voyage made from hence to 
Canton” and looked forward to “a regular and useful commerce with that part of the 
world.”109 James Madison also collected information concerning the Empress from a 
friend who “heartily wish[ed] to see the merchts. of our State engaged in this 
business.”110 Although national leaders expressed support for the China Trade, few 
commented upon the potential for enterprise in the Pacific—would such a project garner 
their approval? 
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“…for the Pacific Ocean” 
 
 
For Americans in the 1780s, the Pacific Ocean represented a distant, relatively 
unknown, and forbidding quarter of the planet. Few Americans had traveled in the “South 
Seas” and most citizens rarely, if ever, considered doing so. Intellectuals took an interest 
in the region, but they labored to find adequate reference materials. “Pacific Studies” 
literature, as modern academics might call it, constituted a new genre in the eighteenth 
century for several reasons. First, older literature, primarily Spanish accounts of 
expeditions in the South Seas, was largely unavailable because of Spain’s secrecy 
regarding its geographical discoveries.111 Second, until the middle eighteenth century, the 
proverbial “tyranny of distance” presented a powerful disincentive to voyages of 
discovery in the South Seas by most European powers other than Spain.112 Third, many 
expeditions into the Pacific, such as George Anson’s circumnavigation in 1741-44, were 
the consequence of wartime privateer operations and did not represent scientific efforts 
directed toward geographical knowledge.113 Fourth, publications concerning scientific 
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navigation, such as accounts of James Cook’s three voyages to the Pacific, did not always 
appear on the market on a predictable schedule.114 For the average American, the Pacific 
World was as unfamiliar as the moon. 
For a growing number of American merchants, however, the Pacific Ocean 
represented a region of enormous economic potential. The China Trade, encompassing 
the exchange of Western Goods for Chinese products such as porcelain, tea, silk, nankeen 
cloth, and decorative arts, was a lucrative business for the European companies who held 
monopolies on trade with the Far East.115 The United States, by contrast, did not possess 
a national corporation in the tradition of the British or Dutch East India Companies.116 
Furthermore, most merchants preferred to restore existing commercial connections in 
Europe, the Caribbean, and the Mediterranean, if possible, rather than risk their fortunes 
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on uncertain voyages to the Far East. Nevertheless, the China Trade excited the interest 
of national leaders, and many of them promoted commerce with the East Indies on the 
national stage. Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and John Adams, the three most 
influential thinkers in the United States, each hoped to advance the cause of American 
commerce in the Far East. Crucially, they represented the three recognized sections of the 
Early Republic—the Southern, Middle, and New England states—and, therefore, they 
demonstrate that the China Trade was an enterprise of national interest. 
Thomas Jefferson visualized the Pacific World principally through the discerning 
eyes of a geographer and natural historian. Three existing studies on this subject conclude 
that Jefferson was “an acute observer in the field,” whose “high attainments as a thorough 
and practical student” in the discipline made him “one of the greatest of American 
geographers.”117 His approach to the discipline reflected a nuanced understanding of the 
interactions between climate, topography, demography, and economics—namely, a 
“man-land” tradition that privileged the interaction between human beings and nature.118 
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Nevertheless, despite Jefferson’s expertise in the discipline, one historian has concluded 
that “Jeffersonian geography is a surface that historians of geography have barely begun 
to scratch.”119 There is strong indication that Jefferson became interested in geography 
under the influence of his father, Peter Jefferson, a professional surveyor and co-creator 
of the famous Fry-Jefferson Map. Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia, as 
well as his examination of the American West, demonstrate a similar approach to the 
synthesis of original research, independent surveys, eyewitness accounts, folk traditions, 
and rumors.120 This means of investigation, which favored the methodical acquisition of 
source materials, would inform his approach to gathering information about the 
Pacific.121 
Jefferson is famous for his outspoken interest in the American West, but his 
geographic concerns also contributed to a quiet fascination with the Pacific World. Prior 
to 1790, he made few comments about the Pacific, and articulated his support for 
transcontinental exploration in terms of overland discovery, suggesting that explorers 
“penetrate through the main continent” and “make the attempt to search that country.”122 
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The geographical works in Jefferson’s library, however, provide a strong indication of his 
burgeoning interest in the Pacific World. Jefferson’s first catalogue of books, begun in 
1783, indicates a concentration in “geographic” works such as atlases, gazetteers, and 
area studies similar in character to his Notes on the State of Virginia.123 Furthermore, in 
addition to these works of a more functional nature, he also professed that he was 
“passionately fond of reading books of history.” 124 Many of the historical works in his 
library focused principally or in part upon the Pacific World. 
When acquiring literature related to the Pacific, Jefferson preferred material that 
was comprehensive in geographical scope and adopted the scientific lens of natural 
history. Mary Louise Pratt observes that travel writing of the eighteenth century 
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significantly contributed to “the construction of global-scale meaning through the 
descriptive apparatuses of natural history.” During this period, she contends, European 
elites practiced natural history “above all in navigational terms” of circumnavigation and 
cartography, projects that “embrace” the globe “as a chaos out of which the scientist 
produced an order.”125 For Thomas Jefferson, a founding statesman of the United States 
and author of its Declaration of Independence, natural history was powerful stuff. 
Jefferson regarded natural history as the chief scientific component “of an useful 
American education,” and considered education the only “sure foundation… for the 
preservation of freedom, and happiness.”126 First, natural history provided an avenue for 
America to take the measure of the world, and in doing so, measure up to the great 
powers of Europe.127 Second, it enabled citizen-scientists to frame discoveries, and even 
the process of discovery itself, as the natural outgrowths of a republican society.128 
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Finally, when conducting natural history in the Pacific, one of the last remaining 
“undiscovered” regions, the United States could extend its values to an ocean hemisphere 
free of European colonialism.129 
Jefferson made an effort to purchase every significant work of “Pacific Studies” 
that existed in the English language during the 1780s. Preferring accounts of scientific 
navigation, he acquired William Dampier’s A New Voyage Around the World (1699), 
Woodes Rogers’s A Cruising Voyage Round the World (1712), and George Anson’s A 
Voyage Round the World (1748). Jefferson also possessed a copy of Hawkesworth’s 
Voyages (1773), which included the accounts of circumnavigations under John Byron, 
Philip Carteret, and Samuel Wallis.130 Because each circumnavigation spanned the South 
Seas, Jefferson learned much about the geography and conditions of the Pacific from 
these works. Moreover, during his diplomatic posting in Paris, Jefferson augmented his 
“Pacific” collection with important French-language titles, such as narratives of voyages 
by Frézier, d’Auteroche, and Schouton. One oversight is striking: Louis Antoine de 
Bougainville’s Voyage autour de monde (1771), a significant work of navigation in the 
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Southern Hemisphere, is missing from what is otherwise a comprehensive list.131 Recent 
accounts provided him with the most accurate information. Chief among these were three 
contemporary accounts of the voyages of Captain James Cook, including Cook’s own 
Journal during the First Voyage Round the World (1772), Georg Forster’s A Voyage 
round the World in His Britannic Majesty's Sloop Resolution, Commanded by Capt. 
James Cook (1777), and William Ellis’s Authentic Narrative of a Voyage performed by 
Captain Cook and Captain Clerke (1782).132 Each contains the standard sequence of 
literary, yet scientific, tropes common in works of navigational travel writing: storms, 
new islands, indigenous peoples, and the hardships of sailing a vast ocean. This 
combination of geographical and historical content, combined with the “scientific” 
authority of the “eyewitness,” enabled Jefferson to comprehend the distant Pacific 
World.133  
During the Confederation period, Jefferson wrote two letters that strongly attest to 
his geopolitical concerns regarding the Pacific. First, in 1783, while serving as a delegate 
to the Congress of the Confederation, Jefferson wrote to George Rogers Clark, a 
revolutionary-war commander associated with the American West. Here, Jefferson 
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warned that the Royal Society of London had “subscribed a very large sum of money… 
for exploring the country from the Missisipi to California.” The observation is sufficient 
to show that Jefferson was watchful of European encroachment in North America. His 
following statements, however, demonstrate his specific interest in the Pacific. 
Speculating that the sponsors of the expedition “pretend it is only to promote knolege,” 
he warned Clark that “I am afraid they have thoughts of colonising into that quarter.”134 
Later, in 1786, during his appointment as the United States Minister to France, Jefferson 
penned a similar letter to John Jay, then the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in New York 
City. Here, he communicated reports concerning Jean-François de Galaup, comte de 
Lapérouse, whose scientific expedition to the Pacific Ocean was, at that moment, 
conducting surveys of the Northwest Coast of America. Jefferson explained to Jay that 
“the gazette of France of July 28, Announces the arrival of Peyrouse at Brazil,” and that 
the Lapérouse expedition would “touch at Otaheité [Tahiti], and proceed to California, 
and still further Northwardly.” Once again, he felt grave concern for European 
encroachment on the western coast of North America. Certainly, Jefferson feared that 
Lapérouse would “make an establishment of some sort on the North-west coast of 
America.”135 
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Both letters demonstrate that Jefferson conceived of the national domain as 
becoming transcontinental in scope and expose his anxiety that European colonization 
might frustrate this aspiration. Deborah Allen has observed that “Jefferson was keenly 
aware that European sponsors of exploratory expeditions used the disinterested language 
of science in order to conceal the extent to which these ventures were driven by a 
political and commercial agenda.”136 Moreover, his parallel roles as statesman and 
amateur geographer prepared him to observe that, if scientific exploration might lead to 
colonization of the Pacific Slope, then those colonies would upset his notion of a 
continental “empire of liberty.” 137 In his estimation, the Pacific Ocean represented the 
western boundary of the national domain and, therefore, the final destination for 
republican government. 
Benjamin Franklin, the most famous individual in Early America, approached the 
question of the China Trade with the questioning mind of a philosopher. He, like many 
other figures of the European and American Enlightenments, may have become interested 
in China after reading the Confucius Sinarum Philosophus (1687). This incomplete 
translation of the Confucian classics, a landmark in the intellectual history of the 
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European Enlightenment, originated with Jesuit missionaries in China. Following its 
publication in Europe, the translation became a sensation among philosophers, and, “in 
one way or another, exercised an influence on a number of prominent individuals” 
including Daniel Defoe, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and many 
others.138 Franklin’s fascination with applied sciences prompted him to research Chinese 
precautions against famine, eastern methods of making paper, the manufacturing of 
porcelain, and the production of silks.139 Benjamin Vaughan, a close friend in London, 
observed that the scientist-printer wished to visit the Middle Kingdom.140 Franklin read 
popular accounts of Western travelers in China and incorporated their details into his own 
publications, such as Poor Richard Improved.141  
                                                            
138 Walter W. Davis, “China, the Confucian Ideal, and the European Age of Enlightenment” 
Journal of the History of Ideas 44, no. 4 (1983): 538-542. 
139 “Benjamin Franklin To the Managers of the Philadelphia Silk Filature” in The Papers of 
Benjamin Franklin, vol. 19, January 1 through December 31, 1773, ed. William B. Willcox, 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 134.; “Benjamin Franklin to Thomas Percival, 15 
October 1773” in The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 20, January 1 through December 31, 
1773, ed. William B. Willcox, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 442.; “Benjamin 
Franklin to John Bartram, 11 January 1770,” in Memorials of John Bartram and Humphrey 
Marshall, ed. William Darlington (Philadelphia: Sherman, 1849), 404-05.; Benjamin Franklin, 
“Description of Making Paper in the Chinese Manner,” 20 June 1788. American Philosophical 
Society Library. 
140 A. Owen Aldridge, The Dragon and the Eagle: The Presence of China in the American 
Enlightenment (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1993), 25 
141 Benjamin Franklin, “Notes on Reading an Account of Travel in China, 1762” in The Papers of 
Benjamin Franklin, vol. 10, January 1 through December 31, 1763, eds. Leonard W. Labaree and 
William B. Willcox (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 182; Benjamin Franklin, “‘The 
Spectator’: The Duke of York’s Travels” in The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 12, January 1 
through December 31, 1765, eds. Leonard W. Labaree, Helen C. Boatfield, and James H. Hutson 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 123.; Franklin, “‘A Traveller’: News-Writers’ 
Nonsense,” in ibid., 132.; Richard Saunders (Franklin pseud.), Poor Richard Improved: being an 
123 
 
Franklin’s philosophical curiosity about China extended to an economic interest 
in fostering an American China Trade. Since the 1740s, Franklin had advocated for the 
discovery of an overland route that might connect the commerce of North America and 
East Asia, via the Pacific Ocean. His 1748 edition of Poor Richard’s Improved included 
an account of Christopher Middleton’s voyage “in Search of the North-West Passage to 
the South-Sea.”142 Likewise, Franklin read accounts of the ship California, which probed 
Hudson Bay for a passage to the “Western and Southern Ocean” in 1746-47.143 Both 
expeditions returned to England after failing to discover a passage.144 Later, in 1753, 
Franklin helped to finance a voyage from Philadelphia, in which he subscribed “£1500 to 
fit out a Vessel in Search of a NWest Passage.”145 This vessel, the Argo, sailed under the 
command of a mysterious figure known as Captain Charles Swaine, who previously 
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served as clerk aboard the California. Swaine’s first voyage stalled when pack ice 
blocked his passage through Hudson Bay, and his second expedition concluded after the 
murder of several crewmembers, including his mineralogist.146 Undaunted, Franklin 
continued to speculate on the existence of a Northwest Passage and corresponded with 
other philosophers concerning the fabled Strait of Admiral de Fonte.147 
During the American Revolution, Franklin’s interest in the Northwest Passage 
appears to have waned, but he remained fascinated with the possibility of an American 
China Trade. While serving as American Commissioner in Paris, Franklin received a 
lengthy memorandum entitled Projet Essentiel pour les Etats-unis de L’amerique 
(“Essential Project for the United States of America”), which outlined a program of 
commercial expansion for the United States following the conclusion of the 
Revolutionary War. The provenance of this remarkable letter, both undated and of 
unknown authorship, is impossible to establish with certainty. I propose, however, a date 
of 1781-82 and possible authorship within the firm of Jacques, Louis, et Laurent 
Couteulx et Companie, then considering several expeditions to Canton.148 Franklin often 
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corresponded with “Couteulx & Co.,” who became an important firm for the fulfillment 
of war materiel in the fight against Great Britain.149 
The anonymous author observed that “the various provinces comprising the 
United States possess a considerable number of ports” and benefited from the blessings 
of “nature herself, who provides a trade in the commodities obtained in their vast 
territories.” Furthermore, he argued, because of these immense natural resources, “the 
inhabitants of these lands cannot have deficits [in trade] in the future.” Trade would, 
however, depend upon more than natural resources or the industry of the people. 
Commercial enterprise would also require the development of routes and markets. Here, 
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date of the letter. Nevertheless, the authorship is impossible to prove with any certainty. 
Anonymous, “Projet Essentiel pour les Etats-unis de L’amerique.” n.d., Papers of Benjamin 
Franklin, American Philosophical Society. Translation from French by this author. 
149 “Benjamin Franklin to Robert Morris, 26 July 1781,” in The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 
35, May 1 through October 31, 1781, ed. Barbara B. Oberg, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1999), 311–13. 
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he advised Franklin that “the trade most helpful to the greatness of the United States of 
America is undoubtedly the East Indies Trade.” First, the author recommended the 
cultivation of “Items of Commerce Particular to America,” including ginseng, rhubarb, 
and varnish, all of which “would be of great value” and “would yield a real profit to the 
Republic.” Second, he recommended that Americans become involved in the Southeast 
Asian carrying trade, in which Americans could profit as middlemen. The author 
specifically noted a lucrative trade in mother-of-pearl between the Spanish Philippines 
and Canton, which Chinese carriers dominated with great success. Indeed, he 
commented, “this branch of trade is so profitable that it should be taken from the 
Chinese.” Finally, he reminded Franklin that “China would be a source of wealth for 
America, by way of shipments of porcelain, silks, silken goods, varnish, paper, lacquer, 
or by the benefits that America would realize through transporting the tea of this empire 
to the various kingdoms of Europe.” 150 
Whether Franklin replied to the memorandum is not known. Nonetheless, he 
certainly recognized the economic potential of the China Trade. Prior to the American 
Revolution, Franklin’s interest in science informed his commentary upon the natural 
resources of North America, its comparative advantages, and how these might be 
harnessed for the benefit of the British colonies. In a pamphlet published in 1760, 
Franklin argued “that the inland parts of America in question are well known to be fitted 
for the production of hemp, flax, potash, and, above all, silk; the southern parts may 
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produce olive oil, raisins, currants, indigo, and cochineal; not to mention horses and black 
cattle.” America’s great commercial advantage, he concluded, was its access to river and 
maritime shipping, which he likened to the ancient trading routes of Eurasia. Using a 
combination of rivers, portages, and roads, Franklin explained that “Furs (the produce 
too of America) are brought to Amsterdam from all parts of Siberia, even the most 
remote—Kamtschatka.” Extending his analysis, he observed that “it is found worth while 
to keep up a mercantile communication between Pekin in China and Petersbourg.” Just as 
the “whole of the trade of the East” had once been conducted along the Silk Road, he 
thought, American merchants should concentrate upon a nautical route between the 
United States and China.151 
The anonymous author who recommended an “Essential Project” to Franklin also 
identified a lucrative avenue for United States commerce with China. Seeking to 
maximize profits, the author suggested that Americans approach China via the Pacific, 
and proposed that “the republic’s ships, loaded with European cargos, may pass into the 
South Sea, taking care to double Cape Horn in the most favorable season.” Following this 
route, Americans could finance a voyage in part by “selling these cargoes,”—in reality, 
smuggling the goods—in the Spanish colonies of New Granada, New Spain, and Peru. 
Moreover, he advised Franklin that “Americans could, using the method we describe 
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here, earn the transportation cost by selling their goods, while other nations, who only 
earn a little money on the Indies, find that their earnings are absorbed by expense of 
crossing [the ocean].”152 The proposal outlined the plan by which Columbia would later 
establish global trade in the Pacific, with one exception—neither Franklin nor his 
anonymous correspondent foresaw that the Northwest Coast, with its bounty of otter 
skins, would supplant the ports of Spanish America. The omission of furs indicates that 
the “Essential Project” is unlikely to have inspired the Columbia expedition. 
Meanwhile, in connecting the parallel themes of North America’s natural 
resources and the colonial capacity for maritime commerce, Franklin foreshadowed a 
problem that would confound advocates of the China Trade: which American products 
would be of interest to the Chinese? Curiously, in drawing his analogies from the 
Eurasian trade, Franklin did not mention that furs—more than any other trade good—
dominated overland trade route “between Pekin and Petersbourg.”153 In fact, the overland 
fur trade motivated the Russian Promyshlenniki (trappers) who colonized Siberia and 
Alaska. Russia envisioned both colonies as mass-production centers to feed an insatiable 
appetite for luxurious, warm furs among the nobility, civil servants, and gentry of 
China.154 The anonymous author submitted his proposal to Franklin, minus reference to 
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otters, in 1781-82. Within a year, John Ledyard, an adventurer from Connecticut, 
enlightened Americans about the economic potential of furs. Perhaps this information had 
escaped Franklin’s attention, but it would later have enormous strategic importance to 
American commerce in the Pacific—furs would sustain the trade between Boston and 
Canton. 
John Adams, whose state of Massachusetts suffered so much during the 
Revolutionary War, approached the question of the China Trade and the Pacific from the 
perspective of a seasoned strategist. Contemporaries recognized Adams, like his friend 
Thomas Jefferson, as possessing strong intellectual discipline, a formidable political 
acumen, and a commanding work ethic. The two shared many interests, among them 
geography, which Jefferson embraced out of academic interest and Adams understood as 
the basis of geopolitics. During his appointment to the Board of War in 1776, Adams 
observed that “Geography is a Branch of Knowledge, not only very usefull, but 
absolutely necessary, to every Person of public Character whether in civil or military 
Life.” The statement shows his preoccupation with geography as an applied field of 
study, different in character from the natural history that interested Franklin or Jefferson. 
Writing to his wife, Abigail, he commented that “The Board of War are making a 
Collection of all the Maps of America, and of every Part of it, which are extant, to be 
hung up in the War Office.” He listed several maps, including the most recent 
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representations of the Thirteen Colonies, the Ohio Country, Great Lakes, and Canada—in 
short, everything needed to run a “war room” in a conflict for independence.155 
The collection also included a six-sheet map by John Green of London, published 
in 1753, which Adams described as “A Chart of North and South America, including the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, with the nearest Coasts of Europe, Africa, and Asia.”156 
Significantly, Green devoted some 40% of the surface area to “The Pacific Ocean or 
Great South Sea,” with attention to the locations of prominent islands, the routes of noted 
explorers, and wind patterns. Unlike most cartographers, he depicted the ocean 
hemisphere as an area of frenetic activity, rather than a vast, torpid wasteland. Moreover, 
in choosing to represent only the Eastern Pacific, Green created the illusion of an ocean 
embraced by the continental expanse of the Americas—a sea poised to become the Mar 
Columbiana.157 The map must have impressed Adams, the patriot and strategist. Given 
his geopolitical interests, and his leadership in the creation of the Continental Navy, we 
can surmise that he focused his attention upon the Pacific Ocean as a possible theater of 
war—and later, as a stage for national economic expansion. For his part, Adams observed 
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that while geography was crucial to anyone “who has any Pretensions to liberal 
Education,” it was also “equally necessary for Merchants.”158  
 
 
  
Figure 7. John Green, A Chart of North and South America including the Atlantic and 
Pacific Oceans, with the Nearest Coasts of Europe, Africa and Asia, chart map, 127 x 114 
cm. London: Thomas Jefferys, 1753. David Rumsey Map Collection. 
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In the summer of 1783, while negotiating a peace treaty with Britain, Adams 
anticipated a new role for the United States in the Pacific. In June, during a carriage ride 
through the French countryside, he conversed with the British Minister Plenipotentiary, 
David Hartley, who “made his Propositions for the Definitive Treaty.” Adams recorded 
nothing more about the proposals, but took greater interest as the discussion turned to 
recent discoveries in the Pacific. Hartley expounded on a wealth of new information 
concerning the Northwest Passage, Russian Alaska, the Bering Strait, and the China 
Trade. The two diplomats also had “a long Conversation” about the myth of “De Fonte’s 
Voyage from Peru to Hudsons Bay.” Always seeking a strategic advantage, Adams 
committed the information to memory before returning to the business at hand. Later that 
evening, he recorded various nautical details, distances, and map coordinates in his 
diary.159 One month later, while still haggling over treaty provisions, Adams guessed, 
correctly, that Westminster might impose prohibitive restrictions on commerce between 
the United States and the British Caribbean. Thereafter, he began to advocate for the 
China Trade as a method of restoring the maritime trade of the United States. Writing to 
Robert Livingston, an influential New Yorker, Adams recommended that American 
merchants should “send Ships immediately to China.” Elaborating on this program, he 
explained that “this Trade is as open to Us, as to any Nation,” and argued that “if our 
natural Advantages are envied Us, we should compensate ourselves in any honest way we 
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can.”160 It is clear, then, that Adams visualized the Pacific as an American route to the 
orient.  
Observers in Britain also recognized the potential for an American China Trade. 
In 1780, Thomas Pownall, the former Royal Governor of Massachusetts Bay, argued that 
the Americans, being “a People whose Empire Stands Singly predominant, on a great 
Continent,” would eventually seek to project their commercial power on a global scale. 
“Will that spirit,” he asked, “which has gone to Falkland’s Islands in Search only of 
Whales, be Stopped at Cape horn, or not pass the Cape of Good Hope?” Pownall 
provided a definitive answer for his audience. “It will not be long,” he explained, “after 
their Establishment as an Empire, before they will be found trading in the South Sea and 
in China.” Like Adams, Pownall understood the commercial value of the Pacific to the 
United States.161 Meanwhile, the American Commissioners, including Adams and 
Franklin, possessed a Congressional mandate to forfeit access to the “East Indies”—we 
cannot be certain if this included Canton—in exchange for independence from Britain.162  
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Some commentators in Britain also perceived the China Trade as leverage in the 
peace negotiations. In 1782, an anonymous “Well-wisher of the East India Company” 
expressed fears of a “scheme to open a Trade from America to the East Indies” and 
warned that “if ships are not already gone to India from America, they will soon.” The 
author characterized such a development as an economic threat to Great Britain and 
hoped that “His Majesty’s Ships or your Cruizers will fall in with them.”163 As the peace 
negotiations wore on through July of 1783, Adams looked for alternative avenues to 
supply the United States with the produce of the China. On 1 August, Adams reported on 
the progress of trade negotiations with the Portuguese Minister in Paris. Writing to 
Robert Livingston, he commented that Portugal “could supply us with Sugars, Coffee, 
Cocoa, Brazil Wood, and even with Tea” procured through the settlement at Macao. 
Nonetheless, the plan constituted an imperfect solution—it threatened to relinquish the 
lucrative carrying trade to European competitors.164 Adams undoubtedly felt relief when 
Congress removed the China Trade from the bargaining table, and the “Definitive Treaty 
of Peace” made no mention of the East Indies, China, or the Pacific.165 Thereafter, 
Americans would be free to conduct an independent trade between the United States and 
Canton. 
                                                            
163 Anonymous, quoted in Holden Furber, “The Beginnings of American Trade with India, 1784-
1812,” New England Quarterly, XI (1938), 238-239. 
164 “John Adams to Robert R. Livingston, 1 August 1783,” in The Adams Papers, 15:193–196. 
165 “Definitive Peace Treaty between the United States and Great Britain, 3 September 1783” in 
The Adams Papers, 15:245–251. 
135 
 
“Columbia and Washington” 
 
 
In Boston, Joseph Barrell possessed a number of characteristics that informed his 
attitude as an entrepreneur, including willingness to accept risk, to innovate upon prior 
business models, and, most importantly, to persevere in the face of setbacks. These 
qualities, though, would not be enough to launch an enterprise into a distant, unfamiliar 
quarter of the world. First, he needed to recruit business partners who shared his vision of 
an “adventure to the Pacific.” Barrell’s main partners, Samuel Brown and Crowell Hatch, 
based their investment in Columbia upon his reputation as a resilient businessman, as 
well as a common desire to earn astronomical profits in the China Trade.166  Second, 
Barrell had to reconcile his commercial objectives with the logistical challenges ahead, a 
suitable task for his main partners. As an entrepreneur, he could strengthen enthusiasm 
for the Columbia expedition, but he understood precious little about the demands of long-
duration sailing. Brown and Hatch, however, possessed expertise concerning sailors, 
ships, and logistics.167 Third, Barrell needed to recruit additional shareholders in order to 
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fully capitalize the enterprise. In reaching out to three silent partners, he emphasized that 
Columbia would be a strong investment, a source of commercial information about the 
Far East, and a wellspring of local pride.168 Finally, Barrell stressed an attitude of flexible 
collaboration between investors, officers, and crew, without which an autonomous 
expedition to the Pacific could not hope to succeed.169 
 The Columbia expedition represented an enormous logistical challenge and a 
significant financial commitment. To overcome these problems, Barrell recruited two 
partners with nautical backgrounds, the merchants Samuel Brown and Crowell Hatch. 
Curiously, both men are all but forgotten today.170 Born in 1753/4, Samuel Brown hailed 
from Newport, Rhode Island. Prior to the American Revolution, he captained a passenger 
ship, Jupiter, which carried settlers from Ulster to South Carolina.171 Brown opened a 
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store in Boston as early as 1771, in which he sold “Choice Brown Sugars, by the 
Hogshead, Barrel, or smaller Quantity, Also, Glass and China Ware cheap for Cash.”172 
Following the British occupation of Newport, in 1776, he permanently relocated to 
Boston. Brown did not limit shipping to settlers, commodities, and luxuries. Like many 
Rhode Islanders, he generated a share of his wealth through the Transatlantic Slave 
Trade.173 Even after moving to Boston, where slave trading was uncommon, he 
maintained his old partnership with William Vernon of Newport. Their operation traded 
between Africa and the sugar islands of the West Indies.174 Their brig Don Galvez, which 
made five voyages from 1785-92, traveled far afield—to Mozambique and the Indian 
Ocean—in search of slave cargoes. The ship is believed to have disembarked 790 slaves 
during its career.175 Brown also owned another vessel, Pacific, in partnership with 
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Crowell Hatch of Boston.176 Curiously, he does not appear in the Boston Directory of 
1789, despite having lived in the town for more than a decade.177 Little more is known 
about him during this period. 
 Crowell Hatch also remains largely unknown today. Hatch was born at Plymouth, 
Massachusetts, in 1737. His father, Edmund Hatch, a farmer, descended from separatists 
who immigrated to America during the early years of Plymouth Colony.178 Jabez Hatch, 
his uncle, operated a wharf at Wheeler’s Point in Boston.179 Crowell Hatch first appears 
as a Bostonian merchant in 1764. His brigantine, Sally, plied the coast between 
Massachusetts and North Carolina.180 He probably commanded this vessel himself, as 
contemporaries referred to him as “Captain Hatch” and he appears to have been 
comfortable at sea. In 1766, Hatch captained his own sloop, Betsy, between Boston and 
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Annapolis.181 Later, he commanded several transatlantic ships on voyages between 
Liverpool and Virginia.182 Intercolonial trade, then considered an important growth 
industry, probably accounts for most his earnings.183 During the Revolutionary War, 
Hatch operated the merchantman America, which smuggled tobacco, skins, and staves 
from the Chesapeake to Great Britain. Furthermore, he may have held a stake in the sloop 
Nancy, captained by a distant relation, Naler Hatch of Malden.184 During 1782-83, while 
Great Britain enforced a blockade of the American coast, Hatch followed the example of 
other Bostonians and invested in privateers. In 1783, he purchased the privateer Lady 
Washington. A fast, ninety-ton brigantine, she would later navigate the Pacific as consort 
to Columbia.185 
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Evidence does not reveal how Brown and Hatch became involved with Barrell, 
but we can conclude that, for them, Columbia represented the extension of a standing 
partnership. Their merchant ship, Pacific, was a profitable venture that drew upon 
Hatch’s connections in South Carolina.186 The partnership appears to have been so close 
that, in later years, Hatch’s reputation suffered from his association with Brown—future 
generations remembered Hatch as a “Black Bird,” or slave trader, even though he is not 
known to have participated in the notorious business.187 Joseph Barrell probably 
encountered them both in 1783, when all three invested in an exclusive insurance group 
managed by goldsmith John Hurd.188 Nevertheless, Barrell must have known Brown, a 
successful privateer owner, through reputation if not in person.189 Likewise, he 
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undoubtedly recognized Hatch as the proprietor of Borland’s Wharf, a commercial pier, 
and as a supporter the Boston Marine Society.190 In 1787, Hatch appeared among the 
merchants who subscribed loans for the purpose of “quelling the tumults & disorders” of 
Shays’ Rebellion.191 Both partners were, therefore, active and successful merchants 
known throughout Boston. Brown ultimately purchased a three-fourteenth share of the 
Columbia, equal to £10,500. Hatch bought two shares at £7,000. Together, their shares 
equaled Barrell’s own five-fourteenths.192 
Concerning logistics and personnel, Brown and Hatch contributed the practical 
talents needed in planning a voyage to the Pacific Ocean. Samuel Brown possessed the 
greatest experience in long-duration navigation, a field of knowledge crucial to launching 
Columbia on her circumnavigation of the globe. To further complicate this ambitious 
feat, the expedition would make wide course deviations into the South Atlantic and North 
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Pacific. Columbia would traverse almost 49,000 miles.193 Of the principals, Brown best 
understood the requirements of sending ships beyond the Atlantic World. Furthermore, 
he probably established the particulars of Columbia’s itinerary. During the 1780s, as 
maritime trade recovered after the Revolutionary War, his business partner in Rhode 
Island, William Vernon, prepared to send their ships Don Galvez and Ascension on slave 
expeditions to Southeast Africa and the “Indian Ocean Islands.”194 Brown recognized the 
importance of intermediate ports in long-duration sailing. Locations such as Cape Verde 
and Saint Helena represented the last opportunity to provision, maintain, or repair a ship 
before embarking into the unfamiliar waters of the Indian Ocean. Brown probably 
recommended that Columbia take on additional supplies at Cape Verde, before 
navigating the desolate South Atlantic. Indeed, in 1787, the expedition later purchased 
livestock, citrus fruit, and salt at the port of “St. Jago’s” (Santiago)195 Brown would have 
recognized, however, that Columbia needed another waypoint before entering the 
hazardous Drake Passage around Cape Horn, gateway to the Pacific. Ships entering the 
torrid passage, infamous for destructive storms, often required months to tack against its 
stiff headwinds. Brown likely suggested a preliminary stop in the uninhabited Falkland 
                                                            
193 “Boston, Wednesday, Aug. 11, The Columbia.” Columbian Centinel (Boston, Massachusetts), 
11 August 1790. 
194 The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database: Voyages. http://slavevoyages.org/tast/database/ 
search.faces?yearFrom=1760&yearTo=1795&anyowner=Vernon%2C+Wm (Accessed on 4 
October 2015). 
195 Robert Haswell, “A Voyage Round the World Onboard the Ship Columbia Rediviva and 
Sloop Washington” in Voyages of the Columbia, 6-10. 
143 
 
Islands, where the crewmembers went fowling and stockpiled fresh water.196 Later, 
cruising west of Spanish Chile, Columbia could resupply in the Juan Fernández Islands, 
where feral goats roamed the countryside.197 Brown’s logistical insight would be of 
tremendous advantage to the expedition. Joseph Barrell, by comparison, had never 
attempted anything on such a scale. 
Crowell Hatch contributed the practical experience of a working captain who 
sailed the Atlantic Ocean before, during, and after the Revolutionary War. First, having 
commanded vessels of various sizes and riggings, he could make strategic 
recommendations about the ships necessary for an expedition to the Pacific. The 
historical record does not reveal which partner selected Columbia, although Hatch 
undoubtedly approved of the flagship. She “sailed exceeding well,” a characteristic of 
crucial importance to completing a journey of tens of thousands of miles in varied, 
unpredictable conditions.198 Moreover, she accommodated a crew of thirty, which 
permitted Hatch to recruit sailors with redundant skills. His strategy recognized the 
dangers of seafaring and hedged against critical vacancies among the carpenters, hands, 
and even officers. For example, among the expedition’s forty crew, eight individuals, or 
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twenty percent, possessed training in piloting and navigation.199 Hatch also emphasized 
redundancy, plus versatility, in the selection of vessels. He contributed his own fast and 
maneuverable sloop, Lady Washington, to sail as consort to Columbia. Hatch recognized 
that the companion vessel would permit multiple, simultaneous fur cruises, thus 
maximizing profits on the Northwest Coast. Alternatively, Washington could reconnoiter 
new trading partners while Columbia stockpiled furs in proven ports. Should tragedy 
strike either vessel, the crew might escape aboard the surviving companion, and, in the 
process, salvage the mission.200 In short, Hatch possessed the nuanced understanding of 
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ships, crew, and officers needed to equip a challenging “adventure to the Pacific.” Joseph 
Barrell, by contrast, was no mariner. 
Barrell’s own contributions lay in his dynamism as an entrepreneur, risk taker, 
and innovator. His interest in the economic potential of the Pacific, and his willingness to 
gamble upon an uncertain enterprise in that quarter, was without precedent in Boston. 
Conversely, Brown and Hatch both excelled in proven, predictable, and established forms 
of commerce. The Pacific, an unproven region, might not have entered their imagination 
without Barrell. Columbia’s success would depend upon his mastery of fur trading in the 
ocean hemisphere. First, there was the problem of financing otter furs. John Ledyard gave 
no definitive indication of what articles to exchange for otter skins, although he did 
observe “a few copper bracelets and three or four rough wrought knives” as evidence that 
“some sort of commercial intercourse, immediate or remote” existed on the Northwest 
Coast.201 The observation may explain Barrell’s decision to provide the expedition with a 
plethora of metal items, including nails, thimbles, and chisels—popular trade goods 
among the coastal Indians.202 In addition, perceiving Massachusetts coin as a possible 
trade commodity, he amassed an indeterminate “quantity of the copper Cents and Half 
Cents, struck at the public mint.” Finally, he included a limited number of “silver and 
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copper medals,” probably the Columbia-Washington Medal, “to be distributed among the 
natives of the Indian Isles.”203 Having solved the problem of financing furs, Barrell faced 
the challenge of trading at Canton. 
During the summer of 1787, Barrell solicited commercial advice from Thomas 
Randall, the former supercargo of the Empress of China and now a partner in the China 
Trading firm Shaw, Randall, and Company of New York.204 Randall informed him that 
“Exchange fluctuates in China” and described the expensive methods by which the 
British East India Company funded its trade using bills of exchange. Moreover, he 
explained, the company recently “sent out in their ships from England three millions of 
dollars” in order to improve the terms of exchange and compensate its Chinese 
creditors.205 The letter must have reinforced Barrell’s confidence that trading in otter furs, 
as opposed to credit, would result in more advantageous terms of exchange for tea, 
porcelain, and silk. The profit margin would also depend, in part, upon negotiating the 
complicated system of trade at Canton. In this respect, Randall promised that the 
Columbia would “derive more considerable advantages from consigning to our house, 
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than it is possible for any supercargo… [who] is unacquainted with the trade.”206 Barrell, 
whose background hinged upon personal connections, recognized that, as newcomers, the 
Columbians would face significant disadvantages at Canton. Moreover, his lucrative 
partnership with Samuel Webb probably informed a preference for working through an 
intermediary. Consequently, he consigned the sale of Columbia’s furs to the Canton 
office of Shaw, Randall, and Company.207 Joseph Barrell, the entrepreneur, had acquired 
the knowledge to compete in a transpacific trade with China. 
Barrell also demonstrated significant vision when promoting the Columbia 
enterprise to other potential investors. We cannot be certain what argument he made to 
convince the three remaining partners, as no sources illuminate his conversations with 
prospective shareholders. Nonetheless, the backgrounds of those partners suggest some 
tentative conclusions. Charles Bulfinch, John Derby, and John M. Pintard had little 
influence over the planning and execution of the voyages. In modern terms, they might be 
considered silent partners, or senior investors who remain uninvolved in the regular 
management of a business. Combined, the three purchased four shares in the business, or 
£14,000.208 Their participation points to several other motivations for investment. 
Columbia was a local enterprise, a valuable avenue for young investors, and represented 
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a crucial prototype for commerce in the Pacific Ocean. Barrell may have articulated these 
arguments when recruiting Bulfinch, Derby, and Pintard. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Mather Brown, Charles Bulfinch, 1786, oil on canvas, 74.9 
x 62.9 cm, Harvard University Portrait Collection, Cambridge, MA. 
Gift of Francis V. Bulfinch to Harvard University, 1933. 
 
 
Remembered today as America’s first professional architect, Charles Bulfinch 
was then merely “a young man of inherited wealth and social position.”209 He was born 
in 1763 to Thomas Bulfinch, a respected physician and influential man-about-town. The 
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family lived in Bowdoin’s Square, an upper-crust neighborhood.210 During the 
Revolutionary War, Dr. Bulfinch arranged a position for his son “in the counting room of 
Joseph Barrell, Esq., an intimate friend & esteemed a correct merchant.” The economic 
vagaries of the conflict, however, meant that Charles was often “at leisure to cultivate a 
taste for Architecture.”211 Given a substantial monetary legacy in his name, and a 
burgeoning reputation as an architect, Charles Bulfinch had little financial need to invest 
in Columbia.  
My supposition is that Bulfinch purchased a two-fourteenths share in anticipation 
of building a nest egg.212 Moreover, he is reported to have invested “in connection with 
his father.” Family accounts state that “it was at Dr. Thomas Bulfinch’s mansion and by 
his fireside” that Barrell pitched the Columbia expedition to “a little circle of friends.” 
We can suppose that Samuel Brown and Crowell Hatch participated in the meeting, 
although surviving sources do not identify the “friends.”213 After investing in the venture, 
Charles Bulfinch turned his attention to several large architectural projects, including the 
Boston Theater, Tontine Crescent, and the Massachusetts State House. Meanwhile, he 
exercised no discernable influence over the Columbia expeditions, and his professional 
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relationship with Barrell centered upon the construction of Pleasant Hill, Barrell’s 
opulent new residence at Charlestown.214 
John Derby, scion of a powerful merchant family of Salem, Massachusetts, 
purchased a single share of the Columbia, worth £3,500.215 Derby was a famous name in 
Massachusetts in 1786-87. His father, Captain Richard Derby, was a shipping magnate 
whose fleet sailed between Salem and South Carolina, Virginia, the Caribbean, and 
Spain.216 Born in 1741, John Derby captained ships prior to the Revolutionary War, but 
his notoriety dates from his participation in the conflict. Following the battles of 
Lexington and Concord, in April, 1775, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress 
commissioned him to deliver their account of events to sympathetic publishers in 
London.217 According to one historian, “Derby cracked on sail… and made a passage 
across the Atlantic of twenty-nine days” aboard the family schooner Quero.218 
Thereafter, during the Revolutionary War, he partnered with local merchants to purchase 
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the privateers Rover and Oliver Cromwell.219 Meanwhile, he captained two other 
privateers, Patty and Astrea, owned in partnership with his brother, Elias Hasket Derby. 
Later, he redoubled his fame by delivering the first news of peace between the United 
States and Great Britain.220 
Elias Hasket Derby may have encouraged his brother John to invest in Columbia. 
While this cannot be proved, the supposition hinges upon his reorientation toward the 
China Trade during the Early Republic. Previously, the Derby family concentrated upon 
Atlantic shipping, and, during the Revolutionary War, Elias financed 158 privateers 
mounting some 2,000 cannon.221 In 1785, however, he sent the first Massachusetts ship, 
Grand Turk, to Mauritius, India, and China, via the Indian Ocean. The profitable outcome 
of the voyage prompted him to dispatch another four ships to China in 1787.222 Columbia 
presented a second avenue of commerce, and, given the allure of the sea otter, one with 
enormous potential. For a minimal investment, then, John Derby could provide his family 
with crucial, firsthand information about the requirements, challenges, and expenses of 
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equipping their own adventure to the Pacific. Indeed, Derby left the partnership following 
Columbia’s first, unprofitable voyage.223 Moreover, the outcome may have contributed to 
his family’s disregard for the Pacific.224 
John Marsden Pintard, a young gentleman of New York, embodied the partner 
who invests at a distance. Born in 1760, he descended from French Huguenot merchants 
of New Rochelle, in Westchester County, New York.225 His father, Lewis Pintard, was 
among the incorporators of the New York City Chamber of Commerce and served as the 
principal importer of Madeira wine to the United States. In 1782, John M. Pintard 
became his father’s resident purchasing agent on the Portuguese island of Madeira, off 
the coast of Morocco.226 The following year, he received a commission to act as the 
commercial agent of Congress on the island.227 From the distant isle, where he was “the 
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only American around,” he supplied wine to luminaries such as George Washington and 
Alexander Hamilton.228 To date, no account of the Columbia expedition has explained 
how a young man residing on Madeira, and with few connections to Boston, came to 
invest in the voyage. In fact, his involvement appears to hinge upon relationships forged 
by his father during the Revolutionary War. In 1777, during the British occupation of 
New York City, Lewis Pintard became the designated agent for American soldiers under 
detention in the city.229 In this capacity, Lewis Pintard negotiated prisoner exchanges, a 
duty that brought him into contact with Major Samuel Webb of Connecticut, then in 
detention on Long Island.230 Their friendship continued after the war, and Webb, a 
relative of Joseph Barrell, is the most plausible connection between Pintard and the 
Columbia.231 
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Pintard owned one share in Columbia, worth £3,500, but later evidence suggests 
that his father managed, and perhaps even initiated, the investment.232 No evidence 
accounts for the motives behind his share, but the investment does demonstrate faith in 
Barrell. Nonetheless, we can surmise a combination of motives based on context and 
outcomes. Like Bulfinch, Pintard’s investment might have been intended to generate a 
nest egg suitable to a young gentleman. Perhaps, like Derby, the investment also served 
to generate commercial insights about the Far East, a future destination for ships 
belonging to the House of Pintard. In either case, the disappointing outcome of the 
Columbia’s first voyage convinced him, like John Derby, to withdraw from the 
enterprise.233 
Assessment of the silent partners reveals three important facets of the Columbia 
expedition. First, although the venture was global in outlook, it remained local in origin. 
From the perspective of Bulfinch and Derby, then, it represented a business opportunity 
with trusted, successful neighbors. The commercial networks that connected the town of 
Boston, as well as neighboring communities such as Salem, worked to inspire confidence 
in local merchants whose own success depended upon maintaining good relationships 
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with neighbors and fellow business people. Second, Columbia was also an investment at 
a reasonable risk. Bulfinch and Pintard invested, in part, we may surmise, out of an 
interest to amass financial reserves. Both individuals could look forward to inherited 
wealth in the future, but their fathers also encouraged short-term investment. Third, 
Columbia presented a valuable source of information about the Pacific Ocean. Derby and 
Pintard, both of whom descended from merchant families, must have anticipated that the 
enterprise would generate commercial knowledge useful to their own, future, ventures to 
Canton. These three features of the voyage provided strong incentives to investment. 
The choice of commanders would be crucial to an expedition in the unknown 
waters of the Pacific. Brown and Hatch recommended two trusted captains, John 
Kendrick and Robert Gray.234 Once again, like so many individuals involved in the 
Columbia voyages, little is remembered about the commanders today. John Kendrick 
descended from immigrants who settled at Harwich, Massachusetts, in 1704.235 Born 
around 1740, he is believed to have served among Massachusetts forces during the 
French and Indian War. Like many residents of Cape Cod, Kendrick found his calling 
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Gray. During the Revolutionary War, Brown invested in Adam Babcock’s brigantine Fanny, 
commanded by Captain John Kendrick. Moreover, Brown and Hatch jointly owned the ship 
Pacific, a ship sailing under the command of Robert Gray in the “South Carolina Trade.” See 
“Adam Babcock to George Washington, 12 June 1777” in The Papers of George Washington, 
Revolutionary War Series, vol. 10, 11 June 1777 – 18 August 1777, Frank E. Grizzard, Jr., ed. 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000), 12–13.; Nokes, Columbia’s River, 17. 
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and livelihood on the sea. Around 1760, he signed aboard a whale ship bound for the 
Gulf of Saint Lawrence. Kendrick appears to have acquired a strong background in 
navigation and command during this period, although no sources confirm the precise 
circumstances. Nonetheless, by 1772, he was registered as the master of the schooner 
Rebecca, a whale ship operating out of Martha’s Vineyard.236 One acquaintance recalled 
that “as a seaman and navigator, he had but few equals.”237 Family tradition holds that 
Kendrick was an ardent Patriot who participated in the famous “Destruction of the Tea” 
at Boston, in December 1773.238 Two years later, he appeared as the master of the 
brigantine Undutied Tea, which traded in contravention of the Massachusetts Port Act.239 
Following the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, Kendrick served as commander of the 
privateer Fanny, an eighteen-gun brigantine known for taking multiple prizes throughout 
1777.240 In this context, Kendrick operated in coordination with Captain James Babcock 
of the General Mercer. Together, they caused a sensation by capturing the merchantmen 
                                                            
236 “Captain Lowndes in 16 days from St. Croix, …” Massachusetts Spy (Boston, Massachusetts), 
9 July 1772. 
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Revolution, vol. 12 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2013), 746. 
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Clarendon and Hanover Planter, both under military escort, near L’Orient.241 Later, as a 
prisoner-of-war, Kendrick staged an roundabout escape via the Azores, Lisbon, and Paris, 
in order to return to Massachusetts.242 He ended the Revolutionary War as captain of the 
Marianne, a Rhode Island brigantine of sixteen guns and a crew of sixty-five.243 
Following independence, he appeared in newspapers as master of the Charleston Packet, 
and perhaps became acquainted with Samuel Brown, Crowell Hatch, and Robert Gray 
though their common involvement in the “South Carolina Trade.”244 In 1787, Kendrick 
had just completed a transatlantic cruise as captain of the Fortune, from Dunkirk to 
Boston, when he was recruited to command the Columbia.245 
While Kendrick’s biography must be pieced together from disparate sources, even 
less is known about Captain Robert Gray. Born in 1755, Gray traced his heritage to 
                                                            
241 These tactics, the eighteenth-century equivalent of the submarine “wolfpack,” were a principal 
method by which American privateers, acting in concert, could gain supremacy over more 
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Saxon England and could claim relatives who fought at Hastings. His immediate 
ancestors immigrated to Plymouth Colony in 1643. Native to Tiverton, Rhode Island, he 
relocated to Boston sometime during the 1770s.246 The timing is not clear, but perhaps 
the move followed the death of his uncle, Samuel Gray, during the Boston Massacre.247 
Where and how Gray acquired his sailing experience is unknown. There is a remote 
possibility that he, at the age of seventeen, became the master of the schooner John, 
registered in South Carolina. If true, this would indicate a prodigious talent for sailing.248 
Family tradition holds that “he was in the naval service of the United States during the 
Revolutionary War,” and indeed, his widow later attempted to claim his military pension. 
Frederic Howay concludes, however, that “there is no satisfactory evidence” to 
substantiate this possibility.249 During the 1780s, Gray captained the merchant ship 
                                                            
246 Frederic W. Howay, “Some Notes on Captain Gray” The Washington Historical Quarterly 21, 
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career outside New England. R. Nicholas Olsberg, See “Ship Registers in the South Carolina 
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Pacific, owned by Brown and Hatch, in their “South Carolina Trade.” Some scholars 
have associated Robert Gray with Samuel Brown’s trade in slaves.250 This reading may 
result from an erroneous association between him and Daniel Grey, another mariner who 
commanded Brown’s ship Don Galvez on runs to West Africa during the 1780s.251 In 
contrast, Robert Gray, master of the “fast-sailing Ship Pacific,” made transatlantic runs 
from Charleston to Hamburg.252 In 1787, shortly after returning from a Europe, Gray 
received the offer to command Hatch’s vessel Lady Washington, tender to the Columbia. 
The captains possessed complementary experience that made them suitable 
leaders for an ambitious “adventure to the Pacific.” Some evidence of their collaborative 
potential, as well as their attitudes toward command, must be gleaned from accounts of 
the expeditions. John Kendrick was respected as “a man of extraordinarily good natural 
abilities, and was noted for his enterprising spirit, his good judgment and superior 
courage.”253 Having coordinated with other privateer captains during wartime, he 
assumed command of Columbia with a solid record of collaboration. Likewise, his 
                                                            
250 Nokes, Columbia’s River, 17. 
251 Several of the sources relating to Don Galvez list the captain’s name only as “Grey,” thus 
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victories against enemy warships recommended him as a daring, resourceful captain, 
capable of overcoming long odds at sea. Later events demonstrate his attention to fine 
detail, whether in regards to management of cargo space, rigging of his vessel, or the 
drafting of contracts.254 In contrast, one historian describes Robert Gray as “a resolute, 
self-reliant, and determined man” who was “eminently practical.”255 Gray, whose 
background in the merchant marine attuned him to business, appreciated the financial 
dimensions of navigation, including adherence to a schedule, quality of cargo, and profit 
margins.256 Moreover, his impulse to become an “exploring captain” prompted him to 
seek new, lucrative discoveries in the Pacific.257 The captains also differed in their 
approach to command. Kendrick was the more experienced mariner. He understood the 
navigational characteristics of schooners, brigs, brigantines, sloops, and ships, giving him 
the experience to command both Columbia and Washington. Where the crew was 
concerned, however, he was “whimsical and vacillating… [and] jealous of his 
authority.”258 Gray was the superior commander in this respect. His consistent, firm 
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manner made him an exceptional leader of men. Throughout the voyages, he obtained 
superb teamwork from his crew. Together, they erected Fort Defiance, constructed the 
sloop Adventure, and rescued Columbia from catastrophic damage.259 In short, the 
captains complemented one another. Most importantly, in case of unforeseen trouble, 
each possessed the expertise to assume overall command and lead Columbia home. 
In addition to collaboration, the partners also emphasized that the commanders 
should exercise good judgement while cruising the ocean hemisphere. Barrell recognized 
that “it would be impossible upon a voyage of this nature to give with propriety very 
binding instructions.” Communications from Columbia would be strained by distance, 
logistics, and happenstance. Barrell informed the captains that “you will be on the spot, 
and as circumstances turn up you must improve them.”260 He understood that critical 
                                                            
whose “uncertainty of action and his leisurely movements were the defects which prevented him 
from obtaining those results to which his other qualities should have entitled him.” Most other 
commentators on the voyages tend to agree. One notable exception is Scott Ridley, whose 
Morning of Fire discusses Kendrick in a more sympathetic manner, contending that he was “a 
bold thinker, a trusted captain, [and] a man who plunged into the unknown wilderness.” Howay 
does concede, however that “when his responsibility was reduced to the control and direction of a 
small vessel he showed qualities of initiative, perseverance, courage, energy, and foresight.” 
Kendrick’s strengths and weaknesses are ultimately outside the scope of this dissertation. 
Moreover, Barrell and the partners could not have anticipated the command difficulties that 
would erupt in the Pacific. Therefore, my analysis concerns the collaborative relationship they 
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See Howay, “John Kendrick and his Sons,” 277-302.; Ridley, Morning of Fire, 1-3. 
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decisions would rest with the captains in the Pacific, rather than with the owners in the 
United States. Taking his instructions to Kendrick and Gray as a single body of thought, 
it is remarkable how few orders he dictated. Instead, Barrell advised the captains with a 
series of guidelines.261 He employed the word “if” on fourteen occasions, and couched 
most aspects of the instructions in the conditional language of “may,” “should,” and 
“would.” Other language demonstrates the full latitude permitted to the captains. For 
example, Barrell explained that “it would not be amiss if you purchased some 
advantageous tract of land” on the Northwest Coast. Moreover, he suggested that “in case 
you sell your ship,” the partners would be “willing to go hand in hand in this concern.”262 
Elsewhere, he recognized the limits of foresight. If trade was disadvantageous at Canton, 
for instance, he suggested “trying what can be done on the coast of Japan and Pekin.” 
Instead of providing direct orders, Barrell preferred to “advise,” or recommend, 
certain courses of action in the Pacific. His stance reveals a further dimension of the 
authority granted to the captains. Kendrick and Gray received permission to deviate from 
the partners’ intentions if necessary to ensure the success of the expedition. Barrell 
“advised” them to trade downriver from Canton, and considered it “advisable” that the 
                                                            
261 Barrell penned his “guidelines” to Kendrick in 1787 (first voyage) and Gray in 1790 (second 
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Columbians construct an additional sloop on the Northwest Coast.263  Even where he 
“strictly enjoined” the captains “not to touch at any part of the Spanish dominions on the 
western continent of America,” the threat of unforeseen events prompted him to add 
“unless driven there by some unavoidable accident.”264 Even his imperative that “you 
will write to us by all possible opportunities” would depend upon serendipitous meetings 
between Columbia and other ships. Recognizing the resourceful character of Kendrick 
and Gray, Barrell authorized them extend the expedition “if you find the trade 
advantageous, and can get the supplies you want.” Finally, because “the voyage proposed 
is of very long duration,” he encouraged the captains to “enjoin system, good order, 
prudence, and economy, which, with a tender treatment of the men under your command, 
will show you to be a father to your crew.”265 Barrell phrased his instructions as 
recommendations to be considered, and followed or discarded, accordingly. 
Finally, while individuals had a strong influence over the planned expedition, we 
must not overlook the central role of one remaining “personality” central to the voyage—
the ship Columbia. Like so many individuals connected with the voyages, she, too, 
remains the subject of speculation. L. Vernon Briggs, a historian of shipbuilding at 
Scituate, on the North River, stated that “the first American vessel that ever 
circumnavigated the globe was built by James Briggs at Hobart’s Landing in 1773,” and 
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adds that “this was the ship ‘COLUMBIA.’”266 Upon closer inspection, however, the 
account appears to be based in tradition rather than the documentary record. Briggs based 
his account upon local lore as presented by Charles Torrey, a resident of Scituate, 
Massachusetts, in 1845.267 In contrast, Frederic Howay concludes, based upon “the 
correct information… [in] two registers of the Columbia in the National Archives, 
Washington, D.C.,” that the flagship was originally constructed at Plymouth. He also 
suggests an original construction date of 1787.268 Nonetheless, J. Richard Nokes, the 
biographer of Captain Robert Gray, contends that “one must yield to the original Briggs 
records as to the original construction date and place.”269 Briggs contends that Columbia 
was “registered in Boston,” but not constructed, in 1787.270 Curiously, the later 
provenance could instead correspond to a “generally accepted” tradition that Columbia 
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was “refitted for the voyage [to the Pacific] at Long Wharf.”271 If this is true, the Briggs 
account introduces another problem in that Long Wharf is located in Boston, not 
Plymouth. Further complications arise from their disagreement on the physical 
characteristics of the Columbia. Howay describes her as “a ship of 212 8/95 tons”272 In 
contrast, Briggs gives her tonnage as 220, whereas Nokes references an unidentified 
source placing her tonnage at 300.273  One possibility is that the various accounts of the 
Columbia may, in fact, refer to different ships. Moreover, where was Columbia, and what 
purposes did she fulfill, during the fourteen years between 1774 and 1787? The 
documentary record does not reveal these secrets.  
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Figure 9. Model of Columbia Rediviva, n.d., photograph, Oregon Historical Society, 
Portland. 
 
 
We can be certain of several features that made Columbia a suitable vessel to 
carry American colors on their first “adventure to the Pacific.” First, Columbia was a 
three-masted, full-rigged ship constructed to support intercontinental shipping. Boasting 
dimensions of 83’6” length and 24’2” beam, and an estimated draught of 11’, her size 
was sufficient to support an autonomous mission.274 She possessed a hold adequate to 
outgoing trade goods, an intermediate stock of otter furs, and a return cargo of teas, 
porcelain, and silks. The hold was also more than adequate to ensure self-sufficient 
operations for long periods of time, if necessary. Second, Columbia was suitable in 
navigational terms. Swift but sturdy, she could easily navigate the dangerous waters of 
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the Drake Passage and the Northwest Coast. Her timbers, probably cut from white pine, 
could withstand the punishing conditions of squalls and extremes of temperature. Indeed, 
she survived storm damage, onboard fires, and submerged rocks during her voyages in 
the Pacific.275 Third, Columbia boasted ten cannons and numerous swivel-guns, making 
her formidable for her size. The armaments ranked her among the most powerful ships in 
the Pacific, comparable even to warships launched from New Spain. Finally, sailing in 
coordination with Lady Washington, she could lead simultaneous missions of exploration, 
coastal reconnaissance, diplomacy, and, of course, fur trading. In short, Columbia was the 
ideal ship for a mission to the Pacific Ocean. 
 Columbia and Washington embarked on their groundbreaking voyage on 30 
September 1787, becoming the first American vessels destined for the remote Pacific. 
Their expedition, however, represented much more than an expedition into new quarters. 
The Columbians would establish a new commercial relationship between the United 
States, the Northwest Coast, and China—one with rippling implications for America’s 
role in the Pacific World. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
“IRON BOUND COAST” 
 
 
On 4 August 1788, Lady Washington prepared to anchor “within a quarter of a 
mile of a ledge of rocks,” perhaps near Castle Rock, off Point Saint George, California. 
Robert Haswell observed “a canoe with the natives of the Countrey paddling toward us… 
These were the first inhabitance we had seen here.” He added that “on there nigh 
approach they made very expressive seigns of friendship.” 1 The Indians were the first 
human beings, other than one another, that anyone aboard the sloop had seen since 
leaving the Cape Verde Islands, nine months earlier. Haswell did not comment upon the 
importance of this moment—the first encounter between Americans and peoples of the 
Pacific—but there is no reason to think that the Columbians overlooked its significance.2 
It is more probable that ocean conditions dominated their immediate thoughts. Captain 
                                                          
1 Columbia and Lady Washington became separated in the Drake Passage and sailed 
independently to Nootka Sound. See Robert Haswell, “A Voyage Round the World Onboard the 
Ship Columbia Rediviva and Sloop Washington” in Voyages of the Columbia to the Northwest 
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Gray had approached “within a mile of a ledge of rocks” where he intended to drop 
anchor, but choppy seas and a “stiff breeze” thwarted his efforts.3 
Some crewmembers’ work permitted them to steal glances of an astonishing 
scene. The Indians approached aboard dugout canoes “hued from a tree of vast bulk,” 
undoubtedly redwood. To a professional sailor, the canoes appeared to be “of the most 
clumsy shape in the world,” but, in fact, the boats answered the purposes of long-distance 
sailing, hunting of sea mammals, and deep-sea fishing. Plus, the Indians were confident, 
expert pilots.4 Their own appearance was equally impressive. Haswell recorded that 
“they were cloathed chiefly in deerskins and they were ornamented with beads of 
European manufactor,” which he suspected to have originated “with the Spaniards at 
Monteray.”5 Given the location of the landfall, between one and two degrees of latitude 
north of Cape Mendocino, the locals can be identified as Yurok or Tolowa Indians.6 The 
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evidence, relating to oceangoing canoes, geographical features, and body piercing, more 
strongly indicates the Tolowas.7 
The moment of contact between Tolowas and Americans could have resulted in 
brief exchange, an extended stay, or possible misunderstandings between the two groups. 
Instead, the encounter ended sooner than either party might have expected. Captain Gray 
began distributing presents in order to convince the Tolowas of his peaceful intentions, a 
precursor to trading for sea otter pelts. Meanwhile, the Indians probably viewed the 
Americans, who anchored in their territorial waters, as a windfall of enormous 
proportions. Western trade goods could enhance their prestige among neighbors. Before 
the two parties could begin to trade, however, the weather worsened. Haswell recorded 
that “our attent[i]on was called another way,” a reference to Gray’s command to weigh 
                                                          
Sturdivant, eds., Handbook of North American Indians, Volume 8: California (Washington: 
Smithsonian Institution, 1978), ix.; Richard A. Gould, “Tolowa” in ibid.,128-29. 
7 Three pieces of evidence inform my argument. First, the canoes, fabricated from the massive 
trunks of Redwood trees, were common among Indian cultures between Cape Mendocino and 
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maturity. Earrings located in the lobes and the auricle, as well as noseplugs, served as adornment 
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anchor and put to sea. He added that “the wind by this time b[l]ew a gale.”8 The captain 
would not have wanted to be driven against the rocks. The encounter was not unusual in 
its brevity. Previous European expeditions along the coast had rarely lingered more than a 
day, or a few hours, in a single location before weather, violence, or standing orders 
urged them on.9 Future encounters between the Columbia expedition and Indians, 
however, assumed the form of sustained interaction, calculated exchange, and cultural 
introductions to the indigenous world of the Northwest Coast.  
 
“A Brisk Trade” 
 
 
Columbia connected indigenous peoples to a global commercial network that 
spanned two hemispheres, three continents, and countries as different as the United States 
and China. The Columbians accomplished this though a process of improvisation and 
adaptation that encompassed both voyages to the Northwest Coast. Improvisation is an 
important skill to all explorers, diplomats, and entrepreneurs, but for visitors to the 
Northwest Coast, who embodied all three roles, improvisation became the most 
significant tool in “learning the neighborhood.” In a fundamental sense, the Columbians 
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did business through practices of trial and error, making do with limited resources, and 
finding creative solutions to unexpected developments.10  
 
 
 
Figure 10. Robert Haswell, Title image (Detail of Columbia and Washington at Anchor on the 
Northwest Coast), c. 1788, ink on paper, as reproduced in Robert Haswell, “A Voyage Round the 
World Onboard the Ship Columbia Rediviva and Sloop Washington,” Massachusetts Historical 
Society, Boston. 
 
 
The coast itself encouraged improvisation on the part of merchant-captains who 
often sailed into uncharted waters. They approached the coast first as explorers on the 
edge of the world, hundreds of miles north of Spanish California. Geological time laid 
                                                          
10 Business scholars have defined improvisation in a variety of ways, including “to continuously 
and creatively adjust to change and to consistently move products and services out the door.” See 
Shola L. Brown and Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Competing on the Edge: Strategy as Structured 
Chaos (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1998), 33. 
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out a dangerous labyrinth of islands, channels, and fjords north of Cape Flattery, on the 
Strait of Juan de Fuca. Climate conditions shrouded the southern stretches of the coast, 
including tidal basins and river entrances, in a relentless fog. The challenge of locating 
the most lucrative anchorages was fraught with trial and error—sailing was improvisation 
against geography itself. Even the recommended harbors, such as Clayoquot and Nootka 
Sounds, concealed navigational hazards such as submerged rocks and shallow draughts. 
The Columbia expeditions faced these challenges on a regular basis, often braving 
previously unexplored waters, such as the Strait of Juan de Fuca, the Strait of Georgia, 
and the Columbia River. During one moment of danger, Robert Haswell noted that the 
surf “dashed us upon the rocks with the utmost fuery” while the “wind increased 
violently.” Under such conditions, he explained, “every surge left us resting dry upon the 
pinnacles of this murcieless Iron bound coast.”11 Invisible hazards lurked beneath the 
surface. Columbia and Lady Washington struck rocks even under the command of 
Captain Robert Gray, a cautious and expert navigator. 
Improvisation did not end when a ship anchored on the Northwest Coast. 
Europeans and Americans entered each harbor with scant information, if any, about the 
indigenous people who might become their trading partners. Shifting to a diplomatic role, 
merchant-captains grasped their own status as outsiders, and approached the Indians with 
cautious camaraderie and gifts. Here, captains improvised in their choice of gifts, hoping 
to choose the most suitable items in each location. Gifts served multiple purposes. They 
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recognized the authority of local leaders, who might distribute exotic items in order to 
enhance their own prestige. Most importantly, however, gifts served to showcase the 
items available for trade. If selected carefully, relatively inexpensive gifts set the stage 
for exchange of more substantial items, such as copper and furs. In another sense, 
Haswell’s reference to the “Iron bound coast” is an unintentional metaphor for the 
regional economy, which placed a high value upon metals. The Columbians correctly 
determined that “iron was the only item of trade held in high estimation” by the 
Tsimshian People, and offered hard, sharp chisels useful to woodworking.12 Among other 
peoples, however, the most valuable trade goods failed to engender a market. John 
Hoskins commented that the Clayoquot People “appeared quite indifferent about trading, 
rather wishing to receive our articles of traffic as presents.”13 Merchant-captains 
negotiated the complex economic conditions of the Northwest Coast much as they 
navigated the geography of the coast itself—by trial and error. Where commercial 
knowledge, the correct commodities, or both, were missing, traders improvised to 
enhance the value of their goods. In 1792, Joseph Ingraham, former Chief Mate aboard 
Columbia, returned to the coast in command of his own brigantine. Finding that other 
traders had flooded the market with iron chisels, he ordered his blacksmith to rework his 
own supply of chisels as decorative collars, which immediately became items of high 
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demand.14 Negotiation of the economic environment taught valuable lessons about the 
importance of improvisation. 
Improvisation provided the experience necessary for merchant-captains to 
implement new adaptations as they embarked on subsequent voyages.15 The knowledge 
gained through trial-and-error during a first expedition informed the itinerary, business 
practices, and cargo prepared for the second.16 Upon returning to the Northwest Coast, 
traders frequented those harbors in which a customized cargo might fetch “prime furs” at 
the most advantageous prices. In some cases, it paid to make additional arrangements 
with preferred trading partners. For example, Captain John Kendrick attempted to 
establish exclusive trade zones on “five tracts of land.” In these agreements, Kendrick 
promised to supply several chiefs with firearms and powder in return for a consistent 
supply of furs.17 Similarly, where gift-giving had opened mutually-beneficial trade 
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between outsiders and Indians, adventurers could reinforce the developing bonds of trust 
through acts of friendship or service. The Columbians acculturated themselves to native 
society on numerous occasions, but especially during the long months in which the 
expedition anchored in winter quarters. John Boit attended a coming-of-age ceremony for 
the son of Wickaninnish, Chief of the Clayoquots, where his status as a foreign guest 
enhanced the chief’s influence.18 Such activities enabled outsiders to become insiders. 
The most important adaptations, however, which transformed indigenous 
communities, related to new understandings of market conditions on the Northwest 
Coast. Just as Bostonians benefited from newspaper reports of “prices current” in their 
city, the Columbians would attempt to compile market research about the peoples of the 
coast. Educated guesswork might dominate the preparations for an initial voyage, but 
firsthand knowledge enabled investors and captains to equip a second expedition with a 
customized cargo of valuable goods.19 In 1790, following the return of Columbia to 
Boston, Captain Robert Gray advised Joseph Barrell to make copper the centerpiece of a 
second expedition. The decision had larger implications than merely setting Columbia on 
a course for financial success—copper consolidated a trade network that connected the 
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Northwest Coast to Boston, and Boston to the copper mines of Southwest England. The 
copper served, of course, to purchase otter skins, and in this respect it was a stunning 
success. More importantly, though, furs tell a reciprocal story in which the Northwest 
Coast became intensively connected to the ancient markets of Canton in China. Together, 
copper and furs became the engines of change for chiefs such as Maquinna and 
Wickaninnish, who utilized their status as middlemen to become the principal 
powerbrokers on Vancouver Island. Moreover, their new wealth, distributed to followers 
through the institution of the potlatch, triggered local adaptations that improved, 
undermined, and otherwise changed traditional ways of life. 
Finally, the experience of the Columbia on the Northwest Coast undermines the 
opposing narratives of the “bad Indian” and the “exploitative European.” The 
Columbians, cruising so far from their operational base in the United States, turned to the 
indigenous peoples of the coast not only as trading partners, but often as allies and 
friends. Indian communities, in particular the Clayoquot and Mowachaht Peoples, found 
compelling reasons to welcome the outsiders. From their perspective, the Columbians 
represented a source of valuable, exotic goods, all of which could enhance their own 
position within the preexisting, indigenous trade network. Between 1788 and 1792, 
Columbia became the vehicle of globalization in these native communities. 
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“Copper was the article in demand” 
 
 
When Columbia arrived on the Northwest Coast in August 1788, she entered a 
thriving world of indigenous exchange. For centuries, two primary trade vectors 
connected the coastal peoples to their neighbors. The first vector, which extended along a 
general west-to-east axis, connected littoral regions with the continental interior. These 
“cispacific” routes often extended from protected harbors on the coast, across mountains 
or straits, and into the heart of North America. Three major routes followed the 
Columbia, Fraser, and Skeena Rivers.20 In this setting, coastal peoples exchanged sea 
resources such as salmon or baleen in return for continental goods including land furs, 
obsidian, iron, and copper. The cispacific routes, often transcontinental in scope, 
developed well before the arrival of maritime fur traders, and archeological evidence 
attests to this fact. For example, dentalium shells discovered among the Mandan and 
Hidatsa Indians reveal the existence of commercial interaction between peoples of the 
Upper Missouri River and those of the Northwest Coast.21 The routes continued 
operating in the period following contact with Europeans. In 1789, British explorer 
Alexander Mackenzie made his first attempt at a transcontinental crossing from Fort 
Chippwyan, in Canada, to the Northwest Coast. Upon encountering a group of Inuits 
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along the Slave River, Mackenzie learned of “large Canoes full of white men to the 
Westward 8 or 10 Winters since, from whom they got Iron”22 The description probably 
indicated the doomed Russian settlement at Three Saints Bay. Later, in 1805, the 
Americans Meriwether Lewis and William Clark observed the vigor and speed of 
indigenous trade along the transcontinental routes. Having manufactured iron hatchets for 
exchange during their winter at Fort Mandan, the explorers continued overland to 
discover their handiwork already circulating among the Nez Perce Indians.23 
The second trade vector followed the north-to-south axis of the coastline and 
connected native communities that shared a common dependence upon sea resources. 
This “circumpacific” route extended for more than 2,400 miles, with approximate 
endpoints at Kodiak Island, in the north, and San Francisco Bay, in the south.24 The 
circumpacific route differed from the cispacific corridors in two important ways. First, 
the conditions of geography, namely the presence of mountains and an arid interior 
beyond them, dictated the existence of a single north-south “trunk” route. The trunk 
facilitated a broad distribution of “northern” and “southern” goods—for example, walrus 
ivory and redwood canoes, respectively—that contributed to a general uniformity of 
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material culture along the coast.25 Secondly, the coastal route facilitated exchange 
between communities with access to similar marine resources, and therefore, it 
encouraged each group to maximize their comparative advantage in local products. For 
example, the people of Vancouver Island harvested and prepared ornamental dentalium 
shells, which became a prized ornamental item across the Northwest Coast.26 Immediate 
neighbors also exchanged specialized foodstuffs, such as whale blubber, acorns, and 
eulachon fish oil.27 The concentration of goods along a single corridor, combined with an 
emphasis upon competitive advantage, made metals—rare, lustrous materials—the 
ultimate status symbol.28 Once again, ancient routes continued to steer, and even 
intensified, the indigenous exchange economy following contact with Europeans. Iron 
tools, probably originating in Russian Alaska or Spanish California, circulated along the 
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coast prior to the arrival of Captain Cook, who observed their use as wealth items among 
the Haidas and Mowachahts.29  
When fur trading expeditions began arriving on the coast in the 1780s, they 
exchanged large quantities of metal in a number of preferred locations, notably Nootka 
Sound, home of the Mowachaht People. The documentary sources, which are particularly 
strong for Nootka, attest to an incredible volume of metal entering the coastal economy 
during this period. In 1785, Captain James Hanna purchased his legendary cargo of 560 
prime skins, worth $20,600, using nothing more than bar iron. During the next summer, 
Captains Nathaniel Portlock and George Dixon traded a cargo of “hatchets, adzes, 
howels, tin kettles, pans, &c.,” all of which the Mowachahts happily accepted.30 In 1787, 
John Meares also did business at Nootka, where he exchanged a cargo of “iron, copper, 
beads, &c.”31 British captains provided their trading partners with enormous quantities of 
metal, and especially iron. Curiously, during the years 1785-87, the growing supply of 
iron did not immediately suppress demand. This was undoubtedly because coastal trade 
tended to disperse local concentrations of exotic goods. By 1788, however, the 
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proliferation of iron drove a widespread devaluation, as observed by members of the 
Columbia expedition. While Columbia and Washington overwintered at Nootka Sound, 
Robert Haswell witnessed the price of iron decline among the Mowachaht Indians. 
Haswell commented that the Indians would still accept “Iron worked into chizles after 
there own plan” as trade goods but complained that “these they soon reduced the value 
of, inhancing the prise [of otter skins] from three chizles to ten.”32  
 
 
 
Figure 11. John Webber, A View of the Habitations in Nootka Sound, 1778, watercolor on paper, 38 
x 23 cm., State Library of New South Wales, Sydney. 
 
During the first Columbia expedition, 1788-89, copper began to supplant iron as 
the preferred trade metal on the Northwest Coast. When Columbia made her second 
expedition to the coast, in the summer of 1791, the transformation in price structures had 
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radiated outward from Nootka. Indians north and south now desired trade goods of higher 
quality, and copper in particular. John Boit recorded that, at Clayoquot Sound, the 
Indians traded prime skins only in exchange for “Copper and blue Cloth.”33 John Hoskins 
observed the new paradigm while trading among the Cheklesaht People, the northern 
neighbors of the Mowachahts. Hoskins noted that “our articles of traffick were 
principally copper and cloathing,” but granted that “iron was more valuable than at 
Clioquot.” Later, during a southward cruise, he remarked upon the same conditions 
among the Makah, recording that “copper and cloathing were our articles of commerce.” 
Furthermore, Indians began to monetize copper as the preferred medium of exchange for 
other items, including slaves. Chief Cassacan of the Ditidaht People reported to Hoskins 
that he “sold a female prisoner or slave girl for several sheets of copper.” 34 The 
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following year, 1792, Boit confirmed that the preference for copper had taken root far to 
the south, along the Columbia River. He reported an exchange price of “4 Otter Skins for 
a Sheet of Copper” while trading among the Chinooks.35 The rate represented a sort of 
“floor price” for the metal, but demand frequently drove prices much higher. 
The Columbians discovered that copper goods formed a special category of trade 
on the Northwest Coast. The expedition often encountered peoples for whom “copper 
was all there cry.”36 During an opening encounter with the Coast Salish, on 20 August 
1788, Robert Haswell reported a successful trade of skins for iron implements, probably 
chisels, but that the Salish “expressed a great desire for copper.”37 In some locations, 
Haswell noted the demand to be so high that, lacking copper goods, a successful trade 
was hardly possible at all. When negotiating with the Mowachaht People of Nootka 
Sound, Haswell again recorded that “copper was the article in demand” and lamented that 
                                                          
during conflicts such as King Philip’s War. Third, Indian slavery was common on the Northwest 
Coast. Here, the category of “slave” denoted persons captured, born into servitude, or whose 
debts required a period of servitude. In this regard, as Philip Drucker notes, enslaved persons, 
“like the natives’ dogs, or better still, like canoes and sea otters and blankets, were elements of 
the social configuration but had no active part to play in group life.” Still, the boundary between 
“free” and “unfree” status remained permeable, depending upon circumstances. That slaves did 
not participate in civil society is, perhaps, the main reason for their absence from the chronicles of 
the Columbia expedition. See John Hoskins, “Narrative of the Second Voyage of the 
‘Columbia’,” 195-98.; Census Bureau. “First Census of the United States,” 8.; Daniel K. Richter, 
Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 59-67.; Rebecca Blevins Faery, “Mary Rowlandson (1637-1711),” 
Legacy 12, no. 2 (1995): 121-132.; Philip Drucker, “Rank, Wealth, and Kinship in Northwest 
Coast Society,” American Anthropologist, New Series 41, no. 1 (1939): 55-65. 
35 Boit, “Remarks on the Ship Columbia’s voyage from Boston,” 397. 
36 Haswell, “A Voyage Round the World,” 44. 
37 Ibid., 40. 
185 
 
“this we were unprovided with.”38 The rage for copper continued throughout the winter 
and into 1789. That spring, when trading with the Clayoquot People, Haswell compared 
the value of copper versus iron, and we can almost imagine his exasperation. “In all these 
houses they have plenty of skins,” he wrote, “which they told us they would rediely part 
with for [iron] Chizles or Copper but of the former they demand an exorbitant price ten 
for a skin and the latter we are totally destitute of.” 39 
Did the expedition expend its copper early in the voyage, or was it, in Haswell’s 
words, “destitute” of this commodity from the beginning? The existing documents are 
silent on this matter. The original bill of lading for the Columbia is missing and copper 
does not appear on the “Calculation of the Washington’s Cargo and How Expended.”40 
Yet, the dearth of copper was probably not an oversight on the part of the owners, but 
rather an unknown factor that remained undiscovered until Columbia arrived on the 
Northwest Coast. In 1787, Joseph Barrell had access to only a few sources concerning the 
peoples of the Northwest Coast, all of which originated during Cook’s third voyage. The 
most familiar was A Journal of Captain Cook’s Third Voyage to the Pacific Ocean 
(1783), written by John Ledyard, a former British marine from Connecticut. In his 
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account, Ledyard attested to the presence of “copper bracelets” and “copper trinkets” 
among the peoples of the Northwest Coast, but did not identify the metal as an important 
item of trade.41 Historians contend that Barrell and Bulfinch, and perhaps the other 
owners, referenced Ledyard’s account while preparing to launch the Columbia. There is 
no evidence, however, concerning their access to other narratives of the Third Voyage. 
William Ellis, a surgeon’s mate, reported that the Mowachaht People were “fond of brass 
buttons, pieces of copper and brass, particularly if bright, and pewter and tine, which they 
converted into bracelets.” 42 John Rickman, a Lieutenant in the Royal Navy, stated that 
the Indians desired “cutlery wares of all sorts, edge-tools, copper, pewter, iron, brass, or 
any kind of metal, with the use of which they were not unacquainted.”43 We can surmise 
that, had these other narratives come to Barrell’s attention before 1787, he would have 
taken special care to load the Columbia with copper. 
In any case, Columbia appears to have sailed without an adequate cargo of 
copper, a situation that hampered her commercial options during the first expedition to 
the Northwest Coast. The Columbians had ample opportunities to trade with the locals 
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while anchored at Nootka Sound through the winter of 1788-89. Nonetheless, trade still 
depended upon a mixture of copper and other goods, some of which the Americans had 
no intention of trading. One trading opportunity involved Wickaninnish, Chief of the 
Clayoquots, who brought “his brother and several persons of distinction” on a diplomatic 
mission to the Mowachahts in January 1789. The Mowachahts, however, had not yet 
returned to their villages at Nootka Sound. In the meantime, according to Robert Haswell, 
Wickaninnish presented “upwards of 30 excellant sea otter skins but they sold us fue as 
they wanted Copper and muskits.” Lacking copper, the Columbians could have 
substituted firearms as trade goods, but their reluctance to arm the Indians brought the 
negotiations to a close. The following day, the Mowachahts “began to come down in 
great numbers,” and their arrival altered the commercial conditions at Nootka. Now, 
competition between the two Indian groups drove prices down so far that “a good maney 
sea otter skins were purchaced” without further demand for copper—or firearms.44 
The presence of copper among the Mowachaht People, as described by members 
of Cook’s third voyage, attests to the preexisting metals trade among the peoples of the 
Northwest Coast.45 Copper, however, greatly exceeded iron in their estimation. Indians 
regarded copper as one of two mineral goods that conferred high status.46 In this respect, 
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coastal peoples contributed to a near-universal demand for the metal among Indians of 
North America.47 Copper occurred along the Northwest Coast in the form of “float 
copper,” or nuggets. Nuggets varied in purity according to the circumstances of their 
occurrence, namely, the ratio of ore to rock. Copper originated in subterranean veins, but 
glaciers—acting over thousands of years—dredged metal fragments from below and 
scattered them across the landscape. Prince of Wales Island, the Queen Charlotte Islands, 
Hope Island, and the appropriately named Copper River represented the main deposits on 
the Northwest Coast.48 Some copper may have originated around the Great Lakes, where 
an indigenous metalworking tradition thrived for more than 7,000 years. This occurrence 
constitutes the largest “native,” or ore-bearing mineral, deposits of copper in the world.49 
Copper resonated with the Columbians as a trade commodity with great potential, 
but it carried a broader cultural significance for the Indians of the Northwest Coast. 
Indeed, Spanish naturalist José Mariano Moziño commented in 1792 that “Copper… 
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among them has the same value gold has to us.”50 For the Indians, demand for copper 
reflected not only its ornamental beauty but also the social prestige, political authority, 
and magical potency that it conferred upon an owner. First, copper indicated an elevated 
social status. “Throughout the Northwest Coast,” as anthropologist Philip Drucker states, 
“possession of riches was the basis of social gradation.” Wealth indicated status because 
it signified an individual’s ability to sustain the community—that is, to provide 
abundance in a world of subsistence. Those in possession of “riches” were, therefore, 
poised to exercise a fuller “extent of participation” in the community than their poorer 
neighbors.51 Moreover, ethnologist George McDonald has concluded that, among a broad 
constellation of status-bearing goods, Indians of the Northwest Coast regarded copper as 
“the ultimate symbol of wealth.”52 Second, because copper represented a supreme form 
of wealth, it also, in a plutocratic society, signified the “ultimate” political authority. 
While anyone could own copper, only chiefs possessed “coppers,” a form of ornamental 
household crest hammered into shape from the raw metal. “Coppers” reinforced a chief’s 
ruling authority by placing his command of materials, as well as communal labor, on 
display. More importantly, among some peoples, a prominent chief’s power could be 
“stored” in a “copper” and passed down to future generations through the process of 
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inheritance.53 Finally, copper was a “supernatural” material that carried a spiritual charge, 
and humans could access that potency through interaction with the metal.54 Indians 
regarded copper as magical because of its “distinctive metallic properties and seemingly 
fortuitous occurrence in nature.” Moreover, those who possessed the metal had “tangible 
evidence of contact with the supernatural… [and] the element of luck.”55 Copper 
possessed tsh’ih (ɥ’iʜ, “supernatural power” or “spirit”), a magical energy that connected 
the spiritual and material worlds. It bound together people, animals, and material objects 
according to their respective abilities and effects on human lives.56 Tsh’ih, therefore, 
closely resembled the concept of Manitou (“magic” or “control-power”) understood by 
Eastern Woodland Indians. The shaman, or even the individual practitioner, could “tap 
into” the potency of copper in order to correct social injustices, transmute natural 
resources into wealth, increase human fertility, or protect against malevolent supernatural 
beings.57 Americans and Europeans who introduced copper into the coastal economy 
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were, from the perspective of the Indians, releasing enormous amounts of prestige, 
power, and spiritual energy into their world. 
The Columbia made its first expedition “destitute” of copper, but Captain Robert 
Gray became strongly attuned to the importance of the supernatural metal as a trade 
commodity. Within three weeks of arriving on the Northwest Coast, in August of 1788, 
Gray determined that the expedition required a supply of copper in order to maximize 
purchases. Writing to Joseph Barrell, he commented that he “intended” to overwinter in 
Macao, “there to get some articles of Trade which I had not on board, that suits best on 
this Coast.” Gray did not specify copper as the “articles” in question, but Robert 
Haswell’s journal of the first voyage makes clear that the Columbia and Washington were 
well stocked in iron and textiles, the other principal items of trade. Gray, therefore, 
probably intended to purchase sheet copper in Macao. Nevertheless, Gray lamented that 
Captain Kendrick, the overall commander of the expedition, “depriv’d me of my 
intentions, and [of] acting myself, he thinking it best to winter here [at Nootka].” Gray 
concluded that, under the circumstances, he had “made two Cruises with considerable 
success,” but lacking copper, “the voyage will not turn out to the Owners expectation.”58 
The difference of opinion between the two captains prevented the first expedition from 
achieving a profit. Without copper, the Columbians could not secure the participation of 
indigenous communities in the fur trade with China. 
                                                          
58 “Robert Gray to Joseph Barrell, July 13, 1789,” in Voyages of the Columbia, 122-23. 
192 
 
Gray insisted, though, upon rectifying the situation, and he probably emphasized 
the demand for copper upon returning to Boston in the summer of 1790. While no record 
attests to the conversations between Gray and Joseph Barrell, documentary records 
confirm that the Columbia began its second expedition with an ample stockpile of the 
metal. According to the ship’s inventory, Herman Brimmer, a Boston merchant, provided 
the ship with 143 sheets of copper. John Pintard, one of silent partners in the Columbia 
enterprise, contributed an additional 124 sheets. Collectively, the 267 sheets weighed a 
total of 3,495 ¼ pounds, an impressive figure that guaranteed the expedition would have 
a sufficient supply of the “ultimate symbol of wealth.”59 On average, each sheet weighed 
13 pounds. The inventory does not indicate the precise dimensions of a single sheet, but it 
is possible that these were available in 6-inch squares, each having a thickness of 1⅛ 
inches.60 In comparison to other trade goods aboard the ship, copper sheets ranked 
second in weight only to a large supply of iron chisels, a utilitarian, bread-and-butter 
trade item of the Northwest Coast. 
The precise geographical origin of the Columbia’s copper sheets is unknown, but 
we can make some educated guesses about their provenance. Prior to the American 
Revolution, copper mining constituted an important growth industry in the colonial 
world. Between 1709 and the 1750s, a number of profitable mines operated in 
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Connecticut’s “Copper Valley,” along New Jersey’s Raritan River, and in northwestern 
Maryland.61 Copper smelting, too, accelerated during the 1720s, with new industries 
along the Naugatuck River providing the base metal for Connecticut’s provincial mint. 
During the 1770s, however, both the mining and smelting industries entered a steep 
decline, largely because of the depletion of known deposits and the associated costs of 
further exploration. The American Revolution interrupted any attempts to revive copper, 
and the dire conditions of the Confederation period exacerbated the difficulty of 
attracting new investors. By 1790, when Columbia was preparing for a second expedition 
to the Northwest Coast, copper smelting was defunct in the United States.62 American 
industries would, therefore, depend upon imports from the world’s largest suppliers of 
copper: Great Britain, Norway, and Sweden. British copper, in particular, developed in 
tandem with the Royal Navy’s demand for hull sheathing that protected its ships against 
weeds, shipworms, and corrosion. Given the standing commercial relationships between 
American merchants and British manufacturers, it is probable that Brimmer and Pintard 
imported their copper from suppliers in Cornwall and Wales.63 
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Table 2. Copper Traded during the Second Columbia Expedition. 
 
 
Copper enabled the second Columbia expedition to do business in a manner that 
stands in stark contrast to the “destitute” first voyage. The purchasing power of copper 
was obvious from the first afternoon of trading. On 5 June 1791, John Boit reported from 
Clayoquot Sound that “we purchas’d many of the Sea Otter skins in exchange for 
                                                          
Review, New Series 48, no. 1 (1995): 38-42.; Jopling, “The Coppers of the Northwest Coast 
Indians,” 58-60. 
DATE AUTHOR PEOPLE TRADE SKINS NOTES 
5 June 
1791 Boit Clayoquot Copper “many”  
5 June 
1791 Hoskins Clayoquot 
“articles of 
traffic”  Unofficial mention 
16 June 
1791 Hoskins Clayoquot 
1 Sheet of 
Copper 4 skins 
Summary of exchange 
rate 
20 June 
1791 Boit Cheklesaht Copper “many”  
28 June 
1791 Hoskins Ditidaht Copper 
“several very 
valuable”  
28 June 
1791 Boit Ditidaht Copper  (duplicate) 
1 July 
1791 Boit Makah Copper “many”  
1 July 
1791 Hoskins Makah Copper  (duplicate) 
10 April 
1792 Boit Coosa Copper “many fine”  
27 April 
1792 Boit Quiluete Copper “a fine lot”  
12 May 
1792 Boit Chinook Copper “a good lot”  
12 May 
1792 Boit Chinook 
1 Sheet of 
Copper 4 skins 
Summary of exchange 
rate 
12 June 
1792 Boit Kwakiutl Copper 
“kept bringing 
furs”  
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Copper.” This auspicious beginning was a sign of good things to come. Later that month, 
at Chekleset Bay, Boit commented that copper had secured “many Sea Otter and Land 
furs” in return for “Copper, Iron and Cloth.”64 Similarly, John Hoskins recorded that 
“several very valuable skins were purchased for copper and cloathing” from the Ditidaht 
Indians.65 In July, upon arriving among the Makah People of Cape Flattery, Boit noted 
that “we Collected many Otters” because “these natives gave the preference to Copper.”66 
The lustrous, supernatural metal enabled the second expedition to trade on much more 
favorable terms and virtually cemented its success from the beginning.  
 During the second expedition, Boit and Hoskins recorded trades of copper on 
twelve occasions, although their stockpile of the metal probably accounts for a significant 
share of what Hoskins called “our various articles of traffic.”67 According to their notes, 
copper purchased large quantities of skins, as attested by references to “many” or “a good 
lot” of skins. On other occasions, such as the purchase of “several very valuable” otters, 
the metal traded for the highest quality of fur. In other cases, copper attracted both 
quantity and quality, making for exceptional trades of “many fine” or “a fine lot” of furs. 
Overall, Boit and Hoskins explicitly commented upon copper in terms of its purchasing 
power on ten of twelve, or eighty-three percent, of occasions. In two instances they 
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recorded a precise exchange rate—one copper sheet per four otters. On another, Boit 
noted that “the natives kept bringing furs,” a comment that indicates a large transaction.68 
Two remaining mentions of copper, which appear to neglect the purchasing price, are in 
fact instances where one author has duplicated the other. Boit and Hoskins mentioned 
copper on just two occasions when no trading took place. In July 1791, while cruising the 
Queen Charlotte Islands, Boit commented that “copper was not in demand” among the 
Haida People.69 His observation is not surprising, given that the islands represented a 
major indigenous source of the metal. Later, in January 1792, Hoskins mentioned that the 
Ditidaht People desired a trade in muskets “which now supplants copper and 
cloathing.”70 These two instances, one in which copper could not compete in a producer’s 
market, and another in which an alternative item of trade superseded its primacy, must be 
considered outliers against Columbia’s success in meeting demand for the metal on the 
Northwest Coast. 
 Boit and Hoskins also commented upon copper’s economic pull during two 
concentrated periods of time. Seven of twelve observations correspond to the first month 
after Columbia’s return to the Northwest Coast. As such, these indicate the first 
reckoning with adjustments in local prices since the first expedition. The Columbians are 
certain to have been pleased that their cargo of copper sheets would trade for quantity and 
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quality of furs. The second time period, which includes five of twelve mentions, 
corresponds to the first month of the 1792 season. These instances constitute a 
reassessment of trade conditions since the previous summer, and again, the Columbians 
would have been pleased to discover that little change had occurred since that time. Boit 
and Hoskins discontinued their commentaries upon copper following each month-long 
assessment. We can reasonably interpret their silence to indicate price stability, 
particularly in light of “a brisk trade for Otter furs” that often “drain’d the village” of its 
merchandise.71 That merchandise, otter skins, formed a reciprocal commodity that 
intensified the integration of coastal communities into the global marketplace. 
 
“Furry Gold” 
 
 
Just as copper represented a trade commodity of importance prior to the arrival of 
Europeans, the maritime fur trade also emerged from preexisting commercial 
arrangements in North America. Where copper enabled the Columbians to establish a 
profitable trade between Boston and the Northwest Coast, furs enabled Indians to 
participate in a broader world of goods. Like copper, which traded along the Northwest 
Coast before contact between the native peoples and outsiders, furs also had a much 
longer commercial history among Europeans. For centuries, furs served as markers of 
hereditary rank among the European nobility, and during the rise of landed gentry, they 
became symbols of acquired status. During the late medieval period, the market for 
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animal pelts expanded in tandem with economic growth. Beginning around 1200, though, 
a parallel intensification in trapping prompted a decline of furbearing animals in Western 
and Central Europe. Overhunting took a disastrous toll upon the limited furbearing 
populations of the British Isles. By 1400, European commercial trapping had pivoted to 
the east, and most furs originated in the Russian principalities of Novgorod and 
Moscow.72  
Russian pelts, and the fur trade that surrounded them, contributed to the 
development of early-modern commercialization, chartered corporations, and managerial 
structures. Russia provided its European neighbors with a number of “northern furs,” 
including sable, ermine, black fox, seal, and marten, as well as more common bear and 
beaver pelts.73 Control of the fur trade provided these kingdoms in Russia, like later fur 
empires, with fabulous wealth and contributed to their political ascendancy among their 
neighbors. Meanwhile, European middlemen in the market towns of Bruges, Leipzig, and 
London profited handsomely as the local distributors of individual furs as well as finished 
coats, shawls, and hats.74 Expansion of the fur trade, and profits from furs, contributed to 
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the growth of the world’s first multinational trading company. Chartered in 1553, the 
Royal Muscovy Company held a monopoly on shipping between Russia and London. 
The company also pioneered the English practice of establishing trading posts, or 
“factories,” in foreign countries where a resident manager, or “factor,” could make 
dynamic business decisions about prices for labor and trade goods.75 The practice of 
middlemen operating from trading posts in distant places would inform generations of fur 
traders, including Joseph Barrell, the principal investor in the Columbia. 
Nevertheless, centuries of fur trapping also reduced the population of furbearers 
in Russia, with the result that European states looked to North America for fresh supplies. 
During the colonial period, European competition for control of furs provided the 
background, and occasionally the proximate cause, for wars of empire in the New 
World.76 The North American trade began as a secondary effect of French fishing on the 
Grand Banks, in the North Atlantic, in which fishermen dried cod at temporary camps on 
the continental mainland. In the process, the fisherman engaged in limited trade with 
Micmac and Wabanaki Indians, including the exchange of animal furs. Reports of high-
quality furs, combined with spontaneous exchange between merchant-explorers and 
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native peoples, prompted European companies to develop trading posts in America. The 
trading companies provided the critical foundation for two settler colonies, New France 
and New Netherland, both of which survived principally on beaver revenues. Conversely, 
the New England colonies of Plymouth, Massachusetts, and Connecticut began as 
plantations, but rapidly evolved to become secondary producers of beaver pelts.77 Later, 
colonies such as Virginia, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina would deliver bear, rabbit, 
and deerskins for market in Europe.78 In all cases, profits depended upon commercial 
partnerships with the principal suppliers of furs—the native peoples of North America. 
This characteristic persisted during the Columbia expeditions. 
European trade in furs, combined with the participation of Indian suppliers, 
extended the influence of the global “world of goods” deep into the continental interior. 
Two British firms, the Hudson’s Bay and North West Companies, also based their 
commercial success upon close relations with indigenous peoples of North America. The 
Hudson’s Bay Company, founded in 1670, operated according to the trading-post model, 
in which Indians delivered seasonal catches of beaver, bear, and buffalo skins to the 
company’s three outposts.79 Each post commanded a vast hinterland and depended upon 
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networks of indigenous trade routes. Many routes followed geographical features such as 
rivers, portages, and lake passages, all of which eased the process of transporting goods 
over long distances. York Factory, the company’s principal trading post, stood at the 
convergence of routes following the Burtwood, Grass, and Minago Rivers, each of which 
terminated in a different region of the hinterland. Some routes, such as the Saskatchewan 
River, extended to the Canadian Rockies, where other paths led westward to the Pacific.80 
Trading posts prompted Indians to become systemic producers of furs, but also sparked 
intense competition between different groups for control of the carrying trade to the 
European trading posts. Later, commercial pressure from the rival North West Company, 
established in 1779, prompted the construction of inland trading posts to provide 
logistical support and provisions across the company’s extensive western domains. Inland 
posts also offered clear advantages for Indians: they eliminated long journeys to market, 
permitted regular trade, and improved access to desirable European goods such as 
firearms, textiles, and cookware. More importantly, the posts enabled some groups, such 
as the Assiniboine and Plains Cree, to become middlemen rather than primary producers, 
a development that brought new affluence to their communities.81 
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Where business competitors, foreign relations, or the overhunting of furbearing 
animals interfered with “business as usual,” fur traders attempted to extend their 
operations through exploration and consolidation of new resources. Following the 
American Revolution, all three considerations became significant factors in the westward 
thrust of the fur trade. First, stiff competition between the Hudson’s Bay and North West 
Companies prompted both to explore the possibilities of transcontinental trade routes, 
trading posts, and client peoples.82 Second, a noticeable decline in furbearing animals 
throughout old territories lent urgency to the search for new domains.83 Finally, 
American independence, and the recognition of a national border along the 48th Parallel, 
excluded the British companies from vast territories formerly within their economic 
sphere.84 Taken together, the picture of diminishing profits, resources, and territories was 
not reassuring. Beginning in 1789, concurrent with the Columbia voyage, the Northwest 
Company commissioned Alexander Mackenzie to investigate possible routes to the 
fabled fur wealth of the Pacific. Mackenzie, therefore, traveled into uncharted country in 
order to determine “the probable advantages that may be derived from advancing the 
trade of it, under proper regulations, and by the spirit of commercial enterprize.”85 His 
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overland expeditions succeeded in charting routes to furbearing regions on the Arctic and 
Pacific Oceans.  
Meanwhile, the American fur trade suffered from poor capitalization and limited 
access to the western territories of the United States. The depression that struck the 
United States following the Revolution discouraged investment in furs, while the 
interstate disputes of the Confederation period prevented resolution of competing claims 
to furbearing lands. To make matters worse, the continued presence of British forces in 
the Ohio Country, in contravention of the Treaty of Paris, jeopardized American access to 
the region’s fur resources.86 Meanwhile, Americans pondered the resources of the West, 
including its vast repository of furbearing animals, and considered the exploration of new 
territories. In 1783, Thomas Jefferson entertained the possibility of sponsoring an 
overland expedition from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean. From his 
perspective, American commerce and expansion was threatened by the potential for 
European “colonizing into that quarter.” Nonetheless, coming immediately on the heels 
of independence, an expedition to advance the flag and national commerce was beyond 
the capacity of the Confederation Congress.87 
The Northwest Coast, remote and largely unexplored, represented the most 
promising untapped source of furs in North America. Russian trappers made the earliest 
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limited inroads into the acquisition of Arctic furs. In 1741, sea expeditions from 
Kamchatka provided the Russian Empire with claims in Alaska. Later, in 1784, the 
Shelikhov-Golikov Company, a fur trading enterprise headquartered at Irkutsk, in 
Siberia, established the first Russian settlement in Alaska at Three Saints Bay.88 This 
operation, largely dependent upon indigenous serfdom, produced a combination of seal, 
otter, and walrus skins, all traditional sources of fur among the Alaska natives. The post 
remained unprofitable, however, owing to chronic starvation, native resistance, and the 
logistical challenges of shipping furs to central Siberia.89 In 1788, immediately prior to 
the arrival of Columbia on the coast, a tsunami annihilated the settlement at Three Saints 
Bay. Meanwhile, the Spanish Empire maintained claims to the entirety of the Northwest 
Coast, from Cape Mendocino northward to Alaska. Spanish navigators had explored the 
coast intermittently since the sixteenth century, and, most recently, Juan Pérez had 
undertaken an expedition to map the region’s “northern mysteries.”90 Pérez commented 
upon the coast’s prodigious fur resources, but its productive potential did not resonate in 
Mexico City or Madrid. Spanish bureaucrats concerned themselves instead with silver, 
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the financial lifeblood that coursed through the commercial arteries of a global empire. 
Their attention was, therefore, fixed upon the rich mining economies of New Spain and 
Peru.91 In contrast, Spain perceived its claims to the Northwest Coast in terms of a 
strategic bulwark against Russian or British encroachment, rather than a site of economic 
expansion.92 
Spanish and Russian explorers established imperial claims to portions of the 
coast, but the economic significance of the sea otter remained unknown until the arrival 
of British navigator James Cook in 1778. While lingering at Nootka Sound, Cook 
conducted detailed hydrological surveys of its channels and islands, made observations 
about the Mowachaht Indians, and took possession of the harbor for Great Britain. 
During their spare time, his crew traded personal items to the Indians in exchange for 
soft, warm, and comfortable furs. Lieutenant John Rickman commented that the 
Mowachahts offered “a great variety of valuable skins, such as beaver, foxes, racoons, 
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squirrels, rein-deers, bears, and several others, with which we were but little 
acquainted.”93 The most important new furbearing animal was what William Ellis, 
Cook’s surgeon, described as the “sea-beaver,” or sea otter. The crew first encountered 
otter fur as a component of water-resistant clothing, crucial to the damp climate of the 
Northwest Coast. Ellis explained that the Indians wore cloaks “apparently made of the 
bark of a tree” and “trimmed with the fur of the sea-beaver” for warmth.94  
 
 
 
Figure 12. S. Smith after John Webber, “A Sea Otter,” engraving, image cropped, colors, and tone 
slightly adjusted, as reproduced in James Cook, A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean . . . Performed under 
the Direction of Captains Cook, Clerke, and Gore . . .1776, 1777, 1778, 1779, and 1780, London: 
W. Strahan, 1780. Library of Congress. 
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Cook first learned of the sea otter from accounts written by Russian adventurers 
in Alaska, but had never personally seen an otter skin. The captain “entertained doubts, 
whether the many skins which the natives brought, really belonged to this animal.” Cook 
positively identified the otter after purchasing a recently-killed, unprepared specimen of 
the species.95 Indian hunters expressed pride in their abilities to catch otters, and 
Lieutenant Rickman reported that they “made no secret of their methods of curing the 
skins, with which they carried on a traffic with occasional visitors.”96 Those 
crewmembers who purchased skins noted their superior protection against the elements, 
which far exceeded that of English woolens. Corporal John Ledyard commented that the 
crew had “no thoughts at that time of using them to any other advantage that converting 
them to the purposes of cloathing.” Their intentions changed upon arriving at Macao. 
Ledyard reported that “skins which did not cost the purchaser six-pence sterling sold in 
China for 100 dollars.”97 This magnificent profit margin prompted the crew to part with 
their skins, and inspired merchant-captains to dream of harvesting furry gold. Following 
the publication of these accounts, British adventurers, operating outside the structures of 
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either the East India or South Seas Companies, rushed to exploit the furs of the Northwest 
Coast.98 
Otter skins recommended themselves as valuable commodities for a number of 
reasons unique to the species. First, the species was, at the beginning of the maritime fur 
trade, both widespread and numerous. Native to a broad territorial arc spanning the North 
Pacific, sea otters (Enhydra lutris) probably numbered between 150,000 and 300,000 
individuals prior to the beginning of intensive hunting in the eighteenth century.99 
Second, otter coats exhibit a rich combination of luster and color. Captain Cook remarked 
upon the opulent “shining or glossy black color” of adolescent otters, prized among the 
nobles, gentry, and bureaucrats of China.100 But the appearance of otter became even 
more pleasing with age. John Hoskins, furrier aboard the Columbia, commented upon the 
development of a “beautiful silver grey” color among the most valuable, adult animals.101 
Third, otter coats boast a texture that Hoskins considered “finer and more delicate than 
                                                          
98 James Hanna, Nathaniel Portlock and George Dixon, and John Meares all promoted the Pacific 
fur trade through their accounts of the Northwest Coast. By and large, however, their voyages 
were structured as seasonal affairs, rather than the extended enterprise envisioned for Columbia. 
John Meares did remain on the coast during the winter of 1786-87, but only because “the bad 
weather had set in, with continual gales of wind, accompanied by sleet and snow.” Portlock and 
Dixon rescued his disintegrating crew, now struggling against scurvy and subsisting almost 
entirely upon alcohol, the following spring. See Meares, Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 
1789, xxi-xxii.; George Dixon, A Voyage Round the World, 157. 
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any heretofore known.”102 Bosting average density of 650,000 hairs per square inch—the 
highest of any mammal—otter pelts are exceptionally soft and comfortable.103 Finally, 
the structure of the coat contributes to an unusual warmth and water-resistance. Otter fur 
consists of two layers. An outside layer of long, flat “guard hairs” preserve the integrity 
and alignment of the dense undercoat. The undercoat—because of its staggering 
density—traps air bubbles between the individual hair fibers, producing a formidable 
layer of insulation that is both heat-retentive and water-resistant. These characteristics are 
of great importance to otters, whose activity, size, and metabolism prevent them from 
building up blubber.104 Humans also appreciate these features in peltry. The otter’s broad 
application in hats, capes, scarves, shoes, robes, and especially winter coats, made it the 
most valuable fur available.105  
For the indigenous peoples of the Northwest Coast, whose access to exotic goods 
depended upon the circumpacific trade route, otters formed a ubiquitous part of all 
coastal ecosystems. Prior to contact with Europeans, however, Indians hunted sea otters 
for purposes of subsistence and local trade, rather than as mass market “commodities.” 
Archeological evidence points to longstanding hunting of sea otters on the coast, 
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beginning a minimum of 8,000 years before the present. Otters were already 
“economically significant” as a source of meat and furs during this period.106 Indian men 
began an otter hunt during the early morning and approached their quarry in canoes. The 
animals often gathered around rocky outcroppings where their own prey, mollusks and 
crabs, were abundant. Occasionally, entire rafts of otter could be found sleeping on kelp 
beds, clutching the plants in order to remain anchored. Most often, Indian hunters 
attacked small groups of three or four otters.107 One method involved shooting otters with 
arrows and then approaching to collect the wounded animals. From a medium range, 
hunters often speared, or harpooned, the otter from a crouching position in a canoe.108 
When otters attempted to escape by diving, multiple canoes could be maneuvered into a 
circle around the location of the dive, until the animals were forced to resurface for air. In 
close quarters, the hunter might club an animal and then pluck its buoyant body, 
                                                          
106 Kenneth M. Ames, “Economic Prehistory of the Northern British Columbia Coast,” Arctic 
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unconscious, from the water. When hunting on land, a variety of snares, traps, nets, or 
lassoes could be used to catch otter.109 
Upon returning to the village, Indian men dressed and stretched the otters. 
Dressing required specialized knowledge passed down over generations. First, hunters 
washed the otters to remove unwanted brine, sand, and plant material. Next, they 
skillfully performed a series of incisions around the feet, under the tail, and up the 
animal’s belly.110 Thereafter, men carefully pealed the skin away from the carcass, 
leaving the meat, organs, and skeleton for other purposes. “Fleshing” involved the 
removal of small bits of muscle and connective tissue that clung to the skin. This process, 
accomplished with sharpened stone or iron tools, required great care in order to avoid 
unwanted perforation of the pelt. Finally, having fully cleaned the otter skin, hunters 
stretched the skin flat across a cedar plank to dry.111 Meanwhile, Indian women boiled or 
roasted otter meat, which was considered to be superior to other mammals because of its 
sweet, buttery quality.112 Woman also transformed the skins into coats, coat linings, and 
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blankets. On average, a mature pelt spans six to eight square feet in area, large enough to 
serve as a small blanket.113 Indians used blankets as both practical household items and 
as gifts associated with courtship between noble families.114 The most beautiful, lustrous, 
and comfortable skins were sewn together as ceremonial robes, indicative of wealth, for 
use by chiefs.115 Otter bones and teeth became small tools, ornaments, and ritual items 
used in “summoning” animals during future hunts. Coastal communities often traded 
otter furs for produce of the continental interior, including obsidian, woodpecker scalps, 
iron, and copper.116 
The sheer prevalence of otter, congregating in vast multitudes in every harbor 
along the Northwest Coast, also marked the species as being of strong cosmological 
importance to Indian societies. Indians perceived otters as something more than animal 
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resources. Instead, because of their common creation, otters were sentient creatures or 
“people” with kinship to human beings. They could, like all creatures, remove their 
animal robes and appear as human beings. Some animals were said to have married 
human beings, who gradually assumed the physical characteristics of their animal 
spouses.117 Otters communicated with human beings on a regular basis. Moreover, 
humans could mimic the phonetics of an animal “accent” in order to hold conversations 
in “otter-language.”118 Because supernatural beings often appeared in the form of otters, 
their speech was regarded as being especially potent. Young men who aspired to become 
shamans were required to capture a river otter, kill it, and remove its tongue as a magical 
item. The tongue conferred an ability to understand the languages of all minerals, plants, 
and animals.119 Indians understood that sea otters, like humans, inhabited towns and 
societies of their own, an impression strengthened by the rafting behavior of the species. 
They returned to the hidden otter towns, inaccessible to human beings, after gathering 
mollusks and crabs.120 The personification of otters colored all perceptions of the species. 
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Commenting on this facet of indigenous belief, the anthropologist Franz Boas 
commented that “the most important characteristic of mythological concepts is 
personification. It is not difficult to understand why animals should be personified, for 
their behavior resembles in many ways that of man. Their actions are easily understood 
as motivated by hunger, fear, anger, and love.”121 Indeed, Indians understood otters and 
other animals to be “people.” 
Nevertheless, Indians of the Northwest Coast did not consider otter “people” to be 
of equal creation despite their spiritual kinship. The creator had, in fact, provided animals 
for the disposal and sustenance of human beings.122 The paradox of this relationship, in 
which the hunter kills a kindred creature, is resolved through spiritual preparation and 
practice in hunting. The Columbians observed that their Clayoquot hosts “believe in 
Good and evil Spirits,” and that specific rituals preceded each hunt.123 Indians recognized 
that each species of animal “people” enjoyed the protection of a guardian-spirit, a 
powerful patron whose character and attitudes exemplified the essence of the animal 
under its care. Prior to beginning a hunt, it was necessary to consult that animal’s 
guardian-spirit in order receive permission to kill.124 Permission depended upon 
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“medicine,” or magical substances and rituals, which could have a critical impact upon 
the success of a hunt. Proper application of “medicine” often required personal 
purification or identification with the essential spirit of the animal.125 The Columbians 
noted the use of snakeskin as a purifying material prior to several hunts. Boit wrote that 
“these Indians are very superstitious in regard to this animal [the snake],” and observed 
that “when they go on a whaling cruise, they always rub their face with a piece of it.” The 
snake, whose venom contained the power of death, could improve upon the outcome of a 
hunt.126 John Hoskins explained that “a piece of this magic animal insured success at all 
time and on all occasions.”127 Other rituals shaped a relationship between the hunter and 
his prey through the manipulation of animal relics, such as an otter’s flipper, that 
embodied the unique abilities of the species.128 Indians also performed secret familial 
rituals, in order to request assistance from a household patron, such as the bear, the 
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thunderbird, or the otter.129 The guardian-otter, for example, provided its human 
followers with a magical harpoon to ensure success in hunting.130 Following a hunt, 
Indians also performed rituals intended to honor the otter’s life, comfort its departing 
soul, and recognize its sacrifice. Adherence to ritual secured that animal’s reincarnation 
and, therefore, the stability of the species in the material world.131 Indians who failed to 
respect animals as “people” risked the retribution of a guardian-spirit, which manifested 
as sickness, starvation, or social unrest.132 Otter skins, therefore, were not commodities 
for a mass market, but rather, a precious gift of comfort given by animal kin. 
The intensification of the fur trade, which assumed industrial proportions in the 
early nineteenth century, changed much of this veneration for animals. Indians became 
increasingly dependent upon furs as export items to be exchanged for manufactured 
goods, and the acceleration of hunting placed a severe strain upon traditional views of 
otters as “people.” External demand for furs, originating in China and Europe, prompted 
hunters to harvest otters on an unsustainable scale unknown to previous generations. Sea 
otters, now understood as commodities to be counted, graded, and sold, ceased to be 
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animal “people” and assumed the status of natural resources.133 Consequently, sea otter 
populations on the Northwest Coast declined from an estimated 150,000 individuals 
around 1780 to a few thousand by 1900. Put another way, hunters trapped tens of 
thousands of otters per year from 1790-1820, but, a century later, annual catches had 
fallen to a few hundred otters across the North Pacific.134 
The Columbia expedition used a number of strategies to locate sources of otter 
skins, including written accounts, word of mouth, cruises of exploration, and extended 
stays in preferred otter ports. Published accounts provided a starting point. Basing his 
business plan on the accounts of Cook’s third voyage, Joseph Barrell selected Nootka 
Sound as the principal destination for the first Columbia expedition. The accounts, 
containing both navigational and commercial points of interest, were familiar to all the 
expedition’s officers. Robert Haswell often reflected on how conditions at Nootka Sound 
compared to published accounts of the harbor, and John Hoskins challenged Cook in 
regard to the mythological Straits of Admiral de Fonte. 135 New accounts, written by rival 
fur traders, became available in the United States prior to the second Columbia 
expedition. These sources also provided useful information. For example, Hoskins 
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commented that James Hanna, captain of the Sea Otter, first sighted and named the 
Queen Charlotte Islands in 1787.136 Word-of-mouth information became equally 
important to the commercial exploitation of otter skins. Where the Columbians 
encountered other American ships, exclusively during the second voyage, they trusted 
their countrymen to provide helpful reports. In August of 1791, Columbia encountered 
the brig Hancock, also from Boston, under the command of Captain Samuel Crowell. 
Crowell informed Gray that “we should find other tribes that were better stocked with 
skins” among the Haida People of Masset River.137 Conversely, the Columbians 
remained wary upon meeting British traders, their competitors. For example, they judged 
the unscrupulous John Meares to be “so intent… in deceiving us that the hesitated not to 
forfit his word and Honour to what we were convinced was a notorious falsity.” Indeed, 
the Columbians caught Meares in several lies, and correctly guessed that his account of 
the coast was blatant misinformation.138 
Published accounts and secondhand reports could not, however, substitute for 
individual cruises of exploration or lingering in preferred anchorages, both of which 
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provided direct access to otter skins. “Exploring Captains” tended to prefer the strategy of 
making cruises. During the first Columbia expedition, in 1788-89, Captain Robert Gray 
made three separate cruises in the course of five months. Put another way, he encountered 
eighteen native groups in an equal number of ports.139 The cruise strategy permitted the 
Columbians to expand their operations beyond known harbors, such as Clayoquot and 
Nootka Sounds, where their presence tended to exhaust local supplies of otter. During the 
first expedition, for example, exploration revealed seven ports where skins were available 
in quantities of ten or more.140 Moreover, four of these harbors had the capacity to 
provide “maney,” “a good maney,” or an “abundance” in successive days of trading.141 
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“some” probably does not extend, in his estimation, above nine skins. Therefore, “some” equates 
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Meanwhile, other ports offered smaller numbers of skins of exceptional quality. Five 
harbors offered “good,” “excellent,” or “prime” skins. The Columbians, of course, prized 
those anchorages that offered a combination of quantity and quality of furs. Nootka 
Sound was the gold standard in this regard. Haswell described the harbor as a 
marketplace where one could purchase “a good maney” of “excellent sea otter skins.”142 
Three new ports offered the same balance of quantity and quality: Clayoquot Sound, 
Cumshewa’s Inlet, and Neah Bay. Their common commercial orientation is undoubtedly 
due to the fact that, like Nootka, the harbors had seen significant British trading activity 
in recent summers, and the locals had become producers of fur, rather than mere users of 
fur. 
Such locations encouraged an alternate strategy, namely, the extension of trade in 
“preferred” anchorages. This option appealed to ships’ furriers, such as John Hoskins, 
who gained more opportunities to judge, haggle over, and select from a larger inventory 
of skins. Each of the “preferred” harbors could sustain consecutive days of trading in 
high volume, with an equally wide range in quality. Hoskins complained when Gray 
abandoned a promising location too quickly, believing that the cruising strategy was less 
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effective than cultivating reliable markets. For example, during two days of trading 
among the Makah Indians, near Tatooche’s Island, the Columbians acquired 
approximately 60 pelts, including “20 prime skins.” This, of course, includes around 40 
skins of lesser quality, including a handful of rough furs whose quality went 
unmentioned. One disadvantage to the strategy of the preferred anchorage was that new 
markets were volatile and additional days of trading might yield diminishing returns. In 
fact, this occurred on the second afternoon at Tatooche’s Island. Haswell recorded the 
purchase of “upwards of 30 sea otter skins” but lamented that “we had the Mortification 
to seen them carey off near 70 others all of excellent quality.”143 The comment indicates 
that the total number of skins available, of all qualities, far outnumbered those purchased. 
Conversely, the exchange demonstrates that even the preferred harbors could be 
inconsistent in supply, terms of exchange, or local whims. Another disadvantage was that 
a ship that lingered in one location might unwittingly forfeit business to rival fur traders. 
In 1792, the consort schooner Adventure tarried on the northern coast of the Queen 
Charlotte Islands before proceeding to Sitka Bay. Upon anchoring in the bay, Haswell 
learned to his chagrin that the Sitka Indians had already exchanged “all the skins they had 
this season” to a competitor, probably the Grace of Boston.144 In this sense, the 
cultivation of a lucrative otter port was akin to a trade secret, learned through painstaking 
trial-and-error. 
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By 1791, when Columbia arrived on the Northwest Coast for a second expedition, 
another five harbors offered a combination of quantity and quality. Among these, two 
additional anchorages, the Cumshewa Inlet and the Columbia River, proved capable of 
sustained trade over multiple days. John Boit recorded that, during two days of trading at 
Cumshewa Inlet, the Columbians purchased “a Good Lot of furs” including “sevrall fine 
Sea Otter skins.”145 Haswell considered this haul rich enough to repeat. In May 1792, the 
following season, he returned in the consort schooner Adventure and acquired “a 
considerable number” of “good skins” over three days.146 During the same week, 
Columbia topped this record while cruising separately along the newly “discovered” 
Columbia River. John Boit recorded the purchase of “a good lot” of furs across ten days 
of consecutive trading, with more than 150 otter and 300 beaver changing hands on a 
single afternoon.147 The emergence of two new “preferred anchorages” demonstrates that, 
as word of outsiders passed between the coastal peoples, Indians began to modify their 
hunting behaviors to accommodate a more intensive trade in otter.  
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Table 3. Notable Fur-Trading Anchorages on the Northwest Coast. 
 
ANCHORAGE QUANTITY QUALITY NOTES 
Cape Scott “many” “valuable”  
Clayoquot Sound “abundance” “many” 
“fine” 
“good” 
Sustained trade during 
each visit—preferred 
Columbia River “a good lot”  Sustained over multiple days—preferred 
Coos Bay “many” “fine”  
Cumshewa’s Inlet 
“a considerable 
number” 
“a good lot” 
“prime” 
“fine” 
Sustained trade during 
each visit—preferred 
Gray’s Harbor “a great many” “plenty”   
Kuileut River “a fine lot”   
Masset River 
“abundance” 
“a considerable 
number” 
  
Neah Bay & 
Tatooche’s Island 
“abundance” 
“plenty” 
“prime” 
“good” 
Sustained trade during 
each visit—preferred 
Nitinaht “many” “good”  
Nootka Sound “a good many” “excellent” Intended port of call, first expedition 
Port Hardy “many” “prime”  
Prince of Wales Island “plenty” “fine”  
Sushin Village “many” “fine”  
 
 
The Columbians assessed otter skins predominantly in terms of quality and price, 
but they occasionally considered the ease of doing business. In 1788-89, sea otter furs, 
being a recent commodity, were not yet subjected to a standardized set of quality 
assessments. The modern system of grading, developed during the height of the maritime 
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fur trade, did not exist.148 For this reason, qualitative assessments vary throughout the 
accounts of the two Columbia expeditions. The chroniclers of the voyages made 
reference to “good,” “fine,” “excellent,” and “prime” skins, and occasionally described 
them as “valuable.” John Hoskins, the expedition’s furrier and clerk, used these terms 
with the most precision, and probably conceived of them as individual grades of fur.149 
During the 1730s, Georg Wilhelm Steller, a German naturalist working in Russian 
Alaska, provided a qualitative scale for the assessment of otters. Steller wrote that “the 
head of the best grade of otters is silvery gray; the cheaper grade of otter has a head of a 
tawny color and yellowish fur; and the lowest grade of otter is that which has no hair, and 
is clad only in short, dirty-gray fur.”150 The top grades probably correspond to Hoskins’ 
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usage of the terms “prime” and “fine,” respectively, while he records the purchase of an 
average skin without description.  
Having assessed the quality of skins, the Columbians made judgments about 
prices and supplies of trade goods. Hoskins in particular kept close watch over rates of 
exchange. He noted, for example, that skins were available for “cloathing in proportion” 
at Clayoquot Sound, or that fur could be purchased “with chizles from two to four for a 
skin” at Cumshewa Inlet.151 On several occasions, the Columbians refused to trade 
because they considered local prices to be too steep. While trading with the Clayoquot 
People, Haswell observed that otter skins were available in exchange for iron chisels, but 
that “they demand an exorbitant price ten for a skin.” Similarly, he complained that the 
Haida People “would not indeed sell me their skins without an exorbitant price.”152 
Unreasonable prices constituted a strong incentive to weigh anchor and do business 
elsewhere. Conversely, Hoskins often reported upon the ease of doing business with a 
particular trading partner. He considered the Cheklesaht Indians to be “inoffensive,” 
commented upon their welcoming attitude, and emphasized that “in their dealings they 
are exceeding fair.”153 In short, he preferred locations where skins were cheap, the 
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partners were reasonable in their demands, or both. Hospitality softened the sting of high 
prices. 
When the Columbia expedition sailed into previously unexplored waters, its 
commercial influence prompted native peoples to become producers for the maritime fur 
trade. Indian communities that once harvested otters at a subsistence level now increased 
their trapping to satisfy the growing demand for furs. In this respect, Columbia duplicated 
the achievements of British traders who first exchanged iron for otters on the Northwest 
Coast.154 The Columbians improved upon the British accomplishments by introducing 
new, exotic goods that intensified the indigenous interest in foreign trade. One encounter 
during Lady Washington’s exploration of the Queen Charlotte Sound, in May 1789, 
exemplifies the process in which a coastal community oriented itself toward the global 
market. Having already done business in neighboring waters, Captain Gray sailed the 
Washington into the Brown Passage, where the crew sighted smoke rising over a 
Tsimshian village. The Tsimshian People had scant experience with fur traders, and it 
was not encouraging—their sole interaction had been a bloody encounter with James 
Colnett, a British captain, in 1787.155 Despite the painful memories, Indians soon 
approached in their canoes with “a fue otter skins.” Haswell recorded that the people 
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“were very anxious that we should tarrey here two or three days, supposing that they 
wished to inform the rest of the tribe of our arrival, that they might bring their skins for 
sale.” Four days later, the trappers returned with ten fresh kills in their canoe, some of 
which were “yet warm with life.” According to Haswell, the Indians communicated that 
they had labored “all the insueing night in drying and preparing their skins.” The otters, 
prepared in haste and of rough grade, were “to our disappointment” not of prime 
condition and would be worth little in China.156 From the Tsimshian perspective, 
however, the skins represented an immediate response to the opening of communication 
with the outsiders, whose exotic merchandise enriched their experience of the world. 
Moreover, for every additional skin hunted, cured, and sold, their communities became 
more connected to a global “world of goods.” 
 
Wickaninnish: Trade and Hegemony 
 
 
Among all those who became powerful as middlemen on the Northwest Coast, 
none was as commanding as Wickaninnish, Chief of the Clayoquot People. His 
importance as a local ruler predated the arrival of the Columbians, but the American 
presence contributed more than any other factor to his emergence as the most powerful 
chief of Vancouver Island. Documentary and oral historical sources are silent about the 
chief’s life prior to contact with Europeans and Americans. Today, his dates of birth and 
death remain unknown. In 1790, the Spanish navigator Manuel Quimper described 
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Wickaninnish as “a heavy man of good face, serious aspect, and about forty years old.”157 
The description corresponds to John Meares’ observation that the chief “though rather 
inclined to be corpulent, was athletic and active.”158 Certainly, his reputation in whaling, 
which underscored his physical and spiritual prowess, was unparalleled. Wickaninnish 
appears to have descended from a line of long-lived forebears.159 He also maintained 
familial relations with a number of neighboring chiefs, and particularly with his northern 
rival, Maquinna of the Mowachaht People. The personal connection appears to have 
minimized conflict between them.160 Elsewhere, his attitude varied. Wickaninnish 
positioned himself toward his weaker neighbors either as a benevolent overlord or as a 
threatening nemesis. Before, during, and after contact with the outsiders, he gradually 
imposed his authority over a number of neighboring tribes.161 John Boit stated without 
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reservation that he was “the most powerfull chief we have yet seen on this Coast.”162 
Wickaninnish held a similar view of the Columbians. Columbia soon became the vehicle 
for the radical economic, political, and technological expansion of his Clayoquot 
Confederacy. 
The Columbians frequented a number of “preferred” anchorages, but, among 
those, Clayoquot Sound offered the most favorable combination of geographic, political, 
and economic conditions for trade.163 John Boit commented that the “land about this 
River is the best without exception I’ve yet seen, on the NW Coast, and a place well 
calculated for a Factory for to reap the advantages of the fur trade.”164 The alternative 
anchorages each suffered from liabilities that made them less than ideal locations for 
Columbia to trade. The nearest anchorage, Nootka Sound languished under Spanish 
occupation by forces hostile to foreign encroachment, making an unsuitable powder keg 
of the harbor.165 Tatoosh’s Island, which controlled the fur hinterland of Cape Flattery, 
stood exposed to the ocean and provided poor protection from storms. Cumshewa Inlet 
and the Houston Stewart Channel, both excellent anchorages with ample supplies of otter, 
had negligible demand for copper, a material present in native deposits on the Queen 
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Charlotte Islands.166 Nitinat Inlet offered significant amounts of fur but functioned within 
the economic sphere of the Clayoquot People. Clayoquot Sound, in contrast, offered 
protection from the sea, remained unoccupied by Europeans, maintained strong demand 
for copper, and prospered under the leadership of the powerful Chief Wickaninnish. 
Wickaninnish strengthened his advantage as a trading partner by providing 
valuable provisions, resources, and information to the Columbia expedition. The 
Clayoquot People, who numbered “upwards of 3000 souls,” took great care to provide 
the expedition with provisions in order to facilitate trade. John Boit recorded that “the 
natives made us frequent visits” in order to deliver supplies of fish, geese, ducks, teal, 
turkey, and venison. Furthermore, he commented that the Indians “kept us well supplied 
with Berries of different kinds, which was very grateful.”167 Likewise, John Hoskins 
noted a number of occasions in which the locals provided fresh vegetables, leeks, onions, 
greens, and potatoes.168 Taken together, these foodstuffs provided all the protein, vitamin, 
and calorie requirements of a ship’s complement at sea. Additionally, the combination of 
greens, leeks, and berries helped to prevent scurvy. Wickaninnish also permitted the 
Columbians to help themselves to the harbor’s ample stands of timber. Robert Haswell 
often commanded short woodcutting missions, a crucial activity that provided firewood 
for cooking, heating, and feeding the blacksmith’s forge. Haswell reported that “there is 
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plenty, though indifferent, timber,” but granted that he “found plenty of good pitch pine 
trees.” On other occasions he “had parties out cutting logs for plank” needed to repair 
Columbia.169 The ship required seasonal maintenance, such as replacement of rotten 
boards, broken spars, and replacement of knees. Moreover, she struck rocks during her 
second voyage, and without replacement timber, the flagship might not have survived the 
experience.170 
In addition to food and timber, Wickaninnish also leveraged his diplomatic 
connections with neighboring tribes in order to provide commercial, geographical, and 
political information to the Columbians.171 Occasionally, he even informed upon 
Columbia’s competitors in a manner calculated to keep his own “preferred” partners 
close and obstruct his enemies. For example, Wickaninnish attested to having traded “a 
great number of skins” to John Meares, an exchange that Meares later attempted to 
misrepresent to Captain Robert Gray. Gray saw through the ruse.172 Crucially, the 
Clayoquot People provided assistance that improved the Columbians’ sense of security 
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on a distant, foggy, and often dangerous coast. Their hospitality cemented the 
relationship between Clayoquots and Bostonians.173 
 
 
 
Figure 13. George Davidson, Winter Quarters, 1793, watercolor on paper, 26.5 x 35.4 cm., Oregon 
Historical Society, Portland. 
 
 
Fort Defiance, Columbia’s winter quarters in 1791-92, continued the pattern of 
mutual accommodation between the Columbians and the Clayoquot People. The 
settlement, which included a log house, forge, storage shed, saw pits, defensive 
breastwork, and a miniature shipyard, became a stage for intercultural exchange.174 
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Indians and Americans engaged in a number of cooperative activities during the winter. 
The mutual need for subsistence resulted in joint hunting parties, regular trade, and 
dinner invitations.175 The Columbians invited their Indian friends to a Christmas 
celebration in which “the principall Cheifs of the sound by invitation din’d on board 
ship.”176 Wickaninnish returned the favor when he hosted the Columbians for a dinner of 
roasted heron, root vegetables, and herbs.177 Meanwhile, the Indians observed the 
construction of the fort and, according to John Boit, “appear’d to be highly pleased with 
the different works going on at the Cove.”178 Certainly, the Columbians and their 
industry enhanced the regional reputation of the Clayoquots. Throughout the winter, 
Wickaninnish and his family remained in constant contact with the Columbians. Robert 
Haswell noted that “all the winter they had stayed on board… and partook of our table as 
we ate and drank.” Indians also took interest in Columbia and made visits to the ship, 
usually in small groups, every two or three days.179 During such occasions, the two 
groups exchanged stories and ideas about the cosmos. The Clayoquot People explained 
that thunder was the sound of the thunderbird carrying a whale into the heavens. Boit 
                                                          
175 Haswell, A Voyage of Discoveries in the Ship Columbia Rediviva, 249-50.; Boit, “Remarks on 
the Ship Columbia’s voyage from Boston,” 385. 
176 Boit, “Remarks on the Ship Columbia’s voyage from Boston,” 384-85. 
177 Hoskins, A Voyage of Discoveries in the Ship Columbia Rediviva, in Howay, Voyages of the 
Columbia, 260-61. 
178 Boit, “Remarks on the Ship Columbia’s voyage from Boston,” 382. 
179 Haswell, “A Voyage on Discoveries in the Ship Columbia Rediviva,” 309. 
234 
 
commented that “we cou’d not make them to understand the real cause” of thunder and 
lightning but, in describing Benjamin Franklin, “much suppriz’d them by saying there 
was a man in our Country that made both.”180 The Indians explained their cosmological 
system in great detail, explaining their kinship with animals, rituals of the first hunt, and 
relationships with the Spirit Guardians.181 Likewise, during the Christmas Day 
celebration at Fort Defiance, the Columbians explained their religious beliefs to the 
fascinated Indians.182 Exchange of ideas facilitated friendship, reinforced trust, and 
enabled mutuality between Indian and outsider. 
 Trust permitted other, more symbolic relationships between the two groups. 
Throughout the winter, the Columbians came and went from the principal Clayoquot 
town of Opitsat, where they “met with very civil treatment.”183 Boit developed especially 
close relationships with several Indians, including the chief, and often stayed overnight in 
the town among his new friends. On these occasions, he commented broadly on Indian 
architectural, culinary, and healing practices.184 Hoskins observed that Indian spiritual 
practice emphasized a different set of medical diagnoses. Shamans supposed that 
Yethlan, the ailing brother of Wickaninnish, was dying of “an excess of grief at the loss 
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of his only child.” In fact, the nobleman lost his appetite following the tragedy. Captain 
Gray determined the cause of the illness to be malnutrition, and he prescribed a 
nourishing diet of soup, rice, and bread stuffing. Both diagnoses were correct, but—from 
an Indian perspective—Yethlan recovered because the Columbians devoted their spiritual 
potency to healing him, not because Gray provided a material cure.185 On other 
occasions, the Columbians enhanced the chief’s prestige through their participation in 
ceremonies, rituals, and feasts. In 1792, they attended a ceremony in which Wickaninnish 
bestowed his own name upon his eldest son. By witnessing the event, the Americans 
acted as representatives of a powerful foreign tribe, now gathered to pay homage to the 
heir apparent. In doing so, they enhanced the prestige of father and son.186 Spiritual 
relationships and prestige intensified the new commercial network that connected Boston 
and Clayoquot Sound. 
                                                          
185 Hoskins, “Narrative of the Second Voyage of the ‘Columbia’,” 254-55. 
186 The chief was known as Ya’aihlstohsmahhlneh before receiving the heredity name 
“Wickaninnish” from his father. After passing the name to his own son, he assumed the name 
Hyyous. For clarity, I refer to this important ruler as Wickaninnish throughout the dissertation. 
See Clayton, Islands of Truth, 132, 136.; Mathes, “Wickaninnish, a Clayoquot Chief,” 116. 
 
236 
 
 
 
Figure 14. John Webber, A Man of Nootka Sound, c.1778, 
black and red chalk with pencil, gray wash and pen and black 
ink on laid paper, 27.9 x 40.6 cm., Library and Archives 
Canada, Ottawa. 
 
 
Meanwhile, Wickaninnish positioned his people as the most significant 
middlemen of the Northwest Coast, a role that enabled them to profit from the 
coordination of trade between indigenous communities and the global marketplace. 
Under his leadership, the Clayoquot People harnessed a preexisting trade with 
neighboring tribes in order to deliver larger quantities of otter to the Columbians. John 
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Boit commented that “the Natives, I dare say, have always plenty of Otters.”187 Similarly, 
having observed “plenty of skins” in Clayoquot houses, Robert Haswell speculated that 
“I realy think there is a great inland communication by rivers.”188 Indeed, Wickaninnish 
often used water corridors to facilitate trade and diplomacy with his immediate 
neighbors, such as the Sheshaht People of Barkley Sound.189 Elsewhere, John Hoskins 
remarked on evidence of “trade carried on between the natives of the island and the 
main,” a dynamic also common on Vancouver Island.190 The Clayoquot People 
maintained trade with a commercial hinterland via corridors such as the central lakes, 
Butte Lake, and Alberni Inlet.191 The Coast Salish and Kwakiutl Peoples, whose cultures 
spanned the Strait of Georgia, represented their immediate trading partners on the 
mainland. Wickaninnish improved upon preexisting trade connections with continental 
groups in order to acquire otter skins at a volume impossible to sustain at home. 
Sheet copper, acquired from the Columbians, enabled Chief Wickaninnish to 
establish a reciprocal trade in which he became a supplier of luxury metals to his 
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neighbors. Copper, as we have seen, was a prestigious metal because of its supernatural 
connotations, and it became an important medium of exchange during the fur trade. 
Wickaninnish demanded the metal during almost every exchange. The Columbia 
chroniclers each observed the use of copper in personal jewelry, ornamentation, and 
decorative arts. None, however, commented upon its appearance in a volume consistent 
with trade between the Columbians and Clayoquots.192 The dearth of copper probably, in 
fact, indicates that it also served as an item of exchange between Indians.193 In effect, 
Wickaninnish became a merchant—by monetizing copper, he cemented and enhanced his 
position as the dominant middleman of Vancouver Island. Otters purchased copper from 
the Columbians, and copper bought more otters from neighboring groups. Wickaninnish 
could profit without producing. The Clayoquot People probably extended their advantage 
as purveyors of metals by transforming sheet copper into valuable “coppers” for 
exchange with their neighbors. While the coastal peoples of Vancouver Island valued 
copper as a prestigious material, they did not personally wear or display “coppers.” The 
practice was, however, common among their continental trading partners, the Coast 
Salish and Kwakiutl Peoples.194 Drawing upon his personal relationship with the 
Columbians, and their supply of metals, Wickaninnish may have directed his people to 
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begin manufacturing coppers for trade with the continental peoples. Production of 
coppers would have permitted the Clayoquot People to improve upon and enhance the 
exchange price of an already valuable material.195 
Capitalizing upon bidirectional trade in furs and copper, Wickaninnish 
accumulated new wealth that dramatically expanded his purchasing power. Documentary 
sources do not attest to the mechanism by which the chief accomplished this, but he 
probably placed a markup, or handling fee, upon goods passing through Clayoquot 
Sound. Although the percentage markup cannot be known with certainty, we can draw 
some rough conclusions about its overall size. During the second expedition, Columbia 
appears to have traded copper in three forms: plates, sheets, and decorative bangles. 
Hoskins recorded in June 1791, that “for a sheet of copper we got four skins.”196 Bangles 
traded at a rate of ten pieces per individual skin.197 Working inductively, we can imagine 
that Wickaninnish, in order to turn a profit, transferred copper plates to the Coast Salish 
and Kwakiutl Peoples at a rate of five or six otter apiece. The rate would have replaced 
his inventory of skins and provided a 25-50 percent profit in kind. Moreover, 
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manufactured “coppers” carried a significant added value and probably traded at double 
or triple the exchange value of unfinished squares, or a rate of twelve to eighteen otters. 
Wickaninnish could potentially realize a profit margin of 200-350 percent. There is a 
strong possibility, however, that Salish and Kwakiutl trappers did not immediately 
increase their production of skins by the same, large percentages.198 Overall profits, 
therefore, probably increased by a maximum of about 100 percent, still an excellent 
performance for an emerging entrepôt and artisan economy. Less valuable items such as 
wooden or stone tools and dentalium beads, traded at rates far beneath a single otter skin. 
In such cases, copper bangles provided a convenient form of “small change” that traded 
in parallel with plate and finished coppers. 
Wealth intensified the familial economic ties between the Clayoquots and their 
close neighbors, while facilitating their domination of the peoples of Barkley Sound. 
Wickaninnish maintained friendly relations with Chief Cleaskinah, a relative also known 
as “Captain Hanna,” whose Ahousaht People controlled the principal entrance to 
Clayoquot Sound.199 Haswell wrote that Cleaskinah “seemed a very inteligent old 
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Fellow,” and there is significant evidence to suggest that he was an important mentor to 
Wickaninnish.200 Economic relationships also helped to support an accommodation 
between the rulers and gatekeepers of Clayoquot Sound. Cleaskinah provided advance 
warning of incoming trade vessels, and, being “under the jurisdiction of Wickananish,” 
received a share of the burgeoning trade revenue in return.201 Their cooperation, which 
engendered peaceful conditions in the harbor, was a central factor in making Clayoquot 
Sound a “preferred anchorage” for the Columbia.  
Wickaninnish also used his growing riches to impose economic hegemony over 
his neighbors on Barkley Sound.202 The harbor, located immediately south of Clayoquot 
Sound, constituted another rich source of furs and provided access to the continent via 
Alberni Inlet. The economic carrot, combined with a military stick, enabled him to 
dominate the otter trade here, as well. When the Columbians attempted to purchase otters 
from the Sheshaht People, inhabitants of Barkley Sound, they received the answer that 
“Wickananish had been down there and purchaced all they had.”203 Wickaninnish paid 
handsomely for otter, and some groups adopted exclusive partnerships in order to obtain 
a share of his wealth. In some cases, the chief’s envoys literally went extra the mile in 
order to dominate the local market in skins. The Columbians expressed surprise that 
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Tootiscoosettle, his eldest brother, had crossed the hazardous Strait of Juan de Fuca in 
pursuit of furs. While anchored at Tatooch’s Island, in Makah territory, Hoskins recorded 
that “several good skins were purchased,” but that “still more were carried away” after 
Tootiscoosettle agreed to match or exceed the American offer.204 The Clayoquot People 
probably resold the same otters, with a heavy markup, to the Columbians.  
Where economic incentives failed to cement his authority, Wickaninnish used his 
riches to achieve military supremacy through the purchase of firearms. British and 
Spanish navigators were fearful of providing the Indians with firearms, but the 
Columbians had fewer reservations in doing so. Wickaninnish provided John Kendrick 
with an easement on the animal and timber resources of Clayoquot Sound in return for 
four muskets.205 This miniscule stockpile was, however, merely a down payment on 
services rendered. José Mariano Moziño later observed that Kendrick “furnished 
Wickananish with more than two hundred guns, two barrels of powder, and a 
considerable portion of shot.”206 Once again, the purpose of militarization was to 
dominate trade in Barkley Sound. In early 1792, Haswell commented that Wickaninnish 
intended “to attack a village called Highshakt and had purchased many muskets and some 
ammunition for that purpose, and had even been very anxious that I should allow the 
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smiths to make daggers to kill the Highshakt People with.”207 Indeed, the Clayoquots 
sought to limit the expansion of their rivals, the Haachaht (“Highshakt”) tribe, who 
refused to pay tribute to Wickaninnish and threatened a number of his otter-producing 
tributaries.208 In seeking retribution, the chief followed a ruthless policy of total 
extermination of his enemies, and is believed to have wiped out several rival groups 
during his career.209 In this regard, the animal resources of Vancouver Island became 
“blood skins” used to finance military conquest. Other groups feared destruction more 
than subjugation and chose a different path. During the 1790s, the Toquaht and Ucluelet 
Peoples aligned their otter economies and military strength behind the Clayoquot 
Confederacy, becoming, in effect, the chief’s enforcers in Barkley Sound. Otter wealth 
made a paramount chief of Wickaninnish.210 
 Finally, Wickaninnish distributed new forms of wealth through the potlatch, a 
practice representing the sinews of the indigenous body politic.211 Considered an 
important ceremony on the Northwest Coast from ancient times to the present day, the 
potlatch is a communal gathering in which a chief transfers a significant share of his 
wealth, in the form of gifts, to individual members of his community. It is not surprising, 
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then, that potlach translates both as “to nourish” and as a “place to be satisfied.” In a 
ceremonial sense, the potlach affirmed his legitimacy as a sovereign and reinforced his 
authority as a provider. Moreover, gifts obligated subordinates to provide loyal service in 
times of emergency or military necessity. In an economic sense, it bestowed accumulated 
personal wealth into the communal domain, thus forming the basis of a gift economy. 
The transfer of wealth, combined with the rituals specific to each occasion, represented a 
chief’s unbroken capacity to provide for his community in good times and in bad. The 
potlatch often accompanied marriages, naming-ceremonies, and noble succession—all 
moments associated with the continuity of kingship.212 In short, the potlatch defined the 
channels of power in a Northwest Coast community. Wickaninnish’s great wealth 
permitted him to be generous toward his followers, allied chiefs, and even toward fur 
traders. In January, 1792, Hoskins and Gray received an invitation to a potlatch in which 
“Wickananish was going to give a great deal both to the Chiefs and people.” Moreover, 
Hoskins noted, the chief “wished to give us some skins”213 Although Wickaninnish 
personally dominated the trade with the Columbia, the potlatch transferred large amounts 
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of iron implements, copper bangles, textiles, and “great coats” to the Clayoquot People. 
His success as a middleman carried over to them, and his prosperity became theirs. 
 Columbia’s second expedition departed the Northwest Coast on 30 September 
1792, but the consequences of her voyages continued to unfold for decades. In an 
immediate sense, the introduction of firearms enabled indigenous peoples to assert 
themselves against outsiders, both Indian and European. Muskets enhanced the security 
of small groups when traveling or working outside the village. Guns also permitted 
communities to resist seaborne raids, such as those perpetrated by the Haida Indians 
against the peoples of Vancouver Island and Cape Flattery.214 Elsewhere, firearms 
became the preferred means of settling resource disputes. During a conflict over fishing 
rights, for example, Ahousaht warriors used muskets to gun down eighty members of the 
rival Otsosaht People. Following the massacre, the Ahousahts decapitated their victims 
and seized the fishing grounds. In other cases, firearms facilitated acts of revenge in 
answer to insults or crimes. The murder of a Clayoquot, in 1792, served as the proximate 
cause for Wickaninnish to unleash his arsenal upon the rival Haachaht People.215 
Similarly, Indians used firearms to deter plunder, pillage, and violence on the part of 
Europeans. The Mowachaht People endured numerous provocations that motivated them 
to amass guns. Maquinna was mortified when a merchant-captain remembered only as 
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“Tawnington” entered his house and looted forty otter skins at gunpoint.216 The chief 
expressed outrage at the abduction, rape, and murder of native girls by Spanish soldiers 
stationed at Fort San Lorenzo. Furthermore, he grieved when Governor Estevan Martínez 
responded to an exchange of insults by executing Callicum, the second-ranked chief of 
Nootka Sound.217 Such incidents demonstrated the need for indigenous rulers to purchase 
muskets and become proficient in their use. 
 Wickaninnish established a terrifying reputation as a modernizing warlord—one 
whose investment in firearms enabled him to resist foreign encroachment. Again, his 
earliest purchase, acquired from John Kendrick, consisted of two hundred muskets, 
powder, and shot.218 The behavior of other fur traders, however, convinced him to 
continue building his arsenal. In 1792, Captain William Brown, commander of the 
Butterworth squadron, attempted to pillage otter skins from the Clayoquot People. 
Wickaninnish fought back with deadly force, killing one Englishman. In reprisal, Brown 
kidnapped and tortured nine Indians, before throwing his victims overboard at sea to 
drown. Wickaninnish lost a brother to the deep. Thereafter, he redoubled his efforts to 
amass firearms.219 Muskets represented a clear improvement over traditional arms such 
as stone and whalebone clubs. Moreover, their range and destructive force exceeded that 
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of the bow and arrow. Concentrated in villages along the coast, firearms enabled 
Wicakaninnish to guard against foreign encroachment upon the inlets, rivers, and coves 
of Clayoquot Sound.220 Tactics enhanced his defense of strategic points. Fur traders soon 
reported that Wickaninnish had mastered the musket-volley, a development that made his 
warriors every bit as dangerous as Europeans.221 Armed and emboldened, the chief 
became more demanding and aggressive toward outsiders. In 1795, Wickaninnish 
participated in the last peaceful trade to be documented at Clayoquot Sound, with 
Englishman Charles Bishop.222 Meanwhile, Maquinna amassed a similar arsenal, and his 
armed resistance became a significant factor in the Spanish withdrawal from Nootka 
Sound, also in 1795.223 
The acquisition of firearms represented only one dimension of an indigenous arms 
race that escalated during the early nineteenth century. Rivalries between paramount 
chiefs, such as Wickaninnish and Maquinna, prompted them to imagine a world of 
indigenous sea power. If canoes symbolized wealth, and a successful whale hunt 
legitimized a chief, then possession of a Western vessel represented the ultimate 
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expression of tsh’ih—the supernatural force that provided each chief with his temporal 
power.224 Indians made keen observation of Columbia, Washington, and other vessels 
originating in Europe or America. Ships conferred a spiritual potency upon their 
commanders, not least because of the prominence of metal in their hulls, armaments, and 
navigational instruments.225 Furthermore, their size implied physical strength of the sort 
belonging to large mythological creatures such as giants and thunderbirds.226 In 1793, 
Wickaninnish attempted to purchase the schooner Resolution from Captain Josiah 
Roberts, but the Bostonian refused.227 Later, Maquinna decided to take what 
Wickaninnish had been unable to buy. In 1803, his warriors boarded and captured the fur-
trading ship Boston at Nootka Sound. Maquinna executed most of the crew, although he 
enslaved two individuals crucial to maintaining the vessel—armorer John Jewett and 
sailmaker John Thompson.228 Jewett became a producer of iron tools and other trade 
goods that enriched the Mowachaht People. In meetings with friends and rivals, 
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Maquinna exhibited the prisoners both as loot and the personification of his own power. 
Wickaninnish recognized the economic value of Jewett, and he offered to purchase the 
armorer on four separate occasions, to no avail.229 In 1811, he attempted to address the 
strategic imbalance by capturing the ship Tonquin, a constituent of the Pacific Fur 
Company. Clayoquot warriors managed to seize the vessel, but the plan fell apart when 
surviving crewmembers scuttled the ship. The sailors ignited 9,000 pounds of gunpower 
intended for the Russians at Sitka, triggering an explosion that obliterated the vessel.230 
Both incidents, the capture of Boston and destruction of Tonquin, resulted in diminished 
trade with Americans. Nonetheless, they demonstrate that indigenous rulers perceived 
ships in terms of strength, wealth, and prestige. 
Over the long term, however, the decline of furbearing resources along the 
Northwest Coast, combined with indigenous reliance upon Western manufactured goods, 
brought about conditions of dependence, debt, and poverty. Columbia arrived on the 
coast neither as an agent of colonization nor exploitation, but she became the unwitting 
agent of economic imperialism in the Pacific. Historian Paige Raibmon has observed that 
the “unmaking of native space” often occurred not through individual acts of 
colonization, but rather, through economic behaviors that collectively advanced the 
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conditions of colonialism.231 For example, where the introduction of firearms contributed 
to more effective hunting of sea otters, that hunting also resulting in a steep decline in 
otter populations.232 Diminishing returns in the fur trade, combined with the ongoing 
purchase of foreign goods, reduced indigenous communities to a state of peonage. Prior 
to 1825, Indians exchanged otters for leather, spoons, cloth, and muskets. Thereafter, 
their preferences expanded to include a trade in blankets, rum, rifles, knives, metal 
utensils, and carpenter’s tools. Some communities even imported products of the Pacific 
World, such as coral, sandalwood, and camphor boxes.233 Indians offset the trade 
imbalance by taking on debt to American and British traders.234  
The scarcity of furbearing animals also intensified conflict between indigenous 
peoples. Because social cohesion required the distribution of wealth through the potlatch, 
impoverished chief felt themselves under intense pressure to seize resources from weaker 
neighbors.235 During the 1840s, the indigenous peoples of Vancouver Island contended in 
the “Long War,” a conflict driven by the scarcity of furbearing resources, competition for 
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access to firearms, and a decline in tribal populations. The replacement of population, 
through the taking of prisoners, became a significant factor upon the continuation of 
hostilities. Vancouver Island witnessed an outbreak of measles in 1848 and a smallpox 
epidemic in 1852-53. Warfare and disease are responsible for a population decline from 
approximately 30,000 (1788) to 3,500 (1885) inhabitants.236 Similarly, the Haida Peoples 
of the Queen Charlotte Islands suffered a decline from 8,000 individuals (1780s) to 
barely 800 (1885).237 Violence begat violence, and chiefs could no longer expect to retire 
peaceably and pass their names to a younger generation. Maquinna died while raiding a 
Muchalaht village in the late 1820s. His enemies drowned him. Wickaninnish was 
luckier—he is believed to have died of old age around 1820.238 With their deaths, much 
knowledge of the first contact with Americans—and especially the Columbians—passed 
into oral tradition.  
 Columbia served as a powerful vehicle of globalization and change on the 
Northwest Coast. Through her engagement with the indigenous peoples of the coast, she 
heralded a new period in which Indian communities would become producers for the 
“world of goods.” The otter furs they produced, and the copper that the Columbians used 
to purchase those furs, connected the coastal peoples to distant quarters of the globe, 
including England, Boston, and Canton. Columbia did not arrive on the Northwest Coast 
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as an active agent of empire, but she contributed to conditions in which colonialism could 
thrive. Meanwhile, Indian leaders leveraged their positions as middlemen to amass new 
and different forms of wealth. Chief Wickaninnish of the Clayoquot People was merely 
the most successful example. In the end, a combination of economic and military might 
propelled the Clayoquots to a position of leadership in an emerging confederacy—one 
that could increasingly steer the interaction between indigenous communities and 
outsiders from the West.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
“ALL THINGS IN ABUNDANCE” 
 
 
Late in 1789, following a sixteen-week transit of the Pacific Ocean, Captain 
Robert Gray penned a letter to his employers in Boston. “Gentlemen,” he wrote, “I have 
the pleasure to inform you of my safe arrival at Canton in the ship Columbia from the 
NW Coast of America. … where I arrived on the 17th Novr.”1 Gray had good reason to 
be pleased—he understood the significance of Columbia’s transpacific crossing from the 
Northwest Coast to China. On one hand, it represented a logistical triumph for Boston 
and the United States. On the other, the Columbians now prepared to trade in the third—
and most critical—location of the expedition, the metropolis of Canton. Would the port 
answer the promise of the maritime fur trade, or dash their hopes for a lucrative voyage? 
Canton held the potential to generate astronomical profits, but its commercial system 
could also deal out ruinous losses. In short, China would determine the overall success of 
the expedition. 
More importantly, Columbia’s arrival at Canton established the first commercial 
route between the United States, the Pacific World, and Asia. In doing so, she established 
an entirely new model for trade. Columbia expanded upon prior models of transpacific 
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commerce. The Manila Galleons, for example, linked the economies of China, Spanish 
America, and Europe, but the galleons accomplished this in an indirect manner that 
required the assistance of Cantonese junks and teamsters in New Spain.2 Meanwhile, the 
British East India Company conducted direct trade between China and Europe, but not 
the Americas.3 Conversely, British fur traders established a route between China and the 
Northwest Coast of America, but chartered companies hindered their interaction with 
Great Britain.4 In contrast, Columbia established direct trade—without geographic, 
territorial, or institutional compromises—between Massachusetts, Pacific America, and 
China. From a historiographic perspective, her accomplishments challenge the dominant 
narrative of United States involvement in the Pacific. Columbia sailed six decades prior 
to Matthew Perry and a century before the Spanish-American War. Indeed, less than a 
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decade after independence, the Columbians charted a global direction for the United 
States, becoming rivals to the British at Canton. 
  
 
 
Figure 15. View of Canton, c.1800, watercolor and gouache on paper, 71.2 x 128.5 cm., Peabody 
Essex Museum, Salem, MA. 
 
 
 Canton (Guangzhou, 廣州), China’s premier international port, also represented the 
sole commercial location where the Great Qing Dynasty permitted Westerners to trade 
with Chinese merchants. Located on the Pearl River (Zhu Jiang, 珠江), eighty miles from 
the South China Sea, the port bustled with the energies of mariners, artisans, and 
merchants. John Boit, fifth mate aboard the Columbia, noted that “the streets are 
generally thronged with people, all busily engag’d in their sevrall avocations.”5 For more 
than two millennia, Canton had prospered as one of the busiest and most cosmopolitan 
ports in the Far East. The metropolis ranked among the most urbanized places in the 
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world in the late eighteenth century, with some 800,000 inhabitants. Canton dwarfed 
Boston and presented a panorama utterly at odds with the indigenous villages of the 
Northwest Coast.6 Most importantly, business was booming in Canton. In 1787, Western 
traders imported goods worth more than $5½ million and exported a commensurate value 
in teas, porcelain, silks, and other products of China.7 Boit considered the city’s shops to 
be “well stock’d with Goods.” When cruising the Northwest Coast of America, the 
Columbians had proven themselves deft observers of the environment, culture, and 
human nature. Surprisingly, though, the Columbians recorded little more than 
commercial information during their two visits to China.8 Indeed, Boit commented that 
“so much has been said about Canton and the Manners and Customs of the Chinese, that 
‘tis needless for me to make any further remarks on the subject.”9 Where business was 
concerned their observations were also far from comprehensive. The historian must also 
incorporate other contemporary accounts in order to reconstruct Columbia’s experiences 
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in China. Those sources emphasize the sheer complexity of commercial arrangements, 
restrictions, and challenges facing the Columbians at Canton. 
Europeans began trading with mainland China following the settlement of 
Portuguese Macao, in 1557, and established a direct commercial connection with Canton 
in 1578-79.10 Their chartered companies became established in Canton a century later, 
when the Qing conquest of Taiwan—and the suppression of piracy—permitted the 
dynasty to relax its attitude toward foreign commerce.11 Thereafter, the complex 
commercial order known as the “Canton System” evolved to meet the overlapping needs 
of multiple constituents, including European and Chinese merchants, Cantonese sea 
workers, Qing bureaucrats, and the Emperor. The principal elements of the system 
evolved from 1700-1730. In 1757, following an abortive attempt by British merchants to 
expand their business to Chusan Island (Zhoushan, 舟山島), an archipelago off the coast of 
Zhejiang Province, the Qianlong (乾隆) Emperor restricted Western trade to Canton.12 
Although this chapter will discuss the characteristics of the Canton System with respect 
to the Columbia expeditions, it is worthwhile to summarize its complexities in brief.  
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Major Samuel Shaw, a Bostonian and the first United States Consul to reside in 
Canton, provided a crucial view of the Canton System through the eyes of an American. 
Each foreign vessel required the patronage of a Chinese “security merchant” 
(baoshangren, 保商人), who became answerable for the ship, her crew, and her cargo. In 
practice, the security merchant arranged all commercial transactions on behalf of his 
clients, as well as collecting duties, fees, and tribute on behalf of the imperial 
government.13 Shaw observed that the security merchant “takes out a permit for 
unloading… [and] when the return cargo is to be sent on board, the mandarins attend, as 
before, and each package must have the seller’s chop upon it.” The security merchants 
comprised a guild whose members had grown rich in their capacity as middlemen. 
Meanwhile, a ship captain negotiated contracts with licensed river pilots, compradors, 
and linguists in order to transport his cargo up the Pearl River. These specialists provided 
for the logistical needs of a merchantmen during its journey to Canton. Pilots navigated 
the sandbars and draughts of the river, compradors provisioned the crew, and linguists 
offered translation and negotiation services. Shaw considered it especially important to 
contract a capable linguist. He asserted that “this person is absolutely necessary, as he is 
employed in transacting all business with the customhouse… and is always on call.”14 
Reliable service workers were indispensable to a successful voyage. 
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Incoming merchantmen stopped at multiple checkpoints between Macao and her 
final anchorage at Whampoa (Huangpu, 黃埔), near Canton. In order to counteract 
smuggling, Chinese customs agents searched the ship at each location. Upon arrival at 
Whampoa, officers and dignitaries received permission to continue upriver and lodge 
among the European “thirteen factories” of Canton. Finally, the law required foreigners 
to leave Canton soon as a transaction was complete and a grand chop (waiyang chuanpai, 
外洋船牌), or exit permit, could be certified. Beginning in 1759, the Qianlong Emperor 
extended this regulation to all foreigners, mandating that European factors leave Canton 
and return to their permanent residences during the annual off-season.15 Shaw explained 
that “no Europeans are suffered to remain at Canton throughout the year. After their ships 
are gone, and they have settled their accounts with the Chinese, they repair to Macao, 
where each nation has its separate establishment.”16 Qing authorities endeavored to 
maintain strict control over foreigners. 
The greatest single challenge that westerners faced was an official view, 
originating in the Forbidden City, that European trade was inconsequential to China.17 In 
1793, Qianlong received George Macartney, an ambassador sent to negotiate a new 
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commercial agreement between Great Britain and China. The emperor refused. He 
articulated his perspective that “Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific 
abundance and lacks no product within its own borders.” Great Britain had nothing to 
offer China.18 An enlightened ruler, Qianlong traveled widely throughout his empire, 
curated a collection of treasures from previous dynasties, and oversaw the publication of 
a 36,000-volume encyclopedia.19 He understood that China’s natural resources were 
among her greatest assets, and “there was therefore no need to import the manufactures 
of outside barbarians in exchange for our own produce.”20 When pressed, he confronted 
Macartney with the statement that “we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange 
or ingenious, and have no use for your country’s manufactures.”21 Western merchants 
also remarked on China’s vast resources. William Trotter, an American in Canton, 
observed that the Chinese “are very sensible of the local situation of the Country and well 
assured that it produces every necessary of life that can render them independent of 
intercourse with the European World.”22 European merchants found themselves unable to 
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achieve a balance of trade in goods and instead purchased Chinese manufactures using 
specie, most often silver dollars minted in New Spain.23 Beginning in 1784, the American 
financiers of the Empress of China compensated for a lack of coin by exporting ginseng, 
a medicinal herb, to China. In 1789, Columbia arrived with a cargo of furry gold—
priceless otter skins that served as symbols of status among the Manchu overlords of 
China. 
Upon arriving at Canton, then, Columbia entered a commercial system designed 
to regulate trade, sustain local and imperial constituents, and limit the presence of 
foreigners on Chinese soil. Despite its complexities, supercargoes and factors recognized 
that the Canton System benefitted its constituents, both Chinese and European. Indeed, 
Shaw commented that the system was ultimately “as simple, as any in the known 
world.”24 For the Columbians, who arrived without a clear understanding of how to do 
business in Canton, the first expedition would be shaped by the problems of mounting 
expenses and bureaucratic delays. The experience of selling furs on a regulated yet 
unpredictable market would teach them new lessons about the importance of 
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improvisation. Those lessons laid the foundations for Columbia’s successful return 
voyage two years later, and most importantly, for the pioneering development of a Pacific 
route from the United States to Asia.  
 
“Nothing but Money” 
 
 
 Money—its form, its supply, or the lack thereof—constantly bore upon 
Columbia’s operations in China. Columbia faced mounting expenses from the moment 
she arrived in the Middle Kingdom, causing overhead to become an increasing drain 
upon her profitability. The expenses appeared in many forms as she proceeded toward 
Canton. Ships entering the Canton System needed to hire pilots, linguists, and 
compradors to manage the logistics of trade. Imperial officials exacted a series of fees, 
presents, and commissions before permitting a transaction to begin. Moreover, successful 
transactions often depended upon the consignment of a cargo to a middleman. Columbia 
sustained all of these expenses. Coming to grips with her expenditures is crucial to 
understanding the lessons that the Columbians learned during their first expedition to 
China. Our effort is complicated. The chroniclers of the voyage did not differentiate 
between the various costs that the Canton System imposed upon Columbia. For this 
reason, any assessment of her financial performance must be based on a reconstruction of 
her itemized expenses. In doing so, the historian can see how a series of minor costs—
and several large ones—complicated the commercial outlook for small American ships 
like Columbia and Washington. 
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 Columbia’s participation in the Canton System began as soon as she approached 
the Lema Islands, constituents of the Wanshan (萬山) Archipelago, off the southern coast 
of Guangdong Province. The islands, lightly populated, constituted an important 
economic outpost of the Qing Empire. John Boit noted the presence of “hundreds of 
fishing boats,” reaffirming Lord Anson’s observation of “an incredible number” of 
vessels that “seemed to cover the surface of the sea as far as he eye could reach.”25 
Fishing represented an important source of income for local inhabitants, as well as urban 
populations on the mainland who had abandoned farming in favor of tea and silk 
cultivation.26 Some fishermen, however, earned additional income by hiring out 
themselves as “outside pilots” (yuyinren, 魚引人) who guided foreign vessels through to 
Macao Roads.27 There is no account of the Columbia’s first encounter with the Chinese, 
but in all likelihood, a fisherman guided her among the islands in 1789. Indeed, Boit 
commented during the second voyage that the Columbians “got a Pilot on board, who 
agreed to carry us to Macao Roads, for 25 Dollars.”28 This was probably an average price 
for an outside pilot, as some charged two or three times as much during bad weather.29 
                                                          
25 Boit, “Remarks on the Ship Columbia’s voyage,” 348. 
26 Robert B. Marks, “Commercialization without Capitalism: Processes of Environmental Change 
in South China, 1550-1850,” Environmental History 1, no. 1 (1996): 61-66. 
27 Van Dyke, The Canton Trade, 36. 
28 Boit, “Remarks on the Ship Columbia’s voyage,” 420. 
29 Étienne Marchand, Voyage Round the World, Performed during the Years 1790, 1791, and 
1792 by Étienne Marchand, Preceded by an Historical Introduction an Illustrated by Charts, etc., 
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Joseph Ingraham recalled that the first expedition approached in “thick weather,” and 
Gray’s accounts confirm that the Columbia paid a larger sum of forty-three dollars, for 
“pilotage of Ship from Grand Lama to Macoa.”30 
 After passing through the archipelago, Columbia stood into Macao Roads, or 
Lingding Channel (Lingdingyang, 伶仃洋), a crowded commercial strait linking the Pearl 
River estuary with the South China Sea. She probably anchored between Portuguese 
Macao and the “Nine Islands” (Jiudao, 九島).31 From the anchorage, the Columbians 
could discern the geographical situation and architecture of Macao (Aomen, 澳門). 
Founded in 1557, the town was situated on an island notable for a temple dedicated to 
Mazu, the patron goddess of fishermen.32 Rugged terrain predominates at Macao, and 
one Philadelphian merchant described the geography of the island as “very uneven and 
almost surrounded by high hills.”33 Ming Dynasty officials understood that, in permitting 
                                                          
vol. 2, trans. C.P. Claret Fleurieu, (London: T.N. Longman and O. Rees, Paternoster-Row; and T. 
Cadell, Jun. and W. Davies, in the Strand, 1801), 89. 
30 In this chapter, I convert all monetary figures to Spanish Dollars using the exchange rate of $1 
(Spanish silver pesos) per £0.2083 (pounds sterling) or 7,200 兩 (liang, silver taels). Robert Gray 
gives the pilotage fee as £9. See Joseph Ingraham, Journal of the Brigantine “Hope” on a Voyage 
to the Northwest Coast of North America, 1790-1792, ed. Mark D. Kaplanoff, (Barre, MA: 
Imprint Society, 1971), 174.; “Robert Gray’s Accounts with the Owners of the Columbia,” in 
Voyages of the Columbia, 137. 
31 Boit, “Remarks on the Ship Columbia’s voyage,” 420. 
32 Zhidong Hao, Macau History and Society (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011), 
12-13. 
33 William Trotter, Ship Pigou, to William Lansom, 10 March 1797, ALS, William Trotter Letter, 
Massachusetts Historical Society. 
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the Portuguese to settle in such an isolated location, the imperial government could 
control the “sea barbarians” (hailiao, 海撩), or Westerners, while still learning and 
profiting from them. The town soon became a destination for silk merchants and Jesuit 
missionaries. During the seventeenth century, Macao emerged as a bustling trade hub, 
with routes to Portuguese Goa and Timor, Spanish Manila, and Nagasaki.34 Commercial 
wealth also supported the construction of churches, a convent, and public buildings in a 
distinctive baroque style.35 The town lay within a defensive wall and under the protection 
of several forts, bristling with cannon.36 
Macao Roads represented the final destination for the outside pilot, who 
relinquished control of a foreign ship to a licensed “Macao pilot.” Qing regulations 
barred foreign vessels from independent ascent of the Pearl River. The presence of a 
licensed pilot ensured that a ship could safely ascend the river, with its tides, sand bars, 
and shallow draughts. Licenses also granted customs officials with an additional means 
of supervising the “sea barbarians.” The European trade companies retained a pilot for 
service as soon an affiliated vessel was sighted entering Macao Roads. Small operators 
                                                          
34 Hao, Macau History and Society, 16-18, 57 
35 Jeremy Tambling and Louis Lo, Walking Macao, Reading the Baroque (Hong Kong: Hong 
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36 William Milburn, Oriental Commerce; or the East India Trader’s Complete Guide; Containing 
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could not afford this advantage, and were required to put ashore in search of a pilot.37 We 
know nothing about how Columbia acquired her pilot in 1790. Boit remarks that “Capt. 
Gray went to Macao in the pinnace” during the second expedition, and we can assume he 
did likewise during the first arrival in China.38 Foreigners recruited their Macao pilots 
from a limited pool, probably numbering no more than ten or eleven candidates in the 
1780s. Some were respected professionals and others were barely competent.39 The 
sources reveal nothing about the identity, language ability, or experience of Columbia’s 
pilots during either expedition. The sources do indicate, however, that no incidents 
occurred in transit, indicating that each pilot was equal to his task. In 1789, Gray 
recorded that the expedition paid $63, for “pilotage from Macao to Wampo.”40 In 
comparison, Van Dyke demonstrates that ships regularly paid $32-64 for pilotage in 
either direction during the 1780s, meaning that Columbia’s fee fell in the upper range.41 
 Columbia now sailed upriver under the care of her Chinese pilot. She could 
traverse the distance to Whampoa Roads in two days, given suitable tides. Proceeding 
northward, the geography of the Pearl River underwent a dramatic transformation from a 
                                                          
37 Van Dyke, The Canton Trade, 37-45. 
38 Boit, “Remarks on the Ship Columbia’s voyage,” 420. 
39 Van Dyke, The Canton Trade, 45. 
40 Gray gives this sum as £13 4s. See Gray, “Robert Gray’s Accounts with the Owners of the 
Columbia,” 137. 
41 Van Dyke, The Canton Trade, 44. 
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wide estuary to a clearly defined river. The most pronounced change occurred at Bocca 
Tigris (“Mouth of the Tigris,” Humen, 虎門), a place that one navigator described as “a 
narrow passage… somewhat more than a musquet-shot over.” Columbia faced her first 
round of customs inspections at this choke point. To prevent smuggling, the Qing 
government maintained two powerful forts on either side of the passage, one resembling 
“a large castle” and the other featuring “eighteen embrasures, reaching to the water’s 
edge.”42 If the fortifications were not sufficient to deter unwelcome vessels from 
ascending the river, the river itself presented hazards such as bars and shallow draughts.  
 Navigational hazards necessitated the assistance of flat-bottomed tow boats 
known as “sampans” (shanban, 舢舨). Again, the Columbians left scant information about 
the sampans needed to ascend the Pearl River. Gray’s accounts mention only those boats 
hired for transport between Whampoa Roads and Canton.43 However, we can be certain 
that sampans guided Columbia’s passage from Bocca Tigris to Whampoa. She needed 
their maneuverability to avoid the river’s hazards. Columbia, at 212 tons, probably 
required the assistance of two sampans, each powered by a team of sixteen oarsmen. Her 
ascent, then, entailed an additional labor cost of $1 per oarsman, or a total of $32. 
Columbia would also require sampans during her departure from China, in 1790.44 
                                                          
42 Thomas Gilbert, Voyage from New South Wales to Canton in the Year 1788, with Views of the 
Islands Discovered (London: George Stafford for J. Derbitt, 1789), 83. 
43 “Robert Gray’s Accounts with the Owners of Columbia,” in Voyages of the Columbia, 137-39. 
44 Van Dyke explains that “ships of less than 250 tons did not need to take as many extra 
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 While Columbia could avoid river hazards with the help of sampans, the 
expedition still needed assistance in overcoming the language barrier. The solution was to 
hire a linguist capable of translating between Cantonese and English. Columbia would 
pass three tollhouses along the river, and a linguist was needed to communicate the toll 
prices at each location. Later, at Whampoa, his duties expanded to include all 
communication with Qing imperial officials and the merchants of Canton.45 The 
chroniclers of the first expedition do not make specific mention of a linguist, with the 
exception of a sum of $72 with which Gray “paid Linguist to obtain pilot.” We know 
nothing, therefore, about this person or his language abilities.46 Once again, Columbia’s 
                                                          
(eight on each side) and charged a fee of Spanish $1 per oarsmen.” Although Van Dyke does not 
state whether the $1 wage was daily or per passage, the Macao pilots charged “per passage” and I 
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45 Van Dyke, The Canton Trade, 77-82. 
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and imperial officials. The sum paid for a linguist is given as £15. See William C. Hunter, The 
Fan Kwae Before Treaty Days, 1825-1844 (London: Kegan, Paul, Tremch, & Co., 1882), 50-53.; 
Anonymous, Crisis in the Opium Traffic, Being an Account of the Proceedings of the Chinese 
Government to Suppress that Trade (Canton: Office of the Chinese Repository, 1839), 98; Jean 
McClure Mudge, Chinese Export Porcelain for the American Trade, 1785-1835, 2nd Edition, 
Revised (East Brunswick, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1981), 50.; Paul A. Van Dyke, 
Merchants of Canton and Macao: Politics and Strategies in Eighteenth-Century Chinese Trade 
(Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011), 385.; Idem., The Canton Trade, 26-27, 85. 
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linguist can be assumed to have performed translation, negotiation, and supernumerary 
duties without incident. Additionally, he assumed responsibility for hiring subcontractors 
such as the carpenters, caulkers, boatmen, and other specialists who performed 
maintenance upon Columbia.47 For purposes of hiring a linguist, Gray would most likely 
have paid a retainer of $216.48 Columbia’s total expense in linguist fees and other 
services rendered was probably Spanish $288, or 3.91% of her total expenditures at 
Canton. In short, the linguist represented a small investment with large implications for 
the expedition.  
 Following the departure from Bocca Tigris, Columbia continued her ascent of the 
river to the great anchorage at Whampoa. Sadly, the Columbians recorded no impressions 
of countryside that fascinated other travelers as “extra-ordinary” and left them “lost in 
amazement.” Other accounts, however, suggest how the Columbians might have 
experienced their arrival in China. William Trotter, a merchant from Philadelphia, 
remarked upon the “curious and interesting” sights that “strike the eye of an European… 
in this part of the world.” While sailing up the Pearl River, in 1797, he admired the 
“extensive rice fields boardering on the River, and on the numerous Canals &c. which 
                                                          
 
47 “Robert Gray’s Accounts with the Owners of Columbia,” 143 
48 Van Dyke observes that the linguist salary remained fixed at $216 for American vessels from 
“the mid-1780s to 1842.” See Van Dyke, The Canton Trade, 82-83. 
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branch from it in all directions.” 49 The countryside supported the cultivation of rice, tea, 
and mulberry trees, whose leaves provided nourishment to the silkworm. Hydraulic 
works provided the irrigation and transport infrastructure needed to maintain a high level 
of cultivation, even on the slopes of hills.50 Thomas Gilbert, a British navigator who 
arrived in 1788, commented upon the vertical orientation of farms “cut into terraces, and 
planted with sugar-canes, yams, plantains, and the cotton-tree.”51 In recent centuries, 
Chinese agriculture had adopted a number of New World crops better suited to dry, cool, 
or alpine conditions. The revolution born of wheat, maize, and potatoes enabled the 
farmer to overcome topography and bring even the most rugged terrain under 
cultivation.52 Trotter considered the panorama a credit to the “assiduous labour of the 
industrial Chinaman, and his anxious desire not to lose a spot that he can render capable 
of yielding any increase.” Both travelers also recognized the sophistication of China’s 
built landscapes. Trotter was especially impressed by “lofty Pagodas which intersperse 
the surrounding country” and inspired in his mind “a kind of respectful veneration.” He 
described the pagodas as “stupendous stone Buildings” that dwarfed even the largest 
                                                          
49 William Trotter, Ship Pigou, to William Lansom, 10 March 1797, ALS, William Trotter Letter, 
Massachusetts Historical Society. 
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houses of worship in the United States, such as Philadelphia’s Christ Church.53 Likewise, 
Gilbert commented upon “a number of considerable towns within the reach of the eye.”54 
Guangdong Province’s commercial economy supported the growth of a dense network of 
market towns, cities, and dock facilities along the river.55 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Thomas Allom, “Whampoa, from Dane's Island,” 1800, engraving, as reproduced in 
Thomas Allom, China, in a Series of Views, Displaying the Scenery, Architecture, and Social Habits 
of that Ancient Empire, Vol. 1, London: Fischer, Son, & Co., 1800, 80. 
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Whampoa Roads, which Trotter described as “an extensive harbour about twelve 
miles below Canton,” served as the final anchorage for foreign vessels.56 Columbia 
arrived here on 17 December 1789. Situated at the confluence of two branches of the 
Pearl River, the anchorage could accommodate scores of ships. Captain Gray recorded 
the presence of “fourteen Americans and about seventy Ships of other Nations” at the 
anchorage.57 Indeed, foreign traffic snarled the river at Whampoa. In another effort to 
control the movement of “sea barbarians,” Qing imperial regulations prohibited Western 
vessels from continuing upriver to Canton. Columbia would remain here until her 
business was complete, on 12 February 1790.58  
 Columbia’s linguist sprang into action upon arriving at Whampoa. He sent 
notification of the ship’s arrival to the Superintendent of Marine Customs, or Hoppo 
(hubu, 戶部), an imperial official responsible for assessing port fees upon all incoming 
vessels.59 The announcement did not, however, indicate that Columbia would be 
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measured right away. Samuel Shaw, the United States Consul in Canton, observed that 
the Hoppo measured ships only “as often as there are three or four that have not been 
visited.”60 Meanwhile, the linguist arranged to hire shipwrights, carpenters, caulkers, and 
other subcontractors needed to repair Columbia. Additionally, he helped recruit a 
purveyor of provisions to feed and supply the Columbians.61 Finally, the linguist began 
the process of engaging a security merchant—sometimes known as a fiador, or hong 
(hang, 行) merchant—to assume responsibility for the ship, its cargo and crew, and the 
payment of port fees and tariffs. Shaw stressed the importance of the security merchant to 
a ship, stating that “a fiador, or surety, must be engaged, before she can discharge any 
part of her cargo.”62 In return for assuming legal responsibility over the enterprise, the 
security merchant received the right of first refusal on the cargo.63 In this respect, 
Columbia would face unexpected difficulties. 
 Subsistence, and the acquisition of provisions, are key considerations for any 
vessel anchored in an unfamiliar port. The Canton System required foreigners to draw up 
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contracts with purveyors of provisions, or “compradors.”64 Captain Gray appears to have 
recorded all expenses associated with Columbia’s provisions, but he was inconsistent in 
his categorization of food, naval stores, materials, and other goods delivered to the ship. 
Richard Howe attributed the first shipment of provisions to “Wyqua Compradore for 
Supplies.”65 Wyqua may have been Cai Fuguan (蔡福官), a “fairly prominent merchant” in 
a longstanding house of compradors.66 He is known to have furnished provisions to 
British fur traders during the 1780s.67 Wyqua supplied a variety of meats, vegetables, 
bread, and spirits during his tenue as comprador to Columbia, albeit at unpredictable 
prices. He delivered some foodstuffs, such as poultry and bread, at a typical market rate. 
                                                          
64 “Comprador” is a Portuguese term meaning “purchaser,” but which came to mean “purveyor” 
in the context of the Canton System. Where a chartered company employed a comprador in a full-
time capacity, the meaning expanded to something approaching “chief cashier” or “major-domo.” 
See Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 2:176. 
65 “Bill for the Columbia’s Supplies” in Voyages of the Columbia, 127-28. 
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also engaged in the tea trade. See Van Dyke, Merchants of Canton and Macao, 178, 346. 
67 Curiously, Wyqua is not specifically mentioned in the “sundry disbursements” listed in Gray’s 
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Other items, including beef, pork, and eggs, traded at two or three times the usual price.68 
The immediate cause of the price inflation cannot be known for certain, but it may 
represent a secondary effect of rice shortages across Guangdong Province in 1786-87.69 
The Columbians ultimately purchased foodstuffs worth $424. Meanwhile, Wyqua also 
supervised the acquisition of replacement and repair materials, such as lumber, duckcloth, 
and cordage, which constituted another expenditure of $1,013.70  In total, Columbia’s 
comprador fees represented an outlay of $1,436, or 14% of her total expenses at Canton. 
                                                          
68 The unpredictable nature of prices at Canton is evident in the list of perishables delivered to the 
Columbia. In some cases, we can compare the Columbia’s cost of provisions against expected 
prices during the late eighteenth century. Van Dyke’s calculation of food prices at Canton 
provides a starting point to develop an “expected” price for provisions during both expeditions, in 
1789-90 and again in 1792-93. Based on projections for 1789, it appears that Columbia purchased 
poultry at a price near the expected rate (0.1 taels). Likewise, bread appears to have traded at a 
reliable rate of four candareens (0.04 taels) per loaf or pound. In contrast, other perishables 
witnessed price inflation above the expected rate. For example, the price per catty of beef (0.07 
taels) represents a moderate rise in the expected price. Meanwhile, the Columbians paid more 
than double the expected rate for eggs (0.0066 taels). Worse still, they paid over three times the 
expected price per catty of pork (0.3117 taels). The pork calculation of 15 stone, or 210 pounds, 
is equal to approximately 157.5 Canton catties. Although the accounts for supplies list “Fish and 
Vegitables,” the two categories of food cannot be differentiated with sufficient precision to 
compare the prices for fish. My comparison is based on price estimates are derived from chart 
“Canton Food Prices from 1704 to 1833” in Van Dyke, The Canton Trade, 65.; See also “Bill for 
the Columbia’s Supplies,” 127-28.; “Robert Gray’s Accounts with the Owners of Columbia,” 
137-39.; Patrick H. Hase, Custom, Land and Livelihood in Rural South China: The Traditional 
Land Law of Hong Kong’s New Territories, 1750-1950 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 
Press, 2013), 404. 
69 The increase in the price of foodstuffs correlates to an inflationary trend in prices of gold 
(+59%), silk (+93%), and pepper (+100%), all valued in silver, since the late seventeenth century. 
See Robert B. Marks and Chen Chunsheng, “Price Inflation and Its Social, Economic, and 
Climatic Context in Guangdong Province, 1707-1800,” T’oung Pao, Second Series 81, Fasc. 1/3 
(1995): 128.; Cranmer-Byng and Wills, “Trade and Diplomacy with Maritime Europe,” 220-22. 
70 Columbia also acquired a small number of items from private vendors operating at 
Whampoa. For example, the expedition purchased ten oars from Samuel Howell and 
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Table 4. Expected Prices for Selected Provisions in 1789 and 1792, Canton. 
  
PROVISION BASELINE YEAR UNIT 
PRICE 1789 
(liang, 兩) 
PRICE 1792 
(liang, 兩) ANNUAL +% 
BEEF 1704 catty 0.0595 0.0616 3.5 
CAPONS 1726 catty 9.14 9.57 2.9 
EGGS 1726 (each) 0.0028 0.0066 2.3 
FISH 1704 catty 0.053 0.055 2.5 
GOAT 1704 catty 0.1262 00.1307 3.3 
PORK 1704 catty 0.087 0.106 3.4 
POULTRY 71 1704 catty 0.087 0.106 3.4 
 
 
 Before Columbia could receive permission to transmit her goods to Canton, 
however, Chinese customs officials needed to assess port and service fees, discounts, and 
commissions. This responsibility belonged to Fu Ning (傅寧), the Superintendent of 
Maritime Customs. Appointed in 1787, Superintendent Fu assumed the office following a 
series of corrupt and overbearing occupants.72 His assessment of Columbia depended 
entirely upon the dimensions of the ship’s cargo space, calculated using a series of 
bamboo measuring poles. The Columbians did not record the measurements or the fees, 
but it is possible to estimate both using the probable dimensions of her cargo hold. 
Columbia probably paid a grand total of $3,266.83 in fees, commissions, foreign 
                                                          
vinegar from I. Ashmead, respectively. See “Robert Gray’s Accounts with the Owners of 
Columbia,” 138. 
71 Poultry includes ducks, chickens, geese, and sundry fowl, but excludes capons (listed 
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exchange adjustments, and a surcharge known as the “Emperor’s Present.” This sum, 
typical of vessels in the smallest measurement category, third-rate, constituted a heavy 
burden. Indeed, the combined port fees represent the single largest expense, at 32%, of 
the expedition.73 
Moreover, Columbia arrived at Whampoa without an adequate supply of silver, 
meaning that she needed cash to pay her fees and receive a permit to disembark cargo. 
Thomas Randall, the American Vice-Consul in Canton, would have urged the 
Columbians to smuggle their cargo “below”—in the neighborhood of Macao—and then 
sail to Canton with “nothing but money.”74 The strategy would have required Columbia 
to register as a “rice ship” and import a modest amount of the grain from points 
downriver.75 Columbia’s passage up the river foreclosed on this option, and, as 
newcomers, the Columbians probably had no knowledge of the alternative. Given the 
circumstances, Captain Gray consigned his cargo to the Shaw & Randall partnership in 
                                                          
73 This sum is equal to 2,352.12 兩, or silver taels. Columbia’s estimated rate (11.091 兩 per ton) 
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and the Pearl River Delta, 1690-1845, Volume 1” (PhD Dissertation, University of Southern 
California, 2002), 688. 
74 “Messrs. Shaw & Randall to Joseph Barrell, Canton, February 7th 1790,” in Voyages of the 
Columbia, 139-40. 
75 Because of their importance in replenishing Canton’s granaries, “rice ships” were allowed to do 
business using silver alone. See Marks, “Commercialization Without Capitalism,” 63-64, 67.; 
Robert B. Marks and Chen, “Price Inflation and Its Social, Economic, and Climatic Context in 
Guangdong Province, 1707-1800,” 136-141, 144-46. 
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exchange for a substantial cash advance. The advance enabled Columbia to disembark 
her furs, but it also secured the services of Thomas Randall in brokering a sale to the 
merchants of Canton. Shaw & Randall contracted to receive a commission of 7.5 percent 
of the otter proceeds. In consigning with the partnership, however, the Columbians 
incurred “factory fees,” which incorporated the costs of transporting, storing, marketing, 
and selling the otters in Canton. The expedition probably paid $2,659, or 26 percent of its 
total expenditures, in factory fees.76 Ultimately, Columbia incurred a grand total of 
$10,163 in expenses—a staggering sum for a small American vessel doing business in a 
strange land, without support from home, and short of hard currency. Indeed, the cost 
almost outweighed the benefits of trading at Canton.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
76 Once again, the Columbians did not record the factory fees, but we can estimate this expense 
by a simple process of elimination. “The Columbia’s Accounts with Messrs. Shaw & Randall” 
provides a grand total of expenses at Canton of Spanish $10,163, with commissions of $1,605 
paid to Shaw & Randall. Subtraction returns $8,558 for the ship’s “Bill of disbursements and 
Factory expenses,” as noted by Gray and Howe. Beyond this point, some educated guesswork is 
required. I presume the subtraction of another subtotal of $5,899.60 in port fees, goods and 
services, supplies, presents, and wages. The remaining sum of $2658.50 is probably specific to 
“Factory expenses.” Smaller sums of river tolls and baggage taxes may also be included, as such 
transactions also occurred outside the factories, although it is impossible to estimate these 
numbers in any reliable manner. That the sum accounts for more than one-quarter of the 
Columbia’s expenses at Canton is not surprising. Van Dyke, “Port Canton and the Pearl River 
Delta,” 42-43, 46-47. 
279 
 
Table 5. Ship Columbia Estimated Expenses at Canton, 1789-90. 
CATEGORY SUBCATEGORY SUM ($ SPANISH) % TOTAL 
    
PORT FEES  3,266.63 32.14 
PILOT   164.17 1.62 
SAMPAN  Upriver 32.00 0.31 
 Downriver 32.00 0.31 
 Whampoa 20.16 0.20 
COMPRADOR  Provisions  424.22 4.17 
 Supplies 1012.94 9.97 
PRIVATE VENDORS   30.24 0.30 
LINGUIST  Retainer 216.00 2.13 
 Additional Services 20.83 0.20 
 Subcontractors 228.88 2.25 
PRESENTS   11.59 0.11 
WAGES   439.96 4.33 
FACTORY FEES   2,658.50 26.16 
COMMISSION  1,604.90 15.79 
    
TOTAL  10,163.00 100.00 
 
 
Lady Washington never traded at Canton. Gray admonished Kendrick that “you 
by no means attempt to bring your Sloop to Canton.” Knowing that the port-fee structure 
discriminated against smaller vessels, he warned his commander that “the Expense will 
amount to at least 2500 Dollars and would involve you in the greatest difficulty.”77 
Kendrick decided against trading at Canton, as Lady Washington would have incurred 
port fees exceeding $3,114.78 When compared against the Columbia’s probable fees, the 
                                                          
77 “Robert Gray to John Kendrick, 21 November, 1789” in Voyages of the Columbia, 127. 
78 This sum is equal to 2,242 兩. The precise specifications of Lady Washington are unknown, and, 
as a consequence, the historian faces difficulties in determining whether Gray was correct. My 
estimates take the contemporary brig Union, commanded by the former Columbian, John Boit, as 
a facsimile. For a discussion of the method of measurement and its application to Lady 
Washington, see Appendix B: Estimated Specifications and Hypothetical Port Fees for Sloop 
Lady Washington. 
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regulatory bias against small vessels is cast into stark relief. Washington’s cargo space 
encompassed perhaps 73 percent that of Columbia, but Kendrick would have incurred 95 
percent of the fees charged to Gray and Howe. Furthermore, Washington would have 
faced pilotage, comprador, linguist, and sampan expenses totaling approximately $2,243, 
only slightly less than Columbia.79 Assuming a consistent rate of consignment paid to 
Shaw & Randall (7.5%), the commission on her sales would have totaled $734. 
Furthermore, Kendrick could expect to spend an additional $1,233 in factory fees and 
disbursements. Lady Washington’s business expenditures would have totaled $7,940—a 
ruinous amount for the tiny brigantine. 
Kendrick might have been lucky enough to dispose of his cargo, 530 furs, at the 
same price brokered for Columbia, an average of $19 apiece.80 The transaction would 
                                                          
79 Given identical river distances and a competitive market in pilots, I assume that Lady 
Washington would have incurred identical piloting fees ($164), Likewise, the contract price for a 
linguist ($216) is predictable. Provisions probably varied to an extent. Kendrick appears to have 
retained roughly half the Columbians. Moreover, he might have benefitted to some degree from 
the consignment of the Columbia’s cargo to Shaw & Randall. Washington may have waited a 
week or two to receive the Hoppo’s official measurement, but the sale of her furs would have 
required fewer than the eleven weeks required for Columbia’s cargo. For these reasons, I assume 
an equal number of mouths to feed over a shorter period of six weeks, with a proportionally 
smaller cost in provisions ($231). Excepting the “nonessential” supplies purchased by Gray and 
Howe (candlesticks, forks and knives, chairs, a silk pennant, etc.), Kendrick would still have 
spent a significant sum on basic materials ($949).  Maintenance and cargo handling would have 
also absorbed a sum similar to that of Columbia ($194). Meanwhile, the minimum cost for 
sampans would likely have been identical ($84), as would the expenses for presents ($26) and 
wages ($440). Kendrick would have paid a hypothetical grand total of Spanish $2,243 in 
additional expenses. The principal reason for the disparity in cost, however, is the Emperor’s 
Present, a sum fixed at 1,950 兩 ($2,708), regardless of an individual ship’s specifications. 
80 This price, rounded up for convenience, is marginally higher than that received by Columbia, at 
an average of $18.72 apiece. Garments are assumed to be fur robes comprising two full pelts 
each, at double the price ($38). Kendrick stated that he also possessed “150 pieces both large and 
small,” and “as to the Quality we judge it equal to any that has been brought from the coast.” My 
calculation for pieces assumes an average size half that of whole pelts, with a proportionately 
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have generated proceeds of $9,785, although Washington’s profit would have been a 
disappointing $1,845, one-sixth that of Columbia. The sum could have purchased a return 
cargo of 99 chests of tea, but this miniscule cargo would be insufficient to turn a profit. In 
reality, however, the prior transaction of Columbia’s cargo would have depressed the 
price of furs, causing Kendrick to trade on far worse terms. Gray indicated this when he 
warned his counterpart that “you will not receive one third the Value for your Skins.”81 
Moreover, Kendrick recognized his disadvantage in being “destitute of every necessary 
or Cash to purchase unless I dispose of my Furrs.”82 Gray was correct to caution against 
sailing the Lady Washington to Canton. Kendrick would likely have traded at a heavy 
loss.83 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
lower price of Spanish $9.50 each. See “Kendrick to Gray and Howe, 6 February 1790” in 
Voyages of the Columbia, 136. 
81 “Robert Gray to John Kendrick, Canton 4th Feby. 1790” in Voyages of the Columbia, 135. 
82 “John Kendrick to Robert Gray and Richard S. Howe, Macao January 27th 1790” in Voyages of 
the Columbia, 133. 
83 Kendrick would have lost money if the average price of furs dropped more than 25%, a distinct 
possibility given that Lady Washington’s cargo would have increased the supply of otters in 
Canton by roughly 50%. Moreover, Randall’s correspondence with Alexander Hamilton indicates 
that the sale price he brokered for Columbia was unusually high for the season. The inflated price 
represents one outcome of the skins attracting the attention of Governor-General Fu, as detailed 
below. 
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Table 6. Projected Value of Furs aboard Sloop Lady Washington, 1790.84 
 
COMPONENT STOCK UNIT ($ SPANISH) TOTAL ($ SPANISH) 
WHOLES  320 19.00 6,080 
GARMENTS 60 38.00 2,280 
PIECES  150 9.50 1,425 
    
TOTAL 530  9,785 
  
  
Instead, the captains arranged to smuggle Lady Washington’s cargo in the vicinity 
of Macao, where she could avoid the compounding expenses of pilots, sampans, tolls, 
port fees, and factory fees. This option eliminated all three of the problems facing 
Washington at Canton. First, Gray advised Kendrick that Washington could avoid the 
Cantonese bureaucracy “provided you smuggle” in the neighborhood of “dirty butter 
bay,” or Lark’s Bay, southwest of Macao.85 The prospect of smuggling may have 
appealed to a former privateer such as Kendrick. Indeed, the Columbians could recall the 
importance of smuggling in New England’s resistance to Great Britain during the 
American Revolution. After independence, too, smugglers attempted to evade state 
imposts on goods entering the United States. China was unfamiliar territory, but the 
Columbians probably felt comfortable with the general practice of smuggling.86 Second, 
                                                          
84 “Kendrick to Gray and Howe, 6 February 1790,” 136. 
85 The emphasis is Gray’s. See “Robert Gray to John Kendrick, Canton January 29th 1790” in 
Voyages of the Columbia, 133-34. 
86 Joshua M. Smith, “Patterns of Northern New England Smuggling, 1789-1820” in The Early 
Republic and the Sea: Essays on the Naval and Maritime History of the Early United States, eds. 
William S. Dudley and Michael J. Crawford (Washington: Brassey’s, Inc., 2001), 35-52. 
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Gray predicted that smuggling could result in sales of Spanish $50-70 per otter, an 
improvement over the $19 price in Canton.87 The higher price reflected a lack of imperial 
supervision among the coastal islands, inlets, and coves, and indicated a flourishing free 
trade area. Lark’s Bay attracted both Chinese and European smugglers, and ranked 
among the busiest illicit anchorages in China. British merchants operated several hulks, 
or floating warehouses, for purposes of stockpiling contraband. Meanwhile, merchant-
captains could do business free of the onerous port fees at Whampoa.88 Finally, by 
smuggling, Lady Washington could potentially exchange her cargo for silver. If lucky, 
Kendrick could proceed upriver to trade at Canton with “nothing but money,” as Randall 
had suggested.89 Smuggling represented a lucrative alternative for small vessels. 
Smuggling also opened up competition between buyers that would not have been 
possible under the security-merchant system in Canton. Gray recommended that 
Kendrick do business with John McIntyre, a private British merchant and longtime 
resident of Macao who was “interested in the fur trade.”90 Although the sources relating 
to McIntyre are thin, there is a strong possibility that he specialized in the “country 
                                                          
87 “Robert Gray to John Kendrick, Canton January 29th 1790,” 133-34. 
88 Paul A. Van Dyke, “Smuggling Networks of the Pearl River Delta before 1842: Implications 
for Macao and the American China Trade,” in Americans and Macao: Trade, Smuggling, and 
Diplomacy on the South China Coast, ed. Paul A. Van Dyke (Hong Kong: University of Hong 
Kong Press, 2012), 50-55. 
89 “Messrs. Shaw & Randall to Joseph Barrell, Canton, February 7th 1790,” 139-40. 
90 “Robert Gray to John Kendrick, Canton January 29th 1790,” 133-34.; Morse, The Chronicles of 
the East India Company Trading to China, 2:175. 
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trade,” or carrying trade, between various points in Asia. There is some indication that his 
career began in British India during the 1760s, the first decade of British conquests on the 
subcontinent.91 He relocated to Macao sometime during the 1770s, from whence he 
shipped porcelain and silk home to his family in Edinburgh, Scotland.92 Operating from 
Macao, he could procure merchants for incoming cargoes and, likewise, maintained 
contacts along the long-distance routes connecting Canton to the Straits of Melaka, India, 
and beyond.93 In addition to shipping the usual Chinese goods, he probably also 
facilitated the resettlement of Cantonese carpenters, blacksmiths, and laborers to the 
mining districts of Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula. McIntyre possessed “a good 
command of Chinese and Malay” as well as talents for bookkeeping, finance, and public 
administration. Later, in the 1790s, he would become one of the “pioneers… responsible 
for the development and vitality of the new port” at British Penang.94 Following his 
contact with Gray he requested information concerning the “Quantity and Quality of 
skins” aboard Lady Washington.95 Meanwhile, a second “Gentleman” expressed interest 
                                                          
91 Letter 156, “Thomas Fitzhugh to the Court requesting permission to take John McIntyre out 
with him as his menial servant, 14 Dec 1761,” IOR/E/1/43 ff 348-349, India Office Records and 
Private Papers, British Library. 
92 John McIntyre Correspondence, private collection.  
93 Ingraham, Journal of the Brigantine Hope, 178-79.; Nordin Hussin, Trade and Society in the 
Straits of Melaka: Dutch Melaka and English Penang, 1780-1830 (Singapore: National 
University of Singapore Press, 2007), 16, 36-37, 73. 
94 Hussin, Trade and Society in the Straits of Melaka, 53-54, 75, 238, 241, 244, 309. 
95 “Robert Gray to John Kendrick, Canton January 29th 1790,” 133-34. 
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in purchasing the cargo and sent representatives to inspect the otters.96 Kendrick later 
communicated that “Several Chinese merchants have proposed to purchase the whole.” 
Nonetheless, he preferred to wait for a counteroffer from McIntyre in order to sell the 
furs “to the Best advantage.”97 Barring these possibilities, Gray believed that Kendrick 
would find other “Merchants in abundance” to purchase Washington’s cargo.98 
The documentary record does not attest to the circumstances surrounding the sale 
of Lady Washington’s cargo, and therefore, information such as the date and recipient of 
the transaction remain unknown. The sale cannot have occurred earlier than 6 February 
1790, when Kendrick first anchored at Lark’s Bay.99 Likewise, John Hoskins reported 
that upon arriving in the harbor, Kendrick “was seized with a violent fever; which caused 
his life for some time to be despaired of.”100 The captain may have contracted any 
number of infectious diseases common to South China, including Malaria, Yellow Fever, 
Dengue Fever, Leptospirosis, or Hepatitis.101 In any case, the transaction could not have 
                                                          
96 The “Gentleman” was probably a merchant of Canton. Gray did not record his identity, 
although a letter of introduction issued to his representatives (“The Bearers of this accompanied 
by the linguister are the persons alluded to in our last”) is sufficient to mark them as Cantonese. 
See “Robert Gray to John Kendrick, Canton January 29th 1790,” 133-34.; “Robert Gray to John 
Kendrick, Canton January 30th 1790” in Voyages of the Columbia, 135. 
97 “John Kendrick to Robert Gray and Richard S. Howe, Macao February 6th 1790,” 136. 
98 “Robert Gray to John Kendrick, Canton, 4th Feby. 1790,” 135. 
99 “Robert Gray to John Kendrick, Canton, 4th Feby. 1790,” 135. 
100 John Hoskins, “Narrative of the Second Voyage of the ‘Columbia’,” in Voyages of the 
Columbia, 164. 
101 The coastal marshlands of tropical China are a natural habitat for bacteria and viruses that 
thrive in standing or contaminated water. Likewise, the region is a breeding ground for organisms 
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occurred until he was well enough to negotiate the terms, and, at the earliest, not before 
Columbia departed on 12 February.102 Kendrick later suggested a sufficient delay that he 
“unfortunately lost the season” for trading, and it is possible that he did not complete the 
transaction until his return to Macao in 1792-93.103 Furthermore, the identity of the buyer 
is unattested in the chronicles of either expedition, and no clues suggest whether the 
transaction involved McIntyre, the “Gentleman,” the “Chinese merchants,” or another 
party entirely. We do, however, know the sales price. Kendrick recorded that “I sold the 
                                                          
that transmit disease, such as mosquitos. Kendrick probably did not contact chronic Malaria 
(Plasmodium falciparum), a disease characterized by recurring expression of symptoms in the 
weeks and months following the initial infection. At least, there is no indication that Kendrick 
suffered from multiple bouts of disease after Lark’s Bay. It is possible that he contracted a milder 
form of Malaria (either P. vivax or P. malariae), Yellow Fever or Dengue Fever (both in genus 
Flavivirus), or Leptospirosis (genus Leptospira). Victims of these diseases, however, tend to 
recover within a short period of time as the infection clears up in a week or less. My conjecture is 
that Kendrick contracted Hepatitis A, a viral infection contracted through ingestion of water 
contaminated with Hepatovirus. The incubation period for Hepatitis is typically between two and 
six weeks, meaning that Kendrick probably contracted the disease at sea or in the Sandwich 
Islands, located approximately 5-7 weeks away from China. In either case, it is not difficult to 
imagine that conditions at sea, where twenty-odd men worked in close quarters without reliable 
access to clean water, were anything but sanitary. Moreover, Hoskins’ observation that Kendrick 
suffered “for some time” would seem to match the longer recovery period (three to eight weeks) 
associated with Hepatitis. It is noteworthy that “Messrs. Wood and Stoddard,” two of Kendrick’s 
followers aboard the Lady Washington, later died under circumstances that resonate as being 
related to tropical diseases. Indeed, John Boit expressed his belief that “they liv’d too fast for the 
climate.” See Médecins Sans Frontières, Clinical Guidelines: Diagnosis and Treatment Manual 
for Curative Programmes in Hospitals and Dispensaries, Guidance for Prescribing, 2016 Edition 
(Paris: Médecins Sans Frontières, 2016), 141-47, 210-212, 213-16, 220-223; Boit, “Remarks on 
the Ship Columbia’s voyage,” 422. 
102 I contend that, given their previous communication on the matter of the sale, Kendrick would 
have notified Gray concerning any transaction that occurred. The absence of documentation 
suggests that Columbia sailed prior to the sale. See “Boston, Wednesday, Aug. 11, The 
Columbia.” Columbian Centinel (Boston, Massachusetts), 11 August 1790. 
103 Kendrick’s language is not clear on this point. “John Kendrick to Joseph Barrell, Macoa, in 
China, Mar. 28, 1792,” in Voyages of the Columbia, 470-471. 
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Cargo of the Sloop… for the sum of eighteen thousand dollars.”104 The sum represents an 
average sales price of Spanish $33.96 per otter. Kendrick could have purchased a 
whopping 961 chests of tea, half again as many as the Columbia could afford in Canton. 
Sadly, the owners did not benefit from the windfall—Kendrick chose to reinvest the 
money in another voyage to the Northwest Coast, rather than sending tea to Boston. 
In the end, the question of money hindered both Columbia and Lady Washington 
during the first expedition to China. Columbia racked up enormous expenses during her 
first week at Canton, and, as we shall see, the sale of her cargo was anything but certain. 
Meanwhile, the prohibitive costs of the Canton System drove Washington to the 
unpredictable business of smuggling. The experiences of both ships, however, hinged 
upon the standing of a commodity, otter skins, that was perhaps too valuable. 
 
“Splendid Furs” 
 
 
Chinese consumers had a longstanding relationship with furs. Beginning around 
200 BCE, and continuing into modern times, furs constituted an important commodity of 
trade between the nomadic societies of Central Asia and the agricultural states of 
China.105 Furs were commonplace for the Turkic, Mongolian, and Jurchen peoples, 
whose homelands centered upon the animal-rich steppe and taiga. The abundance of furs 
                                                          
104 Ibid. 
105 Hans Derks, “Nomads in Chinese and Central Asian History: The Max Weber Case,” Oriens 
Extremus 41, no. 1/2 (1998/99): 18.; Christopher P. Atwood, “The Mutual-Aid Co-operatives and 
the Animal Products Trade in Mongolia, 1913-1928,” Inner Asia 5, no. 1 (2003): 65-91. 
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enabled them to keep warm in the harsh winters, but pelts became “very impractical” 
during the hot summers.106 By contrast, Chinese manufacturers could provide silk and 
cotton textiles, cool in the heat of summer, prompting the development of a reciprocal 
trade during the Han Dynasty.107 The emergence of the Mongol Empire, during the 
thirteenth century, had important implications for the appearance of mass-market furs in 
China. Mongol conquests opened a new, expansive, and safe trade network that extended 
across the Eurasian steppe from Manchuria to Poland.108 Ambassadors from distant 
places brought furs as tribute to the great khans. William of Rubrick remarked upon 
“great quantities of presents” delivered to the court of Güyük, a grandson of Genghis 
Khan. Among the gifts, he regarded “splendid furs” to be riches comparable to silks, 
samites, baldachins, and belts of gold.109 The Golden Horde, a Mongol state in European 
Russia, imposed taxes in fur upon its Russian subjects. The khans then exported most of 
the furs eastward in exchange for silks, spices, and other goods originating in China. 
                                                          
106 Henry Serruys, “The Dearth of Textiles in Traditional Mongolia,” Journal of Asian History 16, 
no. 2 (1982): 125. 
107 Mark Edward Lewis, The Early Chinese Empires: Qin and Han (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 113-15, 130-32, 141-45.; David Christian, “Silk Roads 
or Steppe Roads? The Silk Roads in World History,” Journal of World History 1, No. 1 (2000): 
5-9. 
108 Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System, A.D. 1250-1350 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 154-59. 
109 William of Rubrick, The Journey of William of Rubrick to the Eastern Parts of the World, 
1253-55, as Narrated by Himself, with Two Accounts of the Earlier Journey of John of Pian de 
Carpine, ed. and trans. William Woodville Rockhill (London: Hayluyt Society, 1900), 23. 
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Ermine was otherwise unavailable in China and fetched high prices.110 Indeed, Marco 
Polo noted that the Mongols regarded ermine as “the queen of furs.” Sable, too, fetched a 
high price. Polo calculated the value of a prime pelt at “two thousand besants of gold.”111 
Even after the collapse of their empire, Mongols continued to exchange furs for cloth, 
silk, rice, and manufactured goods originating in Ming China.112 Indeed, Beijing 
entertained Mongol trade missions, in which vising merchants received valuable gifts, as 
the “least costly and most effective” means of eliminating border raids.113   
Fur motivated China’s earliest interactions with the Russian Empire. Russia began 
its eastward expansion during the sixteenth century, when Muscovite merchants found 
themselves encircled by the Ottomans, Tatars, Swedes, Poles, Lithuanians, and the 
Hanseatic League.114 Following the Russian conquest of Kazan, in 1552, trappers known 
as promyshlenniki began Muscovy’s colonization of Siberia.115 The promyshlenniki 
extended their commercial influence across the taiga using a system of rivers, portages, 
                                                          
110 Janet Martin, “The Land of Darkness and the Golden Horde: The Fur Trade under the 
Mongols XIII-XIVth Centuries,” Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique 19, no. 4 (1978): 415-16. 
111 Marco Polo, The Travels, ed. John Mansfield, (London: J.M Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1908), 199. 
112 Derks, “Nomads in Chinese and Central Asian History,” 19. 
113 Peter Purdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2005), 67, 72. 
114 G. Patrick Marsh, Eastern Destiny: Russia in Asia and the North Pacific (Westport CT: 
Praeger, 1996), xiv. 
115 Purdue, China Marches West, 81; R.K.I Quested, Sino-Russian Relations: A Short History 
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 25. 
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and trading fortresses that reflected similar patterns among the British Hudson’s Bay and 
North West Companies in North America. In doing so, promyshlenikki became heirs to 
transcontinental trade routes developed under the Mongol Empire. Meanwhile, using 
superior firepower, they implemented a system of forced production, known as yasak, 
among the native peoples of Siberia.116 Forced labor produced millions of Siberian pelts 
for the Russian market during the early seventeenth century. Later, when establishing 
their fur regime along the Amur River, trappers alienated indigenous peoples nominally 
under the protection of the Manchu Qing.117 During the years 1651-52, they also 
undertook the construction of forts at Nerchinsk, Albuzin, and Khabarovsk, in ignorance 
of existing geopolitical relations in the region. Indeed, Russian and Qing aspirations 
threatened to erupt into violence in the Amur Basin.118 The potential for conflict 
                                                          
116 Historian Patrick Marsh explains that “the normal practice” of yasak “was to demand furs 
from the intimidated native population and enforce compliance as necessary by the taking of 
hostages.” Although the use of forced labor in the production of animal pelts is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation, it nevertheless deserves mention as a factor in creating a Sino-Russian fur 
trade. Elizabeth Mancke has observed that most seafaring European powers lacked “financial 
resources and coercive power” needed to impose metropolitan authority over distant colonial 
territories. Likewise, this was also a consideration in Moscow’s colonization of Siberia and the 
Russian Far East. For this reason, Moscow did little to impede the brutal methods by which 
promyshlenniki obtained pelts and consolidated the taiga as imperial space. Patrick Marsh 
observes that, in recognition of this pragmatic arrangement, local governors known as voevoda 
selected the best furs for presentation to the Czar. See Elizabeth Mancke, “Negotiating an 
Empire: Britain and its Overseas Peripheries, c. 1550-1780,” in Negotiated Empires: Centers and 
Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820, eds. Christine Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy (New 
York: Routledge, 2002), 236.; Alexei D. Voskressenski, The Difficult Border: Current Russian 
and Chinese Concepts of Sino-Russian Relations and Frontier Problems (New York: Nova 
Science Publishers, 1997), 41.; Marsh, Eastern Destiny, 10, 30-31. 
117 Quested, Sino-Russian Relations, 29.; Purdue, China Marches West, 121. 
118 Russian historian S.B. Okun explains that the “whole vast region on the continent of Asia had 
been absolutely terra incognita to the European world prior to the advent of the Russians in the 
sixteenth century.” Marsh observes that Russian interest in geographical knowledge paralleled the 
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heightened when, in 1655, the Lifan Yuan (Bureau of Minority Affairs, 理藩院) discovered 
that several tribes in the region had switched their allegiance to the Russians.119 
Following in the footsteps of the Ming, the Shunzhi Emperor attempted to reduce 
tensions through the lever of trade, once again including furs.120  
In 1689, following a series of incidents in disputed territory, Russian and Qing 
diplomats convened a conference to define the boundary between their respective 
empires. Furs took center stage. Meeting at Nerchinsk, on the Amur, both sides sought to 
establish clear jurisdiction over tributary peoples, defensible borders, and control of 
trade.121 The preamble to the Treaty of Nerchinsk recognized that disputes had arisen, in 
part, from “the crossing of the frontiers by hunters of the two Empires in pursuit of 
game.” Insofar as trappers might operate in the region, the diplomats agreed that they 
were “not allowed to cross the fixed border” and that commercial competition should 
                                                          
growth of the Siberian fur trade, and comments that “there was a strong urge to pursue trade as 
deep into Central Asia as feasible with the ultimate hope of reaching fabled Cathay and its riches.  
Despite the fact that China and Russia had once been part of the same Mongol Empire, 
connections had been sundered now for hundreds of years.” John Stephan observes that “the 
Amur Basin became one of several arenas of encounters between two converging empires and 
cultures, neither of which fully understood the others’ values, objectives, and territorial 
magnitude.” See S.B. Okun, The Russian-American Company (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1951), 7.; John J. Stephan, The Russian Far East: A History (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1994), 29.; Marsh, Eastern Destiny, 42. 
119 Marsh, Eastern Destiny, 45. 
120 Stephan, The Russian Far East, 30. 
121 S.C.M. Paine, Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier (London: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1996), 10. 
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“not be permitted to become a cause for war, and even less for acts of bloodshed.”122 The 
treaty demonstrated that, in defining the northern boundaries of his empire, the Kangxi (
康熙) Emperor preferred to uphold the conditions of peace vital to a successful fur trade. 
Thereafter, and throughout the eighteenth century, the exchange of Russian furs for 
Chinese textiles defined the relationship between the two empires.123 
 Furs were of great importance to the Manchu rulers of the Qing Dynasty, a people 
acquainted with the cold. Their homeland, the region known as Manchuria, is 
characterized by windswept plains, mountainous taiga, and conditions ranging from cool 
to frigid. Prior to the twentieth century, mean annual temperatures averaged below 10º C 
(50º F), with a minimum of five months in which freezing conditions prevailed.124 Low 
temperatures prevented agricultural development across the majority of Manchuria, 
where the summer growing season was a brief 100-150 days in duration. Farming 
occurred only in Liaodong and the Shandong Peninsula, below the 41st parallel.125 Cold 
made woolen textiles, hides, and especially furs indispensable to the people of 
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Manchuria.126 The region, home to a loose confederation of Jurchen tribes, was 
politically fragmented until 1616, when Nurhaci unified the tribes as the “Manchu” 
nation.127 In 1621, Nurhaci commented upon the natural resources of Manchuria, 
emphasizing that the region was “endowed by heaven” with plethora of furbearers 
including sable, fox, lynx, otter, tiger, panther, squirrel, kolinsky, and raccoon-dog.128 
European travelers noted that a particularly “rich stock” was to be found throughout areas 
such as Daura, along the Amur River.129 The animal resources could not, however, 
compensate for plummeting temperatures during the Little Ice Age, which drove the 
Manchus to expand southward and encroach upon the warmer lands of Ming China.130 
When choosing a capital for his “Latter Jin” (後金) dynasty, in 1625, Nurhaci selected the 
town of Shenyang. The walled town appealed to him as defensible and auspicious, but it 
also offered an economic benefit as an important market for furs.131 Fur merchants 
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ranked among the most prominent retailers in Shenyang, a position they occupied into the 
twentieth century.132 Moreover, the capital witnessed the revival of trade in Manchurian 
furs for Korean agricultural produce and tools.133 In 1636, during a time of commercial 
prosperity earned in part through fur profits, Nurhaci’s son and successor, Hong Taiji, 
renamed the dynasty “Qing.” Furs later helped finance his campaigns against the Ming 
Empire.134 
Following the Qing conquest of China, in 1644, furs assumed new importance as 
markers of Manchu identity. In their capacity as representatives of an alien “conquest 
dynasty” ruling over millions of Han Chinese, Manchus distinguished themselves from 
their subjects by visually proclaiming their distinctive “frontier” origins, martial 
traditions, and membership in the regime. Furbearing animals provided a convenient 
means of accomplishing such a goal. First, furs highlighted the environmental differences 
between Manchuria and China.  Pelts connoted the Manchu homelands on the northern 
frontier and, therefore, conferred a geographic association upon the wearer. In contrast, 
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furbearing animals were few and far between in the deforested lands of China.135 Second, 
furs recalled the nomadic lifestyle of the ancestral Jurchen tribes, for whom hunting was 
a “cunning, fearless, and manly” activity crucial to the survival of the tribe. Such 
activities contrasted neatly against the culture of sedentary agriculture, urbanization, and 
“soft” living that prevailed in China. Furs emphasized the cultural differences between 
conqueror and conquered. Indeed, historian Jonathan Schlesinger observes that “one 
could not separate the fur from the man.” 136 Third, Qing sumptuary practices reinforced 
the symbolism of furs. The government possessed a de facto monopoly over pelts, and 
officials in the imperial household acquired the best specimens for use of the emperor and 
his dependents, clients, bodyguards, and senior bureaucrats. The number of furs taken in 
this manner far exceeded the emperor’s needs, however, and he distributed furs as 
presents to allies, dignitaries, and meritorious officials. The recipient, upon accepting the 
gift, was both rewarded for allegiance to the regime and obtained the status of a fictive 
Manchu, regardless of actual ethnicity.137 The symbolic association between furs, 
frontier, and the regime was so strong that the Qing dynasty introduced special land-
management policies “aiming at the preservation of the frontier political and cultural 
status quo” in Manchuria. One important goal was the conservation of natural resources 
                                                          
135 Alexander Eckstein, Kang Chao and John Chang, “The Economic Development of Manchuria: 
The Rise of a Frontier Economy,” The Journal of Economic History 34, no. 1, The Tasks of 
Economic History (1974): 241. 
136 Schlesinger, “The Qing Invention of Nature,” 33-35. 
137 Chang Te-Ch‘ang, “The Economic Role of the Imperial Household in the Ch‘ing Dynasty” 
The Journal of Asian Studies 31, no. 2 (1972): 261. 
296 
 
such as ginseng, pearls, and furbearing animals.138 In the founding decades of the Qing 
Dynasty, then, prestige superseded function as the dominant value of furs.  
 Throughout the eighteenth century, however, furs entered the mass marketplace of 
China, becoming commodities of interest to Han Chinese consumers as well as Manchus. 
The final decades of the Kangxi reign (1661-1722) witnessed the gifting of pelts to new 
constituents such as career soldiers, literati, and elite households. During the reign of his 
successor, Yongzheng (雍正, 1722-1735), the imperial household opened the presentation 
of furs to commoners including elderly mothers, centenarians, and the descendants of 
Confucius. Under Qianlong (1735-1796), the court distributed pelts to meritorious 
recipients from all walks of life, and furs were “no longer confined to the northern 
frontiers, the inner court, or the military.”139 Chinese consumers, eager to adopt an “elite” 
appearance, mimicked the distinctive fur elements of Manchu fashion. An official portrait 
of Qianlong, painted by Giuseppe Castiglione in 1736, depicts the youthful emperor in a 
golden brocade with cape, cuffs, collar, hem and crown all lined with black sable.140  
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Figure 17. Giuseppe Castiglione, The Qianlong Emperor in Court 
Dress, 1736, colored inks on silk, 238.5 x 179.2 cm., Palace Museum, 
Beijing. 
 
 Qing regulations prohibited the use of sable, appreciated for its obsidian sheen 
and plush texture, outside the imperial household and court. Moreover, it remained 
outside the price range of most Chinese consumers.141 Neither factor prevented artisans 
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from transforming lesser furs, using a sophisticated dye technique, into imitation sable.142 
Commoners could also purchase a chao pao, or men’s court robe, identical in design to 
restricted apparel but trimmed with black satin that suggested fur.143 Meanwhile, 
consumers developed a taste for accessories featuring fur, including belts, sashes, caps, 
and mittens.144 Urban merchants responded to the burgeoning market in pelts by 
specializing in fur-lined clothing. During the Qianlong reign, for example, Beijing 
boasted shops specializing in winter hats, hats for indoor settings, and neck warmers.145 
The most beautiful and warmest fur garments often became heirlooms.146 Consumer 
demand for animal pelts, combined with deforestation, gradually reduced the furbearing 
capacity of Manchuria.147 Russian merchants increased their efforts to supply the 
burgeoning market. The caravan of 1728, for example, shipped over 51,000 pieces of 
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sable, 500,000 ermine, and a staggering 1,416,000 squirrels.148 The volume of pelts 
produced in Siberia indicate the scale of the “fur revolution” underway in neighboring 
China. 
Sea otters transformed the market for furs in China. During the eighteenth 
century, sea otters inhabited the coast of Northeast Asia, albeit in smaller numbers and 
concentrations than along the Northwest Coast of America. Their colonies lined the 
shores of northern Hokkaido, Sakhalin, the Kurils, Kamchatka, and the Commander 
Islands.149 Japanese traders first introduced otter furs to the Qing Empire around 1700. 150 
Nonetheless, sea otter pelts remained uncommon in China until Russian promyshlenikki 
took possession of the Kuril and Aleutian Islands in 1745. Thereafter, trappers began a 
relentless attack upon the population, driving otters into a steep decline within a 
generation.151 Meanwhile, otter attained an unrivaled status as the “Royal Fur of China,” 
becoming fashionable among elites even as “land furs” entered the domain of the mass 
market.152 Chinese buyers appraised the pelts according to their physical properties 
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including water resistance, weight, wear, and place of origin.153 Otters outclassed land 
furs in all categories, being superior in terms of resistance to moisture, thermal insulation, 
and luxurious bulk.154 Meanwhile, imperial furriers classified pelts according to the 
characteristics of individual animals, using the terms algin (male), uki (female), and 
imseke (pup). The warmest, softest, and most lustrous specimens were selected to trim the 
emperor’s winter dragon robes.155 The imperial household also gifted otter pelts, in the 
manner of sable, to honored recipients among the civil and military establishments of the 
empire. In some cases, it authorized imperial textile commissioners to sell otter on the 
market, making their furs an important source of state revenue, as well.156   
Scarcity, born of exotic origins, placed “foreign otter” among the commodities of 
greatest interest to the Chinese consumer.157 John Meares, a British fur trader, remarked 
that prices were highest in the cold, northern provinces of China. Meares observed that 
“from five hundred to a thousand dollars, and even a larger sum, are frequently given for 
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a single unit of this precious cloathing.”158 Georg Wilhelm Steller, a naturalist, noted that 
otter was reckoned “dearer… than the skins of sables or foxes.”159 Indeed, otter garments 
were valuable enough to pass as wedding gifts among northern elites.160 Demand for 
pelts remained consistent in the southern provinces, although their usage varied with 
climate. Meares explained that “the thickness of its pile and length of its fur” was “too 
cumbersome” to serve as garments for the inhabitants of the tropical south. Its ornamental 
value was undiminished, however, and he observed that Cantonese elites “seldom fail of 
having a cape of the sea-otter’s skin to their coats, though perhaps at the extravagant 
price of six dollars.”161 In short, while supplementing or replacing land furs known for 
their warmth, sea otters also became important status symbols. 
China imported “land furs” from a number of locations along its borderlands, but 
sea otter pelts entered the empire only through the Russian border town of Kyakhta 
(Кя́хта) and, later, through the southern port of Canton. In 1727, Russian and Qing 
diplomats negotiated the Treaty of Kyakhta, which defined the border between Siberia 
and Mongolia. The agreement also permitted caravans to conduct “free trade between the 
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two, the number of merchants not to exceed two hundred.”162 The caravan route, which 
became “one of the most important trade routes in the Empire,” proceeded overland from 
Kyakhta to Beijing, via the intermediate towns of Urga and Kalgan.163 Kyakhta soon 
emerged as the only settlement to offer a consistent supply of otter, and this fact bolstered 
its exchange economy through the 1760s.164 Nonetheless, the Qing government did not 
extend permission for Russians to pursue maritime trade with China.165 The result was 
that, rather than developing a straightforward coastal trade between the sea otter habitats 
and Canton, furriers were forced to transship otter pelts from Okhotsk, on the Pacific, to 
Kyakhta in Central Asia. The route, which proceeded across steep mountains, rushing 
rivers, swamps, rugged forests, and steppe, emerged in the late seventeenth century as a 
means of provisioning Russian settlements on the Pacific. Caravans traversed a distance 
ranging from 2,370 to 2,650 miles, depending on a combination of trail conditions, 
weather, pack animals, and availability of supplies.166 Profits compensated for the 
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logistical challenges of the overland trade. Indeed, Chinese demand motivated a surge in 
the price of otter across Northeast Asia. Steller observed that the “finest skins” traded in 
Kamchatka for “5 or 6 rubles” during the 1730s. Two decades later, he explained, prime 
specimens “sold even in the land of Kamchatka or 25 and 30 rubles” and could 
occasionally “command a price of 70 and 80 rubles.”167 Prices remained high throughout 
the century. In 1772, a share of cargo containing 20 otter pelts, 3 otter tails, and 52 pieces 
of fox sold at Kamchatka for 800 to 1,000 rubles.168 The overland route linking the 
Pacific, Kyakhta, and Beijing remained the sole source of otter pelts for half a century. 
Canton became the second site of otter importation following James Hanna’s 
pioneering British voyage to the Northwest Coast in 1785. His astounding profit of 
$20,000 on a cargo of 560 otter pelts, or roughly $35.71 per unit, alerted other navigators 
to the potential for opening a lucrative maritime fur trade. John Meares, whose ships 
Nootka and Felice Adventurer cruised the Northwest Coast, anticipated that the fur trade 
“might, in due time, become an object of the first importance” and strengthen the 
“connection hitherto formed with China”169 He did not have long to wait. In 1786, seven 
British vessels made trading expeditions from Asia to the Northwest Coast. Four more 
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embarked for America in 1787. Columbia and Washington joined five British vessels on 
the coast in 1788.170 Meares remarked that commerce at Canton “labours beneath very 
oppressive and increasing disadvantages” of a bureaucratic nature but considered the 
maritime trade superior to “long and circuitous land carriage” through Siberia. He 
reasoned that overland transportation drove up the prices for Russian furs. In contrast, 
Chinese merchants took “entire satisfaction, from being able to obtain the same species of 
furs which they had been accustomed to purchase at Kiascha, at a price so much below 
the usual rate on that market.”171 Comparison of overland and maritime freight costs 
confirms his view. Russian merchants spent fifteen to twenty times more per unit of 
caravan freight than their British counterparts, whose shipping followed sea lanes. 
Merchants passed their costs along to consumers at home as well, meaning that prices in 
Europe also reflected the disparity in freight charges. For example, the worst teas retailed 
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in Moscow at higher prices than the best teas did in London.172 Beginning in 1785, the 
Chinese market for sea otter gravitated toward less-expensive suppliers in Canton—
suppliers such as Columbia and Washington. 
 
“Attended with the Greatest Trouble and Difficulty” 
 
 
Columbia benefitted from the commercial conditions that made Canton an 
emerging center of the maritime fur trade, but the expedition also relied upon local 
middlemen to facilitate a profitable exchange. The middlemen, known as hong 
merchants, formed a guild of licensed intermediaries between Chinese and Western 
producers. Chinese buyers traveled from distant parts of the Qing Empire, including the 
administrative cities of Beijing and Nanjing, to purchase pelts at Canton. Upon arrival, 
they traded teas, silks, porcelain, and other wares to Cantonese merchants, in exchange 
for imported broadcloth and furs.173 The merchants, then, controlled the supply of 
Chinese goods available for export to the West. Furthermore, hong merchants also helped 
to legitimize foreign trade. Each foreign vessel required the sponsorship of a Cantonese 
intermediary, acting as a “security merchant,” in order to disembark cargo in China. The 
merchant assumed responsibility for the ship, its cargo, and the conduct of its crew, in 
exchange for a right of first refusal to imports and exports aboard the vessel.174 The hong 
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merchants, positioned between two exclusive groups of clients, exercised significant 
control over the terms of exchange.  
Some merchants enhanced their intermediary position by establishing close 
relationships with Europeans. Conseequa (Pan Changyao, 潘長耀), a merchant who rose to 
prominence in the 1780s, appears to have made special efforts in this regard.175 William 
Milburn, the author of Oriental Commerce, described him as “agreeable in his manners, 
polite, and hospitable” and noted that he possessed “a very superior knowledge of the 
English language.” Social graces and language talent also served Conseequa well. British 
personnel considered him “so satisfactory” and “agreeable” that he received preferential 
business and became personally “attached to foreigners.” 176 Meanwhile, Poankeequa 
(Pan Qiguan, 潘啟官), perhaps the most successful hong merchant of the eighteenth 
century, worked in especially close cooperation with the English East India Company 
(EIC).177 From 1785-87, he brokered an agreement by which individual merchants agreed 
to purchase EIC woolens in proportion to their exports of tea. In doing so, he made 
himself indispensable to his fellow businessmen and foreigners alike.178 Poankeequa died 
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in 1788, and his son inherited the status of intermediary to the EIC. Meanwhile, hong 
merchants made similar inroads with Americans.  
Western middlemen also supported the efforts of merchant-captains to make a 
favorable exchange in Canton. European companies trading in the port, such as the 
English East India Company and the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC), or 
Dutch East India Company, employed resident factors to oversee business at the “thirteen 
factories.” Factors provided three categories of service vital to European commerce in 
Canton. They extended accommodations and hospitality to traders hailing from their 
home countries, and also welcomed foreigners who lacked official representation in 
China. Samuel Shaw, the first American to reside in China, observed that “on the whole, 
the situation of the Europeans is not enviable” because of the duration, remoteness, and 
isolation of a posting to Canton. Factors worked hard to prevent the “want of society, and 
of almost every amusement” that faced the port’s foreign businessmen. Samuel Shaw 
experienced their hospitality firsthand in 1784, when he received enthusiastic greetings 
from EIC, VOC, French, Swedish, Danish, and German personnel. Europeans dined 
together and even formed an international orchestra that performed at the Danish factory 
on Sundays.179  
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Figure 18. William Daniell. View of the Canton Factories at Canton, 1805-06, oil on canvas, 94 x 
182 cm., National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London. 
 
 
Factors also arranged for storage of European goods in the thirteen factories, 
pending a transaction with the hong merchants of Canton. Shaw observed that the 
factories occupied “less than a quarter of a mile” of waterfront and “are extremely 
confined.”180 Each structure featured office and warehouse space on the first floor, with 
residential areas situated on the second story. Factors leased the buildings from 
Cantonese landlords on a seasonal basis.181 Each establishment received foreign captains, 
supercargoes, and goods arriving from the anchorage at Whampoa. Imports entered into 
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storage pending a transaction, or, if unsold, remained as overstock until the following 
season.182 
Finally, European factors assisted in negotiations with the hong merchants in 
exchange for consignment of goods. In doing so, they leveraged relationships of trust, 
credit, information, and friendship shared with individual Cantonese. Shaw reported that 
Europeans received invitations “to dine with the Chinese merchants, who have houses 
and gardens on the opposite side of the river,” across from the thirteen factories. Guests 
returned the favor by contributing the “table furniture, wine, and a large portion of the 
victuals.” 183 Social relationships also cemented the business arrangements between 
Europeans and Cantonese. For example, EIC personnel often preferred to trade with 
Monqua (Cai Wenguan, 蔡文官), a powerful merchant who impressed his British 
counterparts as “a most independent and liberal man.” Monqua reciprocated by reserving 
his own business “chiefly to the East India Company, though he trades occasionally with 
persons from India and America.”184 Western middlemen facilitated trade through a 
combination of cultural, physical, and social capital. 
The United States did not, however, possess a national company trading to the Far 
East, and, therefore, no American factor resided in Canton. Instead, the Confederation 
Congress commissioned Samuel Shaw and Thomas Randall, principals in the Shaw & 
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Randall merchant house, to serve as the American Consul and Deputy Consul in Canton, 
respectively.185 In this capacity, they monitored American commercial interests and, 
when requested, represented ships hailing from Philadelphia, Rhode Island, and 
Massachusetts. Shaw recorded the presence of all American ships during the 1786-87 
trading season, noting their names, captains, and ports of origin. In 1788, he supervised 
the sale of 140 piculs of ginseng imported aboard the General Washington, a ship 
originating at Providence. Likewise, he orchestrated a trade on behalf of a brigantine 
from New York, also called Columbia.186 Randall performed the same services but 
specialized in financial instruments such as currency, bills of exchange, and credit.187 He 
also corresponded with government figures such as Alexander Hamilton. In 1791, 
Randall reported upon commodities, prices, and volume of trade at Canton, making 
particular note of new trends such as “immense quantities of cotton… shipped by the 
English.”188  
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 Furthermore, the partners cultivated business relationships with Cantonese 
merchants. In 1789, Shaw negotiated a solution to a complicated financial dispute 
between Jonathan Mifflin, supercargo of the ship Asia, and the struggling merchant 
Houqua (Wu Zhongcheng, 伍忠誠). His intervention enabled Mifflin to recover $19,915 
and spared Houqua from embarrassment, or even punishment, as a debtor.189 Moreover, 
Shaw laid the foundation of a long-term association between Americans and Houqua’s 
Yihe Company (Yihe hang, 怡和行). His successor, Houqua II (Wu Bingjian, 伍秉鑑), 
would eventually become “a very opulent merchant” known for “large dealings with the 
Americans, to whom he is said to be attached.”190 Shaw and Randall operated on a 
system of rotations, with one partner residing in China while the other did business in the 
United States. Columbia’s arrival at Canton, during the winter of 1789-90, corresponded 
to Randall’s rotation in Canton, and he assumed a central role in negotiating the exchange 
of her cargo.191 
Randall’s involvement with Columbia began in August 1787, approximately one 
month before the ship sailed from Boston. Writing to Joseph Barrell, Randall described 
his partnership with Shaw and their “view to transact business in China.” He further 
explained that a common friend, “Mr. Jarvis,” probably either Benjamin or Philip Jarvis, 
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had informed him about the Columbia’s expedition “to the North West coast of America 
and from thence to China.” Recognizing their mutual interests, Randall hoped to “solicit 
from you the consignment of this vessel to our house,” and he encouraged Barrell to 
“favor us with the management of your commercial business in that country.” He 
emphasized that the partnership built its expertise upon “two voyages” to China and a 
“fixed” business office in Canton. In this capacity, Shaw & Randall could provide “more 
considerable advantages” than “any supercargo… who had had no residence in that 
country and is unacquainted with the trade.” Finally, he assured Barrell that “no exertions 
shall be wanting on our part to render the voyage lucrative.”192 The letter prompted a 
conversation in which Barrell requested further information about Shaw & Randall’s 
“modes of transacting business in China” and methods of assuring a “profitable return 
cargo.” In a passage reminiscent of Barrell’s instructions to Kendrick, Randall 
emphasized that “it would be best for you to give us general instructions so that we may 
embrace the most advantageous mode of transacting your business.”  
No further documents attest to the correspondence, but Barrell probably agreed 
that Columbia would need a knowledgeable agent with connections in China.193 
                                                          
192 My assumption about the identity of “Mr. Jarvis” is based upon the appearance of “B. and P. 
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Instructions from John Kendrick to Robert Gray, however, indicate that the investors had 
not reached a decision prior to the departure of Columbia. Kendrick explained that, 
lacking further instructions from Barrell at Macao, the expedition should “apply to 
Messrs. Shaw and Randall at Canton.” His language also suggests that the principals 
remained in negotiations with Randall. Kendrick observed that if the firm had “the 
Consignments of the Ship Clombia and Sloop Washington,” then the expedition should 
“follow their orders.” Lacking an arrangement with the firm, however, he instructed 
Captain Gray to “Sell to the Best advantage you Can.”194 Once again, the commanders 
exercised considerable latitude in coping with unknown conditions at Canton. In this 
case, however, the principals forwarded a letter to Macao, expressing their decision to 
consign the cargo to Shaw & Randall.195 
The Columbians did not chronicle their negotiations with the hong merchants of 
Canton. In fact, given the limited and choreographed nature of contact between foreigners 
and Chinese, they probably experienced few direct interactions with the merchants.196 
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Fortunately, Thomas Randall described the fraught transaction in correspondence with 
Alexander Hamilton.197 The importance that Randall placed upon the “the sale of the sea 
Otter skin, that has been lately sold in China,” is evident in his detailed treatment of the 
subject, which constitutes more than one-quarter of the letter. That he considered the 
Columbia transaction to be illustrative of the fur trade is equally beyond doubt. Indeed, 
his account of the episode revolves almost entirely around the difficulty of selling her 
cargo. 198 Randall reported that Columbia arrived with a cargo of “about fifteen hundred 
sea Otter skins of various sizes and quality” and he “expected to have made a very 
advantageous sale of those skins, from there being much wanted by the Mandarines.” The 
impressive profits achieved by British fur traders, combined with his own inexperience in 
the maritime fur trade, probably convinced him that the hong merchants would compete 
to make a quick, lucrative sale. Instead, in a frustrating process that left his patience 
“exhausted,” Randall struggled to conclude a deal for almost two months.199 The 
arduous, unanticipated nature of the transaction also troubled the Columbians. In his 
communication with Kendrick, Robert Gray lamented that “our business is attended with 
                                                          
197 Randall penned this letter as a report on commercial conditions and trends at Canton. 
Hamilton had occupied the office of the Secretary of the Treasury since September, 1789, three 
months prior to the arrival of Columbia at Canton. 
198 Randall’s letter is 6,494 words in length, excepting formal components such as his salutation, 
date, and footers. His treatment of the maritime fur trade is 1,749 words in duration and accounts 
for 26.93 percent of the letter. Likewise, his account of the Columbia transaction runs to 1,608 
words (24.76%). The passage also represents 91.3 percent of his discussion of the fur trade. See 
“Thomas Randall to Alexander Hamilton, 14 August 1791,” 38-55. 
199 Ibid.. 
315 
 
the greatest trouble and difficulty.”200 The expedition faced five significant hurdles to 
business—the cultural value of furs, a shortage of hard currency, posturing between 
trading partners, a lack of trust, and legal ambiguities—during the 1789-90 trading 
season. 
The first challenge hinged upon the cargo itself—otter furs. The pelts, while 
valuable and desirable, presented “difficulties in obtaining a security merchant.”201 In a 
microcosm of the tribute system that affirmed imperial sovereignty through presentation 
of rare goods, exotic and prestigious imports were subject to become a “rarity 
contribution” to the hoppo and mandarins at Canton. Paul Van Dyke observes that the 
practice enabled hong merchants “to purchase clocks and other luxury items at high 
prices from foreigners” and then to deliver them to the authorities “at reduced rates or as 
outright ‘gifts.’” 202 The rarity contribution permitted an imperial official to increase his 
status by keeping the gift or, alternatively, to ingratiate himself with a superior by passing 
the prestigious item up the chain of command. In exchange for his contribution, a hong 
merchant could expect the hoppo to reauthorize his commercial license and overlook 
minor infractions of customs regulations.203 Otter skins represented one the most 
luxurious, prestigious, and exotic items available at Canton, making them prime 
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candidates for the rarity contribution. For this reason, Randall discovered that “no private 
merchant would dare to purchase them, as they were known to be wanted by the 
mandarins for their own use.” Consequently, the merchants felt reluctant to grant security 
for the cargo, let alone accept the financial losses associated with purchasing otter 
pelts.204 
Luckily, Randall received commercial advice from Pinqua (Yang Bingguan,  
楊丙官), a merchant with whom he “was on friendly terms.”205 Formerly a porcelain dealer 
on the West River, Pinqua was a newcomer to the ranks of the hong merchants. He 
launched his second career in collaboration with established merchants such as Chowqua 
(Chen Zuguan, 陳祖官), who dominated trade with the Dutch. Pinqua obtained his license 
as a merchant in 1782.206 In his improved capacity, he found advantages in doing 
business with the other newcomers to the scene, the Americans.207 In 1789, Pinqua took 
interest in the Columbia as an opportunity to build his fortunes by expanding into the 
lucrative, new fur trade. 208  Regarding the Columbia’s furs, he advised Randall that 
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“probably I should eventually obtain my price, if I waited with patience,” because the 
hong merchants “would be obliged to purchase them” as a rarity contribution. In this 
situation, Pinqua explained that the merchants “would have to divide the cost of this 
involuntary present with each other,” a practice that limited the economic harm to any 
one businessman.209 He spoke from personal experience. Trade regulations required the 
merchants to assume group responsibility for unsecured foreign cargoes, unpaid debts, 
and other matters of commercial interest.210 In 1784, the hoppo assigned him a share of 
debts owed by Tsjongua (Cai Xiangguan, 蔡相官), a bankrupt merchant, to the VOC.211 
Randall chose to follow his advice and wait. 
The second challenge concerned Columbia’s return cargo of tea, the apex 
commodity that would make or break the expedition upon returning to Boston. Here, 
Randall faced a significant problem—Columbia arrived “destitute of money.” 212 The 
reasons for her shortage of silver are not entirely clear, but they appear to hinge upon the 
principals’ decision to launch Columbia without firm instructions on the question of 
consignment. In correspondence to Joseph Barrell, Randall explained that “had this 
vessel been regularly consigned to us, we would have advised Capt. Gray to have 
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smuggled his Skins” downriver in exchange for silver dollars. Given that the principals 
did instruct the captains to consign with Shaw & Randall, we must assume either that 
their instructions provided insufficient guidance concerning silver, or that the firm was 
unaware of the need to advise the Columbians.213 In either case, Columbia arrived at 
Whampoa “with no other funds” either for repairs to or purchase a return cargo.  Under 
the circumstances, Randall decided to “advance the necessary money to refit” and also 
purchase tea “on my own account… in order to render the voyage as lucrative as possible 
to the owners.”214 According to Richard Howe, Randall acquired “six hundred Chests of 
Bohea Tea” from Pinqua, but could not calculate the ship’s proceeds until the otter 
transaction was complete. Randall later invoiced Columbia’s teas at $11,242.215 Randall 
also observed that the “smallness of her funds” exacerbated the problem of attracting a 
buyer. Where the rarity contribution applied to a cargo, such as furs, the hong merchants 
hoped to trade an additional share of their wares for silver, a more secure form of wealth. 
In this respect, the Columbians had nothing to sweeten a sour deal. 216 
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Following the acquisition of a return cargo, Randall received notification that the 
hong merchants would assume collective responsibility for Columbia’s cargo. The 
development should have enabled a transaction to take place, but instead, it unleashed a 
third challenge as the merchants postured to gain advantage over the cargo. For example, 
an “altercation” occurred when Columbia’s otters arrived at Shaw & Randall’s factory, 
space that the partnership rented from Pinqua. The merchant explained that the presence 
of the otters in his building would bring “a great injury to him,” because Qing officials 
would appropriate a rarity contribution from the lot at his personal expense, rather than 
the expense of the hong community.217 Randall assuaged Pinqua by transferring the skins 
to an unidentified European factory, perhaps the Swedish establishment, where a number 
of Americans had done business.218 The incident suggests that the Mandarins could 
extract gifts based on the appearance of ownership alone, regardless of actual title. 
Meanwhile, other hong merchants made “applications to examine the skins,” but also 
refused to complete a transaction “for fear of the Mandarines.” Randall complained of 
“offers made to purchase, accepted by me, and then broke upon the part of the Chinese.” 
219 The hong merchants’ behavior reveals that timing was of the essence. Seeking to 
avoid the dreaded rarity contribution, they inspected the pelts, proffered “test” deals, and 
waited for an advantageous moment to buy. Moreover, their “various and continued” 
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interest also indicates that some may have planned to make an independent purchase—if 
the timing was right. Nonetheless, in spite of failing to complete a transaction, the hong 
merchants acted in a coordinated fashion to prevent a rival deal between Randall and “a 
private Chinese merchant” who attempted to purchase the entire cargo.220 Their behavior 
reveals one additional aspect of the fur trade at Canton, namely, that the hong merchants 
would close ranks to prevent luxury goods from falling into the hands of outsider 
businessmen. 
 The waiting ended in January, 1790, when Fu Kang’an (福康安), the Governor-
General of Liangguang, intervened to expedite the exchange of Columbia’s cargo. 
Randall observed that the “Viceroy” (zongdu, 總督), accomplished this by ordering the 
senior hong merchant, Monqua, to purchase the furs “in order that he [the governor] 
might make choice of the best.” 221 Although the Columbia sources do not speak to the 
Governor-General’s involvement beyond to a greater degree, we can presume that he 
intervened not out of altruism or sympathy for the Columbians, but rather to enhance his 
own position. Governor Fu was accustomed to wealth, power, and prestige. Prior to his 
appointment, in 1789, he distinguished himself within the imperial Board of Revenue and 
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as governor of eight other provinces. In 1787, he established a reputation as “one of the 
most capable commanders of the imperial troops” who suppressed a rebellion of “serious 
proportions” on the island of Taiwan. In recognition of his achievements, he received the 
noble rank of gong (公, “duke”) in 1788. Above and beyond all these accolades, his uncle 
was none other than the Qianlong emperor.222  
 Governor Fu’s decision to press the transaction enabled him to demand the best 
furs and, more importantly, to send luxurious pelts to the imperial court in Beijing.223 In 
this respect, he occupied an unusual position. In 1740, the Qianlong Emperor issued an 
edict declaring that Governors-General “should not accept gifts from subordinate officials 
and clerks” upon the reasoning that “if they cannot eliminate this bad habit, then who 
knows if they will be able to prevent it from gradually worsening.” On one hand, then, 
Governor Fu committed the crime of “solicitation of unauthorized funds” (kelian, 恪斂, 
“to respectfully collect”) when demanding the rarity contribution.224 In another way, 
though, his appropriation of the best pelts served the established system of imperial 
patronage that connected commoners, officials, and the emperor. Qianlong derived a 
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significant share of wealth from presents honoring his birthday, festival dates, and 
imperial tours of the provinces.225 In short, Governor Fu’s familial connection to the 
throne, combined with his position as the ranking official in Canton, exempted him from 
charges  of criminal solicitation and transformed him into an important source of furs for 
the imperial court. None of this mattered, however, to the exasperated hong merchants 
who said “little that is good” about a governor with a “reputation for 
unscrupulousness.”226 
 Although the Governor-General’s order set the Columbia transaction in motion, it 
also revealed a fourth challenge—the lack of trust between Randall and the Cantonese.227 
Following a month of prospective sales, Randall received a visit from “a Mandarine of 
rank,” probably a Fiscal Secretary (zhengbi), who “made choice of about one hundred” 
pelts for presentation to the Governor-General. Randall resisted the miniscule sale, 
preferring to “sell them altogether, as parting with the best would injure the sale of the 
remainder.” Indeed, the removal of the best specimens would devalue the remaining furs, 
and, after the posturing of the previous month, he may have suspected that the hong 
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merchants would combine efforts to avoid competitive bidding. Randall expressed 
surprise when the  emissary “desired me to set my price for the whole” and offered that 
“if reasonable he would take them all.” 228 For Randall, the offer circumvented the 
problem of subdivision and prevented a price devaluation. Although he did not record his 
asking price, documentary clues suggest that it was in the neighborhood of $25,400.229 In 
contrast, the Fiscal Secretary may have seen a different sort of opportunity in purchasing 
the lot. His examination of the furs preceded the Lunar New Year, the most important 
holiday in China, by roughly two weeks.230 Each year, the festival provided an occasion 
for the Governor-General and other imperial officials to extort additional presents from 
the hong merchants of Canton.231 Rather than memorializing the throne about the abuse 
of power, the merchants calculated presents as an additional form of business overhead. 
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The change in language, then, from the mandarin making “choice of the best” pelts to 
making a purchase of “them all,” may represent a recognition that Lunar New Year was 
approaching. Indeed, rather than claiming a fraction of the furs as a rarity contribution, 
the mandarin may have intended to purchase the entire cargo as a holiday gift for 
Governor Fu.232 
 The solution introduced new complications, however, as the mandarin requested 
to transport the furs “into the city” without making payment. The request placed Randall 
in a difficult position. Again, trust was at stake. As the middleman responsible to Captain 
Gray for Columbia’s exchange of furs, Randall refused to allow “one of them to go” until 
he received compensation “for the whole.” He could not trust an unknown mandarin to 
make payment, even if that individual was acting on behalf of the Governor-General. 233 
Nonetheless, as a merchant whose livelihood depended upon brokering future trades, he 
cannot have wanted to alienate the imperial bureaucracy in Canton. Despite appearing 
“incensed” at Randall’s stubbornness, the mandarin suggested that Poankeequa II (Pan 
Youdu, 潘有度), “an opulent hong merchant,” should make immediate payment on behalf 
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the Governor-General.234 Once again, the proposal suggests a strategy of appropriating 
presents at the expense of hong merchants who depended upon good relations with 
imperial officials. 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Portrait of Puankhequa II, early nineteenth 
century, oil on canvas, 46 x 35.5 cm., Hong Kong Museum 
of Art, Hong Kong. 
 
 Poankeequa II descended from Han Chinese merchants who relocated to 
Guangdong Province following the prohibition of foreign trade in their hometown of 
Xiamen. In Canton, the family experienced a meteoric ascent to preeminence under the 
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leadership of his father, also known as Poankeequa. In his youth, the patriarch entered the 
commercial world as a maritime trader on junks trading along the coast and in Manila. 
During the 1750s, he established his own Tongwen (同文) firm in Canton.235 Thereafter, 
he gradually came to dominate the merchant community of Canton. In 1760, he 
masterminded an arrangement by which the hong merchants allotted shares of imports 
under the Cohong (gonghang, 公行), or merchant guild. Moreover, he established new 
regulations under which security merchants monopolized the lucrative trades in tea, silk, 
and other fineries. The regulations stipulated that “private” or “shopkeeper” merchants 
required would permission from a licensed hong in order to trade at Canton.236 
Poankeequa the Elder served as president of the Cohong  until its dissolution in 1771, and 
again after the guild was reinstated in 1780.237 Building upon these advantages, he also 
profited from the salvage of wrecked ships, maritime insurance, and illicit gold 
trading.238 Vertical integration enhanced his economic control. The family owned tea 
plantations “of excellent reputation,” leased warehouse facilities, and operated a squadron 
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of junks active in the carrying trade from Canton to Manila.239 The patriarch died in 
1788, less than eleven months prior to Columbia’s arrival in China.240 
Following his death, Poankeequa II assumed control of the Tongwen firm. 
According to one historian, he ascended to a position of incredible wealth and influence 
“but had neither proven ability, nor stature, nor probably any inclination to be chief” of 
the merchant guild.241 Consequently, there is no obvious reason why the mandarin 
selected Poankeequa to purchase the cargo when Governor Fu had already designated 
Monqua, the leading hong merchant, for the task. One possibility is that, amidst a 
worsening situation, there was no previous relationship of trust between Randall and 
Monqua, an associate of the East India Company.242 Poankeequa, by comparison, 
maintained working relationships with the Governor-General, the Americans, and the 
community of hong merchants. He often entertained foreigners with dinner parties, opera 
performances, and live music.243 Furthermore, as the wealthiest merchant in Canton, he 
alone may have possessed sufficient assets to purchase the entire cargo at once.244 
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Perhaps the gesture was intended to offer something in exchange for his economic 
sacrifice, namely, an opportunity to consolidate a level of influence comparable to that 
once exercised by his father, but we cannot be certain.245 
Poankeequa resisted the dubious honor of purchasing the cargo on behalf of 
Governor Fu, which threatened him with a significant financial loss. Once again, mistrust 
of the mandarins came to the fore. We cannot know whether the Governor-General 
intended to reimburse him for the transaction, but it appears unlikely. Randall explained 
that “Pankikoa expostulated upon his being obliged to purchase the skins, not having sold 
me any goods.” The arrangement violated a custom that the merchant could, at the least, 
offset the rarity contribution through reciprocal sales of porcelain, silk, tea, and other 
export products.246 Moreover, it “agitated” the relationship between Randall and 
Poankeequa. Randall contributed to the atmosphere of mistrust when, once again, he 
“opposed” the porters sent to take possession of the furs, arguing that he still had not 
been paid. In doing so, he interfered in more than a simple transaction, but also 
transgressed the protocol of deference between merchants and imperial officials, between 
commoners and nobles, and between Han Chinese and Manchus. By obstructing the deal, 
he brought “great disgrace” upon a respected hong merchant and threatened to “insult” 
                                                          
245 Poankeequa the Elder had been responsible for making gifts to imperial officials on behalf of 
the Cohong. Van Dyke observes that the mandarins extended this role to his sons, as well. 
Columbia may have represented one of the first opportunities for Poankeequa II to affirm his 
influence with the Mandarins. Van Dyke, Merchants of Canton and Macao, 61. 
246 Whether the same custom applied in the case of “presents,” particularly in connection with the 
Lunar New Year, is uncertain. Garrett, Heaven is High, the Emperor Far Away, 77. 
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the Governor-General. Poankeequa described the deteriorating situation as a “kill 
business” that could “ruin” him, especially if his elite customers began to perceive him as 
incompetent. 
In pressing Randall to release the furs to Governor Fu, Poankeequa articulated 
both a strong disincentive to further delay and a compelling incentive for compliance. In 
each case, he constructed the transfer of furs as an enterprise with implications for both 
parties.247 First, Poankeequa emphasized that the Shaw & Randall partnership would also 
suffer “if the skins were not in the city that night, before the gates of it were shut.”248 His 
argument suggested a potent disincentive to further delay in that, if the partnership 
brought undue hardship upon the Cohong, the hong merchants would do future business 
on less advantageous terms, if at all. In short, the merchants would compensate for higher 
risk by passing their expenses along to Shaw & Randall, with negative consequences for 
American standing, influence, and commerce in Canton.249 Second, Poankeequa 
requested a special meeting with several hong merchants in order to determine a more 
equitable means of compensating Randall. The merchants probably gathered at the 
Consoo House, a location where members of the Cohong discussed matters of mutual 
                                                          
247 Many economists argue that a combination of incentives and disincentives can have a strong 
influence on cooperation and trust building. See Harbring, “On the Effect of Incentive Schemes 
on Trust and Trustworthiness,” 708. 
248 “Thomas Randall to Alexander Hamilton, 14 August 1791,” 38-55. 
249 Harris H. Kim, “Market Uncertainty and Socially Embedded Reputation,” The American 
Journal of Economics and Sociology 68, no. 3 (2009): 679-83. 
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interest, such as bankruptcies, regulations, duties, or misunderstandings.250 Following a 
“long and passionate conversation,” Poankeequa informed Randall that Pinqua had 
agreed to “pay me at the price I demanded for the whole of the skins.”251 The promise, 
however, served as an incentive for more than simple compliance, but also provided the 
critical mass necessary to foster a modicum of trust.252 Indeed, Randall now affirmed the 
reputation of the hong merchants as men “who trusted, and were trusted by every 
European.” Expecting to receive payment the next morning, Randall “thought it would be 
impudent to hesitate longer,” and released the cargo for delivery to Governor Fu.253 His 
compliance helped to establish mutual transparency, as well as to restore trust between 
the trading partners.254 
                                                          
250 Hunter, The Fan Kwae Before Treaty Days, 23-24. 
251 “Thomas Randall to Alexander Hamilton, 14 August 1791,” 38–55. 
252 Economists have shown that expressions of trust depend, in part, upon received information 
about the trustworthiness of a potential trading partner. See Fehr, “On the Economics and Biology 
of Trust,” 257-59. 
253 “Thomas Randall to Alexander Hamilton, 14 August 1791,” 38–55. 
254 Economists agree that transparency is important to a culture of trust and trustworthiness 
between business partners. Nonetheless, there is no consensus definition of “transparency” in 
modern economics of business scholarship, largely because of a structural transition to the service 
economy in Western enterprise. Indeed, Andrew Schnackenberg and Edward Tomlinson have 
suggested that transparency is “the perceived quality of intentionally shared information from a 
sender,” although this definition is strongly connected to the modern information economy. 
Nonetheless, it would appear that the concept of transparency also functions in the context of 
eighteenth-century commerce. Here, it follows that visible (or otherwise verifiable) fulfillment of 
the terms of an exchange are helpful in building mutual confidence in the outcome of a 
transaction. Other scholars have recognized that “since ancient times,” transparency has been “a 
potent antidote to the mischiefs of power, such as inefficiency, fraud, and corruption.” For 
example, Mikkel Flyverbom, Lars Thøger Christensen, and Hans Krause Hansen emphasize that 
a condition of “co-presence or accessibility… make people or processes transparent,” and that 
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The conclusion to the Columbia transaction also pivoted on a failure of 
transparency between the hong merchants. Randall complained that “the next morning I 
applied to Pinqua for settlement” but instead faced a new demand that he should accept 
“four thousand dollars less than the price agreed on before.” The complication stemmed 
from ambiguities between legal and ethical constructions of liability. Pinqua explained 
that the other merchants “had promised to pay him their respective proportions of the 
price of the skins.”255 The arrangement, which recognized the principle of collective 
liability among the hong merchants, was a common solution to bad transactions.256 The 
Cohong existed, in part, to protect the community from losses large enough to trigger a 
bankruptcy, or worse, a series of bankruptcies. The syndicate observed the same principle 
in apportioning a failing member’s debts to his more prosperous colleagues.257 In the 
                                                          
most scholarship describes transparency “in terms of observation and information.” In the goods-
driven world of Canton, then, I propose that a suitable modification of the above definition of 
transparency might be “the perceived quality of intentionally shared implementation from a 
trading partner.” See Andrew K. Schnackenberg and Edward C. Tomlinson, “Organizational 
Transparency: A New Perspective on managing Trust in Organization-Stakeholder 
Relationships,” Journal of Management (published online, March 10, 2014, 0149206314525202), 
5-7.; Mikkel Flyverbom, Lars Thøger Christensen, and Hans Krause Hansen, “The Transparency-
Power Nexus: Observational and Regularizing Control,” Management Communication Quarterly, 
29, no. 3 (2015), 386-88, 389-92.; Irish Bohnet, Steffen Huck, Heike Harmgart and Jean-Robert 
Tyran, “Learning Trust,” Journal of the European Economic Association 3, no. 2/3, Papers and 
Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual Congress of the European Economic Association (2005), 
323, 327-29. 
255 “Thomas Randall to Alexander Hamilton, 14 August 1791,” 38-55. 
256 Van Dyke, The Canton Trade, 97. 
257 We cannot be certain how the merchants intended to support Pinqua. One avenue of recourse 
available to the merchants who suffered a loss was the Consoo Fund, a form of commercial 
insurance maintained by the administrators of the Cohong. The fund, originally established by the 
Poankeequa the Elder, operated in a manner similar to the maritime insurance rings common in 
the United States. Import and export duties supported the fund, which compensated the creditors 
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worst scenario, an institutional failure to control bankruptcies and satisfy creditors would 
result in collective punishment of the hong merchants.258 Put simply, legal precedent 
defined liability in a corporate manner. According to Pinqua, however, the merchants 
“broke their promise” on grounds that he furnished the Columbia with tea and should 
“take the profit & loss together.” Randall did not witness the “long and passionate 
conversation” in which the merchants crafted the agreement, nor the circumstances under 
which it collapsed. Indeed, the tea transaction may not have been common knowledge 
until Pinqua requested Columbia’s “Grand Chop,” or exit permit.259 Poankeequa is 
probably responsible for cancelling the agreement, given his interest in the rights and 
responsibilities of the security merchant. There was no reason, in his mind, for the group 
to compensate the one individual who stood to benefit from Columbia.260 Monqua, the 
leading merchant, may have opposed the arrangement for other reasons—his own 
                                                          
of bankrupt merchants and protected against “exactions of the government.” The agreement to 
compensate Pinqua probably originated at the Consoo House, home to the Consoo Fund, which 
would in turn suggest the application of the fund to purchase Columbia’s cargo. If, however, the 
merchants agreed to pay “their respective proportions of the price,” then the agreement probably 
did not utilize the fund which, of course, was already “paid” through taxes. The other possibility 
is that the merchants who assumed “proportions” of the cost did so against their own taxes in 
arrears to the Consoo Fund. It is ultimately beyond the scope of this dissertation to seek an 
answer to this question, but it bears consideration in light of the possible advantages to Pinqua 
(see note 262, below). See John Phipps, A Practical Treatise on the China and Eastern Trade 
Comprising the Commerce of Great Britain and India, Particularly Bengal and Singapore with 
China and the Eastern Islands (London: William H. Allen and Company, 1836), 151-52. 
258 Van Dyke, Merchants of Canton and Macao, 54-62, 146. 
259 “Thomas Randall to Alexander Hamilton, 14 August 1791,” 38-55. 
260 Here, we should recall Poankeequa’s “expostulation” about the injustice of “being obliged to 
purchase the skins” without having an opportunity to stock Columbia. See “Thomas Randall to 
Alexander Hamilton, 14 August 1791,” 38-55. 
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resources were badly overextended during the 1780s.261 In this regard, then, business 
ethics suggested a different understanding of who ought to be individually liable. 
Columbia’s cargo revealed that, while the merchant community bore de jure 
responsibility for her cargo, de facto responsibility fell entirely upon Pinqua. 
Pinqua reacted with desperation to the collapse of the deal, claiming that “he 
should lose fifteen thousand dollars by the business” and proclaiming that Randall “must 
also suffer some loss.” Consequently, he demanded a discount of $4,000 and threatened 
that, if not satisfied, “he would not furnish… the passport for the ship Columbia to 
depart.” The ultimatum left Randall with no alternative. Irritated at the constant “frauds 
and impositions,” he accepted the discounted price of $21,400, thus bringing the 
Columbia transaction to a conclusion.262 The experience left him embittered, tired, and 
                                                          
261 Frederic Delano Grant, Jr., The Chinese Cornerstone of Modern Banking: The Canton 
Guaranty System and the Origins of Bank Deposit Insurance 1780-1933 (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 
2014), 118-22.  
262 A number of monetary inconsistencies confound the historian. First, Pinqua claimed that he 
would “lose fifteen thousand dollars by the business” despite Randall reporting that the merchant 
paid a sum of $21,400. There are two unsatisfactory explanations for the discrepancy—either 
Randall fabricated the numbers in the accounting presented to Robert Gray and Robert Howe or, 
alternatively, Pinqua received compensation to the tune of $6,400 over the objections of his 
colleagues. A second inconsistency concerns the possibility that Pinqua benefitted from his “loss” 
to an incredible degree. The evidence does not state whether he claimed compensation from the 
Consoo Fund, as discussed above, a strategy that he might have pursued against the wishes of 
Poankeequa and Monqua. It is possible, though, that Pinqua leveraged the fund to recover his 
“loss” of $15,000 while squeezing an additional $4,000 from Randall. Finally, a third 
inconsistency concerns John Kendrick’s claim that Shaw & Randall sold the Columbia cargo for 
a sum of $26,000, rather than the reported sum of $21,400. Kendrick never presented the 
evidence that he claimed could “prove” the accusation against Randall. See “Thomas Randall to 
Alexander Hamilton, 14 August 1791,” 38-55.; “The Columbia’s Accounts with Messrs. Shaw & 
Randall,” 141.; “John Kendrick to Joseph Barrell, 28 March, 1792,” 472. 
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unwilling to do further business with the Columbians. Randall stated that he “often 
repented our accepting this consignment on the part of Capt. Gray and M. Howe.” The 
contract interfered with the departure of another “large Ship now loaded” as well as his 
own return voyage to the United States.263 Furthermore, he “positively” declined to 
accept the consignment of Lady Washington’s furs.264 Six months later, he articulated the 
lessons learned during the frustrating transaction. Randall recognized great potential in 
the fur trade but warned that Americans needed “Spanish dollars” and an “established 
factory” in order to maximize their profits in China. Spanish dollars, struck of silver, 
enabled traders to make purchases independent of the price of furs and, therefore, to gain 
“the preference of the Market.” Likewise, a factory would enable traders to store their 
furs and “wait the season over” in anticipation of obtaining “a good price.” 265  The 
lessons might have resonated if Randall had represented any country other than the 
United States. But neither was a realistic option in a cash-poor republic born under the 
banner of free trade. The Columbians learned different lessons. 
 
                                                          
263 “Messrs. Shaw & Randall to Joseph Barrell, 7 February 1790,” 139-140.; “Thomas Randall to 
Alexander Hamilton, 14 August 1791,” 38-55. 
264 “Robert Gray to John Kendrick, 29 January 1790” in Howay, ed., Voyages of the Columbia, 
133. 
265 “Thomas Randall to Alexander Hamilton, 14 August 1791,” 38-55. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
“THE TERRAQUEOUS GLOBE” 
 
 
Following thirty-four arduous months away from home, Columbia returned to 
Boston on 9 August 1790. She arrived to great fanfare and the Columbians disembarked 
as heroes, having become the first Americans in the Pacific. Two days later, the 
Columbian Centinel, a leading newspaper of Boston, announced “with real pleasure” the 
expedition’s return “from a voyage of adventure” to the most distant quarters of the 
globe. Benjamin Russell, the publisher, regarded Columbia’s accomplishments as news 
of the first order. Russell stressed the national dimensions of the voyage, arguing that the 
“country is indebted” to the investors for establishing “a branch of commerce before 
unessayed by Americans.” Furthermore, he recognized the critical role of the 
Columbians. Russell observed that the United States was “under obligation to the intrepid 
Navigators who have conducted this voyage.”1 The article boasted a full column of print, 
or one-sixteenth of the Centinel. Comprising almost 700 words, it compared in length to 
other items of national significance, including dispatches from Europe, an economics 
                                                            
1 “Boston, Wednesday, Aug. 11, The Columbia.” Columbian Centinel (Boston, Massachusetts), 
11 August 1790. 
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essay by Benjamin Franklin, and an “Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the 
Indian Tribes.”2  
 
 
 
Figure 20. Detail of “Boston, Wednesday, Aug. 11—The 
Columbia,” Columbian Centinel (Boston, Massachusetts), 11 
August 1790. 
                                                            
2 In the same issue, the Centinel also reported on the conflict brewing between Spain and Great 
Britain following the Nootka Incident. Curiously, however, the newspaper published “journal 
extracts” attesting to Columbia’s presence at Nootka during the incident, but gave no indication 
that the Columbians had, in fact, assisted Spanish Governor Martínez in expelling the British. The 
federal government received notification of their collaboration in May, 1790, but although the 
American public remained unaware of the matter. The Centinel reprinted two items pertaining to 
the incident. King George’s Message to Parliament gave no indication of American involvement 
in the Nootka Incident. Later, an “extract of a letter from on board the Supply, Capt. Colnet” 
claimed that “an American ship and sloop” participated in a second incident, but neglected to 
name Columbia and Washington. See “Bella! horrida Bella!” Columbian Centinel (Boston, 
Massachusetts), 23 June 1790.; “Nootka Sound.” Columbian Centinel, 31 July 1790.; “Boston, 
Wednesday, Aug. 11, The Columbia.” Columbian Centinel, 11 August 1790. 
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Meanwhile, the Columbians returned to a nation transformed, in which patriotic 
news traveled quickly, far, and wide. In their absence, the United States adopted a federal 
constitution, erected a central government, and inaugurated its first President, George 
Washington. Thirteen states had become one nation in law, as well as spirit.3 Newspapers 
across the land reprinted the article, proudly informing readers about the “first American 
vessels who have circumnavigated the Globe.”4 The achievement placed the Columbians 
in the ranks of pioneering navigators such as Magellan, Drake, and Bougainville, whose 
circumnavigations attested to their prestige and global aspirations of Spain, England, and 
France.5 The announcement traveled like lighting. Some newspapers, such as Osbourne’s 
New-Hampshire Spy and The Providence Gazette and Country Journal, carried the article 
on the same morning as the Columbian Centinel. Five days later, the New-York Daily 
Gazette reported Columbia’s accomplishments in the nation’s capital. Residents of 
Philadelphia, the most populous American city, learned of Columbia on the sixth day, 
when multiple newspapers printed the story. Ultimately, within a fortnight, newspapers in 
every state north of Mason’s and Dixon’s line reported on Columbia, a geographic 
                                                            
3 Robert Middlekauf, The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1982), 669-87. 
4 “Boston, Wednesday, Aug. 11, The Columbia.” Columbian Centinel, 11 August, 1790. 
5 Joyce Chaplin, Round About the Earth: Circumnavigation from Magellan to Orbit (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2012), xvi-xix, 140-42. 
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distribution that closely mirrors the home ports of later expeditions to the Northwest 
Coast. 6 
During her first voyage, Columbia demonstrated that Americans could, within 
five years of a war for independence, complete an ambitious commercial enterprise in the 
distant Pacific Ocean. From the perspective of the mariner, shipwright, or sea worker, the 
expedition was an unqualified success. The Columbians could take pride in their 
accomplishment, which set new navigational records for the United States. The distances 
involved were staggering. During the years 1787-90, Columbia logged 48,889 miles at 
sea without a major accident, failure, or incident.7 No previous expedition originating in 
the thirteen colonies or the United States dared to accumulate such mileage. Only a 
                                                            
6 “Boston, August 11” Osbourne’s New-Hampshire Spy (Portsmouth, New Hampshire), 14 
August 1790.; “Boston, August 11” The Providence Gazette and Country Journal, 14 August 
1790.; [No Headline] The Boston Gazette, and the Country Journal (Boston, Massachusetts), 16 
August, 1790.; “Boston, August 11” The Connecticut Courant, and Weekly Intelligencer 
(Hartford, Connecticut), 16 August 1790; [No Headline] New-York Daily Gazette (New York, 
New York), 16 August, 1790.; “By This Day’s Mail. Boston, August 11” The Federal Gazette 
and Philadelphia Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), 17 August 1790.; “Boston, 
August 11. The Columbia” Gazette of the United States (New York, New York), 18 August 
1790.; “From the Columbian Centinel Dated Boston, August 11” The Pennsylvania Packet, and 
Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), 18 August 1790.; [No Headline] The United States 
Chronicle: Political, Commercial and Historical (Providence, Rhode Island), 19 August 1790, 2.; 
“From the Columbian Centinel of August 11” The Burlington Advertiser, or Agricultural and 
Political Intelligencer (Burlington, New Jersey), 24 August 1790. 
7 Both vessels faced disaster on occasion. In 1789, Lady Washington struck rocks in Bucareli 
Bay. Similarly, Columbia struck rocks in the vicinity of Laredo Sound in 1792. When either 
vessel did sustain damage, however, the Columbians made expert repairs and retuned the ship to 
service. See Robert Haswell, “A Voyage Round the World Onboard the Ship Columbia Rediviva 
and Sloop Washington,” in Voyages of the Columbia to the Northwest Coast, 1787-1790 & 1790-
1793, ed. Frederic W. Howay (Portland: Oregon Historical Society Press in cooperation with the 
Massachusetts Historical Society, 1790), 93-94.; “Robert Gray and John Hoskins to Joseph 
Barrell,” in Voyages of the Columbia, 479-80.; “The Columbia.” Columbian Centinel (Boston, 
Massachusetts), 11 August 1790. 
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handful of vessels, all involved in the East Indies or China Trade, came anywhere close 
to matching her record.8 The shipbuilder could also see much to admire. Columbia 
withstood squalls, gale winds, ice storms, sweltering heat, rocks, and shipworms for three 
years before returning to Boston. Although Captain Gray considered her “much out of 
repair,” she arrived in seaworthy condition.9 From the perspective of Columbia’s crew, 
the expedition was quite safe, having sustained only four casualties during the voyage—
all during the initial passage to the Northwest Coast.10 Her casualty rate is exceptionally 
                                                            
8 Empress of China sailed approximately 32,000 miles from New York to Canton, and back, in 
1784-85. Grand Turk, sailing from Salem, made an expedition of perhaps 33,000 miles. 
9 “Robert Gray to Joseph Barrell, Canton Decemr. 18th 1789,” in Voyages of the Columbia, 128-
30. 
10 The verified casualty rate for the first Columbia expedition is 8%. John Nutting, alternatively 
described as the “Astronomer” and “School Master,” became the expedition’s first casualty on 15 
January 1788. John B. Treat described the astronomer as “being insane” and stated that he “threw 
himself overboard and was lost.” Captain Kendrick states only that Nutting “unfortunately 
drowned.” Additionally, two seamen died of scurvy aboard the Columbia. John Hammond 
perished on 19 September 1789, prior to the ship’s arrival at Nootka Sound. Hanse Lawton 
passed on 28 September 1789, five days after Columbia anchored at Friendly Cove. Haswell did 
not directly comment upon their deaths because he was assigned to Lady Washington during the 
passage to the Northwest Coast. Nonetheless, he identified scurvy as the cause and notes that the 
Columbia’s crew “were in an advanced state of that malignant Distemper.” The deaths of 
Hammond, Lawton, and Nutting are recorded without explanation in the “Ship Columbia’s 
Portage.” One other crewmember died in an incident of violence between the Columbians and 
Indians. Marco Lopez (“Marcus Lopius”), a Cabo Verdean who shipped as Gray’s servant, was 
killed onshore at “Murderer’s Cove” (Tillamook Bay) on 16 August 1788. Haswell explained that 
Lopez was murdered while attempting to recover his cutlass after Indians “took a favourable 
oppertunity to snatch it… and then run off with it.” John Treat mentioned that a second Cabo 
Verdean died expedition, but no other source corroborates the presence of this crew member. See 
Robert Haswell, “A Voyage round the World,” 37, 41, 52; “John Kendrick to Joseph Barrell, 
Nootka Sound July 13th 1789,” in Voyages of the Columbia, 121; “John B. Treat to Samuel 
Breck, Nootka Sound July 14th 1789,” in ibid., 124.; “Ship Columbia’s Portage,” in ibid., 150-51. 
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low for the eighteenth century, exceeding even scientific voyages by captains such as 
James Cook.11 
National leaders also recognized the transformative significance of the first 
American vessel to enter the Pacific, touch upon the Northwest Coast, and 
circumnavigate the globe. John Quincy Adams reported to his mother, Abigail, that “the 
principal topic of conversation this week has been the arrival of the Columbia from an 
expedition which has carried her round the world.”12 His father, John Adams, a recipient 
of the Columbia-Washington medal, and Vice-President of the United States, must have 
appreciated the accomplishment on the part of his fellow Bostonians.13 Meanwhile, 
Governor John Hancock of Massachusetts prepared a Sea Letter, or maritime passport, in 
which he requested that foreign powers lend “aid and assistance” to Columbia during her 
second expedition.14 Thomas Jefferson, the Secretary of State, took interest in her 
implications upon foreign policy. In 1790, he followed the eruption of the “Nootka 
Crisis,” an international incident in which the Spanish Governor of Nootka Sound, 
                                                            
11 Tony Horwitz, Blue Latitudes: Boldly Going Where Captain Cook Has Gone Before (New 
York: Henry Holt & Company, 2002), 204-08. 
12 “John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams, Boston, August 14th 1790,” The Adams Papers, 
Adams Family Correspondence, vol. 9, January 1790 – December 1793, ed. C. James Taylor, 
Margaret A. Hogan, Karen N. Barzilay, Gregg L. Lint, Hobson Woodward, Mary T. Claffey, 
Robert F. Karachuk, and Sara B. Sikes. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2009), 89–92. 
13 Joseph Barrell, Boston, to John Adams, 24 November 1787, ALS, Adams Family Papers, 
Massachusetts Historical Society. 
14 “Sea Letter from the Governor of Massachusetts to Robert Gray,” in Voyages of the Columbia, 
442. 
341 
 
Estevan Martínez, arrested and imprisoned the crews of two English vessels on suspicion 
of freebooting. According to one correspondent, Columbia and Washington were 
anchored at Nootka Sound during the altercation, and some rumors suggested that the 
ships “even seem to have been employed in a part of the operation.”15 Columbia even 
commanded the attention of the most famous man in America, General George 
Washington. In 1788, Joseph Barrell wrote to the general, sending him a silver copy of 
the Columbia-Washington medal. Washington replied that the gift brought him “great 
satisfaction” and gave him confidence that “the sources of commerce shall be enlarged 
                                                            
15 Indeed, Captains Kendrick and Gray collaborated with the Spanish Governor of Nootka Sound, 
Estevan Martínez, to neutralize their British competitors on the Northwest Coast. Charged with 
preventing foreign merchants, settlers, or freebooters from imposing upon Spanish claims to the 
Northwest Coast, Martínez regarded the American presence as less threatening than that British. 
In fact, the governor made common cause with and showered hospitality upon the Columbians, 
behavior that, in the words of one historian, “contrast[s] notably with his behavior toward the 
English.” The Columbians, for their part, understood that their position of privilege depended 
upon supporting the governor against the British. They watched from the sidelines when Martínez 
expelled Ifigenia Nubiana on suspicion of freebooting. Likewise, they bore silent witness as he 
seized Princess Royal and imprisoned her crew. On 3 July 1789, however, Martínez requested 
and received active assistance from Kendrick in capturing the British vessel Argonaut. Some 
scholars conclude that the Columbians even contributed the leg irons used to restrain the British 
prisoners, although the evidence is unclear on this point. In 1790, William Short, Jefferson’s 
private secretary in Paris, reported the rumor that “there were two American vessels there 
[Nootka Sound]… which were unmolested by the Spanish commander and which even seem to 
have been employed in a part of the operation.” Fortunately for the United States, which could 
not afford another conflict with Great Britain, Short also learned that “The English Minister at 
this court considers the American vessels as having been forced to this against their will.” 
Meanwhile, he reported that “the rage for war, and desire to seize on Spanish treasures, and 
punish, as they express themselves, an insult to the British flag, pervade all ranks of people in 
London.” See Haswell, “A Voyage round the World,” in Voyages of the Columbia, 28, 85.; “John 
Kendrick to Don Estevan José Martínez, May 16th [1789],” in ibid., 119-20.; “William Short to 
John Jay, Paris May the 23rd. 1790” in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 16, 30 November 
1789–4 July 1790, ed. Julian P. Boyd (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 436-441.; 
“William Short to John Jay, Paris May the 11th. 1790” in ibid., 425-26.; Warren L. Cook, Flood 
Tide of Empire: Spain and the Pacific Northwest, 1543-1819 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1973), 151-60, 162, 167, 173-74.; George Vancouver, A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific 
Ocean and Round the World (London: G.G. and J. Robinson and J. Edwards, 1798), 3:492-93. 
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and replenished.” Striking a patriotic note, he looked forward to a future in which “the 
new Constellation of this Hemisphere,” the thirteen United States, might be “hailed and 
respected in every quarter of the terraqueous globe!”16 Washington understood that 
Columbia’s achievements mirrored the revolutionary age itself—her voyage to the 
Pacific reflected the new nation’s reorientation away from Europe and toward the wider 
world. 
Columbia’s first expedition, however, which accomplished so much in terms of 
proving the feasibility of an American voyage to the Pacific, was a financial 
disappointment. Writing from Canton, Captain Robert Gray forewarned the principals 
that “our expedition Gentlemen will not be equal to your expectations.”17 Likewise, 
Thomas Randall communicated that Columbia’s “funds will not admit her carrying home 
any other than bohea tea,” the least expensive variety.18 Lady Washington’s status further 
complicated the picture. Barrell speculated that “Kendrick in the Sloop we suppose now 
Trading on the NW Coast,” a development that would, at the least, delay any financial 
returns from that branch of the enterprise. The investors cannot have relished the 
avalanche of bad news, but Barrell—in his usual resilient way—tried to paint the 
                                                            
16 “George Washington to Joseph Barrell, 8 June 1788,” in The Papers of George Washington, 
Confederation Series, vol. 6, 1 January 1788 – 23 September 1788, ed. W.W. Abbot 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1997), 316-17. 
17 “Robert Gray to Joseph Barrell, Canton Decemr. 18th 1789” in Voyages of the Columbia, 128-
30. 
18 “Messrs. Shaw & Randall to Joseph Barrell, Canton Decemr. 18th 1789” in Voyages of the 
Columbia, 130. 
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outcome in a more positive light. Writing to his brother Nathaniel, he explained that 
Columbia was expected in the summer of 1790, “and ‘tis probable that ship alone will 
make a good Voyage, but nothing equal to what we laughed about.”19 The evidence 
concerning Columbia’s return cargo is sparse, but she probably shipped the equivalent of 
220 chests, or 71,360 pounds, of tea from Canton to Boston.20 We know with relative 
certainty that 12,213 pounds, or 17 percent, of her cargo “received damage on the 
Voyage,” probably during a storm somewhere between St. Helena and Boston.21 The 
principals auctioned this portion through the houses of fellow Bostonians, Lewis Hayt 
and Russell & Clap.22 The damaged cargo sold at a biting discount and probably 
represented a loss of $1,800 to $3,340. Accidental damage could occur on any voyage, 
                                                            
19 Joseph Barrell, Boston, to Nathaniel Barrell, 9 June 1790, ALS, Sandeman-Barrell Papers, 
Massachusetts Historical Society. 
20 In actuality, the revenue of $11,241.51 could purchase 220.25 chests of tea—a number that 
suggests the presence of at least one quarter-chest. In fact, we know that a minimum of 34 half-
chests and 39 quarter-chests shipped aboard Columbia. Previous accounts of the expedition have 
assumed, based on the paucity of sources, that the damaged chests constitute the entire cargo. 
There is no reason to believe, however, that the Columbians would have shipped fewer chests 
than their revenue permitted. See “Sale of Columbia’s Damaged Cargo” in Voyages of the 
Columbia, 148-49.; “For Benefit of Insurers. On Monday next, At Eleven o’clock, Will be sold 
by Publick Vendue at Store, No.6, leading to Green’s wharf, Thirty-six chests—31 half chests—
38 quarter chests damaged Bohea Tea, imported in the ship Columbia, Capt. Robert Gray, from 
Canton. Russell and Clap, Auctioneers.” Columbian Centinel (Boston Massachusetts), 21 August 
1790. 
21 “Richard S. Howe and Robert Gray to Joseph Barrell, 18 January, 1790” in Voyages of the 
Columbia, 131-32.; “Sale of Columbia’s Damaged Cargo” in ibid., 148-49. 
22 “To-morrow, Will be sold by Publick Vendue, at Lewis Hayt’s Office, Fifteen Chesrs damaged 
Bohea Tea, for the Benefit of all concerned…” The Boston Gazette, and the Country Journal 
(Boston, Massachusetts), 30 August 1790.; “For Benefit of Insurers. On Monday next,” 
Columbian Centinel (Boston Massachusetts), 21 August 1790. 
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anywhere in the world, but it cannot have been encouraging to investors in an 
experimental field of commerce.  
Meanwhile, we can estimate the financial impact of Columbia’s undamaged teas, 
but in no circumstance could they salvage an unprofitable voyage. The sources are silent 
concerning the remaining cargo, which probably represented between 21.8 and 26.4 long 
tons of tea. The principals could have auctioned, retailed, or reshipped the remaining 
chests. Assuming that the remainder auctioned at a typical wholesale rate of 1s, or $0.24, 
per pound, the principals would have sustained an overall loss of $645 to $2,154. By 
comparison, if they retailed the remainder at 2s, or $0.58, per pound, the expedition 
would have realized a larger sum of $23,426 to $28,409. John Quincy Adams observed 
that “the adventurers after having their expectations raised to the highest pitch, were 
utterly disappointed.” Indeed, even the maximum return was underwhelming when 
considered against the cost of the expedition. Adams further noted that “instead of the 
immense profits upon which they had calculated” the principals would “scarcely have 
their outsets refunded to them.” 23 In reality, the owners came nowhere close to 
recovering the “outsets”—even the most lucrative path would recover the equivalent of 
£5,918, or a pitiful 12 percent of their initial investment of £49,000.  
 
 
                                                            
23 “John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams, Boston, August 14th 1790,” The Adams Papers, 
Adams Family Correspondence, 89–92. 
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“Sink or Swim Together” 
 
 Columbia’s second expedition, from 1790-93, built upon previous experience to 
achieve financial success and reinforce the human relationships that sustained global 
trade. Failure is a powerful teacher. In August 1790, Joseph Barrell and the Columbians 
internalized the lessons of the first expedition and developed new strategies for success. 
The second voyage incorporated new relationships between the owners and officers. 
Financial incentives would encourage a disciplined approach to the enterprise. The 
expedition also adopted new methods to increase trade on the Northwest Coast and 
reduce the expenses of the Canton System. Columbia would sail with a professional 
furrier, the materials to construct a second vessel, and a wider range of trade goods. 
Meanwhile, Captain Gray prepared to engage in smuggling if legitimate business failed. 
Finally, upon returning to Canton, the Columbians would solicit a broker and a security 
merchant in a tactical manner, seeking individuals who could perform a swift and 
profitable transaction. Columbia’s first voyage had been an experiment. In contrast, her 
second expedition would lay the commercial foundations of an American Pacific. 
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Figure 21. Gilbert Stuart, Portrait of Prominent Boston 
Merchant and Privateer Joseph Barrell, 1790, oil on canvas, 
66. x 53.3 cm., Private Collection. 
 
Columbia’s first expedition resulted in financial failure, and the principals could 
have abandoned the enterprise, cut their losses, and invested elsewhere. Instead, Joseph 
Barrell and his partners “were again induced to fit the Ship” for a second expedition—
one that could take advantage of lessons learned during Columbia’s first transit of the 
globe.24 John Derby and John Pintard, both silent partners, liquidated their two-
fourteenths of the enterprise, but the other investors remained committed to the voyage. 
Captain Robert Gray, in cooperation with Isaac Davenport and John McLean, merchants 
                                                            
24 John Hoskins, “Narrative of the Second Voyage of the ‘Columbia’,” in Voyages of the 
Columbia, 165-66. 
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of Orange Street, purchased the outstanding shares.25 The prospects for a second 
“adventure” were promising. During the first expedition, the Columbians internalized key 
lessons about the furbearing animals, producers, and commercial geography of the 
Northwest Coast. Meanwhile, business continued to boom at Canton. In 1787, the British 
East India Company shipped goods valued at more than 845,000 silver taels. By 
comparison, in 1790, this sum exceeded 1,830,000 taels. Likewise, Western imports to 
Canton had grown to a sum exceeding seven million Spanish Dollars, a significant 
increase above the figures for 1787.26  
The preparations for the second Columbia voyage demonstrated that the 
principals had internalized the lessons of the first expedition. First, they reinforced their 
relationship with the senior crewmembers in order to bolster a sense of common purpose. 
Robert Gray’s decision to become a shareholder showed confidence in his own ability to 
turn a profit at Canton.27 The captain’s willingness to risk his own, lesser fortune may 
                                                            
25 Davenport and McLean may have invested on the recommendation of businessman John 
Codman. Joseph Barrell’s business office was situated on Codman’s Wharf, which extended east 
from Market Square into Boston Harbor. See “Ship Columbia second voyage to the N.W. Coast 
of America,” in Voyages of the Columbia, 465.; Boston Directory (Boston: John Norman, 1789), 
16.; Annie Haven Thwing, Inhabitants and estates of the town of Boston, 1630-1800: and the 
crooked and narrow streets of Boston 1630-1822 [CD-ROM] (Boston: New England Historic 
Genealogical Society and Massachusetts Historical Society, 2001), reference codes 23213 and 
44172.; “Merchant’s Row,” Plate 3300, in Samuel Chester Clough, Clough’s Atlas 1798: 
Property Owners of the Town of Boston (c.1900), Samuel Chester Clough Papers, Massachusetts 
Historical Society. 
26 Morse gives the value of Western imports in 1790 as 5,069,653 兩. See Hosea Ballou Morse, 
The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635-1834 (Oxford: The Clarendon 
Press, 1926), 2:136, 201. 
27 “Ship Columbia second voyage to the N.W. Coast of America,” 465. 
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have helped convince the principals to outfit another expedition. Moreover, it welded his 
interests to those of the principals. Joseph Barrell recognized the symbolic importance of 
going “hand in hand” with Gray when he suggested that the owners would now “sink or 
swim together.”28 The new relationship was doubly important because, by 1790, John 
Kendrick had neglected “those golden opportunities” to profit by the fur trade, and was 
considered to have absconded with Lady Washington.29  Thus, rather than depending 
                                                            
28 Joseph Barrell, “Joseph Barrell’s Instructions to Robert Gray, Boston, September 25, 1790” in 
Voyages of the Columbia, 446. 
29 John Kendrick’s reputation suffered tremendously because of his autonomous, and later 
independent, operation of Lady Washington. Kendrick made multiple cruises on the Northwest 
Coast and to Canton, but he eventually found himself at odds with the principal investors. His 
relationship with Robert Gray also grew increasingly strained, particularly after Gray became a 
shareholder in the enterprise—including, of course, Lady Washington. Kendrick’s transactions 
never benefitted the owners and only partially offset his own mounting debts. His other projects, 
however well intentioned, sidetracked him from the primary goal of turning a profit. For example, 
his conversion of the sloop Lady Washington to a brigantine was intended to improve the 
performance of the vessel, but he ultimately accomplished this at the expense of fur-trading 
cruises. Likewise, his acquisition of “lands, mines, minerals… with both the produce of land and 
sea” could have helped establish a base on Vancouver Island, but the pursuit of deeds constituted 
a similar distraction from the mission at hand. Kendrick never explained his reasons for breaking 
away from the Columbia expedition, but his offer to “take the Brig on my own account… and 
abide by all losses and gains” shows that, by 1792, he visualized Lady Washington as his personal 
property. When Joseph Barrell wrote, in 1793, that “I have no pleasing Acct. from Kendrick & I 
fear I never shall,” he understood that Kendrick had—for whatever reason—appropriated the 
vessel and the investment it represented. John Hoskins noted that the captain “appear’d not to 
have the owners interest at heart, but only to gratify his own pleasures” and believed that he “was 
by no means calculated for the charge of such an expedition.” Modern historians continue to 
debate Kendrick. Independent scholar Scott Ridley, for example, considers him a “legend and 
inspiration” who took tremendous risks to advance the interests of employers who mistrusted his 
intentions. Conversely, Frederic Howay contends that “as a commander of an expedition he was a 
complete failure.” The majority consensus holds that Kendrick was, at best, a bumbling captain 
unequal to his command, and at worst, an opportunistic parasite whose actions smacked of piracy. 
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation, however, to contend with this debate in a meaningful 
way. See John Hoskins, “Narrative of the Second Voyage of the ‘Columbia’,” 165.; U.S. 
Congress. Senate. Committee of Public Lands. Report No. 335 (Felch Report). 32nd Congress, 1st 
Session, Reports of the Committees of the Senate of the United States, vol. 2. (Washington: A. 
Boyd Hamilton Printer, 1852), 22.; “John Kendrick to Joseph Barrell, Macoa, in China, Mar. 28, 
1792” in Voyages of the Columbia, 471. Frederic W. Howay, “John Kendrick and His Sons,” The 
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upon a “whimsical and vacillating” captain who might never return, the owners elevated 
Robert Gray to command the second Columbia expedition.30 In his instructions to Gray, 
Barrell emphasized that the captain was “now accountable for the conduct of the present 
voyage” and reminded him of “the pointed manner in which every one condemns the 
conduct of the last.” Meanwhile, the owners introduced new incentives for good 
behavior. Drawing upon the privateer tradition of prize-sharing, Barrell offered the 
captain and officers a commission “upon the sales of the cargo in Boston.”31 A successful 
voyage would float all boats. 
Second, the principals articulated new commercial insights gained during the first 
round of business in China. Barrell now understood that legitimate business, carried out 
through the Canton System, could result in excessive tolls, port fees, and presents. 
Instead, he emphasized that the Columbians attempt to avoid those expenses by “selling 
at the mouth of the river” rather than at Canton. His instructions to Gray, therefore, 
included a tacit recognition that smuggling might result in a significant profit for the 
owners.32 Meanwhile, Gray notified the principals of another opportunity to trim the costs 
of legitimate business at Canton. He explained that it might be possible to “save at least 
                                                            
Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society 2, no. 4 (1922): 285-89.; Scott Ridley, Morning of 
Fire: John Kendrick’s Daring American Odyssey in the Pacific (New York: Harper Collins, 
2010), 203.; Howay, Voyages of the Columbia, xii-xiii. 
30 Howay, Voyages of the Columbia, xiii. 
31 Barrell, “Joseph Barrell’s Instructions to Robert Gray,” 445-46. 
32 Ibid., 444. 
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half the duties” on Columbia by presenting the first expedition’s Grand Chop, or exit 
permit, to the customs authorities in China.33 Moreover, the investors prioritized the 
placement of a supercargo and furrier, John Hoskins, aboard Columbia. The decision 
provided the second expedition with a dedicated business manager, and Barrell instructed 
the officers that “in all matters of traffic on the northwest coast of America, China, or 
elsewhere, you will consult with Mr. John Hoskins.” 34 Although his presence caused 
friction in the chain of command, Hoskins also relieved the pressure on the other 
Columbians to perform as both navigators and businessmen.35 
Another consideration addressed the possibility of recovering some of the 
expedition’s material expenses. Rather than purchasing a replacement for Lady 
Washington, the investors furnished Columbia with the materials necessary to build 
                                                            
33 Captain Gray considered the savings large enough, in fact, that upon accidentally leaving 
behind the Grand Chop at Boston’s customs house, he and Hoskins sent three successive letters to 
Joseph Barrell as reminders to “send it out to Canton by the first good safe hand.” Whether the 
document could actually function in this manner is questionable. Gray appears to have 
misunderstood the nature of the Grand Chop, which, as a comprehensive statement of the 
Columbia’s crew complement, armaments, destination, and outgoing duties paid, attested only to 
the particulars of the first expedition. I am unable to find any documentary evidence pertaining to 
the use of a Grand Chop to reduce duties, or expenses of any sort, during subsequent voyages by 
an individual ship. We must assume that he obtained this impression from other Westerners, 
perhaps either Thomas Randall or John McIntyre. See “Robert Gray and John Hoskins to Joseph 
Barrell, On Board the Ship Columbia at Sea in Latitude 5° No. Longitude 24° West, November 
13th 1790,” in Voyages of the Columbia, 467.; William C. Hunter, The Fan Kwae at Canton 
Before Treaty Days, 1825-1844 (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, & Co., 1882), 101-02. 
34 Barrell, “Joseph Barrell’s Instructions to Robert Gray,” 443. 
35 Howay, Voyages of the Columbia, xxi. 
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another sloop on the Northwest Coast.36 Although the “Expenditure for the Columbia’s 
Outfit and Cargo” makes reference to items such as “frame and plank for the Sloop” and 
“Blocks, etc. for the Sloop,” the majority of ordinary materials are grouped under 
headings such as nails, rigging, and sailcloth for the expedition at large. For this reason, 
we cannot know the exact cost of the unassembled sloop, but it probably did not amount 
to more than £500.37 The Columbians assembled the sloop Adventure during the winter of 
1790-91, and, under the command of Robert Haswell, she multiplied the second 
expedition’s commercial haul in the North Pacific.38 The investors realized, however, that 
Adventure would be unnecessary for the full circumnavigation and, being a small vessel, 
could become a commercial liability in the Canton System. For this reason, Barrell 
authorized Captain Gray to “dispose of,” or sell, the sloop in order to recuperate her 
construction costs.39 Indeed, the captain later sold Adventure to Estevan Martínez, the 
Spanish Governor of Nootka, in exchange for 75 prime otter skins, worth perhaps $5,000 
                                                            
36 The principals may have based this plan upon the prior example of John Meares, whose 
expedition of 1788 constructed the sloop North West America at Nootka Sound. Spanish 
Governor Estevan Martínez seized the sloop in 1789, prompting the famous “Nootka Sound 
Crisis” between Spain and Great Britain.  See John Meares, Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 
1789 from China to the N.W. Coast of America, with an Introductory Narrative of Voyage 
Performed in 1786, from Bengal, in the Ship Nootka (Logographic Press: London, 1791), 2:185-
86, 208-09, 297-99, 354-57.; Barrell, “Joseph Barrell’s Instructions to Robert Gray,” 444.; 
“Robert Gray and Joseph Ingraham to Don Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra, Nootka 
Sound, August 3d, 1792” in Voyages of the Columbia, 474-79. 
37 “Expenditures for the Columbia’s Outfit and Cargo” in Voyages of the Columbia, 448-454. 
38 Robert Haswell, “A Voyage On Discoveries in the Ship Columbia Rediviva,” in Voyages of the 
Columbia, 304-309. 
39 Barrell, “Joseph Barrell’s Instructions to Robert Gray,” 446. 
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at Canton.40 In other words, the finished sloop fetched twice her unassembled value, if 
not more—a sizeable profit. 
Finally, the principals gave new consideration to providing the expedition with 
trade goods, other than furs, that might function as a medium of exchange in China. In 
addition to stocking Columbia with metals for the Northwest Coast trade, as previously 
discussed, the owners also loaded her with “twenty hundred bar lead,” a material often 
imported at Canton.41 This merchandise likely equates to 140½ pounds of “milled sheet 
lead” purchased from John Andrews, a merchant of Union Street, and another 2,020 
pounds supplied by Benjamin Greene, Jr., of Orange Street. Unlike copper and iron, 
which traded as prestige commodities on the Northwest Coast, lead constituted a central 
ingredient in the industrial wares of China.42 Since ancient times, the metal served as 
                                                            
40 “Robert Gray and John Hoskins to Joseph Barrell, Ship Columbia, Straits of de Fuca, 28 
September 1792” in Voyages of the Columbia, 486-87. 
41 “Certificate of the Columbia’s Cargo,” in Voyages of the Columbia, 443. 
42 The principals spent a total of £43 10s 7d (£43.5291) to equip Columbia with 2160.5 pounds of 
lead. In 1784, the Empress of China sold its cargo of lead for roughly ten cents per imperial 
pound. At this rate, the Columbians could expect to realize a moderate sum of $216. This 
calculation, however, varies from actual prices at Canton in 1792-93. According to the records of 
the British East India Company, lead traded at 5 兩 per picul, where 1 picul is equivalent to 133.3 
imperial pounds. Using this price, the second recovered £23 8s 10d, (£23.4416) or $113. The 
calculation suggests that the Columbians traded at a significant loss, recovering just under 54% of 
the original purchase price. Like many aspects of the voyage, lead represented a financial gamble. 
See “Expenditures for the Columbia’s Outfit and Cargo,” 450-51, 461.; Morse, The Chronicles of 
the East India Company Trading to China, 2:202.; John Boit, “Remarks on the Ship Columbia’s 
Voyage from Boston, (on a Voyage, round the Globe)” in Voyages of the Columbia, 421.; Boston 
Directory, 5, 21. 
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component in Chinese pigments, cosmetics, and glasswork.43 Lead also gave strength to 
cast-iron manufactures, bronze alloys, and coinage.44 Although lead mines operated 
across the Qing Empire, native production was unequal to industrial demand for the 
material in China.45 British captains had imported the metal in “considerable quantities” 
since the earliest days of commerce at Canton.46 For the Columbians, lead might 
substitute in part for silver, the precious metal that oiled the wheels of commerce between 
East and West. The owners appear to have considered it a reasonable, if less valuable, 
alternative in a new republic depleted of precious metals.47 Although lead could not 
                                                            
43 Edward H. Schafer, “The Early History of Lead Pigments and Cosmetics in China” T’oung 
Pao, Second Series 44, livr. 4/5 (1956): 413-38. 
44 William Rostoker, Bennet Bronson, and James Dvorak, “The Cast-Iron Bells of China,” 
Technology and Culture 25, no. 4 (1984): 751.; David Hartill, “A Study of the Metropolitan 
Coinage of Qian Long,” The Numismatic Chronicle (1966-) 151 (1991): 74, 88, 92-95. 
45 Robert H. Brill, Kazuo Yamasaki, I. Lynus Barnes, K.J.R. Rosman, and Migdalia Diaz, “Lead 
Isotopes in Some Japanese and Chinese Glasses,” Ars Orientalis 11 (1979): 105.; Hartill, “A 
Study of the Metropolitan Coinage of Qian Long,” 95-96. 
46 William Milburn, Oriental Commerce; or the East India Trader’s Complete Guide; Containing 
a Geographical and Nautical Description of the Maritime Parts of India, China, Japan, and 
Neighbouring Countries, Including the Eastern Islands, and the Trading Stations on the Passage 
from Europe (London: Printed for Kingsbury, Parbury, and Allen, Leadenhall Street, 1825), xi-
xv, 458. 
47 The formation of the United States federal government, in 1789, accomplished much in 
reversing the economic calamities that plagued the United States under the Confederation 
Congress. Private investment increased, new commercial institutions emerged across the country, 
and the nation began to retain specie. Alexander Hamilton’s Bank of the United States, in 
particular, through its capitalization of $10 million in gold and silver, arrested the outflow of 
precious metals from United States. Nonetheless, private reserves of silver did not immediately 
recover, and most merchants continued to exchange in kind rather than in coin. See Paul A. Gilje, 
“The Rise of Capitalism in the Early Republic” in Wages of Independence: Capitalism in the 
Early American Republic, ed. Paul A. Gilje (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Ltd., 
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function as hard currency in China, industry maintained a strong demand for the metal 
throughout the eighteenth century, and, therefore, it held a more consistent exchange 
value at Canton than did commodities such as woolens, cotton fabrics, and furs.48 In 
short, lead functioned as money, if not coin. 
The Columbians left behind a reliable chronology of the second expedition’s 
activities in China, although we can reach only tentative conclusions about its 
transactions. For example, we know that Columbia entered Macao Roads on 8 December 
1792. Likewise, we can be certain that she procured the usual entourage of a pilot, 
linguist, and comprador, and that she proceeded upriver according to the standard 
schedule. Finally, she reached her moorings at Whampoa Anchorage on 12 December.49 
From the perspective of the historian, Columbia’s second expedition to the Northwest 
Coast is far better documented than the first, with five crewmembers having chronicled 
her trading activities.50 In contrast, the Columbians devoted only fragmentary and oblique 
                                                            
2006), 2-5.; Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 98-99. 
48 British East India Company imports of lead at Canton increased from a value of 39,056 兩 
(1784) to 53,858 兩 (1793) during the first decade of American commerce in China. This 
represents an increase of 37%, although the value peaked at 135,433 兩 (247%) in 1786 and at 
133,338 兩 (241%) in 1790. See Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to 
China, 2:94-95, 135-36, 184-85, 206. 
49 Boit, “Remarks on the Ship Columbia’s Voyage from Boston,” 420-22. 
50 John Boit, John Hoskins, and Robert Haswell prepared substantial notes on the second 
expedition, while segments of Robert Gray’s logbook attest to the first ascent of the Columbia 
River in 1792. Owen Smith, Third Mate aboard Columbia, also produced a journal of the 
operations on the Northwest Coast, but his notes do not discuss the voyage to China. 
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attention to their activities in China. John Boit produced the only chronicle of Columbia’s 
second voyage to Canton, and his observations are unusually terse.51 Likewise, the 
correspondence of Robert Gray and John Hoskins reveals a small number of details, but 
their letters cannot serve in a comprehensive fashion. For these reasons, we know little 
about Columbia’s activities, trading partners, and transactions at Canton in 1792-93. A 
dearth of ancillary materials also places significant limitations upon our understanding of 
the second expedition to China.  Joseph Ingraham’s Journal of the Brigantine Hope is a 
notable exception, although the former Columbian comments on conditions in China 
during the 1791-92 season, rather than the 1792-93 season in which Columbia traded at 
Canton. Likewise, John Boit’s Log of the Union occasionally remarks upon his prior 
experiences aboard Columbia, but his commercial observations are specific to the 1794-
95 trading season. Neither of the former Columbians discusses the second expedition in 
meaningful terms. Further complications arise from a lack of documentation on the part 
of middlemen in Canton, so that our interpretation no longer rests upon the observations 
of a figure such as Thomas Randall. Nonetheless, the historian can draw tentative 
conclusions about the lessons that the Columbians learned during the first expedition, and 
how those lessons shaped their execution of a second voyage to China. 
First, the Columbians needed to determine whether to engage in legitimate trade, 
or, as Barrell had suggested, to “avoid the excessive charges of going up to Canton” by 
                                                            
51 Boit’s observations on the South China Coast, at Macao, and in Canton comprise roughly 7 
percent of his chronicle of the second expedition. 
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smuggling the furs at Macao or Lark’s Bay.52 They would not have taken the decision 
lightly, and we can be certain that Captain Gray entertained both options. Legitimate 
trade at Canton required a heavy investment in the standard contractors, tolls, fees, and 
presents, but could result in a handsome profit. The captain needed more information in 
order to make an educated decision, and it was probably, in part, for this reason that the 
he made an overnight journey to Macao. Here again, the chroniclers left no indication of 
what he learned there. Boit is silent except to confirm that “Capt. Gray return’d on board” 
and the others made no comment whatsoever. 53 The most accurate commercial 
information was available only upon ascending the river, but we can be certain that Gray 
obtained some indication of the price of furs from merchants in Macao. John Hoskins 
later commented that “furrs are very cheap and almost impossible to get rid of for 
money.”54 Writing to Joseph Barrell, he predicted that the otter pelts would not sell for 
more than $40,000, which he considered “a small price for our quantity of Furrs.”55 
Compared with the first expedition, a sale of $40,000 would represent a clear 
improvement, although insufficient to make a profitable enterprise of Columbia. In such a 
                                                            
52 Barrell, “Joseph Barrell’s Instructions to Robert Gray,” 444. 
53 Robert Gray would have seen two reasons for going to Macao. First, he undoubtedly visualized 
the stay as a fact-finding mission. Boit confirms as much when he states that Gray returned with 
new information about Kendrick and Lady Washington. Second, Macao was the operational 
headquarters of the river pilots needed for an ascent to Whampoa Anchorage. See Boit, “Remarks 
on the Ship Columbia’s Voyage from Boston,” 420-21. 
54 “John Hoskins to Joseph Barrell, Wampoa 13 Decr. 1792,” in Voyages of the Columbia, 487. 
55 “John Hoskins and Robert Gray to Joseph Barrell, Ship Columbia Wompoa 22 Decr. 1792,” in 
Voyages of the Columbia, 488. 
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scenario, the collective earnings for both voyages would reach $60,000, versus 
investments and expenses of more than $56,500—Columbia would just break even. 
Nonetheless, Hoskins remained hopeful that conditions would improve and promised that 
“we shall see in a few days what can be done.”56  
 Smuggling presented an alternative to the expenses of Canton, and, although the 
first expedition had engaged in legitimate trade, the Columbians also understood how to 
smuggle furs if needed. They probably acquired this knowledge though contact with John 
Kendrick, who disposed of his cargo in connivance with local smugglers during the 1789-
90 season.57 Some evidence for this assertion is found in Joseph Ingraham’s Journal of 
the Brigantine Hope, which chronicles his independent return to the Northwest Coast and 
China. Upon arriving at Macao, in December 1791, Ingraham learned from another 
former Columbian, Captain R. David Coolidge, that the Qianlong Emperor had declared 
an embargo on furs. The embargo resulted from tensions between the Qing and Russian 
Empires, although it also affected traders of other nationalities, as discussed below. 
Knowing that he could not exchange his cargo through legitimate means, Ingraham 
determined that his “only alternative was to go to Lark’s Bay,” a smuggling harbor 
crucial to the “Macao Network.”58 The network dated from the earliest period of 
                                                            
56 John Hoskins to Joseph Barrell, Wampoa 13 Decr. 1792,” 487. 
57 “John Kendrick to Joseph Barrell, Macoa, in China, Mar. 28, 1792,” 470-471. 
58 Joseph Ingraham, Joseph Ingraham’s Journal of the Brigantine Hope on a Voyage to the 
Northwest Coast of North American, 1790-92, ed. Mark D. Kaplanoff (Boston: Imprint Society, 
1971), 177. 
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Portuguese settlement at Macao, and it operated along a shallow branch of the Pearl 
River known as the “Inner Passage” or “West River” (Xi Jiang, 西江). Characterized by a 
labyrinth of creeks, marshes, and tidal inlets, the Inner Passage made it possible for 
smugglers to avoid the imperial authorities during their passage to and from Canton.59 It 
is noteworthy that, having remained in port with Columbia throughout the first 
expedition, Ingraham possessed the knowledge and business contacts needed to access 
the Macao Network. In this capacity, he relied upon Captain Coolidge and other “well 
informed and disinterested people” for current information about Lark’s Bay. Likewise, 
when preparing to move his merchandise, Ingraham activated his prior connections with 
John McIntyre, in Macao, and another former Columbian, John Treat, now serving 
aboard the snow Fairy.60 The Columbians would have accessed similar information and 
                                                            
59 Paul A. Van Dyke, “Smuggling Networks of the Pearl River Delta before 1842: Implications 
for Macao and the American China Trade,” in Americans and Macao: Trade, Smuggling, and 
Diplomacy on the South China Coast, ed. Paul A. Van Dyke (Hong Kong: University of Hong 
Kong Press, 2012), 50-55. 
60 There was no shortage of information circulating through the Macao Network during the winter 
of 1791-92. Owing to the embargo, an assemblage of vessels “all from the N.W. and all having 
furs on board” converged upon Lark’s Bay. Ingraham remarks upon no fewer than ten vessels 
sailing to, present in, or departing the harbor. American ships included Hancock (Samuel 
Crowell), Hope (Joseph Ingraham), and Lady Washington (John Kendrick). British vessels 
assembled there in even greater numbers. Canada (Alexander Muirhead), Fairy (William 
Rogers), Florinda (William Coles), Grace (R. David Coolidge), Gustavus III (Thomas Barnett), 
Halcyon (Charles Barkley), and Nonsuch (John Canning) comprised the British contingent at 
Lark’s Bay. This does not include ships, such as La Solide (Etienne Marchand), that smuggled 
furs through Macao rather than transacting business at Lark’s Bay. Furthermore, some of the 
captains were wanted men. Qing authorities sought John Canning on charges of conspiring with 
the government of British Bengal to smuggle opium, a substance outlawed in China. In 1793, 
rampant smuggling prompted the Superintendent of Maritime Customs to forward a 
memorandum “complaining of the presence of ships at Lark’s Bay, and requiring them to either 
come up the river and be measured, or put to sea: ‘it is well known to have been a practice for 
several years for small vessels laden either with Opium or Skins to lie in this Bay to avoid the 
heavy Port Charges.’” There is no indication that the memorandum had a significant effect upon 
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personal relationships had Captain Gray elected to smuggle the second expedition’s 
furs—but he did not.  
 
 
 
Figure 22. Gaspard Duche de Vancy, engraved by Joseph Louis Masquelier. Vue de Macao en Chine 
(View of Macao in China), 1787, copper engraving, later color, 25 x 40 cm., as reproduced in Atlas 
du Voyage de la Perouse, no. 40 (Paris, L’Imprimerie de la Republique, An v, 1787), Wallis Fine 
Art, Hong Kong. 
 
 
Gray’s decision to do business at Canton is surprising when considered against 
recent events in China, namely, the imperial embargo on fur imports. The embargo 
resulted from a constellation of diplomatic incidents, spanning two decades, that strained 
relations between the Qing and Russian Empires. One concern was the submission of the 
Turgot Mongols, dwellers along the common border, who proclaimed their allegiance to 
the Qing government from 1771-73.  Their submission triggered protests from St. 
                                                            
the business of smuggling. Ingraham, Joseph Ingraham’s Journal of the Brigantine Hope, 175-
190.; Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 2:199. 
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Petersburg, who exacted retribution in the form of provocations along the common 
border. From 1776-90, Russian authorities granted safe harbor to criminals, deserters, and 
convicts who escaped from China.61 In response, the Qianlong Emperor ordered a 
crackdown on merchants who “dared… to smuggle Russian products, sea otter skins, 
[river] otter skins, and squirrel skins” and “really violated the law.” 62 In 1791, the crisis 
escalated to the brink of war. Reports indicated that Russian and Kazakh forces were 
preparing to invade western China, a region known as Xinjiang (“New Territories,” 新疆). 
Qianlong responded with economic leverage. In a calculated move against the trappers of 
Siberia, he declared a comprehensive embargo on foreign furs, regardless of place of 
origin.63 The Select Committee of the British East India Company, operating in Canton, 
received notification about the embargo on 13 March 1791, when Monqua informed them 
that “a Chop had been issued by the Hoppo prohibiting the importation of Sea Otter 
Skins.” 64 The prohibition remained in force nine months later, when Joseph Ingraham 
                                                            
61 “36:6:17 (July 28, 1771) The Turgots Are First Suspected” in A Documentary Chronicle of 
Sino-Western Relations, 1644-1820, ed. and trans. Lo-shu Fu (Tucson: University of Arizona 
Press, 1966), 253-54.; “36:6:17 (July 28, 1771) The Turgots Will Be Received Graciously,” in 
ibid., 254-55.; “36:9:8 (Oct. 15, 1771) The Emperor Commands Submission of the Turgots,” in 
ibid, 262-63.; “38:10:1 (Nov. 14, 1773) Three Russian Convicts Are Caught,” in ibid., 271-72.; 
“40:11:20 (Jan. 10, 1776) Russian Soldier Escapes in Kwangtung,” in ibid., 274.; “4:2:27 (April 
15, 1776) China Should Settle a Frontier Case Impartially,” in ibid., 275-76.; “49:10:4 (Nov. 16, 
1784) Russia Refuses to Punish her Criminals,” in ibid., 298-99. 
62 “55:11:5 (Dec. 11, 1790) Smuggled Russian Fur-skins Discovered” in ibid., 308. 
63 “56:1:29 (March 3, 1791) Tension between China and Russia Intensified,” in ibid., 309-10.; 
“56:3:19 (April 21, 1791), Russia is Questioned,” in ibid., 311-12.; “56:4::12 (May 14, 1791) 
Russia Denies Any Possibility of Military Action,” in ibid., 312-13. 
64 During the 1792-93 season, the Select Committee consisted of President Henry Browne, John 
Harrison, George Cumming, and Hugh Parkin. See Morse, The Chronicles of the East India 
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anchored in Macao Roads.65 The embargo was but a wrinkle in commercial affairs for the 
Select Committee, whose trade in woolens was valued at nearly twenty-four times that of 
furs, but it represented a serious problem for fur traders such as Ingraham.66 
The embargo resulted from Qing misconceptions about the nature of the maritime 
fur trade, and consequently, the embargo had a negative impact on conditions in Canton. 
The Select Committee attributed the blanket prohibition to “an idea” held by the imperial 
government that otter furs “are purchased of the Russians.” 67 Captain Coolidge also 
believed that the authorities “entertained a mistaken notion that all fur ships were in some 
measure concerned with the Russians.”68 The explanation rings true, as Chinese literati of 
the eighteenth century held fuzzy views of the geography of the Pacific, and particularly 
                                                            
Company Trading to China, 2:185.; George Macartney, “Journal of Embassy from London to 
China” in Our First Ambassador to China: An Account of the Life of George, Early of 
Macartney, with Extracts from his Letters, and the Narrative of his Experiences in China, as Told 
by Himself, 1737-1806, ed. Helen H. Robbins (London: John Murray, 1908), 376. 
65 Ingraham, Joseph Ingraham’s Journal of the Brigantine Hope, 177. 
66 The company’s most recent trade in furs, in 1788, was valued at 46,249 兩, compared to 
woolens valued at 1,107,427 兩. Woolens accounted for 23.9 times the value of furs. Put another 
way, woolens constituted 83.73 percent of the company’s trade at Canton, while furs represented 
3.49 percent of the total. The Select Committee did not record furs exchanged through the 
company for any of the intervening years, 1789-91, which is probably attributable to fur traders 
collaborating with smugglers. This is certainly the case for the 1791-92 season, during which fur 
smuggling boomed at Lark’s Bay. When the company resumed selling furs, in 1793, the trade in 
woolens increased to 1,788,309 兩, or 83.75 percent of the total. Conversely, furs declined to a 
value of 16,057 兩, or a miniscule 0.75 percent of the company’s value in trade. See Morse, The 
Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 2:151-52, 205-06. 
67 Ibid., 2:185. 
68 Ingraham, Joseph Ingraham’s Journal of the Brigantine Hope, 177. 
362 
 
areas such as Kamchatka, Alaska, and the Northwest Coast of America.69 Mistaken or 
not, however, Qing geopolitical reasoning was sound—unable to know whether the 
maritime fur trade benefitted his adversaries, the Russians, Qianlong ordered an embargo 
upon all imports alike. Meanwhile, the prohibition had significant effects upon the fur 
trade at Canton. First and foremost, by preventing legitimate business, it compelled 
captains to seek alternative arrangements for their pelts. As previously discussed, 
smuggling provided a solution for private traders such as Ingraham and Coolidge. Some 
resolved to trade in other countries. John Kendrick, for example, embarked on a quixotic 
attempt to market his furs in Japan.70 Other captains traded their furs to the chartered 
                                                            
69 The first accurate work of geography to address North America in the Chinese language was 
Short Account of the United States of America (Meilike heshengguo zhilüe, 美利課和聲國智略), a 
work translated and published by Elijah Coleman Bridgman in 1837. The Pacific World did not 
receive similar treatment until 1848, when Xu Jiyu, a jinshi bureaucrat, published his Short 
Account of the Oceans Around Us (Yinghuan zhilüe, 瀛環志略). Prior to the publication of these 
works, however, Chinese knowledge about fur resources would have been rudimentary, at best. 
See R. David Arkush and Leo O. Lee, eds., Land Without Ghosts: Chinese Impressions of 
America from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1989), 17-20. 
70 John Leo Polich argues that although “the Japanese were very friendly,” Kendrick failed to 
market his pelts because “the use of furs was not a custom in Japan.” This is incorrect. Japanese 
culture valued animal fur as an important trade commodity. Official ordinances mandated the 
acquisition of furs for the imperial court during the Nara Period (710-794), and Japanese 
merchants obtained pelts from the Ainu People of Hokkaido well into the Tokugawa Period 
(1603-1867). The Tokugawa regime later expanded onto Hokkaido in part to gain unfettered 
access to the island’s natural resources, including furs. During the eighteenth century, the shogun 
bestowed furs upon trade missions arriving from Korea. Meanwhile, Japanese captains delivered 
wine, manufactured goods, and foodstuffs to Russian trappers in exchange for the pelts of 
Sakhalin Island. In other words, Kendrick probably faced other problems in marketing his furs. 
Jim Mockford observes that the captain anchored Lady Washington in Kushimoto Bay, one of the 
warmest harbors in Japan. Local climate is dominated by a warm northeasterly current known as 
Kuroshio, or “Black Current,” which originates in the tropical South China Sea. During the 
twentieth century, the Japan Meteorological Agency recorded annual mean temperatures ranging 
from 66.7° to 70.9° Fahrenheit (19.3° to 21.6° C) at Kushimoto. The local residents had little 
reason to trade for Kendrick’s heavy, heat-retaining otter pelts. He would have done better to 
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companies, whose supercargoes assessed and stockpiled the pelts for sale in future 
seasons.71 The storage of pelts in the factories of Canton accounts for John Hoskins’ later 
observation that “there are a great many at market and many more expected.”72 
Fortunately, Qianlong rescinded the embargo on 5 May 1792, seven months prior 
to the arrival of Columbia. His decision hinged upon consultation between the Qing and 
                                                            
trade his furs in cooler locations such as northern Honshu, at Hokkaido, or the Sea of Japan. 
Moreover, Kendrick and his crew irritated the locals by cutting timber without permission, 
performing cannon salutes, and shooting seabirds for sport. Their presence also violated the strict 
isolationist laws of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Mockford observes that “two days after he 
[Kendrick] sailed from Japan, military troops arrived from Wakayama to expel the barbarians.” In 
short, the captain narrowly avoided a confrontation with a company of Samurai. See Leo Polich, 
“John Kendrick and the Maritime Fur Trade of the Northwest Coast” (MA thesis, University of 
Southern California, 1964), 62.; William Wayne Farris, “Trade, Money, and Merchants in Nara 
Japan,” Monumenta Nipponica 53, no. 3 (1998): 323.; Takao Abé, “The Seventeenth Century 
Jesuit Missionary Reports on Hokkaido,” Journal of Asian History 39, no. 2 (2005): 121.; Brett 
L. Walker, “Reappraising the ‘Sakoku’ Paradigm: The Ezo Trade and the Extension of Tokugawa 
Political Space into Hokkaidô,” Journal of Asian History 30, no. 2 (1996): 186-88.; George M. 
McCune, “The Exchange of Envoys between Korea and Japan during the Tokugawa Period,” The 
Far Eastern Quarterly 5, no. 3, (1946): 311.; George Alexander Lensen, “Early Russo-Japanese 
Relations,” The Far Eastern Quarterly 10, no. 1 (1950): 10.; Jim Mockford, “The Lady 
Washington at Kushimoto, Japan, in 1791,” in The Early Republic and the Sea: Essays on the 
Naval and Maritime History of the Early United States, eds. William S. Dudley and Michael J 
Crawford (Washington: Brassey’s, Inc., 2001), 88-93. Japan Meteorological Agency, “Monthly 
mean daily maximum temperature (° C), Shionomisaki WMO Station ID: 47778” 
http://www.data.jma.go.jp (accessed on 18 June 2016). 
71 Captain Étienne Marchand commanded the French commercial vessel La Solide, on a voyage 
around the world, from 1790-92. Like Columbia, the expedition engaged in fur trading on the 
Northwest Coast and in China. At Macao, Marchand noted that the prohibition upon furs 
“appeared impossible to be evaded” and that “a Spanish ship, which had come from Manilla with 
three hundred otter-skins, had been, from the impossibility that was experienced of dealing with 
the Chinese traders, forced to deposit her cargo in a storehouse.” La Solide later completed the 
second circumnavigation of the globe under French Colors. See Étienne Marchand, A Voyage 
Round the World, Performed During the Years 1790, 1791, and 1792, by Étienne Marchand, 
preceded by a Historical Introduction, and Illustrated by Charts, etc., trans. C.P. Claret Fleurieu 
(London: T.N. Longman and O. Rees, 1801), 2:95. 
72 John Hoskins and Robert Gray to Joseph Barrell, Ship Columbia Wompoa 22 Decr. 1792,” 488. 
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Russian Empires, which convinced imperial agents that “the Russians still respected us.” 
Moreover, Qianlong’s agents determined that a dissident lama had “invented this tall 
story” of an invasion “to cover his guilt for having escaped” from submission to the 
Qing.73 In Canton, furs resumed their place among the other import commodities, 
although the release of thousands of units from the factories must have depressed the 
market for pelts.74 The overstock, then, was probably the most important factor in a 65 
percent decline in the value of furs traded by the British East India Company from 1788-
93.75 Likewise, it accounts for Hoskins’ estimate that Columbia’s cargo would not trade 
for more than $40,000.76 Under the circumstances, Captain Gray’s decision to trade at 
Canton, rather than engage in smuggling, is inexplicable. It is possible that he received 
information about rising fur prices, or that, as an investor in the second expedition, he 
preferred to avoid the legal risks of smuggling—the sources are silent on this matter. One 
                                                            
73 Fu, A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations, 1644-1820, 320-21. 
74 Marchand predicted the situation six months earlier when he complained that “unfavorable 
circumstances left little hope of trading with advantage, even in case the prohibition should 
happen to be taken off during the Solide’s stay at Macao; for the great competition of vendors 
must necessarily have lowered the furs to such prices that the sale would yield a loss rather than a 
profit.” See Marchand, A Voyage Round the World, 2:95-96. 
75 As previously noted, the company traded furs valued at 16,057 兩 in 1793, a 65.29 percent 
decline from the previous value of 46,249 兩, in 1788. Taken beside ample evidence that fur 
imports increased over time, the decrease in revenue cannot be attributed to a smaller volume of 
furs. See Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 2:151-52, 205-06. 
76 John Hoskins and Robert Gray to Joseph Barrell, Ship Columbia Wompoa 22 Decr. 1792,” 488. 
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possibility is that, having traded at Canton once before, the captain understood that 
Columbia’s stockpile of “prime,” “fine,” and “good” furs would fetch reasonable prices.77 
Once again, the expenses that Columbia incurred during her second passage, 
anchorage, and transaction at Canton are not known with precision, but the Columbians 
achieved significant savings when compared to the first expedition. Some costs, 
predominantly those required of all vessels trading at Canton, are documented or fall 
within a predictable range. For example, John Boit recorded that “a River pilot took 
charge for $40 to take the Ship to Whampoa,” and we can assume that a similar fee 
obtained a pilot for the outgoing passage, bringing the piloting cost to approximately $80. 
Likewise, he recorded that Columbia needed “a complete overhaul from her keel to the 
truck” and that “this business cost 150$.” In terms of other materials and services, we 
know only that the Columbians purchased twenty-one piculs of iron at an expense of 
$147. Boit recorded one other itemized expense—but in this case, for services not 
rendered. As usual, Captain Gray hired a comprador, but “the first of these fellows that 
was engag’d run away with 250$ in our debt.” Boit neglected to record the expense 
entailed in hiring a second comprador. Nonetheless, we can reasonably estimate that the 
second comprador provided around $225 in provisions, $500 in supplies, and $30 in 
                                                            
77 Depending on the mathematical proportions used to estimate Columbia’s second cargo, the 
number of skins described as “prime,” “fine,” or “good” constituted around 15 percent of her 
merchandise. Indeed, assuming that some skins of exceptional quality went unmentioned as 
components of larger lots, the number could easily approach 25 percent. Under the circumstances, 
perhaps Captain Gray expected to sell his cargo above the average market price—especially in 
comparison to skins that had been in storage, and unoiled, for as much as a year already. 
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construction labor. The chroniclers are also silent concerning Columbia’s linguist fee, 
although we can assume the standard retainer of $216. Similarly, we can include perhaps 
$90 in sampan fees plus official presents valued in the neighborhood of $25. Overall, the 
historian can account for approximately $1,713 in services, provisions, and supplies. 
Other expenses, such as the loss of “a dozen fine hogs” that died while the expedition 
was anchored at Whampoa, cannot be known. Meanwhile, Columbia’s port fees would 
have remained fixed at $3,267. Taking both subtotals together, the second expedition 
incurred expenses in the neighborhood of $4,980. 
John Boit complained that “the Whole expence accruing to the Columbia at 
Canton amounted to the enormous sum of 7000 Spanish $”78 When compared against the 
totals above, however, his calculation leaves more than $2000 unaccounted for. We can 
hazard a guess that the remainder of expenses represent commission paid to Columbia’s 
broker. By eighteenth century standards, the sum certainly was “enormous”—more than 
ten times Captain Robert Gray’s wages for the first expedition, and twenty-seven times 
those of regular crewmembers.79 Compared with Columbia’s expenses during the first 
season at Canton, $10,163, however, the second expedition did business at a discount of 
roughly $3,000. No documentary evidence exists to account for the difference, although 
                                                            
78 Boit, “Remarks on the Ship Columbia’s Voyage from Boston,” 421. 
79 Upon returning to Boston in 1790, Captain Robert Gray received wages at a rate of £3 6s per 
month, for 3 years 21 days of service, or a total of £132 1s 8 1/2d. By comparison, the lowest-
paid crewmembers earned £1 10s per month. For example, Bartholomew Ballard, Columbia’s 
tailor, served for 3 years 16 days, and earned a total of £54 16s. See “Ship Columbia’s Portage,” 
150-51. 
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it may represent a swift transaction in which factory expenses remained low or 
nonexistent. John Hoskins may have documented the reason. Only nine days after 
arriving at Whampoa, he made reference to “delivering a part of the furrs which we 
sold.”80 The swiftness of the transaction may indicate that, during his overnight stay in 
Macao, Captain Gray struck a preliminary deal intended to reduce delays—and factory 
expenses—upon arriving at Canton. If so, his strategy represents another lesson learned 
during the first expedition.    
We can only speculate about the possible identity of Columbia’s broker and 
security merchants, but Captain Gray appears to have chosen superb counterparts. The 
Columbians failed to document the second expedition’s broker, but we can be almost 
certain that Shaw & Randall did not consign the cargo. Following the extended 
transaction in 1789-90, Randall “repented” his involvement with Barrell and the 
Columbians.81 Moreover, neither Samuel Shaw nor Thomas Randall documented any 
contract or relationship to Columbia in 1792-93. In fact, the principals in Boston may 
have preferred that the choice of a broker to be made “on the spot.”82 Barrell instructed 
the Columbians “to call upon Mr. McIntire, at Macao, for orders from the owners,” and 
to “remit the bills to Lane, Son, & Frazer, merchants in London,” but he did not designate 
                                                            
80 John Hoskins and Robert Gray to Joseph Barrell, Ship Columbia Wompoa 22 Decr. 1792,” 488. 
81 “Ship Columbia’s Portage,” 150-51. 
82 Joseph Barrell, “Orders Given Captain John Kendrick of the Ship Columbia for a voyage to the 
Pacific Ocean, 1787,” in Voyages of the Columbia, 111. 
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a preferred broker. Similarly, he designated channels of correspondence via Macao, Paris, 
Lisbon, and London. Again, the absence of instructions concerning a broker is notable.83 
John McIntyre may have brokered the transaction of Columbia’s cargo in 1792, and his 
involvement would further indicate the possibility that Captain Gray struck a deal at 
Macao. Ultimately, we cannot know for certain. 
Likewise, the Columbians recorded little information concerning the acquisition 
of a security merchant. John Boit commented that the furs were “landed at Canton and 
D[e]l[ivere]d to the Hong Merchants,” but he did not indicate which merchant.84 It is 
tempting to assume that the Columbians arranged a transaction with familiar persons such 
as Pinqua or Poankeequa, but intervening events in Canton had altered the makeup of the 
merchant guild. Of the six security merchants available to the first Columbia expedition, 
only four remained in 1792, as Pinqua had become “embarrassed in his affairs” and 
Chowqua II (or “Locqua,” Chen Junhua, 陳鈞華) proved “unable to fulfill his engagements 
for tea.”85 Six new hong merchants received licenses, bringing the total to ten individuals, 
and the shakeup created a situation in which the Columbians had personal experience 
only with Poankeequa. Nonetheless, several other merchants may have come forward. In 
statistical terms, Shy Kinqua II (Shi Zhonghe, 石中和) is the most likely candidate for 
                                                            
83 Barrell, “Joseph Barrell’s Instructions to Robert Gray,” 445-46. 
84 Boit, “Remarks on the Ship Columbia’s Voyage from Boston,” 421. 
85 Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 2:197.; Paul A. Van 
Dyke, Merchants of Canton and Macao: Politics and Strategies in Eighteenth-Century Chinese 
Trade (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011), 177-78. 
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Columbia’s security merchant. During the 1792-93 season, he shipped more than 39,000 
chests of tea, almost twice the volume of his nearest competitor, Poankeequa.86 On the 
other hand, circumstantial evidence suggests that the Columbians may have contracted 
with Monqua (Cai Wenguan, 蔡文官), the individual presiding over the Cohong. Indeed, 
during his command of the brigantine Union, from 1794-95, John Boit reported that he 
did business with “Mr. Monqua, one of the Hong merchants.”87 Finally, there is a 
possibility that Boit’s reference to the “Hong Merchants” indicates a transaction with the 
Cohong at large.88 Again, if no single merchant agreed to secure Columbia, the guild 
would have assumed institutional responsibility for the ship, her crew, and her cargo .89 In 
this circumstance, Monqua would have orchestrated the transaction.  
We know with certainty that the second Columbia expedition was a commercial 
success and a dramatic improvement upon the financial outcomes of the first. John Boit 
                                                            
86 Morse documents that Shy Kinqua held contracts for 2,200 chests of Bohea, 30,000 chests of 
Congo, 3,000 chests of Twankay, and 4,000 chests of Hyson, for a grand total of 39,200 chests of 
tea shipped. Poankeequa, by comparison, shipped 2,000 chests of Bohea, 15,000 chests of Congo, 
2,000 chests of Twankay, and 2,000 chests of Hyson, or a grand total of 21,000 chests.; See 
Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 2:198. 
87 There is an outside chance that Boit intends “Monqua” to refer to Mowqua (Lu Guanheng, 蔡文
官), one of the recent licensees admitted to the cohong. See John Boit, Log of the Union: John 
Boit’s Remarkable Voyage to the Northwest Coast and Around the World, 1794-1796, ed. 
Edmund Hayes (Portland: Oregon Historical Society, 1981), 90. 
88 Boit, “Remarks on the Ship Columbia’s Voyage from Boston,” 421. 
89 Paul A. Van Dyke, The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700-1845 
(Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), 97. 
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recorded that the furs sold for Spanish $90,000, at an average of $45 each.90 This price 
far exceeds the sale price achieved by other American ($5.55) and even British ($13.88) 
traders, although the evidence is insufficient to determine why this might be. When 
corresponding in league with Captain Gray, John Hoskins reported to the owners that “we 
have a tolerable cargo of furrs aboard”91 In private, however, he complained that the 
second expedition “did not collect many skins.”92 Nonetheless, the average price would 
indicate that the Columbians traded approximately 2,000 skins, roughly twice the first 
expedition’s cargo of 1,143 otters.93 Columbia shipped a significant number of furs, even 
if she might have carried more. Seen another way, the second expedition delivered a large 
share of the otters skins imported by Americans in 1792-93. The Select Committee of the 
British East India Company recorded that vessels originating in the United States 
imported a total of 5,425 otters during that season. Assuming that otters comprised 
roughly three-quarters of Columbia’s furs, or 1,500 skins, then her transaction accounts 
for almost 28 percent of the total American imports to Canton.94 
                                                            
90 The sum of Spanish $90,000 is equivalent to 64,800 兩 or £18,747. British traders sold their furs 
at an average price of 10 兩 during the 1792-93 season, while other Americans traded at a ruinous 
price of 4 兩 per pelt. 
91 “Robert Gray and John Hoskins to Joseph Barrell, St. Lorenzo, Nootka Sound, Augt. 21, 
1792,” in Voyages of the Columbia, 479-80. 
92 Ibid., 480-85. 
93 “Inventory of Skins,” in Voyages of the Columbia, 125-26. 
94 John Boit, Robert Haswell, and John Hoskins recorded make mention of “otter furs,” “otter 
tails,” “prime furs,” “valuable furs,” “excellent furs,” et cetera, on a total of 106 occasions in their 
accounts of the second expedition. The majority of this total, however, represents the exchange of 
undifferentiated “furs.” I interpret “furs” to indicate otters of moderate or low value, as all three 
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 The Columbians purchased an even more valuable return cargo. John Boit 
commented that Columbia returned to the United States with “a full Cargo of Teas and 
Nanken with a small proportion of Sugar and China Porcelain.”95 Once again, he 
neglected the precise quantities of each item, but we can envision a plausible cargo 
profile based on contemporaneous records. For example, teas (52%) and textiles (26%) 
comprised the majority of all merchandise exported from Canton aboard American 
vessels during the 1792-93 season. Porcelain, sugar, and quicksilver constituted the 
remainder of exports (22%). Following a similar profile, Columbia would have shipped 
teas valued at $71,095.96 Calculated as weight, this sum is equivalent to 323,868 pounds, 
or almost 149 imperial tons, of tea.97 Packed into 927 chests, the weight consumed more 
                                                            
chroniclers took care to record all transactions resulting in an exchange of “beaver furs,” “land 
furs,” or “other furs.” Mention of other varieties are noted on only 10 occasions. Using their 
imprecise language as an indicator, then, Columbia shipped 10 otters per 1 land fur, or an 
estimated total of 1,800 of 2,000 pelts. This number, however, is probably too high, given than 
Boit recorded the purchase of 300 beaver skins on a single day (18 May 1792) along the 
Columbia River. Adjusting for this quantity, as well as other occasions when “other furs” are 
listed as “many” or being available “in abundance,” it would appear that the proportion is closer 
to 3 otters per 1 land fur, or an estimated total of 1,500 of 2,000 pelts. Nonetheless, this number 
represents nothing more than educated guesswork and a greater level of precision would require 
the discovery of additional documentation. See Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company 
Trading to China, 2:202. 
95 Boit, “Remarks on the Ship Columbia’s Voyage from Boston,” 422. 
96 This sum is equivalent to £14,810. Upon arrival in Boston, the cargo would auction in terms of 
English pounds, shillings, and pence. 
97 The British East India Company recorded that American vessels exported black teas (49.69%), 
wrought silks (19.54%), quicksilver (14.20%), sugar (7.21%), nankeen cloth (4.32%), green teas 
(2.46%), raw nankeen (2.36%), and porcelain (0.22%) in descending order of value. The profile 
for Columbia preserves the relative proportions of four categories of goods (teas, nankeen cloth, 
sugar, and porcelain) among her cargo, equal to 66.26 percent of the distribution of American 
exports in the 1792-93 season. Conversely, it eliminates those items not present in her cargo 
(wrought silks and quicksilver), which account for the remaining 33.74 percent of exports. 
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than 70% of Columbia’s tonnage.98 Based upon grocery advertisements in Boston, the 
Columbians may have purchased three categories of tea.99 Bohea (wuyi, 武夷), a black tea 
cultivated in the hill country of Fujian Province, ranked as the most popular tea in the 
United States. In order to prepare Bohea, farmers harvested its leaves between April and 
September, dried them in the sun, and cured the leaves over the heat of smoldering 
charcoal.100 The category sold at reasonable prices in America and provided laborers with 
a stimulating morning or afternoon beverage. 101 Because of strong demand, Bohea 
                                                            
Recognizing the weight of teas among Columbia’s cargo, the profile maintains a strict proportion 
for black teas (75%) and green teas (4%) as monetary percentages out of 100. Collectively, teas 
constitute a total of 148 imperial tons (70% of total tonnage). This method of calculation results 
in computational errors where the remaining goods are concerned. Beyond this, a strict translation 
of the proportions for sugar (11%), nankeens (10%), and porcelain (less than 1%) result in a cargo 
overload of 280 tons (maximum of 212 tons)! The proportions also contradict Boit’s observation 
that Columbia shipped “a full Cargo” of teas and textiles and only a “small proportion” of Sugar 
and Porcelain. Instead, I propose alternate monetary proportions for nankeens (15%), sugar (5%), 
and porcelain (1%). Remarkably, when calculating the alternate percentages as weight, the cargo 
rests at precisely 212 tons, or Columbia’s total capacity. I must stress that this cargo profile does 
not represent the only possible solution. Note that the British East India Company describes a 
particular category of “raw silk” as “nankeens.” I derive piece rates and tonnage for nankeens and 
porcelain from records pertaining to the Empress of China. See Morse, The Chronicles of the East 
India Company Trading to China, 2:203-04; Philip Chadwick Foster Smith, The Empress of 
China (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Maritime Museum, 1984), 172-73. 
98 Chest sizes for black teas (Bohea: 360 lbs.) and green teas (Hyson: 320 lbs.) derived from 
records pertaining to the Empress of China. Smith, The Empress of China, 172-73. 
99 “Prices Current at the Quay at Boston, August 9, 1793.” American Apollo (Boston, 
Massachusetts), 9 August 1793. 
100 Frederick Pigou, “An Account of the Tea Tree” in A Practical Treatise on the China and 
Eastern Trade: Concerning the Commerce of Great Britain and India, Particularly Bengal and 
Singapore, with China and the Eastern Islands including Much Useful Information and Many 
Interesting Particulars Relative Thereto, ed. John Phipps (London: William H. Allen and Co., 
1836), 43-45. 
101 Maxine Berg, “Consumption in Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Britain,” in The Cambridge 
Economic History of Modern Britain, Vol. 1: Industrialisation, eds. Roderick Floud and Paul 
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accounted for perhaps two-thirds of Columbia’s cargo by weight, or 145 tons. By 
comparison, Hyson (xi chun, 熙春), a green tea harvested in Anhui Province, ranked as a 
distant second in American tastes and shipped in smaller quantities. The Columbians may 
have also purchased a third category known as Souchong (xiao zhong, 小種), another 
black tea that circulated among the wealthier households of the United States.102 Using 
the same cargo profile, the remainder of Columbia’s cargo included perhaps 14,256 
pieces of nankeen cloth, 1,380 pieces of porcelain, and thirty-nine tons of sugar. Because 
she did not export wrought silk, rhubarb, and quicksilver, her cargo more closely 
resembled that of a British East Indiaman than other American ships sailing from 
Canton.103  
The Columbians learned hard lessons during their first expedition. During the 
second voyage to China, however, they achieved a significant reversal of fortune due to 
monetary savings, new business expertise, and wise choices in local counterparts. 
                                                            
Johnson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 365.; T.H. Breen, “Baubles of Britain: 
The American and Consumer Revolutions of the Eighteenth Century,” Past & Present 119 
(1988): 83-84.; Mark Koyama, “The Transformation of Labor Supply in the Pre-Industrial 
World,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 81 (2012): 516-17. 
102 “Prices Current at the Quay at Boston, August 9, 1793.” American Apollo (Boston, 
Massachusetts), 9 August 1793. 
103 During the years 1790-94, the British East India Company exported a distribution of goods 
including tea (3,575,409 兩) at 88.8%, raw silk (274,460 兩) at 6.8%, nankeens (34,580 兩) at 
0.9%, and “Chinaware & Others” (4,025,092 兩) at 3.5%. See “Table 2.7 The total value and 
relative importance of different merchandise articles exported from Canton by the EIC, 1765-
1833 (taels, annual average value)” in Simon Yang-Chien Tsai, “Trading for Tea: A Study for the 
English East India Company’s Tea Trade with China and the Related Financial Issues, 1760-
1833” (PhD dissertation, University of Leicester, 2003), 82. 
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Columbia suffered debilitating expenses in 1789, but her officers saved more than $3,000 
in 1792. Likewise, the Columbians internalized the costs and benefits of doing legitimate 
business through the Canton System and chose a profitable means of marketing their furs 
under the circumstances. Their selection of local counterparts, including a broker and a 
security merchant, eased a transaction worth $90,000. Columbia would return to 
Massachusetts with a substantial cargo of valuable, exotic goods. When the ship 
“unmoor’d and stood down the river” on 2 February 1793, her officers and crew could 
take satisfaction in a job well done.104  
 
“A Saving Voyage” 
 
 
Columbia proved the feasibility of a commercial route between Boston, the 
Northwest Coast, and China. Indeed, her profitable second expedition compensated for 
the financial losses of the first, enabling the venture to break even. Following the second 
voyage, her owners recovered their investments and walked away with pride in their 
accomplishment, if not riches. Similarly, the Columbians applied their trading and 
navigational experiences to new spheres of enterprise on land and sea. Most importantly, 
their success set the stage for future Bostonian, New England, and United States 
engagement in the Pacific World. 
In 1792, while Columbia continued her second expedition, Joseph Barrell 
undertook another, more personal project—the construction of a new residence that he 
                                                            
104 Boit, “Remarks on the Ship Columbia’s Voyage from Boston,” 424. 
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named “Pleasant Hill.” Barrell envisioned his new home as the “seat” of a country 
gentleman, an embodiment of his “taste for the fine arts,” and a place to comfortably 
grow old.105 Situated on Cobble Hill in Charlestown, on more than two hundred acres of 
pastoral land, Pleasant Hill would become a lavish residence.106 Barrell commissioned his 
young friend Charles Bulfinch, a silent partner in the Columbia expeditions and an 
aspiring architect, to draft the plans. Bulfinch, who admired the “many good houses” and 
“wonders of Architecture” of Europe, delivered plans for a mansion in the French 
Neoclassical style.107 The grounds would feature stables, dovecotes, terraces and 
fountains, and an ornamental fish pond. 108 Moreover, Barrell intended his new residence 
to reflect a cosmopolitan taste for “the Chinese manner… mixed with the European,” 
including a number of “paintings, engravings, & representations in clay from China.”109 
By 1793, though, the mounting costs of construction began to strain his finances. Writing 
                                                            
105 “Died, at his seat, Pleasant Hill, Saturday morning last, very suddenly, Joseph Barrell, Esq.: in 
the 65th year of his age.” New England Palladium (Boston, Massachusetts), 13 October 1804. 
Early American Imprints, Series II, 1801-1819, Ralph R. Shaw and Richard R., contributors 
(microfiche), no. 6166. 
106 Nina Fletcher Little, “Early Buildings of the Asylum at Charlestown, 1795-1846, Now 
McLean Hospital for the Mentally Ill, Belmont, Massachusetts,” Old-Time New England 59, no. 2 
(1968): Serial No. 214, 29. 
107 Charles Bulfinch, “Portion of Autobiography,” quoted in The Life and Letters of Charles 
Bulfinch with Other Family Papers, ed. Ellen Susan Bulfinch (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and 
Company, 1896), 40-43.; “Charles Bulfinch to Mrs. Thomas Bulfinch, Marseilles, May 10th, 
1786,” in ibid., 51-55. 
108 Little, “Early Buildings of the Asylum at Charlestown, 1795-1846,” 30-31. 
109 William Bentley, The Diary of William Bentley, D.D.S., Pastor of the East Church, Salem, 
Massachusetts, vol. 1, April, 1784-December, 1792 (Salem: The Essex Institute, 1905), 264. 
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to his brother, Colburn Barrell, he expressed relief that “the ship Columbia is expected in 
July” and “I have reason to expect the property I have there will extricate me from my 
present need.”110 Columbia enabled him to complete Pleasant Hill, and he moved from 
Boston to Charlestown in 1795.111  
 
 
 
Figure 23. Charles Bulfinch, East Elevation of the Seat of Joseph Barrell Esq. 3 miles from Boston, 
c.1792, pen and ink wash, 5.4 x 9.8 cm., Boston Athenaeum, Boston. 
 
 
Columbia’s second expedition not only duplicated the logistical achievements of 
the first voyage, but also proved that Americans could profitably exploit the economic 
potential of the Pacific. Columbia returned to Boston on 25 July 1793, bearing a rich 
cargo of black and green tea, sugar, nankeens, and porcelain—a vast improvement over 
the outcome of the first expedition. Despite the success, Joseph Barrell complained that 
                                                            
110 Joseph Barrell, Charlestown, to Colburn Barrell, London, 25 May 1793, ALS, Joseph Barrell 
Letterbook, Massachusetts Historical Society. 
111 Little, “Early Buildings of the Asylum at Charlestown, 1795-1846,”  30-31. 
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“the Columbia is arrived, she has done nothing to what we expected, but through the 
vigilance of M Hoskins she had made a saving voyage of some profit.”112 Barrell 
understood that Columbia’s second expedition needed to be extraordinarily profitable in 
order to overcome the disappointment of the first—indeed, for the venture to break even. 
The principals had fronted significant sums in pounds sterling—a hard currency—toward 
the enterprise, and all needed to recover their initial investment. Meanwhile, another 
factor complicated the financial picture to an even greater degree. Barrell complained that 
“from Kendrick we have rec’d nothing since the last return of the Columbia,” despite 
prior correspondence in which the errant captain proposed to purchase Lady Washington. 
Nonetheless, Barrell continued to hope that “Kendrick will yet turn out an honest 
man.”113  
                                                            
112 Hoskins should be credited with three implicit contributions to the success of the expedition. 
First, he purchased the finest furs available on the Northwest Coast, thus ensuring an optimal 
trade in China. Second, at Canton, he selected an assortment of merchandise for the return cargo, 
a practice that hedged against uncertain prices in Boston. Third, before leaving China, he assured 
the proper packaging of perishable and fragile items, a measure that prevented damage of the sort 
that troubled Columbia’s first expedition. See Joseph Barrell, Charlestown, to John Webb, 3 
February 1794, ALS, Joseph Barrell Letterbook, Massachusetts Historical Society. 
113 The distances and time involved in corresponding between Boston and the Pacific formed the 
greatest obstacles to a negotiated settlement between Barrell and Kendrick. Barrell’s letter to John 
M. Pintard, an investor in the first expedition, gives some indication of his frustration at delays in 
communication: “We had a proposal from him [Kendrick] two years ago, to pay so much for a 
discharge, & we acceded to so far as this, if he would send us to any part of the Continent 400 
Chests Bohea Tea of the best quality, he paying present, but was running the Risque we would 
discharge him, when our Letter arrived he was gone to the N.W. Coast & we have again renewed 
the offer & tis probable by some of the ships this season from China we shall know the result.—I 
place no dependence on this matter, but am told can procure the Tea, if he wishes it.” See Joseph 
Barrell, Charlestown, to J.M. Pintard, New York, 13 March 1795, ALS, Joseph Barrell 
Letterbook, Massachusetts Historical Society. 
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The financial outcome, however, depended most on market conditions in the 
United States. Valued at $90,000 upon purchase in Canton, Columbia’s cargo 
undoubtedly sold at a significant markup upon auction at Boston. Evidence does not 
attest to the sale value of her nankeens or porcelain, and, in fact, porcelain often sold at a 
loss in America.114 By contrast, Columbia’s teas probably auctioned at a modest profit, 
perhaps in the neighborhood of $36,500. The most profitable component of Columbia’s 
return cargo, however, may have been loaf sugar, a commodity that comprised perhaps 
86,400 pounds, or 5 percent, or her cargo tonnage. Sugar sold at approximately five cents 
per pound in Canton. In Boston, whose residents lost access to Caribbean sugar after 
independence from Great Britain, sugar retailed at a much higher price—roughly $4.90 
per pound. Columbia’s sugar probably auctioned at an intermediate rate, perhaps $2.50, 
although this price would still generate a dazzling profit of $207,000. Overall, the second 
expedition may have realized a total of $243,500.115 Combined with the first voyage, the 
second expedition enabled the principals to break even and recover their initial 
investments. Seen as an individual voyage, her second expedition represented a 
triumphant financial success. 
                                                            
114 Porcelain often served as ballast for shipments of tea, a much lighter commodity, regardless of 
the profit margin on the dishware. See James R. Fichter, So Great a Proffit: How the East Indies 
Trade Transformed Anglo-American Capitalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 
209. 
115 This figure represents sales revenue less the costs of trade goods in Boston, furs on the 
Northwest Coast, and Chinese goods at Canton. 
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Columbia forged new, transnational linkages between the commercial centers of 
Boston, the Northwest Coast, and China, and accelerated the integration of those 
locations into a global trade circuit. During her second expedition, she demonstrated the 
potential to build American commerce around a series of transactions that historian 
Frederic Howay deemed the “golden round.” The golden round consisted of a succession 
of transnational trades—between the United States, the Northwest Coast, and China—in 
which each exchange compounded the profits of previous deals.116 For example, the 
Columbians benefitted from an unusually high profit margin when trading inexpensive 
goods such as iron, copper, or woolens for otters on the Northwest Coast. They 
exchanged Spanish $6,360 in metals and textiles for $90,000 in furs, a profit margin of 
1,315 percent.117 Likewise, the Columbians repeated the process at Canton, where they 
traded exceptional furs for common items such as tea, sugar, porcelain, and nankeens. 
The inventory of $90,000 in furs, therefore, fetched a return cargo worth perhaps 
$280,779 in Boston, or a profit margin of 212 percent. While each transnational segment 
of the Columbia’s voyage turned a profit, the global dimensions of the “golden round” 
                                                            
116 Frederic W. Howay quoted in James R. Gibson, Otter Skins, Boston Ships and China Goods: 
The Maritime Fur Trade of the Northwest Coast, 1785-1841 (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1992), 56-58. 
117 In 1790, Columbia embarked with a total of £1,324 14s 3d (£1,324.71) in trade goods. These 
goods included sheet copper, bar iron, chisels, shoes and boots, colored duffel, nails, trousers, 
jackets, coats, yarn, buttons, colored thread, brass thimbles, boxes of soap, tin kettles, sheet tin, 
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in cargo are equivalent to a total of Spanish $6,359.54. See “Expenditures for the Columbia’s 
Outfit and Cargo,” 460-64. 
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explain her stunning success as a commercial model. In sum, taking into account all three 
segments of the expedition, she realized a staggering profit margin of 4,315 percent. 
Columbia’s second expedition, and the financial solvency it provided, enabled 
Joseph Barrell to undertake a number of private goals that secured his reputation as a 
gentleman. First and foremost, the “saving voyage” permitted him to move forward with 
the construction of Pleasant Hill. During 1794-95, Barrell meticulously curated the 
chairs, tapestries, and carpets that adorned his new residence.118 He lavished attention 
upon his “Oval room,” where he labored to obtain a carpet of suitable dimensions, the 
previous having been “by no means conformable to my directions, although it is very 
handsome.” Moreover, he contrived to heat the oval room with imported register stoves, 
each concealed behind a polished marble fireplace.119 Barrell looked forward to 
entertaining visitors at Pleasant Hill, although its construction caused him to fall behind 
in correspondence with friends and family.120 The architectural splendors of the mansion, 
combined with its vast assemblage of imported goods, helped to establish his position as 
a gentleman of superior social acumen.121 Furthermore, Columbia’s success enabled 
                                                            
118 Joseph Barrell, Charleston, to N. Barrett, New York, 29 Sept 1793, ALS, Joseph Barrell 
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Barrell to dabble in the sort of agronomical experimentation that distinguished other 
gentleman-scientists such as Thomas Jefferson and George Washington.122 He took 
special pride in the cultivation of fruit trees, mostly unsuited to the New England winter, 
within the warm confines of “my greenhouse.” Barrell planted dozens of pear, peach, 
nectarine, apricot, and plum trees inside the structure. Meanwhile, he thanked William 
Pringle, an English horticulturalist, for “hints with respect to the growing of the pears” 
and requested information concerning “any experiments you may make in Agriculture or 
gardening.” Certainly, the practice of agriculture as a “fashion,” rather than a subsistence 
activity, marked him as a gentleman of means.123 Barrell also dabbled in meteorology. 
From 1792-1801, he assembled rainfall records for Charlestown, using a precision rain 
gauge capable of measurements to one one-thousandth of an inch. Similarly, he recorded 
snowfalls but noted that “I have no way to measure the snow.”124 Following these 
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scientific interests, and in part to entertain guests, Barrell collected a range of scientific 
instruments, such as barometers, thermometers, prisms, electrical conduits, refracting and 
reflecting telescopes, and an “artificial eye in brass to exemplify the nature of vision.”125 
Similarly, the “saving voyage” also permitted Barrell to participate in several 
public initiatives that affirmed his status as a leading citizen of the United States. One 
personal goal involved the reclamation of marginal plots of land in Boston. For example, 
Barrell hoped to drain an “unpromising bit of the South End,” a quagmire that he 
previously developed as a fish pond.126 During the 1790s, Boston began to experience a 
high rate of population growth, expanding from 18,038 (1790) to 24,937 (1800) persons. 
Demographic pressure upon the peninsular geography of Boston, then, prompted 
entrepreneurs to invest in the improvement of profitable new plots.127 Following the 
successful return of Columbia, Barrell invested in efforts to transform the morass, located 
between Milk Street and Summer Street—his old address—into a residential 
neighborhood to be known as “Franklin Place.” 128 Columbia’s second expedition also 
enabled him to participate in debt speculation on the national stage. During the American 
                                                            
125 Joseph Barrell, Charlestown, to Colburn Barrell, London, 6 February 1795, ALS, Joseph 
Barrell Letterbook, Masssachusetts Historical Society. 
126 Walter Muir Whitehill and Lawrence W. Kennedy, Boston: A Topographical History, 3rd 
Edition, Enlarged (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 53. 
127 Carole Shammas, “The Space Problem in Early United States Cities,” The William and Mary 
Quarterly 57, no. 3 (2000), 505-11, 514, 516-18, 521-23. 
128 Whitehill and Kennedy, Boston: A Topographical History, 53.; Boston Directory, 10. 
383 
 
Revolution, the thirteen states accepted foreign and domestic loans in order to fund their 
war against Great Britain. Thereafter, their respective debts constituted an economic 
drain and destabilizing force upon the United States. In 1790, the federal government 
acted to assume, consolidate, and retire the debts through public subscriptions at 6 
percent annual interest. Barrell subscribed a total of $29,002 of securities originating in 
North Carolina, placing him among the largest speculators in Massachusetts.129 If held for 
a duration of two decades, the subscription would yield $68,919, a 138 percent profit.130 
Likewise, Columbia permitted him to invest in the nation’s premier financial institution, 
the Bank of the United States. Chartered in 1791, the bank established a uniform national 
currency, raised federal revenue, and paid interest on the domestic debt. Barrell became a 
principal stockholder in the bank and perhaps the chief subscriber in Massachusetts. In 
1792, he championed the creation of a branch location in Boston and lobbied for it to 
possess a robust share, $350,000, or 27 percent, of the institution’s branch capital.131 
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Columbia’s expeditions also helped catapult Crowell Hatch, a respected sea 
captain in prior years, into the realm of politics. Before 1793, his civic activities were 
limited to a modest subscription for improvements to Boston Common.132 Moreover, 
there is reason to suspect that he remained a working captain even after investing in 
Columbia.133  In fact, his involvement with the expedition may have represented a 
financial hardship until her successful return in 1793. Thereafter, perhaps because the 
expedition broke even, he launched himself into the expensive world of politics. In 1795, 
Hatch served on the committee of the Boston Chamber of Commerce, a position that 
extended his professional relationships among the merchants, shopkeepers, and artisans 
of the town.134 Later, in 1803, he fronted a successful campaign for the Massachusetts 
House of Representatives from the County of Norfolk.135 Meanwhile, Hatch continued to 
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engage in business. He experimented with estate management in Jamaica Plain, offering, 
for example, “100 acres of land… most of which is of an excellent soil” and “a pew, in 
the Rev. Mr. Gray’s Meeting-house.”136 Nonetheless, he remained a sea captain by 
training, and imported “Sugar, Logwood, &c to Boston” aboard his ship Argo.137  
Considered a newcomer to Boston in 1789, Samuel Brown became a respected 
citizen, businessman, and philanthropist following the success of Columbia. Indeed, he 
appears to have gained notoriety from his involvement in the “experiment in a branch of 
Commerce before unessayed by Americans.”138 Brown turned his attention toward the 
improvement of his adopted town. In 1793, at the onset of the French Revolutionary 
Wars, he served on a “very full and respectable meeting of the Merchants and others 
concerned in Trade” in order to prevent “any privateers or other armed vessels, being 
fitted out or managed by American citizens” in Boston.139 Despite the federal 
government’s declaration of neutrality in European wars, however, Brown worked to 
organize a “civic festival” to “celebrate the successes of our French Allies, against the 
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combined despots of Europe.”140 Although he upheld the national prohibition on 
privateers, he helped to overturn a statewide ban on theatrical entertainment—a relic of 
Puritan New England—and, in 1794, became a trustee of the new Federal Street 
Theater.141 Later, hoping to enhance the town’s reputation abroad, he helped establish the 
Massachusetts Society for the aid of Emigrants.142 In 1797, Brown collaborated with 
Crowell Hatch and fellow Bostonian Andrew Dexter to convince the town to charter “a 
building on an extensive plan, containing an Exchange, a Coffee-house, and different 
apartments for other uses, which will be conducive to public accommodation.” The 
structure, known as the Boston Exchange Coffee-House, cost more than $500,000 and 
became the first “proper hotel” erected in the United States. Completed in 1806, the 
institution welcomed guests for more than a decade until, in 1818, an attic fire reduced 
the building to ashes.143 
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Charles Bulfinch did not need the “saving voyage” to proceed with his 
architectural career, although financial remuneration probably eased his investment in 
several projects. From 1793-95, he supervised the transformation of Barrell’s 
swamplands into the neighborhood of Franklin Place. The reclamation was successful, 
although the second phase—the ambitious construction of the Tontine Crescent—
required constant infusions of cash and threatened to bankrupt Bulfinch. Conceived as “a 
number of convenient, elegant houses,” the Tontine Crescent represented a beautiful but 
costly experiment in urban renewal.144 Bulfinch orchestrated the work at Franklin Place 
in tandem with another redevelopment program on Beacon Hill, where he built a number 
of imposing mansions.145 Despite his financial overextension, the buildings secured his 
reputation as an imaginative and hardworking architect. In 1798, Bulfinch delivered plans 
for the Old State House in Hartford, Connecticut, and the Massachusetts State House 
above Boston Common. Beginning in 1805, he remodeled and enlarged Faneuil Hall, a 
Boston landmark associated with figures such as Samuel Adams, James Otis, Jr., and the 
Sons of Liberty. In 1818, Bulfinch embarked upon his most enduring contribution to 
American culture, the renovation of the ruined United States Capitol, in Washington 
City.146  
                                                            
144 “The public are hereby informed” Columbian Centinel (Boston, Massachusetts), 6 August 
1793.; Whitehill and Kennedy, Boston: A Topographical History, 53. 
145 Jeffrey Klee, “Civic Order on Beacon Hill,” Buildings & Landscapes: Journal of the 
Vernacular Architecture Forum 15 (2008): 43-46. 
146 British forces burned the Capitol during their occupation of Washington in 1814. Ellen Susan 
Bulfinch, ed., The Life and Letters of Charles Bulfinch, 92, 111-13, 119-21, 233-36. 
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Figure 24. Charles Bulfinch, engraving by Samuel Hill, “Plan of Elevation of the Tontine Crescent 
now erecting in Boston,” in  Massachusetts Magazine 6 (February 1794), page facing p. 67. 
 
 
Columbia’s second expedition, like her first, held strategic and commercial 
implications of interest to national leaders. In 1793, John Kendrick corresponded with 
Thomas Jefferson concerning Spanish assistance rendered to the expedition in the Juan 
Fernandez Islands.147 Similarly, after purchasing land on Vancouver Island, he forwarded 
“Copies of several Deeds” to Jefferson in order to “secure the property of these purchases 
to me, and the government thereof to the United States.”148 Meanwhile, Robert Gray 
established a United States claim to the “Great River of the West,” a development of 
great significance to Jefferson. Gray navigated a hundred miles up “Columbia’s River,” 
                                                            
147 “John Kendrick to Thomas Jefferson, On Board the Ship Lady Washington, Harbor of Maw-
win-na, St. Clair’s Island, North-west coast of America (June, 1793),” in Voyages of the 
Columbia, 154-57. 
148 “John Kendrick to Thomas Jefferson, Port Independence, on the Island of Heong-Kong, March 
1st. 1793,” in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 25, 1 January–10 May 1793, ed. John 
Catanzariti,  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 307–308. 
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as he called it, but the full geographic significance of the river remained unknown. In 
1803, President Jefferson would instruct Meriwether Lewis and the Corps of Discovery 
to treat Point Adams, at the mouth of the Columbia, as the final destination in their search 
for “the most practicable water communication across this continent.”149 Finally, Joseph 
Barrell continued to promote the economic potential of the maritime fur trade. In 1793, 
he once again corresponded with George Washington, now President of the United 
States. Included with the letter, Barrell offered “the only intire Sea Otter Skin, brought to 
this country, which was procured by the Columbia & Washington” and requested that the 
president “accept it as a seat for your Sadle.”150 In short, the gift not only represented 
Columbia’s signature accomplishment, it made the prospects of the fur trade tangible to 
the Chief Executive. 
Finally, the expeditions punctuated the lives of the Columbians, common 
mariners who performed the uncommon task of establishing an American presence in the 
Pacific World. Some leveraged their experiences to achieve great success. Upon 
returning to Boston, John Box Hoskins extended his relationship with Joseph Barrell, 
                                                            
149 Thomas Jefferson, “IV. Instructions for Meriwether Lewis, 20 June 1803,” in The Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson, vol. 40, 4 March 1803–10 July 1803, ed. Barbara B. Oberg (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2013), 176–83.; Stephen E. Ambrose, Undaunted Courage: 
Meriwether Lewis, Thomas Jefferson, and the Opening of the American West (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1996), 54. 
150 “Joseph Barrell to George Washington, Pleasant Hill Charlestown, state Massts, Nov. 25th 
1793,” in The Papers of George Washington, Presidential Series, vol. 14, 1 September–31 
December 1793, ed. David R. Hoth (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008), 433. 
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becoming, in effect, his accountant, purchasing agent, and professional successor.151 In 
1794, Barrell “resigned” his business to a partnership between his son, Joseph, Jr., and 
Hoskins, who “now propose carrying it on, under the firm of Barrell and Hoskins.”152 
Thereafter, Hoskins developed an international network of contacts, with particular 
emphasis upon the port of Bordeaux, France.153 Meanwhile, in 1793, John Boit 
completed his own circumnavigation as captain of Union, a brigantine owned by his 
brother-in-law, Crowell Hatch.154 In 1796, he assumed command of the snow George on 
a voyage to Mauritius. During a tempestuous passage the Cape of Good Hope, Boit 
ordered “all hands fore and aft at both pumps to keep the vessel from going to Davy 
Jones’ Locker,” a decision that saved the George from certain destruction. At Mauritius, 
he recruited a Chinese servant, known as “Chou Mandarien,” who returned with him and 
sailed aboard other Bostonian ships. Boit later reflected on his nautical career in verse, 
                                                            
151 The relationship ran deeper than business. John Hoskins’s father died in 1786, leaving his 
mother with nine children to support upon “but a small remnant of their early fortune.” In 
recognition of the hardship, Joseph Barrell accepted financial responsibility for raising the boy 
and “strove to fill… the place of a father.” Thereafter, Hoskins availed himself of opportunities to 
learn the merchant trade in Barrell’s counting house, in the company of other young men such as 
Charles Bulfinch. See Lucius B. Marsh and Harrier F. Parker, eds., Bronsdon and Box Families 
(Lynn: The Nichols Press, 1902), 227 
152 “Boston, Joseph Barrell, Esq. the father of our Joseph Barrell Jun. having retired from 
business, has resigned it to us, who now propose carrying it on, under the firm of Barrell and 
Hoskins.” (Boston, 1794) Early American Imprints, Series I: Evans, 1679-1800, Charles Evans 
and Roger P. Bristol, contributors (microfiche), no. 46978. 
153 Howay, Voyages of the Columbia, xxii.; Marsh and Parker, Bronsdon and Box Families, 236-
38. 
154 Boit, Log of the Union, xxx-xxxvi. 
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penning poems such as “Epitaph, on a Sailor,” in which he bade farewell to a mariner 
“Free from the Storms, and Gusts of human life, Free from the squalls of passion and of 
strife.” 155 Perhaps his compositions stood as memorials to missing Columbians.  
For other Columbians, the oceans that made them famous also swallowed them 
whole. Robert Haswell returned to sea immediately following Columbia’s second 
expedition and, from 1793-98, commanded the vessels Hannah and John Jay on 
commercial voyages to the East Indies. In 1799, during the Quasi-War against France, he 
enlisted as a first lieutenant aboard the frigate USS Boston. In this capacity, he enhanced 
his reputation as a navigator by returning with the prize corvettes Two Angels and Le 
Berceau.156 Thereafter, Haswell assumed command of the ship Louisa on another 
expedition to the Northwest Coast. The vessel disappeared, and, in 1805, newspapers 
reported him “lately to have been lost” at sea.157 Likewise, Joseph Ingraham assumed 
command of the brigantine Hope on an expedition to the Northwest Coast from 1790-93. 
The voyage, concurrent with Columbia’s second expedition, witnessed the first American 
                                                            
155 Robert Apthorp Boit, Chronicles of the Boit Family and their Descendants and of other Allied 
Families (Boston: S.J. Parkhill & Company, 1915), 17, 29-30, 32-33, 41. 
156 “A letter from Lt. Haswell of the Boston frigate, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated Newport, 
Feb. 15 1800, informs:” Columbian Centinel (Boston, Massachusetts), 5 March 1800.; “Boston, 
Monday, November 17th, 1800. Important Capture.” Boston Gazette (Boston, Massachusetts), 17 
November 1800. 
157 The notice of his disappearance is found in his father’s obituary. See “Died. At Yorkshire, in 
England, William Haswell, Esq. Æ. 73.” Columbian Centinel (Boston, Massachusetts), 28 August 
1805. 
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exploration of the Marquesas Islands, but otherwise ended in financial failure.158 In 1799, 
during the Quasi-War, Ingraham enlisted as sailing master aboard the USS Pickering, a 
14-gun brig, on a commerce raiding mission in the Caribbean Sea.159 Following a 
victorious cruise, in which she “took four French privateers, retook 12 American vessels, 
and liberated 300 American prisoners from the French prisons,” Pickering vanished 
without a trace. Ingraham was never seen again.160 
Captains John Kendrick and Robert Gray also perished while sailing the 
unpredictable oceans of the world. Kendrick, Columbia’s original captain, never returned 
to the United States, nor did the principals realize a profit from his increasingly 
autonomous command of Lady Washington. Rumors of his activities did, however, trickle 
back to Boston. In 1791, he attempted to trade at Japan, becoming the first American 
navigator to anchor in that country’s waters. A few months later, he struck an agreement 
to purchase furbearing lands—or perhaps easements to that land—on Vancouver Island. 
Whether Kendrick undertook the purchase on his own behalf, or that of the investors, 
remains a subject of debate.161 Later, he became involved in the power politics of the 
Sandwich Islands, where he established an alliance with Chief Kaeo of Kauaʻi and 
                                                            
158 Joseph Ingraham, Journal of the Brigantine “Hope,” 43-64. 
159 Christopher McKee, Edward Preble: A Naval Biography (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
1996), 58-63. 
160 “Charleston, July 16.” Philadelphia Gazette and Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania), 4 August 1800. 
161 U.S. Congress. Senate, Report No. 335 (Felch Report), 20-25. 
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attempted to counteract British influence on Maui.162 On 12 December 1794, Kendrick 
attended a celebration following a battle at Aiea, a village above Pearl Harbor. In a 
terrible oversight, a British cannonade fired “in consequence of this victory”—and 
accidentally loaded—blasted him with grapeshot. Kendrick sustained mortal wounds and 
died several hours later.163 
In 1793, Robert Gray returned to his home on Back Street, in Boston, presumably 
with adventure stories to tell. He fathered five children, including one son and four 
daughters, from 1794-1801.164 Gray also participated in the Quasi-War. In 1798, he 
assumed command of the brigantine Alert, of Salem, Massachusetts, under instructions to 
return to the Northwest Coast and Canton. The expedition failed, however, when he lost a 
naval engagement to the French privateer La Républicaine, whose captain seized Alert as 
a prize. Gray briefly became a prisoner-of-war before obtaining release at Montevideo, in 
                                                            
162 Ridley, Morning of Fire, 317-33, 345-52. 
163 Scott Ridley, the principal biographer of John Kendrick, disagrees with this view. In his 
telling, the cannonade may have been deliberately loaded by a British rival, William Brown, 
whom Kendrick had outmaneuvered in the political landscape of the Northwest Coast and 
Hawaii. Ridley suggests that “the appearance of the Washington” prior to the Battle of Aiea 
“would have provoked Brown’s deep-seated hostility toward the Americans, and especially 
toward Kendrick.” In the aftermath of the grapeshot blast, he explains, “Brown claimed it was an 
accident.” See Frederic W. Howay, “John Kendrick and His Sons,” The Quarterly of the Oregon 
Historical Society 23, no. 4 (1922): 292-95.; Ridley, Morning of Fire, 350-53.; Abraham 
Fornander, An Account of the Polynesian Race, its Origins and Migrations and the Ancient 
History of the Hawaiian People to the Times of Kamehameha I, Vol. II (London: Trübner & Co., 
1880), 265-66. 
164 Some sources suggest that he relocated a few blocks away to Snowhill Street in 1798. See 
Frederic W. Howay and Albert Matthews, “Some Notes Upon Captain Robert Gray,” The 
Washington Historical Quarterly 21, no. 1 (1930): 8-12. 
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Spanish South America.165 The following year, he commanded the privateer Lucy, a 
vessel comparable to Columbia in terms of dimensions and armaments.166 In 1800, 
following the cessation of hostilities with France, he embarked upon a longer voyage to 
New South Wales, and possibly onward to Russian America and Canton.167 According to 
one descendant, between 1806 and 1809, he “died of yellow fever on one of his voyages 
from South Carolina and was probably buried at sea.”168 Thus passed the first captain to 
circumnavigate the globe for the United States of America. 
Columbia’s success in establishing a global trade route opened profitable new 
horizons for imitators across the United States. A new generation of adventurers, 
including Ebenezer Dorr and Sons, Thomas Handasyd Perkins, Jonathan and Nathan 
Winship, and William Sturgis, soon followed in her wake. Indeed, Bostonians charted the 
course for the United States to become the dominant power in the nineteenth-century 
                                                            
165 Union of American Republics. Bulletin of the Pan American Union 47, July-December, 1918 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1918), 709-10. 
166 Howay and Matthews, “Some Notes Upon Captain Robert Gray,” 10. 
167 The specifics of this voyage are unknown, outside of orders issues from Stephen Codman to 
Robert Gray on 31 October, 1800. Codman designated him captain of a schooner bound for 
Australia, and ultimately tasked with purchasing a cargo of seal skins for exchange at Canton. 
Assuming Gray traded for seals, he probably would have done so in Russian Alaska, perhaps at 
Sitka or Kodiak Island. If, on the other hand, Gray undertook his own sealing, this phase of the 
expedition may have occurred in the Kerguelen Islands, an archipelago of the Southern Ocean, 
while en route to New South Wales. According to J. Richard Nokes, the letter remains in the 
possession of William Twombly, a descendant of the captain’s wife, Martha Gray. See J. Richard 
Nokes, Columbia’s River: The Voyages of Robert Gray, 1787-1793 (Tacoma: Washington State 
Historical Society, 1991), 274-75. 
168 Howay and Matthews, “Some Notes Upon Captain Robert Gray,” 12. 
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Pacific. Columbia’s expeditions set the stage for the ocean hemisphere to become a “Mar 
Columbiana,” or American Sea. 169 
                                                            
169 Arrell Morgan Gibson, Yankees in Paradise: The Pacific Basin Frontier (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1993), 100, 108. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
“MAR COLUMBIANA” 
 
 
  On 24 August, 1793, a short advertisement appeared in the Columbian Centinel. 
“On Thursday next,” the item explained, “will positively be sold, to the highest bidder… 
the good, well found, and fast sailing ship COLUMBIA.” Lewis Hayt, the Bostonian 
auctioneer, would supervise the sale of the ship, her inventory, and armaments.1 After 
breaking even, Joseph Barrell and his partners decided to pursue other interests, and the 
Columbians disbanded to seek other work. Columbia would not return to the Pacific.2 
Despite her sudden departure from the historical record, however, her accomplishments 
resonated throughout Boston, New England, and the United States. 
 During six years at sea, Columbia established a permanent United States presence 
in the Pacific and launched the transformation of the region to a “Mar Columbiana,” or 
                                                                
1 “On Thursday Next,” Columbian Centinel (Boston, Massachusetts), 24 August 1793. 
2 Columbia’s fate, like so much about her, cannot be known with certainty. No evidence attests to 
who purchased her or what tasks she performed in later years. Documentary evidence reveals 
nothing of her service record from 1793-1801. Tradition holds that she was “ript to pieces,” or 
scrapped, in 1801. See Frederic W. Howay, ed., Voyages of the Columbia to the Northwest Coast, 
1787-1790 & 1790-1793 (Portland: Oregon Historical Society Press in cooperation with the 
Massachusetts Historical Society, 1990), x. 
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American Sea.3 Furthermore, she inspired a new generation of investors, imitators, and 
innovators to follow in her wake. In later decades, American navigators came to control 
the maritime fur trade of the Northwest Coast, developed new business models in 
Polynesia, and accelerated United States involvement in China. Prior to Columbia, 
European powers dominated the Pacific. After her expeditions, however, American 
business eclipsed European activities throughout the ocean hemisphere. Columbia sailed 
under American colors, and an independent republic followed her into the Pacific. A 
commercial empire was born. 
Columbia proved that American commerce in the Pacific could be profitable, and, 
in doing so, she inspired other fur-trading expeditions from Boston, Philadelphia, 
Providence, and New York. Throughout the three decades following Columbia’s first 
voyage, 141 American vessels embarked for the Pacific Ocean on fur-trading missions, 
and 112 are known to have engaged in the trade of the Northwest Coast. Entrepreneurs 
across the United States rushed to repeat and innovate upon Columbia’s 
accomplishments. During the first decade, 1791-1800, a total of thirty-three American 
ships traded along the Northwest Coast. Several expeditions, including those of Hancock, 
Jefferson, and Hazard, overwintered on the coast in order to jumpstart a second trading 
season. Two voyages, those of Margaret and Jefferson, augmented their trading capacity 
                                                                
3 Arrell Gibson, Yankees in Paradise: The Pacific Basin Frontier (Santa Fe: University of New 
Mexico Press, 1993), 8. 
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through construction of companion vessels in the Pacific. In doing so, Americans 
emulated the Columbians.4 The second decade, 1801-1810, saw another forty-four 
American ships participate in the maritime fur trade. The early years saw a dramatic 
increase in the number of American trading vessels on the coast, with twenty ships 
present in 1801, and fifteen in 1802. Some vessels traded for years on end—Atahualpa, 
Guatimozin, Mercury, O’Cain and Vancouver each cruised the coast in at least half the 
summers of the decade.5 Meanwhile, as indigenous peoples hunted an increasing number 
                                                                
4 In this respect, the Columbians emulated British trader John Meares, who became the first 
navigator to overwinter and build a sloop on the Northwest Coast. Meares, however, cannot be 
said to have succeeded in either strategy. He remained on the coast during the winter of 1786-87, 
but only because “the bad weather had set in, with continual gales of wind, accompanied by sleet 
and snow.” Nathaniel Portlock and George Dixon rescued his disintegrating crew, now struggling 
against scurvy and subsisting almost entirely upon alcohol, the following spring. Similarly, North 
West America, the sloop he constructed at Nootka Sound, later became a prize of Spanish 
Governor Estevan Martínez. See John Meares, Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from 
China to the N.W. Coast of America, with an Introductory Narrative of Voyage Performed in 
1786, from Bengal, in the Ship Nootka, Vol. I (Logographic Press: London, 1791), xxi-xxii.; 
George Dixon, A Voyage Round the World but more Particularly to the North-West Coast of 
America: Performed in 1785, 1786, 1787, and 1788; in the King George and Queen Charlotte 
(London: George Goulding, 1789), 157.; “Robert Gray and Joseph Ingraham to Don Juan 
Francesco de la Bodega y Quadra, Nootka Sound, August 3d, 1792” in Voyages of the Columbia, 
474-79. 
5 I adapt these figures from Frederic W. Howay. Although I later cite numbers from Dick Wilson, 
Howay’s compilation is useful in determining the port of origin and activities of American 
vessels on the Northwest Coast. The numbers above include only those vessels known to have 
participated in fur trading on the Northwest Coast of America. I omit vessels lost, captured, or 
wrecked en route to the coast, those devoted to the Hawaiian trade, those engaged strictly in the 
provision of Russian settlements in Alaska, those sold to foreign owners prior to arriving on the 
coast, and voyages described as “improbable,” “doubtful,” or “apocryphal.” I also omit the ship 
Mary, reported on the coast in 1806, which is probably a misprint for the ship Mercury. 
Conversely, the figures include those vessels purchased from foreign owners and relaunched 
under American ownership. See Frederic W. Howay, A List of Trading Vessels in the Maritime 
Fur Trade, 1785-1825, ed. Richard A. Pierce (Kingston, ON: The Limestone Press, 1973), 10-24, 
27-57, 64-102, 107-31, 138-44. 
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of sea otters, the furbearing population entered a steep decline.6 Undeterred, Americans 
launched another thirty-five vessels to the Northwest Coast from 1811-20. Diminishing 
otter resources, however, forced many expeditions to diversify their commercial activities 
to include sealing, poaching, the sandalwood trade, and the provisions trade.7 One vessel, 
O’Cain, under the principal command of Jonathan Winship, Jr., demonstrates the range, 
scope, and intensity of American shipping in the Pacific. From 1803-1816, she completed 
an unprecedented eleven seasons on the Northwest Coast and participated in all forms of 
commerce. Furthermore, she did business in numerous locations, including the Northwest 
Coast, Alaska, California, the Hawaiian Islands, and Canton. Finally, in a cruise that 
illustrates the determination of Americans to dominate the ocean hemisphere, O’Cain 
performed a record eight-year expedition from 1809-16.8 
Meanwhile, Columbia extended Bostonian commerce beyond the Atlantic World 
and established the town as the first “Pacific” port in the United States. Bostonian vessels 
traded on the Northwest Coast each season from 1791-1820, and, during seven summers, 
                                                                
6 David Igler, The Great Ocean: Pacific Worlds from Captain Cook to the Gold Rush (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 107-11. 
7 Howay, A List of Trading Vessels in the Maritime Fur Trade, 10-24, 27-57, 64-102, 107-31, 
138-44. 
8 O’Cain’s eight-year odyssey is attributable to the outbreak of war between the United States and 
Great Britain in 1812. American vessels would be forced to run a dangerous gauntlet in the 
Atlantic Ocean when returning to the United States. Winship made a virtue of necessity by 
remaining in the Pacific, but he also profited handsomely as the most active captain in the region. 
See Howay, A List of Trading Vessels in the Maritime Fur Trade, 55, 57, 70, 75, 82, 86, 91, 95, 
100, 110, 115. 
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they comprised the full contingent from the United States. During that period, Boston 
launched a total of seventy-three vessels, or 67 percent of American vessels engaged in 
fur-trading on the Northwest Coast. Put another way, the town is responsible for 74 
percent of national trading, in terms of ship-seasons, on the coast. Other ports became 
involved in a far less intensive manner. For example, New York dispatched fifteen ships 
(13%) and accounts for 11 percent of trading. Philadelphia ranked third in launches, with 
five vessels (4%), while Providence ranked third in trading, with seven seasons (3%). 
Other small contributors to the fur trade included Salem, Newport and Bristol (Rhode 
Island), Norwich (Connecticut), Baltimore, and Portsmouth (Virginia).9 Some 
Bostonians, such as Thomas Handasyd Perkins, profited handsomely by launching 
concurrent voyages to the Pacific, East Indies, and China.10 Meanwhile, merchantmen 
such as Alert, Pearl, and Atahualpa realized profits worth hundreds of thousands of 
dollars. From 1790-1800, the commerce of the Pacific World became a decisive factor in 
Boston’s renaissance as an emporium to the world.11 
                                                                
9 American shipwrights also constructed five fur-trading vessels in the Pacific—at Clayoquot 
Sound, Nootka Sound, Astoria, in the Hawaiian Islands, and the Marquesas. Together, they 
conducted eight ship-seasons of trading in the ocean hemisphere. By this reckoning, the Pacific 
World rivals Philadelphia as a contributor of vessels to the fur trade, and ranks third in trading 
after Boston and New York. 
10 R.G.F. Candage, “Boston Ships, Past and Present,” Proceedings of the Bostonian Society at the 
Annual Meeting, January 8, 1901 (Boston: Bostonian Society, 1901), 29-35.; Carl Seaburg and 
Stanley Paterson, Merchant Prince of Boston: Colonel T.H. Perkins, 1764-1854 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1971), 49-55, 144-66. 
11 Boston Port Authority, Boston Looks Seaward: The Story of the Port, 1630-1940 (Boston: 
Bruce Humphries, Inc., 1941) 71, 78-79, 83-86. 
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European observers responded to Columbia’s achievements with a mixture of 
frustration, disbelief, and foreboding. John Meares, a British adventurer on the Northwest 
Coast, promoted the wealth of the Pacific, which he believed might “not only become 
new sources of commercial advantage to this kingdom” but also a means of “increasing 
her maritime strength; and thereby aggrandizing, in the most ample manner, the power of 
the British empire.”12 Tempering his view, however, was the unwelcome presence of 
Columbia and Washington. Meares complained that both ships received favorable 
treatment from the Spanish governor of Nootka Sound, Estevan Martínez, whereas the 
governor had impounded British vessels.13 Likewise, he noted that Columbia and 
Washington called at Canton in 1790, along with thirteen other vessels originating in the 
United States, a total second only to Great Britain. Meares undoubtedly considered their 
presence a threat to British control of the region.14 George Macartney, the British 
ambassador to the Qing Empire, thought otherwise. In 1794, he dismissed American 
trade with China as being “so much declined, and so likely in a few years to be almost 
annihilated, that it is the less necessary for me to dwell upon the subject.” Indeed, he 
considered Canton such a difficult market that even “the Americans, with all their 
                                                                
12 Meares, Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789, 281, 286-87, 290. 
13 Meares, “Appendix No. 1. Copy of the Memorial Presented to the House of Commons, May 
13, 1790:—Containing every Particular respecting the Capture of Vessels in Nootka Sound,” in 
ibid., 392-94. 
14 Meares, Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789, 281, 317-18. 
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contrivances and industry, are not likely… to pursue it with much advantage.”15 The 
ambassador, however, had little actual interaction with Americans in Canton. Instead, he 
would have done well to consult George Vancouver, a British navigator who witnessed 
American activity throughout the Pacific. During his expedition of 1791-95, Vancouver 
encountered Americans in every corner of the ocean, including the crews of Eleanora, 
Fair American, Hope, and Nancy, in addition to Columbia and Washington.16 Having 
interviewed their captains, he knew that “the vessels employed in commercial pursuits… 
found their adventures to answer their expectation: many were contented with the cargo 
of furs they had collected.”17 Moreover, he noted the emergence of parallel fields of 
commerce. Americans spearheaded the new trade in pearls, sandalwood, firearms, and 
even served as mercenaries.18 Vancouver cannot have helped but recognize American 
success in the Pacific, whatever its implications for Great Britain.  
 
 
                                                                
15 George Macartney, “Government, Justice and Property, Science, Trade, etc.,” in Our First 
Ambassador to China: An Account of the Life of George, Early of Macartney, with Extracts from 
his Letters, and the Narrative of his Experiences in China, as Told by Himself, 1737-1806, ed. 
Helen H. Robbins (London: John Murray, 1908), 410-11. 
16 George Vancouver, A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean and Round the World, 3 
vols. (London: G.G. and J. Robinson and J. Edwards, 1798), 1:173, 157, 172, 213.; Ibid., 2:95, 
135-45.; Ibid., 3:9, 79. 
17 Ibid., 1:408. 
18 Ibid., 1:172, 186-87, 348-49.; 2:493.; 3:74-75. 
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Figure 25. William Beechey, Portrait of John Meares, 
as reproduced in John Meares, Voyages Made in the 
Years 1788 and 1789, from China to the North-West 
Coast of America (London: Logographic Press, 1790). 
 
 
French and Spanish observers, too, reflected on the growing presence of 
Americans in the wake of Columbia. Captain Étienne Marchand, who circumnavigated 
the globe from 1790-92, noted with approval that “the Americans of the United States” 
had “seized with ardour” the commerce of the Pacific World. Marchand attributed 
American success “to their industry” and a laudable “want of enriching themselves in 
order to pay the public debt.” By comparison to Europeans, he concluded that “they are 
become formidable competitors” and added that “their activity is by no means inferior to 
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that of the English.” 19 Conversely, Spanish officers feared the presence of Americans in 
the Pacific. Manuel Antonio Flores, the Spanish Viceroy in New Spain, worried that “the 
English colonies of America, republican and independent,” might attempt to develop a 
“safe port on the South Sea… [which] might be expected of an active nation that bases all 
its hopes and resources on navigation and commerce.” He concluded that the United 
States “would obtain the richest trade of Great China and India,” perhaps at the expense 
of Spain, “if it were to succeed in establishing a colony on the West Coast of America.” 20 
José Mariano Moziño, a naturalist, regretted that Captain Kendrick had exchanged 
firearms for otters out of “self-interest or rivalry with the English.” Moziño was alarmed 
that Kendrick “gave Maquinna a swivel gun” and “furnished Wickinanish with more than 
two hundred guns, two barrels of powder, and a considerable portion of shot.” In his 
opinion, the burgeoning American arms trade could become “harmful to all humanity,” 
and, at the very least, undermined Spanish authority in the Pacific.21 
                                                                
19 The Solide expedition of 1790-92, under the command of Étienne Marchard, completed the 
second French circumnavigation of the globe. Unlike the prior expedition under Louis Antoine de 
Bougainville (1766-69), a scientific voyage, the Solide expedition intended to test French 
commercial potential in the maritime fur trade. An intermediate voyage under the command of 
Jean-François Galaup, comte de Lapérouse, failed to circumnavigate the globe after wrecking the 
in the Solomon Islands. See Étienne Marchand, Voyage Round the World, Performed during the 
Years 1790, 1791, and 1792 by Étienne Marchand, Preceded by an Historical Introduction an 
Illustrated by Charts, etc., Vol. II, trans. C.P. Claret de Fleurieu, (London: T.N. Longman and O. 
Rees, Paternoster-Row; and T. Cadell, Jun. and W. Davies, in the Strand, 1801), 115-16. 
20 “Flores to Valdés, December 23, 1788,” quoted in Warren L. Cook, Flood Tide of Empire: 
Spain and the Pacific Northwest, 1543-1819 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 130. 
21 José Mariano Moziño, Noticias de Nutka: An Account of Nootka Sound in 1792, ed. and trans. 
Iris Higbie Wilson, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1970), 71. 
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Following the Columbia expeditions, Americans established a permanent 
presence along the Northwest Coast. Americans cruised the coast in such numbers that, 
beginning in 1800, fur-trading vessels from the United States usually outnumbered ships 
hailing from all other nations, combined. The trend was especially pronounced from 
1800-03, and again in 1810-13, when Russian adventurers provided the only serious 
competition to traders from the United States.22 The involvement of American sealing, 
smuggling, and supply ships also contributed to a preponderance of vessels originating in 
the United States.23 John Jacob Astor, an American entrepreneur, even attempted to 
establish a permanent base of operations on the Northwest Coast. In 1811, his Pacific Fur 
Company founded a trading post, known as Fort Astoria, on the Columbia River. 
Misadventure plagued Astoria from the beginning. Within months, Clayoquot Indians 
attacked and captured the settlement’s main trading vessel, Tonquin. One surviving 
                                                                
22 Frederic Howay and James R. Gibson previously produced lists of trading vessels on the 
Northwest Coast, but Dick Wilson has observed that both authors’ work contained “a few 
omissions and errors.” By comparison, he synthesized a number of sources in order to create the 
most comprehensive list currently known. Wilson considers the “Northwest Coast” to extend 
from California to Alaska. Using this definition, Russian traders represented the closest 
competition to commercial vessels from the United States. Russian commercial vessels performed 
219 ship-seasons in the North Pacific, versus 291 American ship-seasons. When including 
Russian warships that participated in or supported the fur trade, the Russian total expands to 258 
ship-seasons. After 1800, Russian vessels outnumbered their American counterparts in the North 
Pacific in 1804, 1808-10, 1815, and 1821. The Russian total includes those vessels purchased 
from Americans and Britons. Likewise, the American total includes vessels sold to Russian 
traders. In a small percentage of cases, then, individual vessels contribute to both the American 
and Russian totals for a single season. In general, I consider Alaska to be separate from the 
Northwest Coast. See Dick A. Wilson, “King George’s Men: British Ships and Sailors in the 
Pacific Northwest-China Trade, 1785-1821” (PhD Dissertation, University of Idaho, 2004), 377-
97. 
23 James R. Gibson, Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods (Tacoma: University of 
Washington Press, 1999), 252-53, 258-65. 
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crewmember retaliated by lighting the ship’s magazine—the explosion destroyed the 
vessel and killed hundreds of Indians. In 1813, following the outbreak of war between the 
United States and Great Britain, British fur traders captured the fort itself. In the 
aftermath, beleaguered managers sold Astoria to the British Northwest Company.24 
Despite such disasters, however, American fur traders continued to cruise the Northwest 
Coast through the 1820s.  
The Columbians also charted the course for an American presence in Polynesia. 
The Hawaiian archipelago, where John Kendrick and others traded, politicked, and 
warred during the 1790s, became a site of strategic importance to American commerce. 
Situated in the Central Pacific, the islands lay astride multiple transpacific trade routes—
the old silver route extending from Mexico to the Philippines, the established fur route 
between the Northwest Coast and China, and a new whaling route between Cape Horn 
and the North Pacific.25 Moreover, the islands offered a range of agricultural products of 
vital interest to mariners, including fish, chicken, and pork (protein), pineapple (an 
antiscorbutic), as well as breadfruit, coconut, banana, sweet potato, sugar, and taro 
(carbohydrates, vitamins, and minerals).26 Local rulers, such as Kamehameha, used 
                                                                
24 Wickaninnish ordered the attack on Tonquin in response to disrespectful behavior on the part of 
Captain Jonathan Thorn. James P. Ronda, Astoria and Empire (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1993), 236-37, 243-76.; Valerie Sherer Mathes, “Wickaninnish, a Clayoquot Chief, as 
Recorded by Early Travelers,” The Pacific Northwest Quarterly 70, no. 3 (1979): 119. 
25 Harold Whitman Bradley, “The Hawaiian Islands and the Pacific Fur Trade, 1785-1813,” The 
Pacific Northwest Quarterly 30, no. 3 (1939): 275-299.; Nicholas Thomas, Islanders: The Pacific 
in the Age of Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 74-80. 
26 This list does not include exotic biota introduced by Europeans during the early years of 
contact, such as boar, cattle, and oranges. See D.E. Yen, “The Origins of Oceanic Agriculture,” 
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geography and agriculture to their advantage, becoming suppliers to Western vessels in 
exchange for weapons, manufactured goods, ships, and political assistance.27 The 
Marquesas, an archipelago explored by Joseph Ingraham, also witnessed interaction 
between Americans and indigenous societies. In 1813, Captain David Porter established 
“Madisonville,” the first American naval base in the Pacific, on the island of Nuku Hiva. 
Operating from Madisonville, Porter undertook commerce raiding missions against 
British ships in the Pacific. Meanwhile, he also supported the indigenous Te l’i tribe in a 
proxy war against the rival Tai pi people, allies of Great Britain.28  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
Archaeology & Physical Anthropology in Oceania 8, no. 1 (1973): 68-85.; Ross H. Cordy, “The 
Effects of European Contact on Hawaiian Agricultural Systems – 1778-1819,” Ethnohistory 19, 
no. 4 (1972): 395-97. 
27 Peter R. Mills, “Neo in Oceania: Foreign Vessels Owned by Hawaiian Chiefs before 1830,” 
The Journal of Pacific History 38, no. 1 (2003): 53-67.; Jenny Newell, “Exotic Possessions: 
Polynesians and their Eighteenth-Century Collecting,” Journal of Museum Ethnography 17, 
Pacific Ethnography, Politics and Museums (2005): 75-88.; Thomas Bargatzky, “Beachcombers 
and Castaways and Innovators,” The Journal of Pacific History 15, no. 2 (1980): 93-102. 
28 Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New 
York: Basic Books, 2003), 31-37.; Thomas, Islanders, 60-72. Gibson, Yankees in Paradise, 314-
17. 
408 
 
 
 
Figure 26. David Porter, “Madisonville,” ink on paper, as reproduced in David Porter, 
Journal of a Cruise Made to the Pacific Ocean (1815), ed. R.D. Madison (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1986), 400. 
 
 
Meanwhile, Columbia accelerated the expansion of American business in Canton. 
The Columbians were not the first Americans to do business in Canton, a distinction that 
belongs to Samuel Shaw and Thomas Randall of the Empress of China. Rather, their 
contributions to the Pacific fur trade complemented and intensified the nascent American 
China Trade.29 Bostonian vessels often followed Columbia’s transpacific route from the 
Northwest Coast to Canton. In China, they encountered Salem merchantmen, including 
Astrea, Light Horse, and Three Sisters, arriving via the Indian Ocean. Together, Boston 
and Salem launched expeditions that made Massachusetts a dominant force in the 
American China Trade, and enabled the United States to embrace the globe. By 1814, 
                                                                
29 James R. Fichter, So Great a Proffit: How the East Indies Trade Transformed Anglo-American 
Capitalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 203-16. 
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more than six hundred American vessels did business in Canton.30 During the first decade 
of the nineteenth century, Americans managed eight trading firms in Canton, some of 
which, such as Perkins & Co. and the Blight Company, saw uninterrupted operation well 
into the 1830s.31 Meanwhile, American merchant-captains such as Stephen Girard 
experimented with the smuggling of opium into China. Similarly, American scavenger 
Oliver Slater sold valuable products of the South Pacific, including sandalwood and 
bêche-de-mer, at Canton. Americans tourists, such as Harriet Low, also disembarked to 
explore the Portuguese city of Macao.32 
In global terms, the Columbians and their successors helped transform an ocean 
once deemed a “Spanish Lake” into a “Mar Columbiana,” or American Sea. Indeed, the 
decline of the Spanish Empire coincided with the development of the maritime fur trade 
and the Columbia expeditions. During the 1780s, Madrid responded to British and 
Russian interlopers in the Pacific by launching naval missions to the Northwest Coast and 
                                                                
30 Igler, The Great Ocean, 31-33. 
31 Many of these companies existed under one name for a few years before “rebranding” under 
the influence of new investors. The Blight Company is a prime example. In 1801, James Oliver 
established a firm on behalf of Peter Blight, a merchant of Philadelphia. In later decades, 
however, it passed to a number of relatives including George Blight, Charles Blight, and James 
H. Blight. See Jacques M. Downs, The Golden Ghetto: The American Commercial Community at 
Canton and the Shaping of American China Policy, 1784-1844 (Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh 
University Press, 1997), 145, 146-150. 
32 The Chinese prized sandalwood for its aromatic properties, and valued bêche-de-mer (sea 
slug)—often deemed “sea ginseng”—as a savory ingredient in soup. See Jonathan Goldstein, “A 
Clash of Civilizations in the Pearl River Delta: Stephen Girard’s Trade with China, 1787-1824,” 
in Americans and Macao: Trade, Smuggling, and Diplomacy on the South China Coast, ed. Paul 
A. Van Dyke (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012), 22-28.; Eric Jay Dolin, When 
America First Met China: An Exotic History of Tea, Drugs, and Money in the Age of Sail (New 
York: Liverlight, 2012), 112-155, 161-63, 178-82. 
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constructing a fort at Nootka Sound. From 1788-96, New Spain bolstered its defenses on 
the coast with warships, reaching a maximum contingent of eight vessels during the 
“Nootka Crisis” of 1790-92. Following the Nootka Conventions, which resolved the 
dispute between London and Madrid, Spain’s presence diminished on the Northwest 
Coast. Spain dispatched its final expedition north of California in 1796. Meanwhile, 
British ships also diminished in number along the coast, yielding momentum in the fur 
trade to Americans in the following year, 1797.33 
Continental events also affected the development of a “Mar Columbiana.” 
Following the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, New Spain moved to defend its borders 
against the pressures of an expanding republic, the United States. Meriwether Lewis and 
William Clark demonstrated that Americans could traverse the continent, unhindered, to 
the Pacific, despite two attempts by Mexico City to intercept the Corps of Discovery.34 
Spanish California, connected to the metropolis only by tenuous roads, trails, and sea 
lanes, drifted into the autonomous status of a quasi-state on the fringe of empire. 
                                                                
33 Again, Wilson’s list informs my analysis. Spanish commercial vessels and warships completed 
a grand total of 45 ship-seasons of trading on the Northwest Coast from 1785-1821. Their 
participation declined after the decade 1786-96, with only six ship-seasons in later years. British 
commercial vessels completed 102 ship-seasons on the Northwest Coast during the period, and 
maintained a presence there in all but six years. After 1796, however, British trading vessels 
never exceeded their American competitors in number. I exclude George Vancouver’s seven 
exploratory ship-seasons on the coast. Spanish and British numbers pale in comparison to the 
American presence in the wake of Columbia. During the period, American commercial vessels 
performed a whopping 291 ship-seasons of trade on the Northwest Coast. In all cases, I include 
only vessels known or suspected to have traded on the coast. See Wilson, “King George’s Men,” 
377-97. 
34 Abraham P. Nasatir, “The Shifting Borderlands,” Pacific Historical Review 34, no. 1 (1965): 
13-16. 
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Bostonian smugglers did business with the Indians and Franciscans of Alta California, 
trading manufactured goods, textiles, and sacramental wine in exchange for otter skins at 
San Diego, Monterey, and San Francisco.35 Meanwhile, Spain also found the transpacific 
silver trade unsuitable to new economic realities. In 1815, following the industrial 
revolution in Europe, competition from the Royal Philippine Company, and separatist 
revolts at Acapulco, King Ferdinand VII terminated the Manila Galleons. In doing so, he 
ceded transpacific trade to the United States, just as American commerce in the Pacific 
rebounded from the War of 1812.36 During this period, Madrid struggled to overcome the 
parallel problems of freebooters originating in the United States and rebellions across 
New Spain. In 1819, Spain attempted to forestall American expansion in the Southwest 
through the instrument of the Adams-Onís Treaty, an agreement that recognized 
American claims to the “Columbia Territory,” also known as the Oregon Country. 
Finally, in 1821, armed separatists captured Mexico City and declared independence, 
creating an impoverished and weak “Empire of Mexico.”37 Spanish power withered in 
the Pacific Ocean, permitting the region to fall under the influence of the United States. 
                                                                
35 Magdalen Coughlin, “Boston Smugglers on the Coast (1797-1821): An Insight into the 
American Acquisition of California,” California Historical Society Quarterly 46, no. 2 (1967): 
99-120.; William J. Barger, “Furs, Hides, and a Little Larceny: Smuggling and Its Role in Early 
California’s Economy,” Southern California Quarterly 85, no. 4 (2003): 381-412.; Julia G. 
Costello, “Purchasing Patterns of the California Missions in ca. 1805,” Historica Archaeology 26, 
no. 1, The Archaeology of the Spanish Colonial and Mexican Republican Periods (1992): 62-65. 
36 Benito Legarda, Jr., “Two and a Half Centuries of the Galleon Trade,” Philippine Studies 3, no. 
4 (1955): 363-64. 
37 Frank Lawrence Owsley, Jr. and Gene A. Smith, Filibusters and Expansionists: Jeffersonian 
Manifest Destiny, 1800-1821 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1997), 32-60, 61-81. Ed 
Bradley, “Fighting for Texas: Filibuster James Long, the Adams-Onís Treaty, and the Monroe 
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Throughout the Pacific, American whaleships and sealers began to exploit the 
ocean hemisphere on an industrial scale. Whales provided the industrializing world with 
a number of useful materials, including whale oil, spermaceti, whale bone, and 
ambergris. In 1791, seven whaleships hailing from Nantucket and New Bedford, 
Massachusetts, followed Columbia into the Pacific.38 Global considerations shaped the 
decision to trawl a distant ocean. First, the Pacific offered ample resources for the 
harvest. Modern estimates suggest that over 1.8 million whales swam the Pacific, versus 
544,000 in the Indian Ocean and 346,000 in the Atlantic. Second, because of government 
interference and the territorial jurisdiction of the chartered monopolies, especially the 
South Sea Company, the British whaling industry entered a steep decline in the 1790s. 
Meanwhile, American whalers expanded their operations to meet a growing demand for 
whale products in Great Britain and the United States.39 Thereafter, American whaleships 
did their gruesome business in waters familiar to the Columbians. They harpooned gray 
whales and humpbacks along the Northwest Coast, pursued sperm whales in the 
                                                                
Administration,” The Southwestern Historical Quarterly 102, no. 3 (1999): 322-342.; David E. 
Narrett, “Liberation and Conquest: John Hamilton Robinson and U.S. Adventurism toward 
Mexico, 1806-1819,” Western Historical Quarterly 40, no. 1 (2009): 23-50.; Philip Coolidge 
Brooks, “The Pacific Coast’s First International Boundary Delineation, 1816-1819,” Pacific 
Historical Review, 3, no. 1 (1934): 62-79.; Michael C. Meyer and William L. Sherman, The 
Course of Mexican History, 5th Ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 285-97. 
38 Six whaleships hailed from Nantucket and one from New Bedford, towns which became 
nineteenth-century leaders in the whaling industry. See Walter S. Tower, A History of the 
American Whale Fishery (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1907), 93-97. 
39 Robert Lloyd Webb, On the Northwest: Commercial Whaling in the Pacific Northwest, 1790-
1967 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988), 5-15, 35-36.; Igler, The Great 
Ocean, 118. 
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Marquesas, and stalked fin whales in the fisheries off Japan. Between seasons, whaleships 
often refitted and replenished at ports in the Hawaiian Islands, particularly Honolulu and 
Lahaina.40 The whaling industry reached its peak in 1845, when 500 New England 
whaleships, 68 percent of whalers originating in the United States, and 56 percent of the 
world’s total, cruised the Pacific Ocean. Whaling became so important to the economy of 
Nantucket that it negotiated a separate peace with Great Britain in 1814, in order to 
preserve its whaleships from capture or destruction on the high seas.41  
Columbia’s exploitation of sea otters also set a precedent for the unhindered 
harvest of other sea mammals. In subsequent decades, Americans wrought enormous 
destruction upon whale populations in the Pacific. For example, the population of gray 
whales is estimated to have fallen from around 96,000 individuals in the late eighteenth 
century, to 50,000 in 1851, 10,000 in 1874, and almost none in 1900.42 Meanwhile, 
American sealing vessels also followed Columbia into the Pacific. Sealers hunted the fur 
seal, an animal whose pelt characteristics resembled that of the sea otter. Consequently, 
                                                                
40 Nicholas J. Lee, “A Brief History of Pacific Coast Whaling” (Jenner, CA: Fort Ross 
Conservancy Library, n.d.), 5-9.; Rhys Richards, “Pacific Whaling 1820 to 1840: Port Visits, 
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Quarterly 54, no. 2 (1981): 182-84, 185-87, 196-98. 
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sealing expeditions became more frequent after the decline in otter populations.43 In 
hunting fur seals, Americans expanded upon a preexisting industry on the part of the 
Russian-American Company, an operation that exported more than 2,300,000 skins from 
1743-1823. American sealing soon extended to other places known to the Columbians, 
such as the Juan Fernández Islands and Northern California. Between the 1790s and 
1820s, when seal populations collapsed throughout the Pacific, Americans and Europeans 
clubbed perhaps ten million animals.44 Columbia inaugurated an era of intense 
commercialization in the Pacific Ocean, and marine species could not withstand the 
impact of industrialized hunting—like sea otters in prior decades, whales and fur seals 
soon faced possible extinction. 
Finally, Columbia’s landmark expeditions helped establish a “New Constellation” 
of American political, diplomatic, and military interests across the Pacific World. The 
United States government followed in the footsteps of Captain John Kendrick in the 
Sandwich Islands, later known as the Kingdom of Hawaii. In 1820, the State Department 
appointed its first consul to the kingdom, John Coffin Jones, Jr., a Massachusetts 
merchant who traded manufactured goods in the islands. Jones received a mandate to 
protect American commerce and missionaries, and to counterbalance the influence of 
                                                                
43 Kurk Dorsey, “Putting a Ceiling on Sealing: Conservation and Cooperation in the International 
Arena, 1909-1911,” Environmental History Review 15, no. 3 (1991): 28-30. 
44 Igler, The Great Ocean, 112-17. 
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British agents in the archipelago.45 In 1826, the United States cemented its position 
through “articles of arrangement” negotiated between Commander Thomas ap Catesby 
Jones, U.S. Navy, and Kamehameha III of Hawaii. The articles, which functioned as a 
treaty of “peace and friendship,” extended American recognition to the monarchy, 
promoted commerce, addressed maritime salvage and deserters, and secured protection 
for United States citizens in Hawaii. Moreover, the agreement made the kingdom a 
“neutral state” and undermined its status as a nominal protectorate of Great Britain.46 
Thereafter, the islands became an advance base for the United States Pacific Squadron 
and U.S. Exploring Expedition.47 
The United States government also pursued a position of dominance in the 
Oregon Country, a region familiar to the Columbians. In 1805-06, the Corps of Discovery 
completed its transcontinental crossing of North America, an accomplishment that 
strengthened Captain Robert Gray’s territorial claim to the Columbia River Valley. The 
construction of Astoria in 1813, combined with overland settlement via the Oregon Trail 
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46 Robert H. Stauffer, “The Hawai’i-United States Treaty of 1826,” The Hawaiian Journal of 
History 17 (1983): 43-53. 
47 Nathaniel Philbrick, Sea of Glory: America’s Voyage of Discovery, The U.S. Exploring 
Expedition (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 233-58. Jeremy M. Black, Fighting for America: 
The Struggle for Mastery in North America, 1519-1871 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2011), 223-24. 
416 
 
after 1832, substantiated the national claim by merit of “improvement” of the land.48 
Meanwhile, John Floyd, a Virginian representative to Congress, argued that American 
possession of Oregon would eliminate a point of contention with Great Britain, support 
the whaling industry, and encourage the China Trade. Promoters described Oregon as a 
“New Eden,” an agrarian paradise ripe for settlement, and convinced thousands of 
Americans to travel overland to the Willamette Valley.49 Following upon the heels of 
settlement, the United States government extended formal control over the region—the 
U.S. Exploring Expedition surveyed the coastline of Oregon, the U.S. Army supervised 
the deportation of native peoples to Indian Reservations, and the State Department 
secured American sovereignty in Oregon.50 Following the acquisition of Oregon, 
President James K. Polk looked toward the acquisition of additional Pacific territory in 
                                                                
48 Regardless of the short duration of the initial experiment at Astoria, it demonstrated that 
Americans could establish and provision permanent settlements on the Pacific slope. In this 
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California, at the expense of Mexico.51 Once again, government followed in Columbia’s 
wake to consolidate an American presence in places of strategic interest. 
The Far East represented the most remote theater of United States government 
activity in the decades following the Columbia expeditions. Beginning with Samuel 
Shaw, in 1786, the Confederation Congress—and later, the State Department—
commissioned consuls to represent American commercial and diplomatic interests at 
Canton. United States Consuls worked to maintain good relations with the Governor-
General, settle financial disputes between American and Chinese merchants, and ensure 
smooth coexistence with Europeans.52 During the 1820s, consuls also assumed 
responsibility for the diplomatic support of Protestant missions in China, as well as the 
protection of American citizens who fell afoul of Chinese law—areas in which the 
consuls achieved mixed success, at best.53 Meanwhile, American participation in opium 
                                                                
51 The American conquest of Mexican California, from 1846-48, and the subsequent gold rush in 
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smuggling, which increased as fur and sandalwood profits declined, became a significant 
bone of contention between the United States and Qing Empire. By 1830, American 
firms smuggled hundreds of thousands of pounds of opium each year, and annual profits 
exceeded $1,000,000.54  
 
 
 
Figure 27. Attributed to Lamqua, View of Foreign Factories, Canton, oil on canvas, 57.2 x 
81.2 cm., 1825-1835, Peabody Essex Museum, Salem, MA. 
 
 
 The federal government also worked to secure new commercial advantages in the 
Far East, particularly in the aftermath of the Opium War. In 1839, when a commercial 
conflict over contraband opium erupted into hostilities between Great Britain and the 
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Qing Empire, the United States government remained neutral. Americans did, however, 
see potential advantages when London imposed its commercial will upon Beijing. The 
Treaty of Nanjing, signed in 1842, stipulated a number of concessions such as 
extraterritorial status and residence rights for British subjects in five “treaty ports” in 
China.55 Thereafter, the federal government rushed to acquire similar concessions for 
Americans. In 1844, Caleb Cushing, the U.S. Ambassador to China, negotiated the Treaty 
of Wangxia, an agreement that permitted American citizens the same commercial and 
residence rights gained by Britons at Nanjing.56 Later, in 1853-54, Commodore Matthew 
C. Perry extracted a similar agreement—using threat of force—from the isolationist 
government of Japan. Fearing the bombardment of their capital, Edo, Japanese 
negotiators signed the Convention of Kanagawa. The document granted American 
                                                                
55 Because of its coercive and one-sided nature, the Treaty of Nanjing is regarded as the first of 
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commercial, residency, and naval access to two treaty ports at Shimoda and Hakodate.57 
Two generations after the Columbia expeditions, then, American businessmen and 
diplomats resided in the “International Settlement” of Shanghai, while the U.S. Pacific 
Squadron patrolled from stations in Japan. In short, the Stars and Stripes followed 
American commerce into the Pacific. 
When Columbia first sailed into the Pacific, in 1788, her principal investors, 
captains, and crewmembers intended to test a promising new business model. They hoped 
to demonstrate a profitable new avenue for the United States in the China Trade. 
Columbia was, in the words of John Hoskins, “a novel undertaking” on the part of a 
“country but so lately emerg’d from the ravages of a long, inhuman, and bloody war.”58 
From 1787-93, Columbia embarked upon two expeditions fraught with logistical 
challenges, commercial uncertainty, and danger. Nonetheless, the Columbians recognized 
that “the trade to China from the N.W. being lucrative and in its infancy, it was not to be 
long neglected.”59 In circumnavigating the globe, they intended to “extend their trade and 
commerce under the influence of peace, to foreign climes, and regions to them before 
                                                                
57 George Feifer, Breaking Open Japan: Commodore Perry, Lord Abe, and American Imperialism 
in 1853 (New York: Smithsonian Books, 2006), 27-49, 138, 233-58.; Marius B. Jansen, The 
Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 
274-79. 
58 John Hoskins, “Narrative of the Second Voyage of the ‘Columbia’,” in Voyages of the 
Columbia, 161-62. 
59 Joseph Ingraham, Voyage of the Brigantine “Hope” on a Voyage to the Northwest Coast of 
North America, 1790-1792, ed. Mark D. Kaplanoff (Barre, MA: Imprint Society, 1971), 1. 
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unknown.”60 Columbia achieved success in all respects—but none could have foreseen 
that she would lay the foundations of an American empire in the Pacific. 
 
  
                                                                
60 Hoskins, “Narrative of the Second Voyage of the ‘Columbia’,” 161-62. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
ESTIMATE OF PORT FEES FOR SHIP COLUMBIA REDIVIVA 
 
 
The commercial success or failure of ships trading in Canton depended on a 
combination of many factors, including goods, prices, consignment, and timely 
transactions. In addition to these variables, one important consideration was the 
assortment of port fees the Superintendent of Maritime Customs (Yuehai guanbu, 粤海關
部), assessed against all foreign vessels arriving at Whampoa Anchorage.  None of the 
chroniclers of the Columbia expeditions recorded the port fees paid at Canton. They are 
probably included among $8,558 for the ship’s “Bill of disbursements and Factory 
expenses,” but further differentiation is needed in order to reconstruct the full financial 
profile of the voyage.1 This was not unusual for “private” ships trading outside the 
institutional structures of the chartered European companies. Indeed, these enterprises did 
not depend upon or report to a corporate bureaucracy, captains felt less inclined to keep 
detailed personnel, ship, trade, or management records. Meanwhile, those captains who 
preserved documents often chose to “throw them in a box without any organization.”2 
Columbia’s financial records, which are lost, probably experienced a similar fate during 
                                                          
1 “The Columbia’s Accounts with Messrs. Shaw and Randall,” in Voyages of the Columbia to the 
Northwest Coast, 1787-1790 & 1790-1793, ed. Frederic W. Howay (Portland: Oregon Historical 
Society Press in cooperation with the Massachusetts Historical Society, 1990), 141. 
2 Paul A. Van Dyke, “Bookkeeping as a Window into Efficiencies of Early Modern Trade: 
Europeans, Americans, and Others in China Compared, 1700-1842” in Narratives of Free Trade: 
The Commercial Cultures of Early US-China Relations, ed. Kendall Johnson (Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong University Press, 2012), 24. 
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or immediately after the voyages. Nonetheless, the historian can estimate the port fees 
assessed against Columbia. Doing so depends upon a calculation of the length and stern 
dimensions of her cargo hold, according to Cantonese methods. Because Columbia’s full 
specifications do not survive, however, some sleuthing is needed to estimate her cargo 
space. Frederic Howay quotes her basic dimensions as 83’6”(1,002 inches) long and 24’2 
(290 inches) stern, starting figures that can be considered reliable.3  
The Hoppo’s first calculation concerned the length of Columbia’s cargo hold. Van 
Dyke observes, however, that the method for calculating the cargo space was related to 
the actual cargo dimensions, but rather with a “length measurement taken between the 
foremast and the mizzenmast (or rear-most mast).”4 The calculation, therefore, requires 
an estimate of the unknown distance between the Columbia’s masts. W.J. Thompson 
states in Wooden Shipbuilding that “the rule in the United States for masting ships is 
doubtless the most variable on the globe.” Nonetheless, he contends that the strongest 
results “have been gained from several of the best proportioned, double-decked freighting 
ships,” and my estimate applies their proportions to Columbia. Thompson contends that a 
ship’s length should be divided into 760 equal parts, with the distance between foremast 
                                                          
3 Frederic W. Howay, Voyages of the Columbia, vi. 
4 Paul A. Van Dyke, The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700-1845 
(Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 2005), 19-20, 26. 
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and mizzenmast totaling 475/760 parts, or 62.5 percent of the overall length.5 Using these 
proportions for Columbia, the distance between masts is 626.25 inches, or just over 52 
feet.  
The second calculation, which concerns the width of Columbia’s hold, is far 
simpler to reconstruct. According to Van Dyke, “the width measurement was taken aft of 
the mainmast (uppermost full-deck) between the port and starboard taffrails,” or the 
widest portion of the ship.6 Here, the Hoppo’s measurement would reflect the simple 
dimension of 24’2 stern, as stated above. According to the Cantonese method, then, the 
Columbia’s cargo hold was approximately 626.25 x 290 inches in area. 
In order to proceed, we must convert British imperial inches into a Chinese unit of 
measure. Cantonese officials measured short lengths in units known as covids, sometimes 
transliterated in English as “cubits.” Samuel Wells Williams, author of A Chinese 
Commercial Guide, states that the covid as “used by tradesmen at Canton varies from 
14.625 to 14.81 inches.” For these purposes, then, I assume a median value of 14.7175 
inches per Cantonese covid.7 The conversion yields basic dimensions of 43.5514 x 
19.7044 covids, or 838.5409 square covids, for Columbia’s cargo hold. The method of 
                                                          
5 W.J. Thompson, Wooden Shipbuilding: A Comprehensive Manuel for Wooden Shipbuilders to 
Which is Added a Masting and Rigging Guide (Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Company, 1918), 184-
86. 
6 Van Dyke, The Canton Trade, 26. 
7 Samuel Wells Williams, A Chinese Commercial Guide, Consisting of a Collection of Details 
and Regulations Respecting Foreign Trade with China, Sailing Directions, Tables, &c., Fourth 
Edition (Canton: Office of the Chinese Repository, 1856), 300-301. 
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calculation reduced this value to a manageable size by applying a divisor of 10, leading 
the Columbia to have a taxable cargo space of 83.8541. 
Finally, each ship received an initial measurage fee according its classification as 
first, second, or third-rate. William Milburn gives the qualifications for each class in 
Oriental Commerce. Class qualification, unlike the measurement of cargo space, took a 
ship’s overall “bow-to-stern” length into account. Ships measuring between “65 to 71 
cubits long, and 20 to 23 broad,” received the classification of “third rate.” For ease of 
calculation, customs officials also classified smaller vessels, such as Columbia, in this 
category.8 Officials assessed third-rate ships at a rate of five silver taels (liang, 兩) per 
unit of cargo space. The final estimate of Columbia’s initial measurement fee is, 
therefore, equal to 83.8541 x 5 兩, or 419.2255 兩 ($582.26). Put another way, where 
Columbia is recorded at 212.0842 tons, the final estimate equates to fees of 11.0905 兩 
($15.40) per ton. 
 Using the initial fee, the Hoppo applied a complex series of adjustments in order 
to calculate a final fee. Their first consideration was the “Emperor’s Discount,” a feature 
intended to represent the goodwill of the government in Beijing, and to provide a 
practical incentive to foreign trade. The discount automatically reduced the initial 
measurage fee by a stunning 20 percent. Meanwhile, the Emperor’s Discount more than 
                                                          
8 William Milburn, Oriental Commerce; or the East India Trader’s Complete Guide; Containing 
a Geographical and Nautical Description of the Maritime Parts of India, China, Japan, and 
Neighbouring Countries, Including the Eastern Islands, and the Trading Stations on the Passage 
from Europe (London: Printed for Kingsbury, Parbury, and Allen, Leadenhall Street, 1825), 468. 
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compensated for commissions paid to customs officials, as well as adjustments related to 
exchange rates. Commissions served as contributions to the income of imperial customs 
officials, especially the Superintendent, whose official salaries reflected the fiscal 
conservatism of the Qing Dynasty. The Hoppo received a commission of 10 percent of 
the initial measurement fee, meaning that he collected handsomely from each incoming 
vessel. Meanwhile, his servants shared a gratuity of 2 percent. Next, the officials imposed 
an additional surcharge intended to adjust for differences in silver content between the 
Cantonese sycee (yuanbao, 元寶), or silver ingot, and Spanish Dollars. Imperial officials 
reckoned the difference in silver content at 7 percent. Columbia’s final measurage fee, 
then, including all adjustments is estimated to have totaled 402.12 兩 (Spanish $558.50) 
In completing the process, customs officials also assessed a fixed fee of 1,950 兩 
($2,708.33) known as the “Emperor’s Present.” The present represented a formal act of 
gratitude on the part of merchant-captains for their privilege of trading in China. In fact, 
it served as a tariff for the exclusive support of the imperial household in Beijing. One 
implication of the fixed fee was that small vessels spent a larger proportion of their 
operating funds on the Emperor’s Present. The inclusion of the present brings Columbia’s 
estimated port fees to a grand total of 2,352.12 兩 ($3,266.83). 
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Table 7. Estimated Port Fees Assessed on Ship Columbia, 1789. 
 
COMPONENT PERCENTAGE  SUM (liang, 兩) 
SUM 
($) 
    
INITIAL MEASURAGE FEE  419.23 582.26 
EMPEROR’S DISCOUNT (-20%) (-83.85) (-116.45) 
Subtotal A  335.38 465.81 
    
HOPPO’S COMMISSION  33.54 46.58 
Subtotal B  368.92 512.39 
    
SYCEE DIFFERENCE IN ALLOY 7% 25.82 35.87 
HOPPO’S SERVANTS’ 
COMMISSION 
2% 7.38 10.25 
    
FINAL MEASURAGE FEE  402.12 558.50 
EMPEROR’S PRESENT  1950.00 2708.33 
    
TOTAL PORT FEES  2352.12 3266.83 
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APPENDIX B 
 
ESTIMATED SPECIFICATIONS AND HYPOTHETICAL PORT FEES  
FOR SLOOP LADY WASHINGTON 
 
 
The historian faces a dearth of reliable information about Lady Washington, as her 
exact provenance, specifications, and deed are lost. Neither her owners, captains, nor 
crew discussed the remarkable little vessel in detail. We can, however, make some 
educated guesses about her dimensions based upon period renderings and comparable 
ships. 
In 1989, Gray’s Harbor Historic Seaport Authority, a historic preservation 
nonprofit in Aberdeen, Washington, constructed an operational replica of Lady 
Washington. The vessel makes regular tour cruises along the coast and is recognized as 
the official ship of Washington State.1 It would be tempting to consider the replica’s 
dimensions as a starting point for thinking about her historical namesake. She was 
designed by naval architect Ray Wallace, now deceased, whose prior work includes the 
“Sailing Ship Columbia” at Disneyland.2 David Cottrell, a seaport board member, was 
generous enough to communicate with me concerning the replica. According to Cottrell, 
Wallace relied heavily upon Howard Chapelle’s book, The Search for Speed Under Sail, 
1700-1855, considered an important reference work about eighteenth-century 
                                                          
1 Gray’s Harbor Historic Seaport Authority, http://historicalseaport.org (Accessed 6 April 2016) 
2 Richard Francaviglia, “Walt Disney’s Frontierland as an Allegorical Map of the American 
West” Western Historical Quarterly 30, no. 2 (1999): 173, 178. 
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shipbuilding. Moreover, his design for Lady Washington preserves a number of features 
common to HMS Sultana, a well-documented schooner of the period.3 The replica 
measures 67’ (804 inches) in length, 22’ (264 inches) in beam, and is rated at 99 tons.4 
Lady Washington is not, however, a sloop. Wallace’s two-masted replica reflects John 
Kendrick’s decision to “rig our sloop into a brig” on the Northwest Coast.5 This 
consideration invalidates the replica as a facsimile. 
 Instead, the historian can turn to the sloop Union, a vessel that replicated 
Columbia’s expedition to the Pacific, Northwest Coast, and Canton in 1794-96. Launched 
at Providence, Rhode Island, Union represented another venture on the part of Crowell 
Hatch, a principal investor in Columbia.6 Moreover, she sailed under the command of 
Columbia’s former fifth mate, John Boit, whose prior exploits had proven him to be “a 
most competent navigator, perhaps even an outstanding one.” According to maritime 
scholar Hewitt R. Jackson, Union was “so close to the Lady Washington in dimension 
                                                          
3 David Cottrell, personal communication, 28 January, 2016.; Howard Irving Chapelle, The 
Search for Speed Under Sail, 1700-1855 (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1967).; Karl 
Heinz Marquardt, The Global Schooner: Origins, Development, Design & Construction, 1695-
1845 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 2003), 34-35. 
4 Gray’s Harbor Historic Seaport Authority, http://historicalseaport.org/about-us/our-vessels/lady-
washington (Accessed 6 April 2016) 
5 Robert Haswell, “A Voyage Round the World Onboard the Ship Columbia Rediviva and Sloop 
Washington” in Voyages of the Columbia to the Northwest Coast, 1787-1790 & 1790-1793, ed. 
Frederic W. Howay (Portland: Oregon Historical Society Press, 1990), 55. 
6 John Boit, Log of the Union: John Boit’s Remarkable Voyage to the Northwest Coast and 
Around the World, 1794-1796, ed. Edmund Hayes (Portland: Oregon Historical Society, 1981), 
xxviii-xxx. 
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and tonnage that a direct comparison is possible.” Moreover, their “spar and rigging 
details would be much the same” such that “the sail plan, as a whole, coincides with that 
of the Lady Washington.”7 Edmund Hayes, the principal historian of the Union, gives her 
specifications as 94 tons, with a length of 65’6 and beam of 19’9”.8 The figures serve, 
therefore, as a reasonable facsimile for Washington’s dimensions. 
Once again, dimensions are key to estimating the port fees, but, as a sloop, 
Washington demanded a different method of calculation. In 1789-90, she still possessed 
but one mast. Van Dyke observes that “taking the length measurement between two 
masts only worked, of course, with ships that had at least two masts.” Under the 
circumstances, “the length measurement was taken between the mast and the rudder 
head,” a location aft of the main hull and beneath the quarter deck.9 My calculation 
depends upon knowing the position of Washington’s mast. For an American sloop, W.J. 
Thompson gives the “station of the mast” at “three-fourths (3/4) of the breadth from the 
forward part of the deck.”10 Using this guideline, the distance between the Washington’s 
mast and rudder head would be approximately 49’1” (589 inches). In contrast, Robert 
Haswell’s drawing of the Columbia and Washington suggests different proportions. His 
                                                          
7 Hewitt R. Jackson, “Research on the Sloop Union” in ibid., 127-32. 
8 Ibid., xxviii-xxx. 
9 Paul A. Van Dyke, The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700-1845 
(Hong Kong: Hong King University Press, 2005), 29. 
10 W.J. Thompson, Wooden Shipbuilding: A Comprehensive Manuel for Wooden Shipbuilders to 
Which is Added a Masting and Rigging Guide (Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Company, 1918), 187. 
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sketch, presumably rendered from direct observation, appears to place Lady 
Washington’s mast at a position one-third the length of the deck. The design resembles 
the first ship commissioned to the Continental Navy, the sloop USS Providence.11 Some 
interpretive ambiguity results from the fact that Haswell was not a trained artist—his 
drawing of Lady Washington does not clearly distinguish between the vessel’s deck and 
head.12 Meanwhile, the Columbia and Washington Medal, which includes the other 
known representation of the sloop, corroborates his placement.13 While the variation in 
dimensions appears insignificant, it translates to an approximate mast-to rudder distance 
of 43’7” (523 inches), or a difference of 5’6”. 
 Lady Washington never traded in Canton. Nonetheless, we can hypothesize about 
the port fees that awaited a ship of her specifications. Using the Chinese method, Lady 
Washington’s cargo dimensions would have been roughly 557 x 237 inches. Translated 
into covids, her dimensions would be 37.85 x 16.10, or 609.45 square covids. Customs 
officials would reduce this number by a factor of ten, in order derive a taxable cargo 
space of 60.9446. Meanwhile, Lady Washington would have been classified as a “third 
rate” vessel subject to fees of five silver taels (liang, 兩) per unit of cargo space. Lady 
Washington’s initial measurage fee would, therefore, calculate to 60.9446 x 5, or 304.72
                                                          
11 Paul H. Silverstone, The Sailing Navy, 1775-1854 (New York: Routledge, 2006), 7. 
12 Haswell, “A Voyage Round the World,” 3. 
13 Joseph Barrell and Joseph Callender, Columbia and Washington medal, 1787, obverse and 
reverse in silver, ex Appleton. Massachusetts Historical Society. 
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兩 (Spanish $423.23).14 Discounts, commissions, adjustments, and the “Emperor’s 
Present” would increase the port fees to a hypothetical grand total of 2242.29 兩 (Spanish 
$3114.29). Put another way, where Washington is estimated at 94 tons, the grand total 
equates to fees of 23.8542 兩 (Spanish $22.94) per ton.15 Compared with Columbia, her 
fee-to-tonnage was exorbitant, being 115% higher.16 
 
Table 8. Hypothetical Port Fees for Sloop Lady Washington, 1790. 
 
COMPONENT PERCENTAGE  SUM (liang, 兩) 
SUM 
($) 
    
INITIAL MEASURAGE FEE  304.72 423.23 
EMPEROR’S DISCOUNT (-20%) (-60.94) (-84.65) 
Subtotal A  243.78 338.58 
    
HOPPO’S COMMISSION  24.38 33.86 
Subtotal B  268.16 372.44 
    
SYCEE DIFFERENCE IN ALLOY 7% 18.77 26.07 
HOPPO’S SERVANTS’ 
COMMISSION 
2% 5.36 7.45 
    
FINAL MEASURAGE FEE  292.29 405.96 
EMPEROR’S PRESENT  1950.00 2708.33 
    
TOTAL PORT FEES  2242.29 3114.29 
 
                                                          
14 Van Dyke, The Canton Trade, 26. 
15 The fee-to-tonnage ratio becomes even more prohibitive if we use the 99-ton figure cited for 
the replica of Lady Washington. Using this model, she would have paid fees of 22.8618 兩 
(Spanish $31.75) per ton. 
16 For a more comprehensive explanation of fee calculations, please see Appendix A: Estimate of 
Port Fees for the Ship Columbia Rediviva. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
MAPS 
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Map 1. First Columbia Expedition: Boston to the Pacific Ocean. 
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Map 2. First Columbia Expedition: Southern Ocean to Nootka Sound. 
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Map 3. First Columbia Expedition: Operations on the Northwest Coast. 
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Map 4. Second Columbia Expedition: Boston to the Pacific Ocean. 
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Map 5. Second Columbia Expedition: Southern Ocean to Clayoquot Sound. 
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Map 6. Second Columbia Expedition: Operations on the Northwest Coast. 
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Map 7. Columbia Expeditions: Transits of the Pacific Ocean. 
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Map 8. Columbia Expeditions: Operations in China. 
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Map 9. Columbia Expeditions: Canton to the Cape of Good Hope. 
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Map 10. Columbia Expeditions: Cape of Good Hope to Boston. 
 
